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abstract 
In twentieth-century literary theory, the concept of realism has been 
highly contentious. Much critical attention has been devoted to a radical 
critique of realism which has advocated a rejection, or at least a 
supercession, of realistic aesthetics, on philosophical and literary grounds. 
Realism has been characterized as at least outdated and perhaps 
fundamentally mistaken in its aesthetic and epistemological premises. 
In this thesis I shall try to challenge this radical critique without resorting 
to simple ideas of objectivity or positivism. By analysing various kinds of 
anti-realistic critical theory, I shall try to show that this radical critique has 
set up an idea of realism which is vulnerable to their criticisms but which 
does not adequately represent the nature of realistic representation, 
particularly in the novel. I shall then turn to the works of three 
prominent twentieth-century critical authors and offer an interpretation 
of their theories which leads towards an alternative view of realism. 
Presenting this alternative view of realism is the principal ambition of 
this thesis. Rather than seeing realism as the literary consequence of 
epistemological positivism, I shall try to show that realism can be 
understood as a historicizing and ironic interpretive process. By creating 
determinate representations of social and historical reality, realism 
simultaneously makes possible a theoretical critique of that reality. These 
seemingly contradictory tendencies are, I shall try to show, fundamentally 
indivisible. There are, of course, many uses to which the term "realism" 
has been put, and I do not propose to attempt finally to define the idea of 
realism. Rather, I shall suggest only that it is possible theoretically to 
consider the realistic novel as a tensile literary form which embodies the 
relationship between representation and critique. Thus, the seeming 
antithesis between realism and critical theory is, I suggest, misplaced. The 
alternative view for which I shall argue in this thesis encourages a 
reevaluation of both the realistic novel and critical theory. 
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prologue 
Since the dawn of literary and aesthetic theory scholars have been 
preoccupied with the representation of reality in literature. It has been, 
perhaps, the most enduring problem, if not the defining concern, of the 
study of literature since antiquity. The representational dimension of 
literature arises famously in classical philosophy. In Book 10 of The 
Republic, Socrates asks what would become a recurrent question with 
which literary critics and theorists would struggle: 
'Can you tell me in general terms what representation 
is ? I'm not sure that I know, myself, exactly how to 
describe its purpose.'1 
As is well-known, Socrates and his interlocutors go on to consider the 
relationship between poetry and truth in light of the theory of Forms. For 
Plato, mimetic representation defined poetry and, since representation was 
always twice-removed from Form, poetry remained only ever a falsity, a 
misrepresentation of the truth. The poets, therefore, were excluded from 
the republic. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, embraced poetry precisely because he 
understood it as mimetic, and, in contrast to Plato, incorporated mimesis 
as an integral part of his own theories of knowledge and truth. Neither of 
these philosophers, of course, is well served by this ridiculously brief 
account, and, in truth, what they countenance as mimetic poetry bears 
little relationship to contemporary literary genres and forms. Indeed, as we 
shall see, it has been a common critical error to associate Aristotelian 
mimesis with contemporary ideas of literary realism. Nonetheless, this 
early disagreement as to the value of a general realistic ambition illustrates 
the perennially contentious nature of the question. 
In these two literary theories we can see that, from the first, the question of 
the representation of reality, indeed of reality itself, is marked by critical 
and philosophical dispute; different philosophical bases, and different 
views as to the relationship between literature and reality, give rise to 
different literary theories which in turn imply contrasting aesthetic and 
philosophical conclusions. Plato and Aristotle, we can say, are the deepest 
1Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1974), p.422. 
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background of the problem of realistic representation which, as I shall 
argue, is of persistent critical and philosophical import. 
This potential for, and history of, critical contestation occasion the present 
study. While the claims of Plato and Aristotle may have given way, the 
subsequent histories of literature and of literary theory offer little more by 
way of resolution of the problem of realistic representation. Questions 
remain: how is realistic representation possible, what kind of 
philosophical claims does it make, how can it be theorized, how important 
is it ? "Can you tell me," we might ask, echoing Socrates, "what it is ?" 
What follows doesn't claim definitively to provide an answer to this 
loaded question. I propose, rather, a theoretical exploration of what I call 
the "fraught background" of realistic representation. The phrase "fraught 
with background" comes from Auerbach's great study Mimesis, and it 
serves as the title of this study because of its divergent connotations. In 
one sense, fraught calls forth a range of uncomfortable connotations: a 
sense of peril, of tension, of anxiety, and certainly the history of critical 
approaches to realistic representation is well-marked by these. Critical 
debates over realistic representation have extended to questions of 
language, of genre, of the nature of art, certainly, but also to philosophy, 
psychology and politics. As it is implicated in so many contentious areas of 
inquiry, we cannot but sympathize with Hayden White's assessment of 
realistic literary representation as "the most vexed problem in modern 
(Western) literary criticism" .2 
In another sense of "fraught", its background is pregnant or laden with 
conceptual cargo that offers itself to continued critical rummaging about. It 
is possible to see realistic representation as not merely a stubbornly 
persistent remnant of an ancient critical debate but as a rich vein of 
theoretical ore which is far from being exhausted. 
These two senses, however, cannot really be so neatly divided. The 
contentious history is what makes it so pregnant an issue. But in order to 
make the present study manageable, its ambition must be tempered by 
clear limits and boundaries. I do not, as I have said, propose a 
2Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p.2, n.4. 
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~  
comprehensive answer to the question of realistic representation, but 
merely aim to suggest one way in which it might be considered. My 
inquiry, therefore, must acknowledge two important constraints. 
The first is the kind of literary phenomena with which we are concerned. 
What Plato and Aristotle meant by mimesis is far removed from modern 
literary forms and we are not here concerned with classical mimesis but 
rather with the question of realism as it has emerged and developed in the 
relatively recent genre of the novel. Realism is not, of course, the only 
achievement or ambition of the novel, but it has been a concept with 
which the novel has been closely associated. This idea will be explained in 
more detail in due course but it is important to make clear that in 
discussing the representation of reality in literature I am concerned with a 
particular kind of representation which is not exclusive. 
The second constraint, or rather parameter, of this inquiry is that it is 
intended to be a study in modern literary theory. More particularly, I shall 
be concerned to examine the relationship between realism and various 
developments in modern literary theory, proceeding from a perceived 
antithesis between the two towards a reconciliation which is based on a 
particular synthetic theoretical approach. This too will be expanded in 
what follows. My purpose at this stage is only to introduce the two key 
ideas of this thesis; the realistic novel, and critical theory. As a recent 
controversy in Australia over a novel which was purported to be based 
upon testimonial evidence, which then turned out to have been entirely 
fictitious, will attest, the question of realistic representation is still 
contentious. I hope here cautiously to investigate the critical background 
to this question and to suggest that it remains an important issue in 
contemporary literary theory. 
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- Introduction -
Truth, reality, and the novel 
In The Seagull by Anton Chekhov an interesting dramatic conflict arises 
between a young, aspiring writer and an older, established writer. The 
older man, Boris Aleksyeevich, is to be seen in the play observing the 
other characters and making notes in his book; material, presumably, for 
his novel. But Kostia, the younger man, rails against this kind of artistic 
method, against, he says, 
these high priests of a sacred art depicting the way 
people eat, drink, make love, walk about and wear 
their clothes ... 1 
Kostia, admittedly, is talking about theatre not the novel, but his implicit 
criticism of Boris can be extended to that genre as well. What he rails 
against, and what Boris holds to, put very simpl¼ is realism. Now the term 
realism is extremely volatile; it has been put to so many uses in literary 
criticism alone that its usefulness has often, and with some justice, been 
questioned. 2 Nonetheless, I shall be using it in this thesis mainly because 
alternative terms or phrases are either bulky and awkward, like "the 
representation of reality in literature," or "realistic literary 
representation," or are also vague and potentially misleading, like 
"mimesis." As I shall be using the term, it is important to make clear what 
is conceived by it for the purposes of this thesis. The subtitle of this thesis 
relies upon two terms which require clarification before any sort of 
argument can proceed. 
( a) The novel and the philosophy of realism 
Realism, as I am using it here, does not refer to any particular period in 
literary history, nor to a prescribed literary method. Rather, I understand 
realism to indicate a literary ambition - to represent social and historical 
reality - which is achieved through certain literary techniques. The 
features of this idea of realism are, very broadly, those developed in the 
1 Anton Chekhov, Plays, trans. Elisaveta Fen (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), p.123. 
2 A good discussion of the usefulness or otherwise of the term" realism" is provided in 
Damian Grant, Realism (London: Methuen, 1970). In the following section of this study I 
shall discuss in greater detail Roman Jakobson's interrogation of the term. 
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nineteenth-century novel in Europe and Britain, although, as I have said, 
my use of realism is not confined to the period concept of realism. G.J. 
Becker has suggested that the "reality" towards which realism is intended 
is an amalgamation of a belief in the existence of external phenomena and 
the apprehension or perception/ observation of these phenomena.3 More 
specifically, it is a synthesis of the apprehension, in a very broad sense, of 
the external world and the concomitant sense that external world doesn't 
only exist by virtue of such apprehension. Other people, for example, have 
similar access to that world. What we are dealing with then is the 
representation of social life as it may be observed - the aesthetic approach 
adopted by Chekhov's Boris Aleksyeevich. 
The subject matter of realistic representation, then, is the external social 
world, and the mode of representation is a perceptual/ observational or 
apprehending consciousness which strives towards objectivity. A novel 
like Ulysses, therefore, is not altogether realistic because, while it may be 
concerned, as Joyce certainly was, with the detai~s of everyday Dublin, its 
manner of presentation, at least in parts of the novel, tends more towards 
the imaginative or symbolic than the observational. Realism must 
assimilate both an idea of external reality - individuals and their social and 
historical environment - and the observation of that reality. Given this 
definition of realism, we can see how some kinds of narrative situate 
themselves outside the realistic paradigm: Virginia Woolf, we might say, 
goes too far towards the observing consciousness, while Alain Robbe-
Grillet, for example, gets too close to the objects, for their respective 
techniques straightforwardly to be considered realistic. Realism, in a 
sense, is a kind of "middling"4 - middle-distance, middle-class, and, as 
Becker points out, realistic novels begin in the middle - to the events of a 
3See George J. Becker, "Introduction: Modem Realism as a Literary Movement" in George J. 
Becker ed., Documents of Modern Literary Realism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963). Other descriptive surveys of realism which have been particularly useful include 
Rene Wellek, "The Concept of Realism in Literary Scholarship" in his Concepts of 
Criticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Damian Grant, Realism ; J.P. Stem, 
On Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). More recently, Wallace Martin's 
primer of narrative theory provides a thorough overview of these ideas; see Wallace 
Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
4George Levine makes this point with regard to the historical development of realism in 
England; see George Levine, The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein 
to Lady Chatterley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.5. 
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realistic novel, unlike, say, lyric poetry, there is a background and a 
future. 5 
This kind of realism is, of course, most commonly associated with the 
novel, and, as I've said, with certain nineteenth-century novels. Ian Watt's 
well-known historical account of the novel posits an important 
correlation between the two, suggesting that the development of realism 
as an aesthetic ambition required stylistic changes from previous generic 
forms to which the novel was particularly well-suited.6 The strength of the 
association between the novel and realism leads Wallace Martin to suggest 
that they "are often treated as interchangeable terms" .7 But the kind of 
realism which is contemplated in this study is not necessarily limited to 
the "realists" of the nineteenth-century. As I have said, realism is 
understood as an ambition, or, as Raymond Williams puts it, "a general 
attitude" 8 which is not only defined by the specific techniques which are 
commonly associated with nineteenth-century novels. In the final part of 
this thesis I shall discuss in detail two quite different novels from different 
periods and cultures to test the strength of the theoretical method 
developed in the first two parts. 
With this idea of realism in mind, it is necessary to ask several 
preliminary questions. How is it, for example, that readers read a novel as 
realistic ? Novels are, after all, fictitious. What ideas of truth and of reality 
are implied in the suggestion that a novel is "realistic" or "true-to-life ?" 
Paradoxically, the true-to-life was generally not literally true at all; in a 
sense, the realistic novel revives Aristotle's distinction between poetry 
and history and his preference for the former because of its greater access 
to essential truths. Clearly, the idea of realism involves some very grave 
questions about truth, and about cognates of truth, such as knowledge, 
objectivity, and reference. These questions, very broadly, relate to what we 
might call the "philosophy of realism." 
5See Becker, Documents of Modern Literary Realism, p.29. 
6See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (1957; 
London: Hogarth Press, 19487), pp.31££. Watt doesn't suggest that these literary techniques, 
which he calls "formal realism," were invented in the novel or by novelists but that they 
were simply more important, more concentrated in the novel. 
7Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, p.57. 
8Raymond Williams, Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (1983; London: Fontana 
Press, 1988), p.260. 
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Philosophically, realism orginally meant something other than what is 
usually inferred.9 But the more familiar sense of realism with which we 
are concerned here proceeds from some seemingly very simple 
philosophical propositions. Fredric Jameson, for example, correlates the 
moment of realism with what he calls a "bourgeois cultural revolution" 
towards which the function of the realistic novel is "the systematic 
undermining and demystification, the secular 'decoding,' of those 
preexisting inherited traditional or sacred narrative paradigms which are 
its initial givens."10 Setting aside the political and historical implications 
of Jameson's claim, we can see that his view suggests that philosophically 
realism is a narrative response to a kind of relocation of truth. Although 
writing in a different current of ideas, Watt makes an analogous 
suggestion. In making a conceptual connection between what he calls 
philosophical realism and the novel, he describes this kind of relocation as 
a turn towards "the position that truth can be discovered by the individual 
through his senses", 11 an idea which also resembles Martin's suggestion 
that histories of realism presuppose a "philosophical commitment to a 
scientific view of man and society, one opposed to idealism and traditional 
religious views."12 
The range of philosophical and historical implications which can be 
drawn from this view of the "philosophy of literary realism" is far too 
extensive to be discussed here in any detail. A.D. Nuttall, for example, 
begins his discussion with reference to seventeenth-century philosophy of 
language in England - that of Hobbes, Spratt, and Locke13 - while Elizabeth 
Deeds Ermarth argues that realism "belongs to a cultural tradition that 
took its direction from Renaissance humanism."14 Nonetheless, it is 
important briefly to dwell on the idea of a philosophy of realism. 
9 Ian Watt writes: "By a paradox that will surprise only the neophyte, the term 'realism' 
in philosophy is most strictly applied to a view of reality diametrically opposed to that of 
common usage - to the view held by the scholastic Realists that it is universals, classes or 
abstractions, and not the particular concrete objects of sense-perception, which are the true 
'realities"'; Rise of the Novel, p.11. 
1°Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act 
(London: Routledge, 1983), p.152. 
11Watt, The Rise of the Novel, p.12. 
12Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, p.61. Martin is summarizing Becker's argument in 
Documents of Modern Literary Realism and Wellek's in Concepts of Criticism. 
13 A.D. Nuttall, A New Mimesis: Shakespeare and the Representation of Reality (London: 
Methuen, 1983), pp.1-2. 
14Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, Realism and Consensus in the English Novel (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), p.3. 
4 
Alongside the suggestion that realism presupposes a "scientific" view, we 
must understand that it is a specific kind of science, one that we might call 
a civic science. Juxtaposing philosophical realism and literary realism, 
Watt makes a telling comparison: 
The novel's mode of imitating reality may therefore 
be equally well summarised in terms of the 
procedures of another group of specialists, the jury in 
a court of law. Their expectations, and those of the 
novel reader coincide in many ways: both want to 
know ' all the particulars' of a given case - the time 
and place of the occurrence; both must be satisfied as 
to the identities of the parties concerned, and will 
refuse to accept evidence about anyone called Sir Toby 
Belch or Mr. Badman - still less about a Chloe who 
has no surname and is 'common as the air'; and they 
also expect the witness to tell the story 'in his own 
words'. The jury, in fact, takes the 'circumstantial 
view of life' ... 15 
This allusion to jurisprudence recalls George Eliot's oft-quoted suggestion, 
in Adam Bede, that the narrator speaks as if from the witness-box under 
oath, of course, to tell the truth,16 and also prefigures Tzvetan Todorov's 
critique of verisimilitude which begins by suggesting that legal 
judgements are made not on the truth but on the most plausible 
testimony .17 The analogy with jurisprudence, however, is itself highly 
fraught; as Ermarth points out, there is not only truth involved, but also 
the law .18 But without relying too heavily upon it, it is helpful as a 
metaphor for the kind of philosophy with which realism might be 
attributed. The truth of this philosophy, it might be said, is secular, 
observational, and consensual, and it is approached through rigorous 
objectivity and, as Watt points out, through a faith in the referential 
capacity of language. 
Such a view can account for the seeming paradox that realistic novels are, 
in large part, fictional. The "truth" of a realistic novel, its realistic efficacy, 
15Watt, The Rise of the Novel, p.31. 
16See Becker, Documents of Modern Literary Realism, p.113. 
17See Tzvetan Todorov, Poetique de la prose ( Paris: Seuil, 1971), p.92. Todorov's critique 
will be discussed in greater detail below. 
18See Errnarth, Realism and Consensus, p.33. 
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lies not in the fact that the events actually happened, or that the narrator, 
author, or reader were present at the supposed events, observing the 
characters, listening to them speak. No-one, I suspect, believes that the 
town of Middlemarch, for example, actually exists. Rather, the "truth" of 
realism resides in its adherence to this particular model of truth. The 
literary techniques achieve a simulation of objective apprehension of the 
external phenomenal world. Inclusion of historical and geographical 
particulars reinforces the plausibility of a realistic narrative, detailed 
observation of the social environment convinces readers that this or that 
novel is "true-to-life." 
(b) Critical theories and the crisis of truth 
The other important term in my subtitle - critical theory - also needs 
clarification because the many different ways in which the epithet 
"critical" has been employed and appropriated. Critical philosophy, for 
example, can refer to very different philosophical tendencies. Kant, of 
course, sets out his philosophy as a series of critiques which at once 
criticize and validate the subjects of his analysis such as reason or ethics. 
But this model is at odds with other claims which attach to "critical." 
Vincent Descombes, for example, cites Deleuze's contention that Kant's 
philosophy fails as a "critical" philosophy, which is achieved, rather, by 
Nietzsche. 19 The term "critical theory" has strong associations with the 
Frankfurt School. Indeed, Horkheimer and Adorno claimed that what 
they called Critical Theory represented an inevitable and necessary 
advance on philosophical critique,2° a development which might be said 
to have effected or at least attempted a permanent redefinition of the word 
"critical." This background is further complicated by the very broad idea of 
literary criticism which is often divided into so-called theoretical criticism 
and so-called practical criticism. 
Given these complications, it is important to make clear that my use of the 
term critical theory is not confined to one or another of these usages. 
Rather, "critical" here refers to a particularly interrogative attitude towards 
19See Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans.L. Scott Fox and J.M. Harding 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.155. 
20Habermas' essay on Horkheimer and Adorno discusses this in some detail; see Jurgen 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), pp.116££. 
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the study of literature. Discussing the problem of critical philosophy, 
Descombes writes that 
Philosophy which never takes this is the way it is for 
an answer, which wants to see this as the point of 
departure for an interrogation, merits being called 
critical (critique). 21 
Descombes' standard of critique or critical is particularly helpful. If we 
make the generic transition from critical philosophy to critical literary 
theory we can see that, understood in this fashion, a critical theory must 
interrogate both the text and its own approach towards the text. Neither is 
"given," nor simply the "way it is." Intellectual movements, such as 
Critical Theory, then, are instances of such an approach, but certainly do 
not, for the purposes of the present study, exhaust the idea of critical 
theory. 
If this interrogation of "the way it is" is regarded as the "critical" 
dimension of literary theory, we can see, then, that the seeming dedication 
to the way it is in the realistic novel appears to collide with a critical 
disposition. If the standards of reality and of truth discussed above are 
hallmarks of "the philosophy of realism" then the realistic novel runs 
into a problem. Such a "philosophy" would seem to fall short of the 
working definition of "critical" at which we have arrived and, 
consequently, a critical theory of literature would seem necessarily to reject 
the realistic novel. This problem can be examined more clearly if we 
return specifically to the questions of truth and reality which were 
discussed above. 
The quasi-scientific, objective, referential "truth" of realism is, of course, 
regarded as hopelessly outdated in contemporary critical theory, often 
relegated to a particular historical period, and sometimes cited as evidence 
of the fundamental errors - epistemological, political, artistic - of that 
period. 22 Theoretically aware literary critics cannot use expressions like 
21Vincent Descombes, Grammaire d'objets en taus genres (Paris: Minuit, 1983), p.130, trans. 
mme. 
22Fully to recapitulate the vast scholarship on this point would be an impossible task. 
Briefly, however, the reference is to the burgeoning scientism of the nineteenth-century 
which roughly coincided with Rankean "objective" historiography, rapid 
industrialization in Europe and, as it happens, the era of the realistic novel. Critics of the 
methods and claims of each of these ideas are numerous, and some critics, such as Barthes 
7 
"Dickens' representation of Victorian London," without a lingering 
anxiety about having resorted to a number of suspect presuppositions. To 
continue to use such ideas, it might be said, is to have kept one's critical 
head in the sand for at least the last three decades, and quite possibly for 
much longer. The referentiality of language has been questioned at least 
since Plato's Cratylus, objectivity is increasingly elusive, knowledge is a 
problem, and truth everywhere is in crisis. 
This crisis of truth and knowledge is an important motivation behind the 
history of philosophy. Each philosophical truth displaces the last, or, 
rather, each tries to establish itself in an environment of clashing ideas. 
Nietzsche, an important figure in the crisis of truth, offers this account: 
Many 
r~po,-i~e. 
A great wind blows among the trees, and everywhere 
fruit fall down - truths. The squandering of an all-too-
rich autumn: one stumbles over truths, one steps on 
and kills a few - there are too many.23 
responses to the cr1s1s of truth are possible. Nietzsche's own 
t..JtA5 a wilful appropriation of truth, a juxtaposition of truth and 
power which validated Bacon's conflation of knowledge and power and 
prefigured the more recent exploration of this idea, most notably in the 
work of Michel Foucault. Other responses include Hegel's curious dualism 
of Geist which posited two kinds and two repositories of truth, which were 
still very closely connected. Literary theory made its own set of responses, 
which, as we shall see, have had the cumulative effect of placing literary 
realism under a radical question mark. Given that truth is so contentious, 
it can be asked whether realism has anything other than a regressive 
function, whether any continued store in realism is not just a rejection of 
the crisis of truth. 
and Jameson, argue a correspondence between two or more of these cultural phenomena. This 
is evident in Jameson's description of realism as a contribution to the "bourgeois cultural 
revolution" (see note 9 above) and Barthes' suggestion that the contemporaneity of the 
realistic novel and objective historiography - and other "authentic" representational 
practices - was no coincidence; see Roland Barthes, "The reality effect" in Tzvetan Todorov 
ed. French literary theory today: A Reader, trans. R. Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), p.15. 
23Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, and, Ecce Homo, ed. Walter Kaufmann, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p.314. The 
quotation is from Ecce Homo and is in reference to Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols. 
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As I have indicated, much contemporary literary theory is highly skeptical 
of realism, for precisely these reasons. Realism is implicated in the denial 
of or non-response to critical thought which concerns itself with the 
proliferation of different ideas of truth and knowledge. Critical theories of 
all kinds are employed in efforts rigorously to undermine truth-claims 
and to reveal the limits, shortcomings, and conditions of knowledge. 
The subtitle of this study, then, countenances what appears to be an 
antithesis between its two key terms - critical theory and the realistic 
novel. Certainly, as I shall discuss below, such an opposition has often 
been suggested and endorsed, but in what follows I shall be suggesting that 
it is possible to argue for a different relationship between the two, a 
relationship which is synthetical rather than antithetical. This thesis, then, 
is an inquiry into the relationship between realism, which, as we have 
seen, seems to rely on a truth-claim, and critical theory, which challenges 
the very idea of a truth-claim. As Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it, we have 
seen a "theoretical weakening of our belief in knowledge",24 and literary 
theory, in conjunction with similar developments in other disciplines, 
has made varying responses to this phenomenon. 
( c) Synthesizing realism and theory - the aim of this study 
For the purposes of this study realism is not taken simply to refer to 
certain periods in literary history, or to specific literary techniques and 
devices. The idea of realism with which I am concerned, as I have said, 
involves an idea of reality as a social and historical environment, rather 
than as an overtly symbolic or imaginational environment, or as a highly 
individualized view of that social and historical environment. The 
representation of this reality rests upon the communication of a view of 
this environment to the reader. While readers do not experience the 
reality represented by the text, they come to know it through the text. The 
tense environment of the Russian aristocracy on the eve of Napoleon's 
incursions, provincial life in late-Georgian England, the social and 
economic volatility of the U.S.A. in the 1920s; these social backgrounds are 
literary figures of which readers achieve a kind of vicarious knowledge, 
24Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Truth in the Human Sciences" in Brice R. Wachterhauser ed. and 
trans., Hermeneutics and Truth (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p.27. 
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knowledge which is supplemented by other discourses, such as history or 
geography, which further attest to the "reality" of these environments. 
But if realism involves the development or acquisition of "knowledge" of 
the social and historical reality towards which it is intended, how is it 
affected by the erosion or at least problematization of knowledge which 
has been effected by critical theory? More precisely, is such knowledge 
really possible? 
The first fundamental question with which this thesis is concerned 
emerges from this problem: what kind of relationships have been 
suggested between critical theory and realism? Proceeding from the idea 
that realism provides a kind of knowledge of reality, a number of different 
tendencies in literary theory have questioned and rejected realism because, 
it is argued, realism fails to appreciate the problems of truth and 
knowledge. The relationship between critical theory and realism, then, is 
antithetical; critical theory is implacably suspicious, while realism seems 
to be faithfully satisfied. 
This antithesis, which was discussed earlier in this introduction, generates 
the second question with which we are concerned: is this critical antithesis 
between theory and realism necessary or desirable? As I shall try to show, 
the antithesis between theory and realism arises because of the seemingly 
objectivist or positivist model of knowledge upon which realism is said to 
rest. The supposed objectivity of the social world, as well as the possibility 
of representing it, suggest that the concept of realism is predicated upon an 
unshakable faith in all sorts of epistemological truths. As truth and 
knowledge are called into question by theorists of various persuasions, 
realism, if it does rest on such foundations, is necessarily implicated. 
But this critical logic, I suggest, overstates the epistemological claims of 
realism, and in so doing jeopardizes its own critical credibility. Is it 
possible, then, to think of realism in terms other than those associated 
with one or another variety of cognitive or aesthetic positivism or (false) 
objectivity ? Such a revision, I shall try to show, overcomes the seeming 
antithesis between critical theory and realism. While the generally 
suspicious attitude which characterizes critical theory is not misplaced, the 
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targetting of realism for its supposed "faith" in the objectivity of reality 
and its self-satisfaction with regard to its procedures is. 
To demonstrate this, I shall consider a second group of literary theories 
which, in various ways and to varying degrees, characterize realism as a 
highly problematic literary concept. The ideas discussed in Part II of this 
study, I shall try to show, encourage a highly critical understanding of 
reality, of literary representation, and of knowledge, rather than leading 
towards a view of realism as yet another kind of epistemological 
essentialism. By developing this concept of realism, I hope to show how 
the seeming antithesis between critical theory and realism is misplaced. It 
is only conceivable as long as the constituent elements of literary realism 
are characterized as inherently positivist or essentialist. If a different idea 
of what realism is can be established, this antithesis, as I shall try to show, 
necessarily gives way to a synthetic relationship between the two. 
These, then, are the two primary tasks of this study. The first is to analyse 
various critical theories which have rejected realism, and to try to show 
how the concept of realism upon which this rejection is predicated is 
disingenuously reductive. The second is to analyse a second group of 
theories in order to arrive at a more sensitive and more critical idea of 
realism, and to show how such a view of realism is easily assimilated into 
a theoretical approach which truly merits being called critical. 
These fundamental aims are supplemented by two more general 
propositions which I hope to establish. The first relates directly to the idea 
of realism. By mounting a critique of some (but by no means all) of the 
ways in which critical theory has been antagonistic to realism, I hope to 
establish that realism, while not entitled to any sort of aesthetic privilege, 
is still a useful literary concept, and that the familiarization of the reader 
with the world of the text is still a productive ingress for literary criticism. 
Realism has certainly never been an exclusive achievement of literary 
texts, even those texts which are, by almost any measure, considered to be 
works of realism. Since the development of the social and historical 
representational mode which informs what I refer to as realism many 
other literary forms and genres have developed, often as challenges to the 
conventional form of the realistic novel. As we shall see, various kinds of 
critical theories have turned to some of these more recent forms to 
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support their own theoretical challenge to realism. But while realism, as I 
have said, is not entitled to any sort of privilege amongst all these 
different aesthetic possibilities, the disrepute into which it has fallen in 
some critical circles is not warranted. 
The second proposition regards the question of literary theory itself. The 
place of realism within a particular critical scheme is a useful index of its 
theoretical orientation, and I shall try to show that it is often with regard 
to the question of realism that the shortcomings of some kinds of critical 
theory are most clearly apparent. Within the critical schemes which are 
broadly antagonistic to realism there is, I suggest, a general tendency to 
misrepresent realism and so to proceed from what is essentially a flawed 
base. The credence of a particular critical theory depends upon its capacity 
to reveal the linguistic, philosophical, or ideological errors of a literary 
form of which the theory itself seems to have an erroneous view. As we 
shall see, the concept of reification has figured significantly in the 
development of contemporary critical theory, referring to a tendency to 
characterize as objective what is really a constructed or contrived state of 
affairs. Ironically, as I shall discuss below, the progenitor of the concept of 
reification, Georg Lukacs, eventually became perhaps the most ardent 
defender of realism against aesthetic theories and practices which owed 
much to his development of the concept. Ironic also is the way in which 
realism, which is said to rely upon or participate in processes of social and 
historical reification, has itself been reified by critical theory; it has had the 
kind of "phantom objectivity" which Lukacs saw in economic and 
political structures bestowed upon it by critics whose stated ambitions are 
to resist and even to destroy instruments and products of reification. 
A reconsideration of realism, then, occasions a re-orientation of literary 
theory. Realism, I suggest, is an extremely complicated theoretical concept: 
it seeks to communicate a certain kind of knowledge about the world of 
experience, the real world, through the literary representation of a (largely) 
fictional environment to readers who generally have no direct experience 
of the historical milieu which is being represented. Indeed, the authors 
themselves often have no direct experience of the "reality" with which 
they are concerned; the events of War and Peace, for example, antedate 
Tolstoy's birth by about twenty years. The two novels to which we shall 
turn in the final part of this study offer mixed evidence on this matter. 
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Middlemarch is wholly set some forty years before its composition, in a 
period when Eliot herself was an infant. By contrast, U.S.A. undertakes a 
very broad historical sweep which extends from the late 1890s, during 
which Dos Passos was an infant, through the events of the Great War, of 
which he certainly had direct experience, to the late 1920s, a period in 
which he was at his most politically active, activity which is reflected in 
the narratives of the characters in the novel. 
Given this complexity, it is curious that realism has been characterized as 
so wilfully simple a literary concept. The problems not only of 
communicating but of achieving knowledge of the "reality" of the text are 
not overlooked by literary realism, but highlighted by the complicated way 
in which it achieves its representational verisimilitude. Rather than being 
predicated upon naive, tendentious, or disingenuous attitudes towards 
reality, realism, I suggest, illustrates the problematic quality of its 
elements; the ideas of reality, truth, and knowledge. 
Accordingly, literary theory benefits from a capacity to appreciate this idea 
of realism. The theorists to whom I shall turn in Part II, while they are 
different · in their approaches and not without their problems, advance 
their theories from this kind of apprehension of realism. Rather than 
setting their critical theory against realism, they see realism as the kind of 
literary concept which embodies the philosophical, political, and linguistic 
or semantic problems with which they are concerned. Instead of defining 
and evaluating art according to abstract principles of truth or 
representational standards of accuracy, they view literary texts as 
illustrations of various kinds of problems, and realism in literary texts is 
an illustration of the problems of the very things which it seeks to 
represent and via which it seeks to represent them. 
This view tends to suggest that realism is a peculiarly tenuous idea. Most 
fundamentally, perhaps, it seeks to communicate knowledge of the real 
world. Indeed, if realism means anything at all, the achievement of 
versimilitude, of a simulacrum of a stratum of the social and historical 
world, is crucial. Like other discourses which rely upon an idea of "truth", 
such as history or biography and autobiography, a plausible representation 
of reality is of paramount importance. Indeed, history and autobiography 
are telling parallels, and have often been mentioned in discussions of 
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realism as a literary form. 25 These other discursive genres have, like 
literary realism, undergone significant problematization, generating 
tension between, on the one hand, claims to and the need for truth and 
knowledge in the representational text, and the implicit problems of truth 
and knowledge which that text highlights. 
A similar and perhaps even more heightened tension can be seen in 
literary realism. As I have said, it must achieve verisimilitude, it must 
represent something which is understood as real, but it sets about doing so 
largely through the "untrue" medium of fiction, into which it introduces 
elements of other discourses, such as history or geography. Given this 
seeming paradox, two very important questions arise: can the real be 
represented through the fictional, and can such an enterprise possibly be 
unaware of its own inherent problems? It is not, however, necessary to 
answer these questions, they merely highlight how complicated a concept 
literary realism is, or at least how complicated it might be seen to be once it 
is no longer characterized as the simple literary manifestation of dogged 
objectivism or positivism. 
This tension between the representational aspect of realism and its 
problematization of representation generates a kind of critical irony. 
Realism must achieve verisimilitude, but in doing so it undermines its 
own enabling concepts. The relationship between the text and the social 
and historical world towards which it is intended is not one of simple 
correspondence but a highly fraught process of affirmation and 
interrogation. If realism is taken as an index of the general orientation and 
method of literary theories, it is possible critically to discriminate between 
two sorts of theoretical approaches. One sort of approach, which has been 
favoured in recent times, is represented by theoretical efforts to erode and 
to deconstruct anything which seems to rely upon some kind of claim to 
truth or to knowledge. The problem with such an approach is that it 
frequently sets its critical method against a conveniently reductive model 
of literary realism which, according to such theories, is an unashamed 
commitment to, or faith in, the most simple understandings of reality and 
representation. The second sort of approach is to take account of the 
25Martin, for example, suggests that, "[r]ealistic fiction is similar to history when it treats 
a large cast of characters and long stretches of time; when concentrating on a single 
protagonist, it approaches biography and autobiography"; Recent Theories of Narrative, 
p.75. 
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problematic qualities of realism. Such an approach is based upon a less 
vulnerable, more accurate account of realism which allows the critic both 
to preserve the representational claims of the text and the theoretical 
problems which are, in my view, an ineluctable component of realism. 
( c) The problem of background: the method of this study 
The issues with which this study is concerned may appear nebulous, and it 
is necessary, therefore, to make clear where the borders of this study are 
drawn, and to prefigure the method and structure through which I shall 
try to establish my arguments regarding realism and literary theory. As 
will become clear, the range of material which has been addressed has 
made necessary a certain amount of expository discussion to show how 
each theoretical approach relates to the particular critical questions with 
which I am concerned. In order clearly to set out this discussion, this thesis 
will be divided into three parts, each of which deals with a separate stage 
of my argument. 
The first part - "Some Ends of Realism" - will undertake a critique of 
various literary theories which, in their efforts to be critical, have 
questioned or rejected literary realism. The title of this part plays on a 
familiar ambiguity of which, in a public lecture at the Australian National 
University, the philosopher John Passmore made similar use. Passmore's 
lecture was entitled "The End of Philosophy" under which he discussed 
not the termination of philosophy, but rather the aim or ambition of 
philosophy, suggesting that this "end" deferred the other "end" which, it 
has been suggested, is or at least might be nigh. 
In this part I shall discuss those developments in and contributions to 
literary theory which have suggested that the "ends" of realism, as they are 
characterized within such theories, such as the establishment of standards 
of objectivity, or the naturalization of particular habits of language, 
involve uncritical assumptions about language and society. Various 
linguistic, poetic, philosophical and political orientations in literary theory 
have undertaken a critique of these "ends" and, consequently, announced 
the "end" of realism, at least in the social-historical mode with which we 
are concerned here. In some cases aesthetic alternatives have been 
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suggested, in others, critical theory has set about negating realism from 
within, arguing that the seeming realism of a text is to be disregarded 
because it inhibits the critical interrogation of a text. Roland Barthes' S/Z 
is, perhaps, the most well-known, and certainly the most assiduous 
exercise of this kind. 
This first part is necessarily selective in the material with which it is 
concerned. I have not discussed, for example, American New Criticism, 
even though the "fallacies" against which Wimsatt and Beardsley argued 
might well be implicated in some of the "ends" of realism contemplated 
in this section. This part is not exhaustive because its purpose in 
surveying the opposition between critical theory and realism is to provide 
a background against which the argument of the second part of this study 
may be understood. By looking closely at various developments in 
twentieth-century critical theory, I shall try to show how the "crisis of 
truth" has influenced literary theory, and how, in various ways, critical 
theory has problematized some of the key issues with which literary 
realism is concerned; language, textuality, and the apprehension of reality 
have been among the most important ideas with which the theories 
discussed in Part.I have been concerned. 
My analysis of this material serves two essential functions. The first is 
clearly to introduce the antagonism between realism and various forms of 
critical theory. It is against this antagonism that this study is generally set. 
Secondly, although the kinds of thought discussed in this part differ 
importantly from one another, they share a tendency to claim a 
particularly privileged or enlightened critical position. There is, we might 
say, a common shape to these critical methods: they begin by identifying 
something which is, according to them, uncritical, and then proceed to 
demonstrate their preferability on the basis of the extent to which they do 
not fall into the same traps as their critical target. In this case we are 
concerned with the realistic novel, which variously suffers being excluded 
from the category of the artistic, consigned to historical obscurity, and 
characterized as the willing and effective accomplice of politically 
domineering ideologies. Certainly if realism were the concept identified by 
these tendencies, such accusations might be credible, but it is not clear that 
this view of realism is the only one possible. Part II of this study is devoted 
to arguing that other views are not only possible but preferable. 
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Part II - "Realism: A Critical Background" - undertakes detailed analyses of 
literary theories which, I suggest, are certainly critical in their approach, 
but which, among many other achievements, see literary realism as one 
kind of artistic synthesis of such a critical approach. This view, I suggest, is 
a powerful rebuttal of the theoretical disapprobation of realism which is 
surveyed in the first part, and, therefore, requires that both realism and 
critical theory itself should be revised. Three chapters are devoted to the 
analysis of the work of Georg Lukacs, Erich Auerbach and Mikhail 
Bakhtin, in which I shall detail how the critical contributions of these 
theorists countenance and, certainly in Auerbach's case at least, rely upon 
the idea of realism as a vehicle of critical analysis. 
Essentially, the ideas of truth and reality upon which realism relies are 
revised by these theories, and it is this revision which questions the so-
called theoretical renunciation of realism and makes possible the synthesis 
of critical theory and realism. To present -this synthesis is the central 
ambition of the present study, and in this part I shall seek to detail this 
revision and establish this synthesis. Towards this, this part will include 
arguments that realism can continue to be a productive concept in literary 
studies; that attitudes towards realism can serve as a useful index of the 
orientation of critical theories; and that theories which, among other 
things, make productive use of the concept of realism are preferable 
platforms from which to advance literary theories and criticism. This is 
not, as I have said, to suggest that realism in literature is preferable to all 
other aesthetic ends. I am suggesting only that realism is one critical 
ingress among others, the possibilities of which are in danger of being 
overlooked. 
I shall seek to establish these claims by exploring in detail a range of works 
by each of the critical authors considered. In the cases of Lukacs and 
Auerbach, I shall place their clearly expressed preference for realism 
against the background of the development of their critical positions. By 
trying to show how their preferences for realism emerge from this 
background, I intend to make clear that the nebulous idea of realism has 
always carried with it a sensitive appreciation of the problematic nature of 
the ideas - such as ideas of history and society - which it involves. In 
different ways, and to different degrees of persuasiveness, both Lukacs and 
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Auerbach turn to realism precisely because it embodies interpretive 
problems of the apprehension and representation of reality. The 
determinate representation of the social world emerges for them from a 
theoretical background which critically recognizes the ineluctable 
problems of determinacy, representation, and the social world. 
In the case of Mikhail Bakhtin, the relationship between realism and his 
critical oeuvre is less straightforward. While Bakhtin did consider realism, 
he also considered a great many other things, and realism does not occupy 
the same position of importance as it does in the works of Lukacs and 
Auerbach. My approach will therefore be to explore a wide range of 
Bakhtin's critical texts, and try to show how they contribute to the theory 
of realism which I am seeking to develop. My analysis will seek to 
establish that Bakhtin' s method involves the development of a series of 
conceptual figures which negotiate between, in a very broad sense, 
determinacy and indeterminacy. I shall then try to show how the realistic 
novel can be considered another such figure, with a similarly critical 
background. 
These ideas will be developed in due course, and I shall try to redress the 
question-begging simplicity of this brief account. At this stage I hope only 
to offer an introduction to the theoretical ideas with which I am 
concerned, and to prefigure the claims which I shall be making and the 
theoretical propositions which I hope to establish in the course of this 
study. The detailed and sometimes lengthy studies of various critical 
authors which follow are consequences of these propositions. Because my 
aim is to reconsider the realistic novel against the background of 
twentieth-century literary and critical theory, it is necessary to explore that 
background in some detail, to try to understand what tendencies in critical 
theory have motivated the theoretical "end" of realism. When, in Part II, I 
seek to establish a different way of considering the relationship between 
the two, my method has been to show how realism emerges from 
theoretical backgrounds which, using the idea of the critical established 
above, certainly warrant being called critical. 
In Part III - "Reading Realism: Theory and Practice" - I shall analyse two 
literary texts - Middlemarch by George Eliot, and U.S.A. by John Dos Passos 
- to test and support the theoretical claims made in Part II. In each case, I 
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shall try to show how an acknowledgement the realism of the text is a 
productive ingress into the analysis of the texts, rather than an 
impediment. These claims, and the critical position which they advocate, 
are, as I shall try to make clear, the proposed synthesis of the two 
seemingly antagonistic positions outlined in Parts I and II. I hope to 
preserve the relentless critical spirit which has contributed to the radical 
questioning attitude evinced by contemporary critical theory while 
acknowledging the need for and ineluctability of the ideas of reality and of 
realism. I see literary realism as a complicated theoretical figure which 
makes possible such a reconciliation. This study, then, is a reassertion of 
the importance of the idea of realistic representation, and also an 
exploration into the contentious situation, the "fraught background" of 
contemporary literary theory. 
(e) Terms and conditions: the scope of this study 
With such broad concepts and categories as realism and critical theory on 
the loose, it is also necessary to exercise some caution and restraint with 
regard to the ambition and scope of this study. Certainly what I mean by 
realism cannot apply to every novel which has ever been called or 
considered realistic. The representation of social, historical environments 
and of the lives of individuals within those environments, is, as I have 
indicated, a kind of loose definition of what I mean, in this study, by 
realism. Rather than a very close focus upon individual lives, or a highly 
subjective representational focus, realism concentrates on a fairly broad 
stratum of social life from a broad, middle-distance representational 
perspective. As I have said, this is the general representational structure 
most commonly associated with nineteenth-century novelists such as 
Balzac, Stendhal and Tolstoy, among, of course, countless others. 
But the techniques associated with nineteenth-century realism do not 
exhaust the possibilities for representing social and historical reality, a 
point borne out by the vast differences between the two novels which are 
discussed in Part III of this study. 
Middlemarch is certainly closer to most conventional ideas of realism 
than U.S.A., but the two novels are similar insofar as each is concerned 
with the representation of a social and historical milieu. On the one hand, 
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then, these two novels are both examples of what I am calling realism, but 
on the other hand, the differences between them are significant enough to 
necessitate several qualifications. My conception of realism, which 
incorporates these two novels, is clearly very general, and, therefore, 
cannot claim to be in any way definitive or absolute. There are other ways 
in which realism can be defined, ways which might include one but not 
the other of these texts, or perhaps neither. Certainly, if parts of U.S.A. 
were taken in isolation, they would seem radically to question whether 
the novel should be spoken of as realistic at all, a question to which we 
shall return in due course. 
The social and historical representation which characterizes realism for 
my purposes must be taken not so much as a definition of realism as 
simply one way in which realism might be understood. Similarly, the 
theoretical view of realism which is developed in Part II of this thesis, 
particularly insofar as it stands as a kind of corrective response to other 
theoretical views of realism, cannot be considered an authoritative 
account of the literary and philosophical properties of realism. Rather, it is 
again only one possible way of understanding a literary concept which, 
while it necessarily contradicts other understandings, doesn't exhaust the 
concept or claim to provide a definitive theoretical account. 
These qualifications might seem to betray an excess of caution, but I think 
them necessary, and preferable to exaggerated claims for the reference or 
applicab_ility of one's theoretical suggestions. Realism, and representation 
in general, go to the heart of the mysterious and as yet elusive relationship 
between literature and reality, and it may be possible to characterize any 
literary work as, at some level, realistic. Without some preliminary 
qualifications, claims about the nature and function of realism might 
seem to be attempts to define, or even as claims to have ultimately seized 
upon, the very nature of literature and of reality, and such claims are 
usually as short-lived as they are overstated. Indeed, the very need for 
caution and qualifications might be seen as evidence of the complicated 
issues which arise when the concept of realism is carefully considered, 
which renders its critical rejection all the more premature. 
In what follows, then, my claims must be understood to be covered by 





theoretical concept of realism which, in contrast to a prevailing antithesis 
between realism and critical theory, sees their methods as generally 
congenial, I hope to offer a way of thinking about realism which 
illuminates useful critical possibilities for the reading of novels which 
undertake to represent social and historical reality. Rather than an 
exhausted literary mode or an outdated aesthetic standard, realism 
provides an ingress both into theoretical debates and into literary criticism, 




Some Ends of Realism 
The three chapters which make up this part are concerned, as I have 
mentioned, with "ends." Many different results, objects, and intentions of 
realism have been posited and what the different approaches discussed in 
each of these chapters have in common is that they suggest that these 
"ends" of realism constitute a denial or rejection of a critical attitude. On 
the basis of these ends - what are seen as realism's claims to absolute truth, 
to authority, and so forth - the "end" of realism is announced or called for. 
Realism, Catherine Belsey, to whom we shall turn in Chapter Three, tells 
us, "is no longer tenable."1 
My argument with this position, or, rather, the different positions 
surveyed in this part, is not simply a matter of pointing out what I see as 
their '...! rrors or shortcomings and then relying upon these as the disproof 
of their critical validity. The critical dimension of these various 
enterprises is something which is preserved in the theoretical position 
towards which this thesis is intended. But what seems to be a necessary 
antithesis between critical theory and realism is, as I shall try to show, 
based on a view of realism which overlooks the complexity of realism as a 
literary phenomenon. 
My critique of these various theoretical movements is intended to identify 
what seem to be productive contributions to literary theory while 
challenging what I consider mistaken premises or conclusions. In some 
cases, the assimilation of the theoretical arguments is more pronounced 
than the challenge to them, and in others the balance is tilted towards a 
more polemic refutation of claims and concepts. Generally, however, the 
aim of this part is to introduce the seeming opposition between critical 
theory and realism against which I shall make my own claims regarding 
the congeniality between the two. The "ends" of realism, I shall argue, are 
not necessarily those attributed to it by many of the theorists discussed in 
1Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980), p.46. 
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this part and, therefore, the necessary "end" of realism is, like Mark 
Twain's famous obituary, greatly exaggerated. 
The following critique~ however, is not only concerned to address the end 
of realism. The shortcomings of these theoretical contributions, or at least 
those areas where their critical focus is less sharp than elsewhere, 
highlight the dangers of holding to too narrow an idea of critical or literary 
theory. Paul de Man's essay on what he calls the "resistance" to theory, for 
example, seems to countenance only a very specific idea of what is 
theoretical. The tendency to characterize as theoretical only the most 
recent developments in literary theory, or the most radical, limits and, I 
suggest, impoverishes literary studies in general by positing exaggerated 
dichotomies of which the one between realism and theory which 
occasions the present study is one example. That such dichotomies, rather 
than one or another of the poles of them, are untenable is, perhaps, 
illustrated by the case of the theoretical currency of the work of James 
Joyce. 
Joyce has often been used as a kind of index of the critical in literature, and 
of departures from realism. He is cited approvingly by numerous theorists 
of various persuasions, with the notable exception of Georg Lukacs, who 
cited him disapprovingly for much the same reasons. Joyce's intellectual 
genealogy includes, among others, of course, the Renaissance thinker 
Giambattista Vico, a forebear whom he shares with the German theorist 
Erich Auerbach, whose major work, Mimesis, is explicitly concerned with 
realism. 
Now these coinciding influences in Auerbach and Joyce certainly do not 
establish any sort of equivalence between the two figures, and it would be 
ill-advised to make too much of the conceptual connection. But the 
connection does highlight the complexities of what is called literary 
theory, and shows how some arguments which claim to be theoretical 
actually lack a critical edge, a deficiency which can lead to poorly sustained 
conclusions. Literary theory itself must be read and interpreted, must be 
subject to critical analysis, in order for theory to maintain its critical edge. 
These are the points to be addressed in Part I, which is divided into three 




different stage of the present argument. In order thoroughly to take 
account of various kinds of what we might call anti-realistic theory, each 
of these chapters includes fairly extended analyses of the works of various 
theorists. The length and detail of this survey of different theories of 
realism is necessary for the establishment of my two main propositions. I 
shall not only try to show what has been said of realism, but also to 
identify the fundamental models or concepts of critical theory which are 
implied by these various positions. It is not simply a matter of disproving 
various claims about realism, but rather a critique of these fundamental 
concepts with which we are concerned. In the third and final chapter of 
this part I shall turn more specifically to the shortcomings of the critical 
theories discussed in chapters 1 and 2 to illustrate how their 
misapprehension of realism is an emblem of fundamental critical 
misconstructions which require revision. Thus, this first part establishes a 
background against which, in Part II I shall make my two arguments; the 
first argues for a revision of the concept of realism, and the second for a 
concomitant reorientation of critical theory. 
At the conclusion of this part, I hope to have made clear that the 
renunciation of realism, the end, is only necessary, or, rather, conceivable, 
if certain claims about what realism is and does are accepted. These claims. 
I suggest, are more a caricature of realism than the products of a critical 
investigation, and therefore both realism and critical theory itself need to 
be reconsidered. Such an investigation, and the further development of 
my argument, will be taken up in Part II. 
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Language, textuality, and representation 
Words, as is well known, are the great foes of reality. 
- Joseph Conrad 
That words are an imperfect representational medium is certainly, by now, 
fairly well established. Conrad's anxious narrator, who delivers the line 
which serves to introduce this chapter laments his over-familiarity with 
words; it compromises, he seems to think, his grasp of reality. In this 
chapter we shall be concerned with three critical tendencies which, in a 
sense, have acted on the tenet that there is, to resort to an overworked 
phrase, a gap between words and things, of which Plato, in his critique of 
mimesis, was clearly aware. 
Arguably, realism has always had a sense of its own textuality and its own 
language. Even Aristotelian mimesis, which can be considered a distant 
predecessor of realism in the novel, countenanced the problems of the 
text. Later, G.H. Lewes, whose association with the realistic novel was 
certainly stronger than that of Aristotle, placed this important 
qualification on artistic realism: 
Art is a Representation of Reality - a Representation 
which, inasmuch as it is not the thing itself, but only 
represents it, must necessarily be limited by the nature 
of its medium; the canvas of the painter, the marble 
of the sculptor, the chords of the musician, and the 
language of the writer ... 1 
The theorists discussed in this section share Lewes' feeling that these 
limitations, in this case of language, are being overlooked. Both Aristotle 
and Lewes belong, one might argue, to a different critical environment 
than the present, but in the twentieth-century the representational 
limitations of language have been much discussed and debated. We might 
recall, through Tzvetan Todorov, Paul Valery's dictum that literature is 
1G.H Lewes, "Realism and Idealism" in Alice R. Kaminsky ed., Literary Criticism of 
George Henry Lewes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p.87. 
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no more than the extension of certain properties of language. 2 This idea 
gives rise to the affirmation, or at least acknowledgment, of language, and 
the complexities of language, as important aspects of literary realism. 
An emphasis on language informs the three theoretical approaches 
discussed in this section. I have not taken these approaches in strict 
chronological order, but rather according to the extent to which they may 
be considered hostile to realism, and the degree of problematization which 
they bring to the questions with which this study is concerned. Each is 
concerned to encourage an awareness of the language of realism, to redress 
what, according to them, is a kind of taking-for-granted of language, a 
wilful neglect of the gap between words and things which, they suggest, 
provides the very interest of both words and things. This, we might say, is 
the critical project of theories which rely on the problems of language to 
approach the study of literature: to resurrect language and the use of 
language, a task which, in the view of some of these theorists, requires the 
end of realism. 
(a) Neo-classicism: Booth and the ancient art of rhetoric 
Wayne C. Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction, according to the preface to the 
first edition, is concerned with "the rhetorical resources available to the 
writer ... as he tries, consciously or unconsciously, to impose his fictional 
world upon the reader."3 In particular, Booth is concerned with techniques 
and textual devices which betray the hand of the author. No matter how 
much it may seem that fiction is "showing" its material - to use Booth's 
strongly Aristotelian terminology - close analysis will always reveal that it 
is "telling" its story. "[T]he author's judgement', Booth claims, "is always 
present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it" (RF, 
p.20). 
Booth's analysis of technique proceeds by challenging what he calls 
"General Rules" of narrative, the first of which is particularly germane to 
the present inquiry - "True Novels Must Be Realistic". Booth is, perhaps, 
overstating the extent to which this maxim imposes itself, and perhaps 
2 See Tzvetan Todorov, Poetique de la prose , p.32. 
3Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd ed. (Middlesex: Peregrine Books, 1987), 
p.xiii. The preface to the first edition is included in this edition. References to this work 
(hereafter RF), will be included in the text. 
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ironically, but his discussion is nonetheless instructive. Beginning with 
the presence or otherwise, in a work of fiction, of the author's voice, Booth 
illustrates how debate regarding the appropriate manifestation of 
authorial presence was often conducted in terms of what he (Booth) called 
"the realistic illusion": 
Perhaps a majority of attacks on the author's voice 
have been in the name of making the book seem 
'real.'(RF, p.40) 
Discussing the extent to which the position of the author's voice - and 
associated narratological elements - bears upon the intensity of the realistic 
illusion, Booth rehearses the claims of other critics; notably, Ian Watt, 
Henry James, and Jean-Paul Sartre. He says of Watt that he proceeds from 
an "all-pervasive assumption .. . that 'realism of presentation' is a good 
thing in itself"(RF, p .41) . He writes of James that he works towards "a 
general rhetoric in the service of realism"(RF, p.50). Sartre's aesthetic, 
Booth notes, is more ambivalent than those of James and Watt, 
countenancing a radical aesthetic break, away from the rhetorical 
techniques associated with the realistic illusion. The narratological 
complexities of _the author's voice do not, however, entirely deny the 
possibility of realistic representation. Booth writes: 
In the general assumption that a novel should seem 
real, James and Sartre would probably be. joined by 
most novelists from the beginning of fiction. In the 
assumption that a realistic effect is worth the sacrifice 
of most if not all other virtues, they would be joined 
by many novelists and critics in this century.(RF, p.53) 
In 1961, when the first edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction appeared, such 
assertions were perhaps more supportable than in contemporary literary 
studies. Even so, The Rhetoric of Fiction is noteworthy for the extent to 
which it placed technical questions at the heart of the analysis of fiction, 
including the question of realistic representation. Booth's neo-Aristotelian 
poetics challenged many stylistic prescriptions - undermining the claims 
of authors/theorists to be moving away from artifice towards "truth" - and 
argued against a transparency theory of literary representation. His 
criticism, however, doesn't entertain the radical problematization of 
referentiality which has made the realistic assumptions of which Booth 
writes highly contentious. Nonetheless, Booth's critical statements which 
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are aimed at an analysis of the rhetorical properties of fiction are a useful 
example of how problems of language are implicated in the idea of the 
realistic novel. The general rules against which Booth argues can be 
understood as uncritical assumptions which fail to appreciate the 
complexity of this implication. Like his predecessor Aristotle, Booth is 
concerned with rhetoric, with the persuasive properties of language. His 
study is, in a sense, an effort to focus attention on the art of rhetoric, and to 
encourage a kind of literary criticism which, through an awareness of the 
rhetoric of fiction, holds at arm's length the assumptions which inform 
what he calls general rules. 
Booth's revival of rhetoric is, of course, only one way of returning to 
language in literary theory. By trying to effect a return to rhetoric, Booth's 
challenge to realism is not essentially against realism itself, but rather 
against attempts to excise rhetoric from fiction, either in the name of 
realism or in pursuit of some sort of artistic purity.4 But earlier returns to 
language, in a different critical environment to that within which Booth 
made his statements, constituted a more profound, or at least more 
polemic, challenge to realism. 
(b) Russian Formalism: the resurrection of the word 
In the early part of the twentieth-century, two groups of scholars in the 
fledgling Soviet Union began to outline aesthetic theories that seriously 
challenged views of literature which validated realistic aesthetics. 
Prominent amongst these scholars was Viktor Shklovsky who argued, 
according to Wallace Martin, that "the realism of fiction is a product of 
technique, not of scientific observation of reality."5 Working against the 
importance of representational aesthetics in an earlier generation of 
Russian critics, Shklovsky's Formalism worked upon the following 
principle: 
4 
In order to transform an object into a fact of art, it is 
necessary first to withdraw it from the domain of life.6 
See RF, p.96. 
5Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, p.48. 
6Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose (1925), trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, Ill. : 
Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), p.61. 
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To accomplish this withdrawal, Shklovsky proposed an artistic strategy of 
what has come to be called "defamiliarization" - translated more literally 
as "making strange." The revitalization of artistic perception which was 
implicit in defamiliarization was the defining characteristic of the literary -
a characteristic attributed, more than a century earlier, to poetry, by 
Wordsworth, who suggested that in poetry, "ordinary things should be 
presented to the mind in an unusual way" .
7 For Shklovsky, 
defamiliarization serves a number of purposes, not least of which is to 
distinguish between literary and non-literary verbal structures; it serves, as 
Fredric Jameson puts it, "as the enabling act which permits literary theory 
to come into being".8 Fundamentally, Shklovsky's project was to achieve 
what he called, in an early brochure, "The Resurrection of the Word,"
9 an 
interruption of the habit of passing from words to their putative meaning; 
or, in the language of structuralism, Formalism's conceptual heir, from 
signifier to signified. 
If we set aside the avant-gardism associated with defamiliarization, and its 
attendant ideas of literature and literary history
10 we can begin to think 
generally ·about the structure of Shklovsky's theories, and so to consider 
how their anti-representational bias fits into the present study. In working 
away from the sociological approach to literature, of which realistic 
representation was an important element, Shklovsky was arguing for a 
critical dimension of literary studies which questioned habitual patterns of 
cultural communication, themselves an extension of fundamental 
problems of perception. In "Art as Technique", he states his position on 
the problem of perception: 
If we start to examine the general laws of perception, 
we see that as perception becomes habitual, it becomes 
7"Preface to Lyrical Ballads" in William Wordsworth, ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p.597. 
8Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.52. 
9Cited in M.M. Bakhtin/P.N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A 
Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. Albert J. Wehrle (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), p.54. 
10See Jameson, The Prison-House, p.52 
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automatic. Thus, for example, all of our habits retreat 
into the area of the unconsciously automatic.11 
Shklovsky sets himself resolutely against such automatism. He continues: 
And so life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization 
destroys works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the 
fear of war ... And art exists that one may recover the 
sensation of life ... The technique of art is to make 
objects "unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to 
increase the difficulty and length of perception 
because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in 
itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of 
experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is 
not important. 12 
Shklovsky's aesthetic seems, then, to be a-representational, which is 
consistent with the Formalist affinity with Russian and early Soviet 
avant-garde movements. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that alongside 
his interest in Laurence Sterne he manages to pursue his theories in 
Tolstoy's fiction, reversing a critical tendency to characterize Tolstoy's 
work as, among other things, realistic. 
Shklovsky's position is an extreme one. His theory turns on a distinction 
between the habitual, which he says destroys life, and the artistic, which 
seems to approach some sort of aesthetic essentialism. Only in the rarified, 
challenging art work, he suggests, can life be recovered, and in order for 
this to be achieved a radical break between art and life must be effected. 
Realistic aesthetics, which necessarily rely upon a continuity of art and life, 
run contrary to this aesthetic program. 
Boris Tomashevsky evinces a similar concern, pointedly contrasting 
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"realistic motivation" to "artistic motivation": ~ , 
We demand an element of "illusion" in any work ... 
our perception of it must be accompanied by a feeling / 
11Viktor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique"(1917) in Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis eds and 
trans., Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1965), p.11. 
12Shklovsky, "Art as Technique", p.12. 
that what happens in it is "real." The naive reader 
feels this with extraordinary force ... 13 
Even "experienced readers," Tomashevsky argues, demand "conformity to 
reality": greater aesthetic awareness does not preclude a "need for realistic 
illusion." 14 Predating Booth, Tomashevsky uses the same phrase that 
Booth used in his analysis of literary technique. 
Tomashevsky goes on to make more explicit the opposition between 
realistic and artistic motivation: 
A system of realistic motivation quite often includes a 
denial of artistic motivation.15 
He then introduces the idea of defamiliarization, as "a special instance of 
artistic motivation",16 although, as with Shklovsky, Tomashevsky is able 
to locate artistic motivation in seemingly "realistic" literary structures, 
blurring the distinction between the realistic and the artistic. 
Tomashevsky' s sense of "realistic" as against "artistic" motivation 
involves the same kind of distinction as that which Shklovsky posited 
between art and life. Realistic motivation relies upon the habitual, 
whereas artistic motivation works towards the pure essence of the artistic. 
Only when this purity is achieved is it possible for art to exercise a salutary 
effect on life. 
Shklovsky and Tomashevsky set their aesthetic theories against "naive" 
reading; by complicating the reading process, they argue, the habitual 
reception upon which realistic techniques rely can be overcome. Form is 
more important than content, the work more important than the reality it 
purports to represent. 
Another Formalist, Roman Jakobson, who worked in Moscow with 
Tomashevsky, 17 considered the idea of realism more directly. In an essay 
13Boris Tomashevsky, "Thematics", in Lemon and Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism, p .80. 
14Tomashevsky, "Thematics", p.81. 
15Tomashevsky, "Thematics", p.85. 
16Tomashevsky, "Thematics", p.85. 
17For matters relating to the historical development of Formalism, see primarily Victor 
Ehrlich, Russian Formalism: History-Doctrine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). 
See also Tzvetan Todorov, Literature and Its Theorists: A Personal View of Twentieth-
Century Criticism, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
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which appeared in 1921, "On Realism In Art", Jakobson took critical issue 
with the idea of realistic representation. His initial target is what he calls 
"slipshod ... terminology" in literary history. Among other terms, he 
writes that 
the term 'realism' ... fared especially badly. The 
uncritical use of this word, so very elusive in 
meaning, has had fateful consequences. 
What is realism as understood by the theoretician of 
art ? It is an artistic trend which aims at conveying 
reality as closely as possible and which strives for 
maximum verisimilitude. We call realistic those 
works which we feel accurately depict life by 
displaying verisimilitude.18 
Jakobson argues that the idea of realistic representation which is supposed 
to be inferred from the term "realism" has dimensions of ambiguity 
which a single, consistent term cannot begin to explore. He begins by 
articulating three meanings of realism: realism as conceived by the author; 
as perceived by the reader; and as characteristic of a specific artistic current 
of the nineteenth-century. Beginning with this tri-partite division, 
Jakobson thus both problematizes the term, and hints at the complexities 
of its supposed defining characteristic: representation. Where, he asks, is 
the realistic standard of verisimilitude located: in the author; in the 
reader; or in literary tradition ? In this, Jakobson anticipates developments 
in literary theory from the "fallacies" outlined by Wimsatt and Beardsley 
to Foucault's critique of the author-function and Barthes' move from 
"work to text." In doing so, Jakobson shows not only that the terminology 
or nomenclature of the literary representation of reality is problematic, but 
also that the very idea of realism is difficult clearly to understand. 
Jakobson further develops this problematic by reasserting the figurative 
capacity of language - which parallels the idea of defamiliarization - and by 
asserting this idea as a motivating force in literary history and in the 
concept of realistic representation. His original tri-partite distinction is 
thus augmented by his claim that both deformation of and adherence to 
Todorov, of course, was instrumental in the dissemination of Formalism through his edition 
and translation of Formalist essays into French in 1965. 
18Roman Jakobson, "On Realism in Art", trans. Karol Magassy, in his Language in 
Literature, ed. Krystyna Pomoroska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 
1987), p.20. Further references to this essay will be included in the text. 
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artistic and textual codes have been characterized as "realistic." Jakobson's 
anticipation of later critical developments emerges again: 
The words of yesterday's narrative grow stale; now the 
item is described by the features that were yesterday 
held to be the least descriptive ... features that were 
scarcely noticed.("On Realism", p.22) 
Jakobson prefigures the different theoretical accounts of the transition 
from phase to phase of representational aesthetics offered by Northrop 
Frye and Erich Auerbach, and also bears out Jameson's discussion of how 
Formalism redefines literary history "as a series of abrupt 
discontinuities." 19 This revolutionary model of literary history, of course, 
coincides with the Formalist involvement in an aesthetic and critical 
avant-garde. 
Jakobson argues that these complexities militate against continued use of 
the word "realism." "Whoever senses faithfulness to life in Racine does 
not find it in Shakespeare, and vice-versa"("On Realism", p.23). This 
historicity, he says, "brings the extreme relativism of the concept of 
'realism' into sharp relief"("On Realism", p.24). But Jakobson's analysis 
also highlights a problem which goes beyond mere terminology, and for 
which his (ironic) conclusion - realisms A1, A2, B, C etc. - doesn't account. 
Aesthetic forms, and shifts in aesthetic conventions - Jakobson mentions 
Symbolism, Futurism and Expressionism - are predicated upon changing 
understandings of reality itself, changing epistemologies, a radical idea 
which has since provoked a great deal of critical debate. 
In terms simply of literature, Jakobson says that this dialectical drive 
towards greater representational accuracy generated "posthumous 
criticism ... (which) periodically questioned the realism of Gogol', 
Dostoevskij, Tolstoj, Turgenev, and Ostrovskij"("On Realism", p.25). 
Discussing the aesthetic tendencies of this nineteenth-century "school," 
Jakobson notes the importance of the "unessential detail," a figurative 
device which generates the impression of representational fidelity: 
If the hero of an eighteenth-century novel encounters 
a passer-by, it may be taken for granted that the latter 
is of no importance ... But it is obligatory in Gogol' or 
19Jameson, The Prison-House, p52 
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Tolstoj or Dostoevskij that the hero first meet an 
unimportant and ... superfluous passer-by, and that 
their resulting conversation should have no bearing 
on the story ... [s]uch a device is frequently thought to 
be realistic.("On Realism", p.25) 
Jakobson - again prefiguring a similar idea in subsequent literary theory; 
specifically Barthes' essay "L' effet du reel" - demonstrates, with this idea, 
the interconnection between textuality - the persistence of the unessential 
figure - and realistic representation - the unessential detail indicates a 
breadth of descriptive detail which is more "realistic" than more narrowly 
focused narrative. The form, again, is crucial, and prior to the content. 
Like Shklovsky and Tomashevsky, Jakobson is calling for more critical 
readi,ng and interpretive practices which move away from face-value 
acceptance of literary representations, and towards which this kind of 
formal interrogation is the first step. 
The tenets of the Formalists exercised a strong influence upon subsequent 
developments in literary theory, and particularly on French 
structuralism, 20 with which Formalism is linked principally through 
Jakobson. 21 The resurrection of the word, of which Shklovsky wrote, and 
which, we have seen, gives rise to serious critical questions about realism 
and representation, later became the resurrection of the sign, a critical 
development which was similarly to confront the vexed problem of 
realism. 
(c) Structuralism and the reality effect 
Structuralism and the question of realistic representation reached an 
important conjuncture in 1968: the Parisian journal Communications 
20J ameson writes: "French Structuralism is related to Russian Formalism, less as nephew to 
uncle, in Shklovsky' s phrase, than as crossed cousins within an endogamous kinship 
system"; The Prison-House, p.101. 
21Jakobson left Moscow for Prague, moving to the United States during WW II. His 
relationship with structuralism (particularly with Levi-Strauss) is well-documented. He 
is cited by, among others, Todorov (see "L'heritage methodologique du Formalisme" and 
"Langage et litterature" in his Poetique de la prose) and Roland Barthes ("Introduction to 
the Structural Analysis of Narratives" in his Image - Music - Text, trans. Stephen Heath 
(London: Fontana, 1977)). His influence upon Barthes seems to have been profound, 
considering the similarities between Jakobson's essay and Barthes' "L'effet du reel". 
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devoted an issue to la vraisemblable - verisimilitude.22 Edited by Tzvetan 
Todorov, and including essays by Roland Barthes, Gerard Genette, Julia 
Kristeva, film theorist Christian Metz, and Todorov himself, this 
publication embodied the burgeoning critical antagonism towards the idea 
of realistic representation. This collection of articles represents a forceful 
expression of how literary theory was challenging traditional literary 
values, resulting in the critical problematization from which literary 
mimesis has become indissociable. 
Most influential, perhaps, of the Communications essays is Roland 
Barthes' "L'effet du reel" - the reality effect.23 Concerned to reveal what 
Barthes calls the "referential illusion," Barthes' essay echoes strongly 
Jakobson's "On Realism in Art", particularly in its exploitation of the 
"unessential detail." Barthes begins by counterposing literary description 
with structural analysis. Flaubert and Michelet - two authors whom he 
cites - produce - like many others, he adds - data and descriptive details 
which, under structural analysis, are seemingly "useless." These features 
of a text, Barthes argues, seem to be independent of or resistant to what he 
calls "meaning": 
the irreducible residues of functional analyses ... 
denote what is commonly called 'concrete 
reality'(casual movements, transitory attitudes, 
insignificant objects, redundant words). Unvarnished 
'representation of reality', a naked account of 'what is' 
(or was), thus looks like a resistance to meaning, a 
resistance which confirms the great mythical 
opposition between the true-to-life ( the living) and 
the intelligible.24 
Barthes' argument must be placed in the context of the structuralist 
"resurrection of the sign." The seeming resistance of certain textual 
features to functional analysis, he argues, constitutes a claim that "concrete 
reality" is beyond, or prior to, meaning. Understood structurally, this 
means that the signifying processes25 of meaning production do not 
22Communications 11 (Paris: Seuil, 1968). 
23Reissued in Tzvetan Todorov ed., French literary theory today. 
24"The reality effect", p.14. Further references to this essay will be included in the text 
25Barthes' notion of the sign derives from the linguistic, more specifically, Saussurean, 
origin of structuralist thought. Barthes' essays, "To Write: An Intransitive Verb", and 
"Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" detail this genealogy. 
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constitute "reality"; rather, it exists in a kind of pre-signifying, pre-
discursive immutability or self-evidence. Barthes argues that nothing, 
including reality, is prior to "meaning," understood in its structuralist 
sense. To advance this claim he considers the conceptual transition to 
what he calls the "new 'vraisemblance."' 
Barthes recalls the classical distinction between poetry, or narrative, 
characterized as vraisemblable, and history, which is simply vrai, or, 
rather, real. "Since antiquity," he writes, "the 'real' and history have gone 
together"("Reality effect", p.15). In modernity, however, a kind of 
collusion has developed between history and narrative. Barthes notes the 
historical contemporaneity of objective historiography and realism in 
literature, as well as a developing tendency towards hard evidential modes 
of representation: 
It is logical, therefore, that realism in literature should 
have been, give or take a few decades, 
contemporaneous with the rise of 'objective' history, 
to which should be added the present-day 
development of techniques, activities, and 
institutions based on an endless need to authenticate 
the real ... [T]he 'real' is assumed not to need any 
independent justification ... it is powerful enough to 
negate any notion of 'function' ... it can be expressed 
without there being any need for it to be integrated 
into a structure ... the having been there of things is a 
sufficient reason for speaking them.("Reality effect", 
p.15) 
This conceptual convergence of history and narrative gives birth to the 
new verisimilitude - realism. But, Barthes is arguing, this seeming self-
evidence is not prior to structure, but merely part of another structure. In 
order to make this clear, Barthes analyses semioticall y the "concrete 
detail"; reasserting the signifying nature of the narrative detail 
undermines the idea that the real exists independently of structure: 
at the very moment when these details are supposed 
to denote reality directly, all that they do, tacitly, is 
signify it. Flaubert's barometer, Michelet's little door, 
say, in the last analysis, only this: we are the real. It is 
the category of the 'real', and not its various contents, 
which is being signified; in other words, the very 
absence of the signified, to the advantage of the 
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referent ... becomes the true signifier of realism. An 
'effet du reel', (a reality effect) is produced, which is 
the basis of that unavowed 'vraisemblance' which 
forms the aesthetic of all the standard works of 
modernity.("Reality effect", p.16) 
This reality effect, Barthes says, serves to make representation seem like a 
"pure encounter between the object and its expression"("Reality effect", 
p.16). Such purity, however, according to Barthes, is unachievable; 
resurrecting the sign, insisting upon its structural nature, questions, 
Barthes insists, radically and necessarily, "the age old aesthetic of 
'rep re sen ta tion"' ("Reality effect", p .16). 
Barthes' "reality effect" argues against what I have called the seeming self-
evidence of realistic representation, an idea which characterizes the 
modern (as distinct from the ancient, a transition which Todorov, as we 
shall see, details) concept of verisimilitude. A similar argument may be 
distilled from Todorov's lengthy introduction to Communications 11 - an 
extended version of which appeared several years later in his collection of 
essays Poetique de la prose. The idea of self-evidence, or, at least of 
evidence, is immediately implicated in Todorov's essay as he introduces 
the idea of verisimilitude through an ancient Sicilian legal dispute. The 
disputed occurrence, Todorov says, did not, of course, take place before the 
judges; their task, therefore, was, on the basis of the testimonies (les recits) 
of the contestants, not to establish the truth, but to approach and give an 
impression of the truth. 
This contest gave rise, Todorov says, to the science of rhetoric, and to the 
concept of verisimilitude, both of which Todorov enlists in his 
structuralist project to demonstrate, against a predominant habit of 
thought, that "words are not simply the transparent names of things."26 
It is a matter of taking language out of its illusory 
transparence, of learning to perceive it and, at the 
same time, to study the techniques which it uses to 
disappear, to exist no more before our eyes, like Wells' 
26Tzvetan Todorov, Poetique de la prose, p.92, trans. mine. Further references will be 
abbreviated and included in the text. Structuralism is not, of course, the only theoretical 
movement to advance this claim. Many branches of linguistics have been concerned with 
this idea and Plato's Cratylus - a later dialogue - turns on this very question. 
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invisible man swallowing his chemical 
potion.(Poetique, p.92) 
Todorov' s analysis of verisimilitude, like Barthes', countenances the 
transition from the "old" to the "new"; the slide from a distinction 
between verisimilitude and truth to a conflation or equation of the two. 
He proceeds to break down the idea of verisimilitude into four senses. The 
first, he argues, is "its most naive sense of conforming to reality"(Poetique, 
p.94). This is quite close to Barthes' formulation - a pure encounter 
between an object and its expression - and Todorov is quick to discredit 
this naive understanding of the concept. He cites classical poetics to 
support his argument: 
Corax, the first theoretician of verisimilitude, had 
already gone further (than this naive sense): for him 
verisimilitude was not a relation with the real (as if it 
were the truth), but with that which the majority of 
people believed to be real, in other words, with public 
opinion.(Poetique, p.94) 
This classical idea is Todorov's second sense of verisimilitude: 
The second sense is that of Plato and Aristotle: 
verisimilitude is the rapport between a particular text 
and another, general and diffuse, which we call 
'public opinion.'(Poetique, p.94) 
The third sense of which Todorov speaks concerns what might be called 
generic verisimilitude, the conventions imposed upon the reception of 
particularly stylized works. 
The fourth and final sense is of particular resonance: 
Finally, in our days, another usage has become 
predominant: we speak of the verisimilitude of a 
work to the extent that it tries to makes us believe that 
it conforms to reality and not to its own laws; in other 
words, verisimilitude is the mask which dresses up 
the laws of the text, and which we are supposed to 
take for a relation with reality.(Poetique, p.94) 
This idea evinces the critique of verisimilitude in which Todorov and 
Barthes are participating. The conventional aspects of verisimilitude - its 
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own laws - are obfuscated, "masked", thus suggesting that the text has a 
simple relation to reality. This is, of course, part of the re-emphasis of 
language which is central to the structuralist project: Barthes' notion of 
intransitive writing and Todorov's stated intention to explain and 
illustrate Valery's statement regarding language and literature characterize 
this movement. 
Two aspects of Todorov's analysis are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, a 
kind of deception is implied; verisimilitude, he says, is a "mask." This 
implication develops into the notion of naturalization: textual properties 
become "naturalized" so as to seem given, natural, rather than 
conventional. 27 This is the obfuscation of textuality against which 
linguistically-oriented poetics - such as those of Todorov and Barthes - are 
working. 
The second element of Todorov's analysis which warrants further 
attention is his invocation of "public opinion." Todorov is not, of course, 
alone in this. The structuralist critic Gerard Genette uses a similar 
definition of verisimilitude: "the idea that the public has of the true or 
possible.'"28 In different ways, Shklovsky and, incidentally, Northrop Frye 
might also be said to share this point of view, insofar as their analyses of 
"realism" countenance changing perceptions and standards of 
verisimilitude. 29 A question, however, remains, or, rather, demands 
attention: how is this "public opinion" to be measured ? Clearly, neither 
Todorov nor Genette anticipated very wide public surveys or opinion 
polls to determine whether more people than not thought that Le rouge et 
le noir and Madame Bovary were realistic where Diary of a madman and 
Great Expectations were not. Nonetheless, their arguments seem to 
presuppose that in any given milieu there is going to be some uniformity 
of response. 
27 A detailed account of this development is given in Jonathan Culler's primer of 
structuralist thought. See Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1975), Chapter 7. 
28Gerard Genette, "Structuralism and literary criticism", in David Lodge ed., Modern 
Criticism and Theory: A Reader (Harlow: Longman, 1988), p .72. 
29In Anatomy of Criticism, Frye lists a sequence of literary works and then suggests that 
"each work is 'romantic' compared to its successors and 'realistic' compared to its 
predecessors"; see Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (1957; 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p.49. 
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Addressing this difficulty requires us to take account of how this 
structuralist interrogation of verisimilitude marks the final stage of how 
the ideas of textuality discussed here call for a departure from an aesthetic 
of realism. The close focus on textual codes and conventions, exemplified 
most completely by Barthes' S /Z and Gerard Genette' s sustained 
structuralist analysis of Proust in Narrative Discourse, culminates in the 
distinction between the lisible, and the scriptible. Texts which are merely 
lisible - readable - seek to foreclose the possibilities of linguistic 
signification; they seek to make language transparent. Scriptible -writable -
texts, on the other hand, leave room for, indeed require, a kind of play of 
signification, a realization of the nature and role of language in literature. 
The foreclosure of the readable has profound implications for the idea of 
"public opinion" as the normative reference point of verisimilitude. 
Coupled with the idea of naturalization, this public opinion seems to 
collude with the idea of the readable. In other words, it forecloses the 
possibilities of a text in order to maintain its verisimilitude. Public 
opinion, then, is implicated both as the agent of textual foreclosure and as 
something which is itself foreclosed. This double foreclosure makes 
possible 'the rapport between the text and public opinion which, by 
naturalizing certain textual conventions, allows readers to overlook 
language, to make an easy referential transition from the words - the text -
to the things - reality. 
This, clearly, is another matter. We have moved from a critique merely of 
literary and linguistic practices and beliefs to implying a philosophical 
interrogation of the understanding of reality itself. Todorov suggests as 
much: 
It is a bitter surprise to one day perceive that our life is 
governed by the same laws that we discovered in (the 
evening paper) and that we cannot change them. The 
knowledge that justice obeys the laws of 
verisimilitude, not of truth, will save no-one from 
being condemned.(Poetique, p.99) 
Todorov thus revives an opposition between verisimilitude and truth, 
and by implication, questions the truthfulness of realistic representations, 
giving more weight to the complexities of representation than the 
evaluative adjective realistic. This reassertion into critical practice of the 
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importance of language is much more radical than those with which we 
began this chapter. Todorov concludes his essay by asking, "is (truth) 
anything other than a distant and deferred verisimilitude?"(Poetique, 
p.99). 
(d) Language and the limitations of realism 
The quotation from Lewes with which we started this chapter serves as a 
useful point at which to conclude. There are, of course, substantial and 
important differences between the different critical approaches discussed 
in this section, but it is nonetheless useful to consider what they might be 
said to have in common. Each, simply, is arguing against the idea of self-
evidence in language, and, by extension, in literature. Language in 
literature cannot be understood merely as effecting the transition from the 
words on the page to the things which they represent, even if the 
representations are fictional. Booth's analysis tends towards a general 
aesthetic theory which derives from classical poetics; Formalism seeks, as 
Shklovsky put it, to resurrect the word; and structuralism seeks to 
resurrect the sign, to focus attention upon the constructivist nature of 
linguistic communication. 
In this sense, each of these approaches advocates a critical approach to the 
text. Ordinary apprehension of literature, in the various views of these 
theorists, lacks this critical perspective. Whether the critical method is to 
seek out the rhetoric of fiction, to focus on a new, purely artistic use of 
language, or to articulate the semiotic structure of literary texts, each of 
these theories questions the aesthetics of realism. Understood in light of 
these theories, words, to return to Conrad, become the foes not necessarily 
of reality, but certainly of realism. But this opposition between critical 
theory and realism takes an even more radical turn when not only the 
material of the text is subject to this kind of anti-intuitive inquiry but also 
its putative representational horizon. That is, when we are no longer 
content with not taking the text as it is, but begin to focus our analysis 
upon the other side, as it were, of the representational equation; the 
problem of reality itself. 
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Reality, the real, and representation 
Reality seems to us something worlds apart from invention. 
- Sigmund Freud 
Some critical theories of the text, as we have seen, seek to impede the 
transition from words to things, to challenge critics thoroughly to take 
account of the language and form of representation. This textual 
dimension is not, however, the only problematic aspect of realism, and in 
this chapter we shall explore some theoretical developments which have 
practised an analogous critique upon the idea of the "things" themselves. 
If the previous chapter was concerned with poetics, in this chapter this 
inquiry becomes philosophical. How is it that the representational horizon 
of the text is understood as reality? How is reality understood? 
The apprehension of reality has, of course, been perhaps the perennial 
question in philosophy. The existence of "things-in-themselves", and of 
the access of human consciousness to those things, have been among the 
principle issues with which philosophers have grappled. Realism, insofar 
as it seems to rely upon a notion of a commonly available and 
comprehensible idea of reality, as was discussed in the introduction to this 
study, would seem, then, to have answers to these questions. Once again, 
however, this presupposition runs into theoretical developments which 
challenge the self-evidence of the reality towards which representations 
are intended. Therefore, a critical theory of realism must, to some extent, 
confront the tradition of radical philosophical doubt and skepticism which 
has been implicit in philosophy at least since Kant1, and which latterly has 
borne pronouncedly upon literary theory. 
The influence of philosophical questions upon literary theory takes many 
forms, but it is possible to say that the predominant effect has been a 
1 Doubt and skepticism have, of course, been present in philosophy since its very dawn. 
Heraclitus, for example, is often cited as precursive to contemporary philosophy's most 
radical skepticism. The philosophical terrain in which the present study is moving, 
however, must be demarcated somewhere, and the dialectical movement of Western 
philosophy since Kant covers the pertinent concepts sufficiently. 
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repudiation of mimetic aesthetics in the service of greater critical 
awareness. Realistic representation has been variously characterized as 
naive, ideologically manipulative, or simply impossible, the standard 
works of realism, under the appropriate critical microscope, being revealed 
as inadequate in meeting their own representational requirements. 
A particularly divisive critical debate which turned upon these issues was 
what came to be known as the modernism-realism debate. Conducted 
within a group of Western Marxists, this debate serves usefully to 
introduce some of the ideas with which this section of the present study is 
concerned. Fredric Jameson's commentary upon the debate offers this 
account: 
Modern literary theory has in fact given us what are 
two essentially irreconcilable accounts of realism. On 
the one hand there are the classical apologias for this 
narrative mode ... Here realism is shown to have 
epistemological truth, as a privileged mode of 
knowing the world we live in and the lives we lead in 
it ... 
[However,] the ideologues of modernism do not seek 
to refute the ... defense of the realistic mode on its 
own terms . . . they sense its weak link to be 
preaesthetic, part and parcel of its basic 
presuppositions. Thus, the target of their attack 
becomes the very concept of reality itself which is 
implied by the realistic aesthetic ... The objection ... 
charges that realism, by suggesting that representation 
is possible ... tends to perpetuate a preconceived 
notion of some external reality to be imitated, and 
indeed, to foster a belief in the existence of some such 
common-sense everyday ordinary shared secular 
reality ... Yet ... the sheer accumulated weight of the 
great modern works of art ... tend to confirm the idea 
that there is something quite naive, in a sens quite 
profoundly unrealistic ... about the notion that reality 
is out there simply, quite objective and independent 
of us, and that knowing it involves the relatively 
unproblematic notion of getting an adequate picture 
of it in our heads. 2 
2Fredric Jameson, "Beyond the Cave: Demystifying the Ideology of Modernism", in hisThe 
Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-86, Vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), pp.120-121. 
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Jameson's comments capture the tenor of much skeptical literary theory 
and philosophy. Realism, it is said, involves an array of presuppositions as 
to the existence of the objective world and our possible knowledge of it. 
Jameson's summary implies that the choice is either realism or 
modernism, a belief in objective reality or skepticism towards it. He goes 
on to argue that the uncritical acceptance of "reality" is linked to the rise of 
capitalism and the bourgeois commodification of everyday life. Belief in 
reality, then, leaps from naivety to ideology, and it is the inherent 
contradictions of bourgeois ideology, illuminated by modernist aesthetics 
as alienation and discontinuity, which signal the shortcomings of a 
realistic aesthetic. Jameson writes: 
Realism is no longer appropriate; indeed, in this new 
social world which is ours today, we can go so far as to 
say that the very object of realism itself - secular 
reality, objective reality - no longer exists either.3 
Jameson's claim, that reality no longer exists, is a political claim. The 
horizon of social reality, he argues, is only conceivable under certain 
political conditions. By manoeuvring between the two poles of the debate, 
Jameson historicizes both belief in objective reality and its attendant 
aesthetics, a move which is made possible by the tension in Jameson's 
own theory between the relativism of historicism and the essentialism of 
his commitment to Marxian methods. The tenets of historical 
materialism, and Jameson's neo-Marxist historicism, thus account for the 
"realism" debate as he sees it. 
Jameson's account, however, is only one way of looking at this issue, and 
certainly leaves some questions unanswered. The historicism which 
Jameson brings to both the philosophical/political and aesthetic 
dimensions of this debate is an insightful critical development, but it 
remains unclear what might be meant by his claim that reality no longer 
exists. If it once existed and no longer does, what has emerged in its stead? 
Or perhaps he means that it never existed, except insofar as capitalism 
produced a common, but erroneous, belief in it. Certainly Jameson is 
aware of the pitfall of making a "straw-man" of critical targets4, but it 
would be another project to try to determine whether his theoretical 
3Jameson, "Beyond the Cave", p .122. 
4See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p .18. 
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account of this issue falls into such pits or not. Nonetheless, James
on's 
account introduces well the philosophical problematics of the critiqu
e of 
realistic representation, particularly those which are motivated
 by 
varieties of political philosophy, and which concern the much discus
sed 
concept of ideology. 
I. REALITY AND 'THE REAL' - REIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY 
(a)The Frankfurt School: a dialectic of reality 
The sustained critique of idealism and positivism mounted by the cri
tical 
theorists of the Frankfurt school has serious implications for the ques
tion 
of realistic representation in literature. Here, we shall consider some of
 the 
tenets of what came to be known as critical theory, and the ways in w
hich 
these ideas have borne upon literary theory and criticism. 
An important precursor to the full articulation of critical theory was
 the 
debate conducted between Georg Lukacs, on the one hand, and Ernst B
loch 
and Bertholdt Brecht, on the other, during the 1930s. In this debate we
 can 
see the impact of a radical critical program upon literary studie
s, a 
radicalism of which Lukacs was thoroughly condemnatory. Lukacs 
was 
almost entirely concerned with literary criticism at this stage,
 his 
commitment to realism evident in the essays collected as Writer and Crit
ic 
and other essays. Lukacs' 1970 preface to the English edition of th
is 
volume clearly evinces his hostility towards avant-gardism: 
My critical studies ... were directed against two fronts: 
against the schematic deadliness and 
impoverishment of socialist literature and against 
those movements seeking salvation in following 
Western avant-garde schools ... if certain exponents of 
the artistic avant-garde now represent themselves as 
inveterate anti-Stalinists, they can do so only because 
their work of that period has properly fallen into 
oblivion ... 
I sought, on the other hand, to revive the realist 
tradition of richness in content and form ... 
5 
5Georg Lukacs, Writer and Critic and other essays, ed. and trans. Arthur D.
 Kahn (New 
York: The Universal Library, 1971), p.8. Lukacs' prefaces to his republis
hed works would 
make, in fact, an interesting study in themselves. His problematic relat
ionship to Stalin 
and Soviet orthodoxy, complicated, of course, by Krushchev's denunciat
ion of Stalin in 
1956, prompted, it seems, a little revisionism here and there. George Li
chtheim, for 
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Included in this collection is an essay entitled "Art and Objective Truth", 
which argues for objectivity as the cornerstone of Marxist-Leninist 
epistemology: 
The basis for any correct cognition of reality, whether 
of nature or society, is the recognition of the 
objectivity of the external world, that is, its existence 
independent of human consciousness. Any 
apprehension of the world is nothing more than a 
reflection in consciousness of the world that exists 
independent of consciousness. This basic fact ... also 
serves, of course, for the artistic reflection of reality.6 
This kind of statement seems to presuppose a very straightforward 
epistemology, and a straightforward understanding of literary realism. We 
shall consider Lukacs in greater detail below; these few examples of his 
work from this period will suffice, at this stage, to illustrate some of the 
ideas against which Bloch and Brecht, and later the Critical Theorists, were 
arguing. 
Lukacs, from Moscow, had maintained a strong anti-Expressionist 
aesthetic position, against which Bloch had written. Bloch's defence of 
Expressionism took issue with Lukacs' very understanding of the 
relationship between art and reality: 
' . 
But what if Lukacs's reality - a coherent, infinitely 
mediated reality - is not so objective after all ? What if 
his conception of reality has failed to liberate itself 
from Classical systems ? What if authentic reality is 
also discontinuity ? Since Lukacs operates with a 
closed, objectivistic conception of reality ... he 
resolutely rejects any attempt on the part of artists to 
shatter any image of the world, even that of 
capitalism. Any art which strives to exploit the real 
fissures in surface inter-relations ... 7 
/ 
example, sees Lukacs' work during these Moscow years as including "a fair amount of what 
can only be described as rubbish", noting also Lukacs' references to "Stalin's 'epoch-making' 
work on linguistics". See George Lichtheim, Lukacs (London: Fontana, 1970), p.76. 
6Lukacs, Writer and Critic, p.25 
7Ernst Bloch, "Discussing Expressionism", trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Ronald Taylor ed., 
Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 1980), pp.16-27, at p.22. 
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In phrasing his challenge in this fashion, Bloch highlights what is 
philosophically at stake in this debate. While the debate can be distilled 
into a case of aesthetic preference - old-guard and new-guard - it also has 
profound philosophical implications. Against Lukacs' belief in objective 
reality, Bloch suggests an alternative model; one of discontinuity and 
"fissures." Conventional realism, if Bloch is correct, is not only regressive 
artistically, it is mistaken philosophically. To this challenge, Lukacs 
responded with "Realism in the balance", another salvo against 
Expressionism, and, more particularly, against Bloch's enthusiastic 
defence. Lukacs justified his position by invoking Marx: 
Bloch directs his attack at my view of totality ... The 
principle to be refuted, he believes, is 'the undiluted 
objective realism which characterized Classicism. 
According to Bloch, my thought is premissed 
throughout 'on the idea of a closed and integrated 
reality ... ' 
Lukacs continues: 
In the present debate we are concerned with ... (this) 
question, namely, does the 'closed integration', the 
'totality' of the capitalist system, of bourgeois society, 
with its unity of economics and ideology, really form 
an objective whole, independent of consciousness ? 
Among Marxists ... there should be no dispute on 
this point. Marx says: 'The relations of production of 
every society form a whole.'8 
The transition from this emphasis on the totality translates readily into 
aesthetic realism. Lukacs insists that a Marxist theory of literature must 
have reference to reality. He posits the notion of totality as the means of 
understanding reality "as it is": 
If literature is a particular form by means of which 
objective reality is reflected, then it becomes of crucial 
importance for it to grasp that reality as it truly is, and 
not merely to confine itself to whatever manifests 
itself immediately and on the surface. If a writer 
strives to represent reality as it truly is, i.e. if he is an 
authentic realist, then the question of totality plays a 
8Georg Lukacs, "Realism in the Balance", trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Aesthetics and 
Politics , pp.30-31. 
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decisive role, no matter how the writer actually 
conceives the problem intellectually.9 
For Lukacs, as a Marxist, the fragmented reality which Bloch suggests may 
in fact be authentic reality, is an impermissible view to which to hold. 
Bloch is suggesting that art must strive towards such a view of reality and, 
in doing so, must necessarily leave behind the literary techniques of social 
and historical realism. Being realistic within such a scheme means being 
Expressionistic, rather than representational. Fundamentally, we can see, 
the debate turns on the question of whether or not art should define itself 
as representational, taking social and historical reality as a model rather 
than a target. For Lukacs, the representational aspect of literature reflects 
the possibility of authentic knowledge of reality, while for Bloch, and for 
Brecht, who similarly took up the debate, anti-representational art serves 
this function. It may be, as Fredric Jameson has suggested, that Lukacs 
simply did not like modern art or literature. There are suggestions in 
Lukacs' work of a kind of aesthetic conservatism and prudishness; he 
objects to naturalism10, to the sexuality of the works of D.H. Lawrence and 
Henry Miller11, to Joyce. However, the complexity of these issues cannot, I 
suggest, be attributed merely to differences in personal taste. This becomes 
more apparent in later contributions to the debate, and in the more fully 
developed articulation of these philosophical issues in the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt school. 
The impact of critical theory on literary concerns is well expressed in 
Adorno's work on literature. Adorno, who, along with Horkheimer, can 
be considered the chief theoretician of the Frankfurt school, similarly took 
issue with realism: 
Nowadays, anyone who continued to dwell on 
concrete reality ... and wants to derive his impact from 
the fullness and plasticity of a material reality 
contemplated and humbly accepted ... would be guilty 
of a lie: the lie of delivering himself over to the world 
9Lukacs, "Realism in the Balance", p.33. 
10See Lukacs, "Narrate or Describe?", in Writer and Critic. 
11See Lukacs, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, trans. John and Necke Mander 
(Berlin, 1955; London: Merlin Press, 1963), p.74. 
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with a love that presupposes that the world 1s 
. f 1 12 meaning u ... 
Adorno goes on to consider the movement away from realism in the 
novel, the genre with which realism was most frequently associated. In 
these references, we see how Adorno' s philosophical anti-empiricism 
generates a movement towards literary avant-gardism. Realism, Adorno 
argues, is the aesthetic counterpart of what we might call a faith in the self-
evidence of things. The dialectic having undermined that self-evidence, 
the realistic theory of literature must, accordingly, give way. 
In this context, Adorno wrote against Lukacs, who after WWII had 
continued his invective against modern art, particularly now modernism. 
Adorno's criticism is telling. He points out many shortcomings in Lukacs 
critical work, what we might call his "shotgun" approach, for example: 
Lukacs groups completely disparate figures under the 
concepts of decadence and avantgardism (for him they 
are the same thing) - not only Proust, Kafka, Joyce, 
and Beckett but also Benn, Jiinger, and perhaps 
Heidegger; and as theoreticians, Benjamin and 
myself. 13 
But, the strength of Adorno' s criticism of Lukacs' shortcomings aside, the 
fundamental point of difference is the orientation of the relationship 
between art and reality. Adorno sets art against reality, rather than with 
reality, as in the relationship proposed by Lukacs. He writes: 
... not by gazing at mere immediacy, does art become 
knowledge ... Only in a crystallization of its own 
formal law and not in a passive acceptance of objects 
does art converge with what is real. In art knowledge 
is mediated through and through. In art even what 
Lukacs considers to be solipsism and a regression to 
the illusionary immediacy of the subject does not 
signify a denial of the object, as it does in bad 
epistemologies, but rather aims dialectically at 
reconciliation with the object ... It (art) represents 
negative knowledge of reality ... A theory of art that 
12
Theodor W. Adorno, "The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel"(1954), in 
Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature, Volume I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.30. 
13 Adorno, "Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukacs Realism in Our Time"(l958), in Notes 
to Literature, Volume I, p.221. 
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refuses to acknowledge this is philistine and 
ideological at the same time.14 
Adorno's formulation of the negative cognitive relationship between art 
and reality must be understood within the context of the Frankfurt 
school's sustained critique of reason; the project to reveal the myth, we 
might say, of enlightenment. 
Max Horkheimer - installed as director of the Frankfurt school in January 
1931 15 - was instrumental in inaugurating one sense of the word "critical" 
which persists in contemporary literary and philosophical studies. He 
writes: 
The critical theory of society ... has for its object men 
as producers of their own way of life in its totality. 
The real situations which are the starting point of 
science are not regarded simply as data to be verified 
16 
The theorists of the Frankfurt School enlisted literature into Critical 
Theory, taking the position that literature must not simply verify reality, 
but embody a critique of it. Ironically, perhaps, the Frankfurt school 
actually owed much of this critical methodology to Lukacs.17 In History 
and Class Consciousness, Lukacs had laid the groundwork for critical 
analysis of social structures based upon what he called the phenomenon of 
, 
reification. Reification, which confers, Lukacs says, an illusory objectivity 
upon social phenomena, is the immediate target of his Hegelian-Marxist 
critique: 
It (reification) can be overcome only by constant and 
constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified 
structure of existence by concretely relating to the 
concretely manifested contradictions of the total 
14Adomo, "Extorted Reconciliation", pp.224-225. 
151 have obtained this, and most other, historical information on the Frankfurt school from 
the following sources:Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imgination: A History of the Frankfurt 
School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-50 (London: Heinemann, 1973); Andrew 
Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum, 
1982); Richard Kearney ed., Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume VIII: Twentieth-
Century Continental Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994). 
16Max Horkheimer, Postscript to "Traditional and Critical Theory", in Paul Connerton ed., 
Critical Sociology: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p .222. 
17Lukacs' influence on early critical theory is well-documented; see Arato & Gebhardt, The 
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, pp.193-207; Andrew Feenberg, Lukacs, Marx, and the 
Sources of Critical Theory (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981). 
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development, by becoming conscious of the 
immanent meanings of these contradictions 
He continues: 
Only when the consciousness of the proletariat is able 
to point out the road along which the dialectics of 
history is objectively impelled ... will the proletariat 
become the identical subject-object of history whose 
praxis will change reality. 18 
Once again, we will defer more detailed discussion of Lukacs' work; it is 
necessary, however, to understand the general shape of Lukacs' critique. 
Reificiation - and its cognate concept of ideology - imposes itself upon 
human cognition. Jameson, concluding the volume Aesthetics and 
Politics, summarizes the substance of Lukacs' critique: 
reification is a process which affects our cognitive 
relationship with the social totality ... The reification 
of late capitalism ... renders society opaque: it is the 
lived source of the mystifications on which ideology 
. b d 19 1s ase ... 
While Lukacs' critical theory, such as it is, proposed various solutions or 
goals towards which the critique of society might progress - the humanism 
of his Hegelian-Marxism, the Party during his strict orthodoxy - the 
adoption and adaptation of his method of social and cultural critique by 
the Frankfurt school involved an ever-increasing radical skepticism, 
particularly in the aesthetic and cultural theories of Adorno. Unlike 
Lukacs, Adorno was prepared to believe that the inherent contradictions 
of the reified structure of society were irresolvable, and to abandon the 
possibility of social re-integration. For Adorno, earlier reified and reifying 
frameworks, like religion, were being replaced by culture. The 
collaborative Dialectic of Enlightenment makes this comparison: 
The sociological theory that the loss of the support of 
objectively established religion, the dissolution of the 
last remnants of precapitalism, together with 
technological and social differentiation or 
18
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (Berlin, 1923; London: The Merlin Press, 1971), p.197. 
19 Aesthetics and Politics, p.212. 
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specialization, have led to cultural chaos is disproved 
every day; for culture now impresses the same stamp 
upon everything. Film, radio and magazines make up 
a system which is uniform as a whole and in every 
part.20 
In accordance with this conviction, Adorno argues for the possibility of art 
not merely to reflect critical knowledge of the reified world but actually to 
be critical knowledge. "New music", James Joyce, a relentless need, 
according to Jameson, "for modern art and thought to be difficult";21 these, 
among other things, constitute, for Adorno, the possibilities of critical 
knowledge. The Marxian critique of actual political conditions, of 
commodity fetishism, of ideology, develops into a critique of reason and 
rationalism, of aesthetics, of culture, of any sort of cultural, social, or 
philosophical unity. 
Fredric Jameson notes Adorno's resolute radicalism. He writes: 
The essential argument of Negative Dialektik and 
Adorno's ultimate philosophical position, seems to 
me to be an articulation on the theoretical level of 
that methodology which we have seen at work in a 
concrete, practical way in the earlier aesthetic essays 
and critical writings ... the practice of negative 
dialectics involves a constant movement away from 
the official content of an idea - as, for example, the 
"real" nature of freedom or of society as things in 
themselves - and toward the various contradictory 
forms which such ideas have taken, whose conceptual 
limits and inadequacies stand as immediate figures or 
symptoms of the limits of the concrete social situation 
itself .22 
Adorno's radical skepticism anticipates, in some ways, the radical 
skepticism which was later to develop in the structuralist and post-
structuralist movements. Jameson's overview of the realism-modernism 
debate makes this connection: 
20
Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming 
(London: Verso, 1979), p.120. 
21 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of 
Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p.3. 22Jameson, Marxism and Form, p.55. 
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post-structuralism has added yet a different kind of 
parameter to the Realism/Modernism controversy, 
one which - like the question of narrative or the 
problems of historicity - was implicit in the original 
exchange but scarcely articulated or thematized as 
such. The assimilation of realism as a value to the old 
philosophical concept of mimesis by such writers as 
Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard or Deleuze, has 
reformulated the Realism/Modernism debate in 
terms of a Platonic attack on the ideological effects of 
representation.23 
The logic of this development from the realism/ modernism debate to 
post-structuralism is instructive. Although realism is quite different to the 
classical idea of mimesis, conflating the two makes possible a rejection of 
realism on the same grounds as Plato's rejection of mimesis. Plato 
dismissed mimesis because it claimed truthfully to represent objects of 
which the truth, according to Plato's theory of Forms, was necessarily 
located outside and beyond its appearance. If the truth-claim attributed to 
mimesis is transferred to realism, then realism seems to be claiming a 
truth where it only represents an appearance of the truth. This 
appearance, moreover, is not limited by a lack of access to the truth of 
things, but by the ideological subsitution of appearance for essence. 
This is a complicated juxtaposition because while classical ideas of 
mimesis can be considered distant forebears of realism, there are 
important differences, particularly with regard to the idea of "truth," 
which are elided by too simple an identification between them. If realism 
is described as co-extensive with classical mimesis then its implicit 
cognitive claim, under attack from this radical critique of cognition itself, 
seems untenable. The movement from political critique to metaphysical 
critique, as represented particularly by Adorno, characterizes 
representational aesthetics as uncritical. Critical theory becomes possible 
only when rational structures give way to relentless abstraction, a negation 
of the real. 
23 Aesthetics and Politics, p.199. 
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(b)Louis Althusser: a science of theory 
The other predominant current of Western Marxism - and one which 
claims to depart from the Hegelianism of both Lukacs and the Frankfurt 
School - which bears upon the present inquiry was inaugurated by 
Althusser's "intervention," via which, according to Vincent Descombes, 
Althusser re-negotiated Marxism so as to provide it with a scientific, anti-
humanist grounding, thereby extricating it from the vestiges of theoretical 
humanism without surrendering it to vulgar determinism. 24 As 
Descombes notes, and Althusser himself is very explicit about, his 
intervention was occasioned by specific developments in the (empirical) 
history of world communism - Sino-Soviet antagonism, and the 
denunciation of Stalin. 25 Here, as with the Frankfurt School, we are 
concerned with the general theoretical shape of Althusserian Marxism. 
We start with the aspect of Althusser' s thought which is, perhaps, most 
well-known: anti-humanism. Althusser's anti-humanism is renowned, 
and often the basis of criticism, on the grounds that he rejects as 
"ideological" any values which are implicit in the nebulous concept of 
humanism. 26 It seems oxymoronic to speak of anti-humanist Marxism, 
Marxism deriving, of course, from an apprehension of social injustice. It is 
helpful, then, to attend to this concept, to make some sense of what anti-
humanism means in this context. 
The basis of Althusser' s anti-humanism is his claim that there is a 
discontinuity between the young Marx of the Theses on Feuerbach and the 
mature Marx of Capital. The Hegelian Marxism represented by Lukacs, 
which posits humanity as both the subject and object of Marxism is 
rejected, Althusser says, by Marx himself: 
In 1845, Marx broke radically with every theory that 
based history and politics on an essence of man. This 
24See Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p .18. Perry Anderson also stresses the 
irruptive quality of Althusser's work, arguing that it represented the first major 
theoretical system born within French communism; see Perry Anderson, Considerations on 
Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976), p .38. 
25
For a full account of these events in the context of Althusser's works, see Gregory Elliott, 
Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London: Verso, 1987), pp.16 ff. 
26See, for example, Richard Freadman and Seamus Miller, Re-thinking Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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unique rupture contained three indissociable 
elements. 
(1) The formation of a theory of history and politics 
based on radically new concepts: the concepts of social 
formation, productive forces, relations of production, 
superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last 
instance by the economy, specific determination of the 
other levels etc. 
(2) A radical critique of the theoretical pretensions of 
every philosophical humanism. 
(3) The definition of humanism as an ideology. 
. .. 
This rupture with every philosophical anthropology 
or humanism is no secondary detail; it is Marx's 
scientific discovery.27 
Althusserian anti-humanism is not, however, an advocacy of the 
monstrous, a negative value system which does not concern itself with 
human welfare. Rather, it must be understood in the context of scientific 
Marxism, and in particular with Althusser's attempts to locate the 
perspective of critical theory outside human experience. Fredric Jameson 
argues this: 
The most scandalous aspect of Structuralism as a 
movement - its militant anti-humanism, as found in 
both Marxists (Althusser) and in anti-Marxists 
(Foucault) alike - must be understood conceptually as 
a refusal of the older categories of human nature and 
of the notion that man (or human consciousness) 1s 
an intelligible entity or field of study in himself .28 
And Jameson goes on to say that this "essential theme of Structuralism, 
(is) not so much an intrinsic discovery in its own right, but rather ... a kind 
of motivation for some more basic tendency in structural research, namely 
the emphasis on decoding and decipherment."29 
Althusser's emphasis on this kind of scientific Marxism derives from his 
conviction that human experience is inevitably corrupted by ideology. The 
history of the term ideology is so fraught with vagaries that it seems today 
to be empty of any clear meaning. Nonetheless, its importance within 
27Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (Paris, 1965; London: Verso, 1990), p.227. 
28Jameson, The Prison-House, p.139. 
29J ameson, The Prison-House, p.141. 
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Althusser' s schema necessitates attention. While for Lukacs, ideology and 
its entanglement in the concept of reification was equated with "false 
consciousness," the antidote to which was the true consciousness of the 
proletariat as the identical subject-object of history, the ideology to which 
Althusser refers is less easily eluded. The well-known "lived relations" 
definition is clearly expressed in For Marx: 
we can say that ideology, as a system of 
representations, is distinguished from science in that 
in it the practico-social function is more important 
than the theoretical function (function as knowledge). 
What is the nature of this social function? To 
understand it we must refer to the Marxist theory of 
history. The 'subjects' of history are given human 
societies. They present themselves as totalities whose 
unity is constituted by a certain specific type of 
complexity, which introduces instances, that, 
following Engels, we can, very schematically, reduce 
to three: the economy, politics and ideology. So in 
every society we can posit, in forms which are 
sometimes very paradoxical, the existence of an 
economic activity as the base, a political organization 
and 'ideological' forms (religion, ethics, philosophy, 
etc). So ideology is as such an organic part of every 
social totality ... So ideology is not an aberration or a 
contingent excrescence of History: it is a structure 
essential to the historical life of societies.30 
This ineluctability of ideology is supplemented by the relationship 
between ideology and the unconscious, used here in a non-Freudian 
sense: 
In truth, ideology has very little to do with 
consciousness ... It is profoundly unconscious ... 
Ideology is indeed a system of representations, but in 
the majority of cases these representation have 
nothing to do with 'consciousness' ... it is above all as 
structures that they impose on the vast majority of 
men, not via their 'consciousness'. They are perceived 
- accepted - suffered cultural objects and they act 
functionally on men via a process that escapes them. 
Men 'live' their ideologies as the Cartesian 'saw' - or 
did not see - if he was not looking at it - the moon two 
hundred paces away: not at all as a form of 
consciousness, but as an object of their 'world' - as 
30 Althusser, For Marx, pp.231-232. 
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their 'world' itself ... men live their actions ... in 
ideology, by and through ideology; in short ... the 
'lived' relation between men and the world ... passes 
through ideology, or better, is ideology itself.31 
Given that, according to Althusser, life is thoroughly ideological - he goes 
so far as to say that ideology is "indispensable" and the well-known essay 
"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"32 considers some of its social 
manifestations - it cannot provide access to what he calls knowledge. 
Althusser sets up a distinction between, on the one hand, experience and 
ideology, and, on the other, theory and knowledge. Theory is Althusser's 
guiding concept;33 it incorporates the idea of Marxism, of philosophy itself, 
as scientific praxes which enable true, non-ideological knowledge. In this, 
Althusser' s project is comparable with that of the Frankfurt School, his 
antipathy towards their "ideology of reification" notwithstanding. Both 
critical tendencies argue for a (critical) theory which sets itself against the 
social and historical world, and which can be the only claimant of 
cognitive authority. 
It must be noted, however, that Althusser's theory, so dependent on a 
rigid distinction between experience and knowledge, has trouble 
maintaining this very distinction. Having argued (conceded?) that even 
communist societies cannot do without ideology, Althusser defines the 
ideology of a classless society as being measured by the (experienced) 
"profit of all men." This return to experience is more thoroughly charted, 
and with something of an air of finality, by Vincent Descombes: 
31 
Returning ... to experience and the 'lived-through', 
Althusser abandons the attempt to endow Marxism 
with an epistemological foundation and reverts to the 
phenomenological foundation which previously had 
been thought satisfactory enough. In 1965, Althusser 
had denounced the confusion of the 'real object' ... 
with the 'object of knowledge' ... The rehabilitation of 
Althusser, For Marx, p.233. 
32See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). 
33 Althusser was the general editor of the publishing serie in which most of his major works, 
as well as those of Macherey and Balibar, among others, appeared. The title of this series 
was Theorie. 
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the identity between the two after 1970 brings the 
Althusserian undertaking to an official close.34 
But these complexities - even shortcomings - of Althusserian theory, and 
the "official" close of the undertaking, do not signal the end of the 
Althusserian matter. The influence of structuralist Marxism upon 
contemporary literary theory has been profound, and, as I have 
mentioned, has motivated much of the 'anti-theory' reaction. Accordingly, 
I shall overlook this "close" and consider now the impact of Althusser's 
distinction between knowledge and ideology upon questions of literary 
representation - particularly as it is manifested in Althusser's own literary 
theory, and in the work of his student Pierre Macherey. 
Althusser himself considers the relationships between theory /knowledge, 
ideology, and art/literature, in the following terms: 
The problem of the relations between art and ideology 
is a very complicated and difficult one. However, I can 
tell you in what directions our investigations tend. I 
do not rank real art among the ideologies. 35 
Althusser refers to Pierre Macherey's literary theory - to which we shall 
shortly turn - and goes on to say that art, which is not ideology, is similarly 
not knowledge. Rather, art, according to Althusser, has a "relationship" 
with each. He writes, 
the peculiarity of art is to 'make us see' (nous donner 
a voir), 'make us perceive', 'make us feel' something 
which alludes to reality ... What art makes us see, and 
therefore gives to us in the form of 'seeing', 
'perceiving' and 'feeling' (which is not the form of 
knowing), is the ideology from which it is born, in 
which it bathes, from which it detaches itself as art, 
and to which it alludes.36 
34Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.135. Descombes is not referring to the 
same material as I; the point, I believe, is nonetheless valid. It is also important to note 
that Descombes' analysis of Althusser gives particular resonance to his use of the terms 
f:henomenological and epistemological. 
5 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p.221. 
36 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p.222. Althusser's words here - about making one see, 
and so forth - are strikingly similar to those of Joseph Conrad in his preface to The Nigger 
of the 'Narcissus'. Whether this is intentional or not is, perhaps, not determinable, but it 
provides an interesting point of analysis insofar as Althusser's intention is critically to 
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Althusser suggests, then, that art is a kind of intermediary between 
knowledge and ideology. Real art, that is; whatever he may mean by that. 
It is possible to juxtapose this "real art" with the idea of art as critical 
knowledge proposed by Adorno, which, as we have seen, involves a 
commitment to aesthetic discontinuity. Althusser, however, cites 
Macherey as an authority on this point, and Macherey's essay to which 
Althusser refers is about Tolstoy (via Lenin), who, according to Jameson's 
analysis of Adorno, is something of a literary Beethoven, as opposed to 
Schonberg and Joyce, who represent Adorno's critical art.37 
As Althusser says, Pierre Macherey contributed the most complete 
synthesis of literary theory and structuralist Marxism. Applying 
Althusser's principles of production, structural causality, and 
overdetermination, Macherey develops a productionist aesthetic: 
the work does not proceed with this ingenuous 
freedom, with this independent movement which 
will be the token of pure invention, but is rather 
sustained by an organized diversity which gives it 
both form and content. 
Therefore, the improvised nature which the work 
presents is nothing but an effect, a product ... The 
work is not made at random, according to the law of a 
disinterested freedom, it is made because at each 
moment and at each of its levels it is precisely 
determined. 38 
This productionist aesthetic reasserts Althusser's distinction between 
ideology and knowledge and places literature in between the two. Literary 
theory, according to Macherey, enables the critic to appreciate this complex 
double-edged relationship which places literature thus. In order to argue 
this, Macherey develops a specific concept which he calls 'fiction': 
Fiction, which we must not confuse with illusion, is 
the substitute, if not the equivalent, of knowledge 
undermine these "effects" by interpolating his theory of ideology, whereas Conrad's seems 
to be to achieve them. 
37
Jameson, Marxism and Form, p.41. Beethoven in Adomo's schema is not characterized as 
entirely "regressive" and neither, by extension, is Tolstoy; but they do not achieve the 
critical position that Adorno attributes to Schonberg. 
38Pierre Macherey, Pour une theorie de la production litteraire (Paris: Franc;ois Maspero, 
1966), p.51, trans. mine. 
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(connaissance). A theory of literary production must 
teach us what the book 'knows', and how it 'knows' it. 
Thus, for the flight of illusion which gives an 
indeterminate account, the book substitutes the clear 
contours - which are not, however, simple - of a 
fiction. Fiction is a determined illusion: the essence of 
the literary text is in the establishment of one such 
determination. 39 
Fiction is thus a kind of conduit between theory /knowledge and 
ideology /illusion. Literary theory, which attends to fiction, is the 
knowledge and communication of the fiction of the literary text. 
Macherey's book turns on this intermediary quality of literary theory, its 
position between illusion and knowledge, the implicit and the explicit, 
envers/endroit, what the text says and what it does not. He pursues the 
articulation of this theory through the establishment of theoretical 
principles, through analysis of literary criticism, particularly Lenin's work 
on Tolstoy, and through working on several diverse literary texts. 
This articulation of a literary theory based on the Althusserian principles 
seems to militate against realistic theories which are unable to move, 
Macherey argues, beyond the idea of semblance, which inhibits the 
transition from illusion/ideology to fiction/literary theory, and certainly 
rules out the achievement of knowledge/theory. Macherey says as much, 
defining literary discourse as parody, rather than representation. There 
would seem, then, in structuralist Marxist literary theory, to be an 
emphasis on dissonance. Fredric Jameson, rethinking interpretation in the 
light of Marxian aesthetics, makes this point: 
In the case of Althusserian literary criticism proper, 
then, the appropriate object of study emerges only 
when the appearance of formal unification is 
unmasked as a failure or an ideological mirage. The 
authentic function of the cultural text is then staged as 
an interference ... for Althusser and Pierre Macherey 
the privileged form of this disunity or dissonance is 
the objectification of the ideological by the work of 
aesthetic production. The aim of a properly structural 
interpretation or exegesis thus becomes the explosion 
of the seemingly unified text into a host of clashing 
and contradictory elements.40 
39Macherey, Theorie, p.80. 
40Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p.56. 
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Althusserian theory, then, sets itself against the unity of form and content 
and the representational relationship between the text and reality which 
are characteristic of realism. Or, at least, so it seems. Jameson, however, 
goes on to point out that, unlike "canonical post-structuralism", the 
Marxian analysis must be reunified, because Marxist theory, with the 
possible exception of the negative dialectics of the Frankfurt School, relies 
upon the possibility of the ultimate reconciliation of political alienation. 
Elsewhere in the same book, he says that Althusser does not "draw the 
fashionable conclusion that because history is a text, the 'referent' does not 
exist."41 Macherey himself shows how literary theory, as he understands it, 
may be radically critical, but is not radically skeptical: 
Obviously this does not mean that criticism serves to 
undo literature, to destroy illusion: the study of 
literary works supposes neither a blind faith nor an 
obligatory mistrust: faith and mistrust would be the 
two extreme forms of the same rank prejudice.42 
The impact of scientific Marxism upon literary theory, at this stage of its 
development, is complicated. While this kind of theory insists upon a 
radical critique which would seem to encompass mimetic literature, it is 
also attended by an appreciation of the unavoidability, even the necessity, 
of literary mimesis. In due course, I shall show how this critical position 
can itself be subject to critique which will show how it may be possible to 
reconcile literary mimesis with critical literary theory. 
Before moving to that stage of the present study, however, it is necessary 
to consider another philosophical development which has influenced 
literary theory and the problem of mimesis. The twentieth-century 
emphasis on the critical, which we have considered in relation to 
language and literature, and the social and historical world and literature, 
has also been applied to questions of metaphysics. We turn now to these 
questions as they inform Jacques Derrida's radical phenomenology and its 
cognate critical method, deconstruction. 
41Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p.35. 
42Macherey, Theorie, p.91. 
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II. REPRESENTATION AND 'PRESENCE' - DECONSTRUCTION 
It is with some caution that we call Derrida's work "phenomenological." 
Richard Kearney points out that Derrida himself acknowledges his 
phenomenological heritage, more Heideggerian than Husserlian, 
especially insofar as the former set himself against classical metaphysics.43 
Additionally, Derrida's early major works were essentially reworkings of 
phenomenological texts, particularly Speech and Phenomena. It is beyond 
the scope of this study thoroughly to consider Derrida and his 
phenomenological heritage. These complexities have, of course, been 
exhaustively discussed,44 and it is not my intention here to enter into 
similar kinds of discussions nor to consider the various ways in which 
Derridean thought has been interpreted and mobilized. Rather, I shall 
here look at a small selection of Derrida's work and consider how some of 
the tenets of Derrida's method, as they are manifested in these texts, bear 
upon the present enquiry into realistic representation. 
In the landmark essay "Structure, sign and play ... ", perhaps the founding 
document of post-structuralism45, Derrida makes clear the critical bias of 
his enterprise. He takes issue with metaphysics, with history, with 
structuralism, trying to show how each is possessed of a will towards some 
sort of origin, or, more particularly, towards a centre. By setting himself 
against - by initiating his critique of - ideas or concepts of the centre, 
Derrida illustrates the "rupture" in the history of the concept of structure 
with which he begins his essay. The nature and function of the centre, 
Derrida says, is that 
it is the point where the substitution of contents, of 
elements, of terms, is no longer possible. At the 
43Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy: 2nd edition (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1994), p.114. 
441 am particularly indebted to the following texts for material on and analyses of Derrida: 
Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, particularly Chapter 5, "Difference"; 
Descombes, Grammaire d'objets en taus genres; Kearney, Modern Movements in European 
Philosophy; Kearney ed., Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy; Jonathan Culler, On 
Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 1984). 
45It is Derrida's emphasis in this essay on what he calls the "structurality of structure" 
which prompts this suggestion. Where structuralism replaces the idea of self-evidence 
with a notion of structural-evidence, Derrida seeks to question the means whereby this is 
achieved through his critique of the "centre." It is noteworthy, however, that while 
structuralism was a term which accompanied the development of the theories now 
characterized as structuralist, in the context of French philosophy and theory, post-
structuralism is not a widely used term. 
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centre, the permutation or the transformation of 
elements ... is forbidden. At least, it has always been 
forbidden (and I use this word by design). It has always 
been thought, then, that the centre, which is unique 
by definition, rules the structure, escapes 
structurality .46 
Derrida is concerned to challenge this prohibition against questioning the 
centre. In order to do so, he argues that the very idea of the centre is 
contradictory. Appeals to the centre and its cognate idea of presence47 have 
always, Derrida argues, informed, and so limited, Western discourses. By 
arguing that the centre is not a fixed place but a function, Derrida seeks to 
decentre discourse, to make the centre also discourse, and to emphasize 
what he calls "the play of signification"(ED, p.411). 
But, typically, this process is problematic, and much of Derrida's argument 
turns on this very point. Reluctantly citing Nietzsche, Freud, and, 
especially, Heidegger, as forebears of the decentring process, Derrida 
illustrates the problem in the following terms: 
all these destructive discourses and all their analogues 
are caught in a kind of circle. This circle is unique and 
it describes the form of a relationship between the 
history of metaphysics and the destruction of the 
history of metaphysics: there is no way to unsettle 
metaphysics without the use of metaphysical 
concepts; we have no language ... which would be a 
stranger to this history; we cannot express any 
destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slide into the form, into the logic and into the implicit 
postulations of the very thing which it would 
contest.(ED, p.412) 
This, of course, is the deconstructionist paradox: how can one undermine 
language except in language? A problem arises insofar as a critique of 
appeals to the centre seems necessarily to have claimed an infallible 
position from which to undertake that critique. But this position, within a 
deconstructionist scheme, must also be criticized. This problem may be 
46Jacque Derrida, L'ecriture et la difference (Paris: Seuil, 1967), p.410, trans. mine. 
47"Presence" may be understood as "centre" substantiated - as Derrida says, God, or 
transcendentality, or essence, as centre; see p.411. Hereafter, this volume will be referred to 
as ED, and references will be included in the text. 
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understood as a problem of self-critique. From what perspective, and to 
what end, is self-critique to be undertaken? 
Derrida explores this problem with reference to the ethnological work of 
Levi-Strauss. He articulates several key concepts along the way: the notion 
of bricolage, of play, and of supplementarity. All of these ideas are figures 
of the way in which Derrida seeks to set the strategies of deconstruction to 
work in the human sciences. Understanding the human sciences in terms 
of these ideas, Derrida argues, confronts the tendency towards a centre, 
towards presence, and this confrontation represents the possibility of a 
perpetual, but unsuccesful, testing of the limits imposed upon human 
sciences by their traditional metaphysical base. 
The figure of play is particularly important to this project. The lack of 
exhaustiveness to which Levi-Strauss refers is predicated on an empirical 
relationship between the inquirer and the field of inquiry. If a total picture 
of the field - in Levi-Strauss' case South American mythology - is not 
achieved, it is a shortcoming on the part of inquirer, a lack of omniscience. 
Levi-Strauss defends himself by suggesting that such a shortcoming is not 
fatal to inquiry,_ that the non-total view is, in many cases, sufficient. But 
Derrida's critique modifies this relationship between the inquirer and the 
field of inquiry. Instead of seeing the failure to achieve totalization as 
deriving from the inevitable shortcomings of the inquirer, or the inquiry, 
Derrida characterizes non-totalization as an ineluctable property of the 
field of inquiry itself. This redefinition of the field of inquiry is where 
Derrida interpolates his concept of play: 
this field is, in effect, one of play, that is to say, of 
infinite substitutions within a finished ensemble. 
This field only permits these substitutions because it 
is finite, that is, because instead of being an 
inexhaustible field, as in the classic hypothesis, 
instead of being too big, it lacks something, to know a 
centre which arrests and grounds the play of 
substitutions.(ED, p.423) 
Play, then, is the figure that Derrida uses to try to deconstruct existing 
approaches in the human sciences. The properties of play allow him to 
locate infinite substitutions within a finite field, a move which both 
validates and relativizes every effort at inquiry. The importance of play is 
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reinforced by his efforts to imbue the concept of play with a kind of 
philosophical primacy: 
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an 
element is always a signifying and substitutive 
reference inscribed within a system of differences and 
the movement of a chain. Play is always the play of 
absence and presence, but if we would think play 
radically, we must think it prior to the alternatives of 
presence and absence; we must think of being as 
presence or as absence from the possibility of play, and 
not the other way around.(ED, p.426) 
Articulating these deconstructionist concepts - play, bricolage, absence -
Derrida is trying fundamentally to revise the human sciences, to change 
them from ambitious inquiry which contemplates its success to an endless 
process of valid but fruitless engagements. He is keenly aware of the 
difficulties of realizing such an ambition. Even Levi-Strauss, catalyst for 
much of his argument in this essay, according to Derrida, evinces a "kind 
of ethic of presence, a nostalgia for the origin"(ED, p.427). Turning from 
Levi-Strauss to Nietszche, Derrida writes of: 
the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of 
the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of the 
world of signs without error, without truth, without 
origin ... (ED, p.427) 
But he closes the essay with a tacit acknowledgement that Being-as-absence 
is not, perhaps, an option; a reflection on our, and his, aversion to this 
unnamable formlessness. 
Derrida's willingness to close his discussion with an image of "terrifying 
monstrosity" is itself evidence of the way in which, according to Richard 
Kearney, "Derrida rigorously undermines traditional notions of thinking 
and endeavours to overcome the division between philosophical and 
aesthetic discourse."48 His essay, like the concepts it discusses, is a kind of 
Gothic tale, haunted by absence, which it cannot quite explain nor escape.49 
48 Kearney, Modern Movements, p.112. 
49Derrida's later work seems to me to be increasingly aesthetic. The Post-Card (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), for example, begins as a vaguely erotic correspondence. 
Spectres de Marx: L' etat de la dette, le travail du deuil at la nouvelle Internationale 
(Paris: Galilee, 1993), begins as a kind of drama, Hamlet actually, as it begins to rethink 
the "phantoms" of Marxism. 
65 
This aspect of Derrida's work motivates the vast divergencies of 
interpretation of his philosophy. While "Structure, sign and play in the 
discourse of the human sciences" seems to endorse a kind of Nietzschean 
view of the lack of centre, it would be erroneous to suggest that this is an 
uncontested view of Derrida's position.50 
Nestled amongst the complexities of his task and of his expression, not to 
mention the industry which has committed himself to the exploration of 
his work, however, he exhibits, I suggest, one consistent trait: a 
relentlessly critical disposition. Countless philosophical propositions, not 
to mention philosophers, are subjected - in Derrida's vast ceuvre - to 
deconstructionist analysis. Similarly, forms and patterns of human 
behaviour, the material of the human sciences, are subjected to Derrida's 
" radical critique. Derrida's method, however, is not merely to confront his 
material. Rather, the strategy of deconstruction, according to Descombes, is 
a kind of double game: 
Derrida opts to play a double game (in the sense that a 
'double agent' serves two sides), feigning obedience to 
the tyrannical system of rules while simultaneously 
laying traps for it in the form of problems which it is 
at a loss to settle.51 
Descombes continues on this point: 
The double game is thus not only of the 
deconstructor' s doing: in order for it to be played, the 
language of philosophy must itself already be full of 
duplicity (in both senses of the word - state of 
doubleness, or hypocrisy and lying). Indeed, ever since 
his first published text, the introduction to Husserl's 
Origin of Geometry, Derrida has done nothing but 
denounce the pretensions of philosophical language 
to univocity. He has not ceased to wage a campaign ... 
in favour of equivocity.52 
50It would, of course, be impossible here fully to overview the different ways and different 
disciplines in which Derrida has been interpreted, misinterpreted, employed, and so on. 
Two helpful references, however, have been Penelope Deutscher, "Operatives differance", 
forthcoming in The Journal of Political Philosophy, in which she considers some of the 
various labels which have been attached to Derrida; and Irene E. Harvey, Derrida and the 
Economy of Differance (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1986), p.23, where she 
firovides an a-z of what, in her view, Derrida is not. 
1Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.139. 
52Descombes,Modern French Philosophy, p.140. 
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Derrida's campaign in favour of equivocity can be seen in Speech and 
Phenomena, his first major work, which seeks to deconstruct Husserl's 
phenomenological critique of metaphysics. According to Derrida, Husserl's 
critique of metaphysics is only of metaphysics "in the customary sense", 
when, according to Derrida: 
Husserl, while ceaselessly criticizing metaphysical 
speculation, in fact had his eye only on the perversion 
or degeneracy of what he continued to believe in and 
wished to restore as authentic metaphysics ... 53 
The problem with Husserl's critique of metaphysics, according to Derrida, 
is that it is still concerned to identify an element of immediacy, of 
univocity, in human thought. Husserl's distinction between indication, 
which is conventional, mediated language, and expression betrays this in 
Husserl: 
All speech, or rather everything in speech which does 
not restore the immediate presence of the signified 
content, is in-expressive. Pure expression will be the 
pure active intention ... of an act of meaning ... that 
animates a speech whose content ... is present(SP, 
p.40) 
We can see parallels between Derrida's critique of metaphysics and Roland 
Barthes' analysis of the reality effect; both suggest that a belief in an 
immediacy between a sign and its content must be undermined. Derrida 
says as much when he argues that Husserl's philosophy of presence, 
insofar as it relies upon immediacy, 
eliminates signs by making them derivative; it annuls 
reproduction and representation by making signs a 
modification of a simple presence. But because it is 
just such a philosophy ... which has so constituted and 
established the very concepts of signs, the sign is from 
its origin and to the core of its sense marked by this 
will to derivation or effacement. Thus, to restore the 
original and nonderivative character of signs, in 
opposition to classical metaphysics, is, by an apparent 
paradox, at the same time to eliminate a concept of 
53Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, 
trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p.5. Future 
references will be abbreviated SP and included in the text. 
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signs whose whole history and meaning belong to the 
adventure of the metaphysics of presence.(SP, p.51) 
For Derrida, then, the resurrection of the sign is not merely an aesthetic 
manoeuvre, but a metaphysical rupture, it requires the kind of revision 
which he advocated in "Structure, sign and play". Without such a 
revision philosophical critique is, Derrida suggests, limited to 
characterizing being as a form of presence, and, he says, the persistence of 
the privilege, or univocity, of presence, has profound implications for all 
forms of representation: 
Representation can be understood in the general 
sense ... but also in the sense of re-presentation, as 
repetition or reproduction of presentation.(SP, p.49) 
Insofar as representation is incorporated into a philosophy of presence, it 
would seem to be antithetical to deconstruction, which is concerned, as we 
have seen, not simply to deny presence, but to reassert the interrelation 
between presence and absence. Derrida's deconstructive figures 
supplement the originary function of presence, interrupting its immediacy 
and denying its identity. 
If deconstruction revises philosophy so as to question the very idea of 
representation, then the specific form of representation with which we are 
concerned in this study would seem also to warrant deconstructive 
critique. Indeed, Derrida, when he does turn to the question of artistic 
representation, seems to be suggesting just such a revision. Derrida 
revives the long-standing association of critical thought with aesthetic 
avant-gardism, and turns to the theatre of cruelty as a kind of aesthetic 
embodiment of deconstruction. The theatre of cruelty is not, he says, a 
representation, which sets it apart from classical theatre. Persisting with 
this anti-representational theme, he goes on to question artistic 
representation itself: 
Is not the most naive form of representation 
mimesis ? Like Nietzsche - and the affinities do not 
end there - Artaud wants then to finish with the 
imitative concept of art, with the Aristotelian 
aesthetics in which the Western metaphysics of art are 





And, further on in the same essay, he evokes a familiar topos, the death of 
God. The Dostoevskian overtones of this topos are highly suggestive.54 
Without an idea of God, which, as we have seen, performs the function of 
a centre, all sorts of revisions are necessary; epistemological, ontological, 
and ethical. This eviction of God makes, in the case of the theatre of 
cruelty, art into such a revision: 
The theatre of cruelty chases God from the stage. It 
does not stage a new atheistic discourse, it does not 
give rise to the speech of atheism, it does not deliver 
the theatre space to a philosophical logic proclaiming 
once more ... the death of God. It is the cruel theatrical 
practice which, in its act and structure, inhabits, or, 
rather, produces, a non-theological space. 
The stage is theological in as much as it is dominated 
by speech, by a will to speech, by the picture of a first 
Word ... (ED, p.345) 
With the theatre of cruelty, art effects the kind of critique which, in 
Derrida's view, eluded Husserl. It is not a belief in the absence of God, it is 
a non-theology which precedes and precludes models and ideas of deities. 
Derrida is discussing theatre, the Aristotelian aesthetics to which he refers 
are dramatic, and there is certainly a world of difference between 
Aristotelian mimesis and the realistic novel. The specific reference to 
drama, and to Artaud, prohibit a simple transposition of Derrida's 
argument here to the debate over "realism." But it is possible inferentially 
to consider some implications for the present study of his aesthetics of 
non-immediacy and non-representation. What Derrida attributes to 
classical mimetic drama is a kind of transparency, which allows a passage 
through the text to the "reality" towards which the text is intended. This 
attribution has much in common with what I have called the "ends" of 
realism. If realism is characterized by these properties, the kind of quasi-
theological commitments which Derrida attributes to drama, then 
deconstruction poses a serious problem for realism. The effect of 
deconstruction on literary criticism would seem, then, to be a radiorl 
critique and renunciation of realism. Within such a critique, realism can 
be cited only to support, despite itself, deconstructionist arguments against 
presence and representation. 
54Derrida doesn't mention Dostoevsky, but the question of the death of God looms large in 
his novels, especially, of course, The Brothers Karamazov. 
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This move has certainly been made in some developments in literary 
theory: an antithesis has been posited between realism and deconstruction, 
and we turn now to consider some of these developments which have 
mobilized one or more of the critical movements discussed in this and the 
previous chapter. In my analysis of these developments, I shall try to show 
that the credibility of their theoretical contributions relies upon a 
reductive apprehension of realism which gives rise to the seeming 
antithesis between critical theory and realism. Questioning such an 
apprehension, I suggest, necessarily calls into question that antithetical 
relationship and, in Part II of this study, I shall try to show how a different 
relationship might be understood, a relationship which reconciles the 
critical disposition of, for example, Macherey or Derrida, with continued 
attention to realism. 
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- 3 -
Critical practices and the end of realism 
'What giants?' asked Sancho Panza. 
- Cervantes 
In the previous two chapters, we have surveyed a range of theories which 
seek, in various ways, to bring to the study of literature, and of the human 
sciences in general, a critical perspective. In Chapter 1, theories which 
located this critical perspective in an awareness of and attention to 
language were discussed. For Booth, the object of critique was what he saw 
as a kind of disingenuity in reading, a wilful effacement of the rhetoric of 
fiction, and he sought to revive an Aristotelian concern with language 
and rhetoric. The Formalists and structuralists similarly used language as 
a focus of critical theory; the Formalists by insisting upon a constantly 
renewed approach to words, and the structuralists through what Barthes 
called "the imagination of the sign." For both groups of theorists, 
literature played an important role in the achievement of this kind of 
critical insight because it constitutes a concentrated exercise in language 
through which words, as per the Formalists, may be renewed, or in which 
the operation of signs, as per the structuralists, may be observed. 
For the Formalists, perhaps, and for the structuralists, certainly, a failure 
critically to appreciate language indicates a general incapacity to achieve a 
critical perspective. In Chapter 2, approaches which have tried to achieve 
this general critical position were considered. The Frankfurt School 
conflated the critical with what might be called a non-teleological or 
negative dialectic which constantly tries to dispel posited socio-cultural 
certainties - social institutions, literary genres - a process which begins 
with concrete examples, such as, in the case of Adorno, musical 
conventions, but extends from this sociological basis to a 
philosophical/ conceptual level. Fredric Jameson, in his analysis of 
Adorno, charts this extension: 
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it is this optical illusion of the substantiality of 
thought itself which negative dialectics is designed to 
dispel. 1 
This version of critical thought - Critical Theory - assigns to art and 
literature this negative function. As we have seen, Critical Theory, where 
it is concerned with literature, suggests that literature can somehow 
embody the essence of negation, it can be the critical, as long, that is, as it 
dissociates itself from any vestiges of positivism. It would be instructive to 
try to assess whether the aesthetics which are supposed to achieve this 
actually constitute a new orthodoxy, which would consign them to a place 
in a teleological dialectic, perhaps, but would undermine the broader 
claims for them. But such a critique is outside the scope of this study. We 
must be content here to place this example of critical thought in the 
background of this inquiry, assimilating it as one example of how, in the 
name of critical theory, the "end" of realism has been called for. 
For Althusser, theoretical critique was, perhaps, more difficult to achieve. 
His suspicion of experience led him to seek a kind of disembodied, 
incorruptible vantage point from which to pursue a stainless science of 
theory. The place of art in such a science is, as Althusser concedes, very 
complicated but like the Frankfurt School, at least in this respect, both 
Althusser and Macherey try to assimilate literature and the theory of 
literature into their vision of a critical science, theoretical Marxism. Once 
again, we can infer a fairly simple proposition from these complicated 
theories: to be critical is to be suspicious of all forms. of commonly held 
beliefs, which would include the idea of reality which seems to be 
countenanced by the realistic novel, and art, in our case literature, must be 
critical. Derrida's philosophical strategies would seem also to support this 
proposition. But where Althusser sought to ground critique in the 
theoretical - as opposed to the experiential - Derrida's critical method 
requires a renunciation of the need for such a grounding. The 
deconstructionist figures of play, and of absence, demand a relaxation of 
the anxiety which might be occasioned by the idea of a groundless critique. 
For Derrida, such a relaxation, which is, of course, not merely a reversal of 
anxiety but a fundamental revision of the grounds of anxiety, constitutes 
the possibility of what we are here calling the critical. 
1Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, p.57. 
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While, as we have seen, some of these demands for a critical theory, or, 
perhaps, a theory of the critical which suggests how a critical position 
might be achieved, are seriously flawed, it doesn't necessarily follow that 
the critical, in the sense conceived of by these various theories, is invalid. 
As I have said, this study challenges the perceived antithesis between 
realism and critical theory and, therefore, necessarily entails a critique of 
theories which seem either to lead towards or explicitly to advocate such 
an antithesis. Before, however, this critique of these kinds of critical 
theories can proceed, it is helpful to consider some of the more explicit 
and more polemic manifestations of hostility towards realism in the name 
of being critical. 
(a) Critical practice and classic realism 
In the work of Shklovsky, or of Adorno, or of Derrida, to name some of 
the theorists with whom we have been concerned, it is possible to see how 
a concomitant commitment to what might be called anti-realism may be 
inferred. Indeed, it is not only a matter of inference. Theories which have 
advocated or claimed a critical position have often posited aesthetic 
revolution as the counterpart to philosophical and political progression. 
Vincent Descombes makes just this point with reference to this tendency 
as it was associated with the Tel Quel group in the 1960s: 
'progressive' novels would not be those whose 
content refers to the experience of the workers ... but 
those which in one way or another transgress or 
endanger the code of the novel. The progressive 
writer will then be Joyce or Mallarme, not Zola or 
Aragon. 
And he adds this note: 
Tel Quel popularized these themes in the sixties. 
However, they leaped directly to the conclusion (that 
a literary avant-garde is ipso-facto the political avant-
garde) without troubling themselves unduly over the 
isomorphism between the novel form and bourgeois 
modes of power. 2 
2Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.127. 
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Contemporary literary theory has inherited this iconoclasm, has its own 
version of Mayakovsky's celebrated call to "burn Raphael." The 
development of realism in the novel, contemporaneous with what 
Jameson calls "the bourgeois cultural revolution" ,3 conflates an aesthetic 
intention towards social and historical reality with an uncritical approach 
towards that reality, as well as a mistaken understanding of the nature and 
possibilities of literature. When the moment of bourgeois culture passes, 
so too, such a view would suggest, will realism, and perhaps the novel, 
maybe even literature. Realism, the "ends" - aims, intentions, 
achievements - of which are indissociable with those of the bourgeoisie, 
middle-class, cultural elite, or whatever, will, inevitably come to an "end." 
In Catherine Belsey's primer of critical theory, Critical Practice, this kind of 
rejection of realism is very much in evidence. Belsey argues that realistic 
aesthetics presuppose a "common sense" approach to literary criticism, 
and goes on to claim that "common sense itself is ideologically and 
discursively constructed, rooted in a specific historical situation and 
operating in conjunction with a particular social formation." 4 She 
invokes, variously, Barthes, Lacan, Althusser and Derrida in support of 
this claim, and concludes that common sense, as she has defined it, 
proposes a humanism based on an empiricist-idealist 
interpretation of the world. In other words, common 
sense urges that 'man' is the origin and source of 
meaning, of action, and of history (humanism). Our 
concepts and our knowledge are held to be the 
product of experience (empiricism), and this 
experience is preceded and interpreted by the mind, 
reason, or thought, the property of a transcendent 
human nature whose essence is the attribute of each 
individual (idealism) . These propositions, radically 
called in question by the implications of post-
Saussurean linguistics, constitute the basis of a 
practice of reading which assumes, whether explicitly 
or implicitly, the theory of expressive realism. This is 
the theory that literature reflects the reality of 
experience as it is perceived by one (especially gifted) 
individual, who expresses it in a discourse which 
enables other individuals to recognize it as true.5 
3Fredric Jameson, "The Realist Floor-Plan", in Marshall Blonsky ed., On Signs (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), p.373. 
4Belsey, Critical Practice , p.3. 
5Belsey, Critical Practice, p.7. 
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These arguments provide the basis for Belsey' s critical theory which, she 
claims, as we have already seen, makes clear that "the theory of literature 
as expressive realism is no longer tenable."6 To continue to believe in 
what she calls "Aristotelian" aesthetics, she claims, is to remain critically 
naive. More specifically, according to Belsey, it is to rely on the lisible text 
(in Barthes' terminology), to be ideological (in an Althusserian sense), to 
be neurotic (in a Lacanian sense), or to subscribe to presence (as theorized 
by Derrida). Belsey thus mobilizes much of the critical thought we have 
discussed in this part of the present study against what she calls "classic 
realism." 
It would, however, be sophistic to rely upon Belsey' s polemic against 
classic realism to disprove the antithesis between realism and critical 
theory. Although Belsey_ seems to overlook that what is generally 
understood as realism - and what she calls realism - is not equivalent but 
only tangentially related to what Aristotle called mimesis, and that her 
indictment of realism fails to mention, or only mentions in passing, 
major theorists of realism such as Lukacs and Auerbach, reliance upon 
these shortcomings is a poor foundation for a challenge to the rejection of 
realism, and for an alternative critical theory of realism. Certainly, in her 
polemic, Belsey is not alone. Colin MacCabe has also argued against the 
view that "narrative discourse functions simply as a window on reality",7 
from a structuralist/post-structuralist position similar to that of Belsey, 
and Terry Eagleton, in his influential introduction to literary theory, 
approvingly cites Barthes as maintaining that "there is a literary ideology 
which corresponds to this 'natural attitude', and its name is realism."8 
Both critical theory proper, by which I mean the work of the theorists 
disussed in chapters 1 and 2, and literary theory which has been 
subsequently influenced by critical theory, then, seem either to be 
announcing or proposing a radical end to realism. At best, following this 
movement of thought, realism - the concept, the practice, and even fhe 
literary texts - is unhelpful and, at worst, obstructive, to critical thinking. If 
realistic literature is to be considered, its representational qualities must be 
6Belsey, Critical Practice, p.46. 
7 
Colin MacCabe, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (London: Macmillan, 1978), 
r,,15. 
Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p.135. 
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turned against the text itself; it must be defamiliarized, made scriptible, 
deconstructed. 
Belsey's suggestion that mimesis is no longer tenable is a revealing one, 
because she clearly supposes that contemporary critical thought has no 
more use for such aesthetics. Other recent developments in critical theory, 
such as postmodernism9 and some strains of post-colonialism 10 have 
argued against the inhibiting, uncritical aspects of literary realism. 
This antithesis between realistic representation and critical thought is not, 
however, beyond synthesis. As I have said, it is not sufficient simply to 
argue against the excesses or shortcomings, obscurities or inconsistencies 
of theories which have tried, in various ways, to be critical. It is necessary 
to establish an independent connection between a critical disposition and 
the representational properties of realism. It is not the case that a flaw in a 
particular critical theory means that the objects of critique are thereby 
vindicated or validated; it is not, I think, reasonable to claim that, for 
example, Lukacs is right because Bloch is shortsighted or overenthusiastic 
in his defence of Expressionism. Rather, the critique of critical theory must 
take it seriously, its own method must be critical. 
(b) The critique of critical theory 
There are, in a sense, two different ways in which the critical theory might 
itself be criticized and the antithesis between critical theory and realistic 
representation taken up. The first would be fundamentally to oppose the 
9With regard to postmodernism, see Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp.73 ff. Other writers have posited the divide 
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between realistic representation and post-modernism more explicitly. See, for example, ~ 1 
Marguerite Alexander, Flights from Realism: Themes and Strategies in Postmodernist 
British and American Fiction (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), p.6. 
10 The question of 'realism' in post-colonial theory, and, indeed, the field itself, seems to/ 
me to be particularly vexed. On the one hand, Ashcroft et al write of the "illusion, 
continually undermined by post-colonial literature, ... that literary discourse constitutes a 
process of mimetic representation", a position which they derive from Homi Bhabha; see 
Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and 
Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London: Routledge, 1989), p.55. On the other hand, 
Chidi Amuta, drawing both on classical Marxist sociology and on twentieth-century 
African political radicalism, countenances a complicated, but important, place for 
"realism" in the context of African literary studies; see Chidi Amuta, The Theory of 
African Literature: . Implications for Practical Criticism (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp.127-
128. 
tenets of the different kinds of critical thought which have been advanced 
against realistic representation. 11 Such an approach - which has 
occasionally claimed to be, or has been accused of being, what might 
erroneously be called anti-theoretical - would suggest that the critical 
aspect of literary theory is little more than intellectual posturing, and that 
the sheer abstraction of much critical thought is a front for meaningless, 
nihilistic iconoclasm. Lukacs' accusation that his Frankfurt School 
adversaries lived in the "Grand Hotel Abyss" is, perhaps, among the more 
elegant charges of this kind. 
Certainly, the various critical theories which I have been discussing are 
not without their problems. As we have seen, Althusser' s anti-humanist 
science of theory is grounded upon an ineluctable contradiction, and, 
paradoxically, Derrida's critique of language is, as we have discussed, 
mounted in language. As well as these problems of critical theory, there 
are also the shortcomings and excesses of "theoretical" literary criticism 
which adopts certain critical theories over-enthusiastically. 
The critical element of these directions in thought is, however, an 
important ele_ment of literary studies. Recalling Descombes' 
characterization of the critical as not content to take "the way it is" for 
granted, we can see that each of the theories discussed in the first two 
sections of this part of the present study can contribute to a critical 
dimension in literary studies. Relentlessly subjecting the seeming 
premises of literature to critical scrutiny works against fixed or static 
conceptions of literature, opening new and challenging possibilities for 
literary criticism. 
I propose, therefore, a different way of taking issue with these theoretical 
positions over the issue of realistic representation. Rather than challenge 
the critical efforts of, for example, Adorno or Macherey, I shall try to show, 
77 
nWorks which take such an approach include: Raymond Tallis, In Defence of Realism . 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1988); Richard Freadman and Seamus Miller, Re-thinking 1},ecr'1, CC"'""bfitf-: 
Co.1\1\bv':Oj?, O"'"Q/s·J.., 
1 
\~~V,-))hn Orr, Tragic Realism & Modern Society: The Passionate Political in the CJ 
Prc1<::> Modern Novel , 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1989); A.D. Nuttall, A New Mimesis; John 
Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Grouping these 
works together is not meant to suggest that they express the same ideas in the same 
fashion, nor am I necessarily or uniformly hostile to these works. On the one hand, I have 
found some to be unproductively dismissive of critical theory, and would seek to distance 
my argument from theirs. On the other, to some, particularly Ellis and Nuttall, I am 
greatly indebted. 
in the following section of this thesis, that realistic representation is not 
incompatible with critical thought. With regard to Macherey in 
particular, insofar as he insists upon the implicit tension within literary 
texts, my own theory must acknowledge an affinity, and, indeed, an 
influence. 12 
In an essay entitled "Mimesis and Representation", Paul Ricceur addresses 
this problem, beginning by acknowledging that "[f]or contemporary 
philosophy, representation is a great culprit."13 Ricceur's response to this 
problem anticipates the ambition of this study: 
Representation ... it is said, should be denounced as 
the reduplication of presence, as the re-presenting of 
presence. 
My project will be to try to extricate representation 
from the impasse to which it has been relegated, to 
return it to its field of play, without, however, in any 
way weakening the critique which I have just 
mentioned. 14 
Ricceur sets about this project by returning to Aristotle and Augustine to 
tap what he calls the polysemic resources of the idea of mimesis, which, he 
suggests, accepts or assimilates the philosophical critique of representation 
without abandoning representation. My own project is similar, although it 
is concerned with a specific kind of representation: the realistic novel. The 
similarity is that I do not wish to discourage or renounce the relentless 
need for a critical perspective in literary theory, I wish, in fact, to preserve 
some of the critical insights discussed in chapters 1 and 2, while departing 
from the conclusions about realism arrived at by some of these theorists 
and by the literary theorists discussed in this chapter. 
The points at which I depart from the critical theories discussed so far, and 
from which I advance my critique are the ideas of the "ends" and the 
"end" of realism. We have seen above how these critical theories 
generally posit a distinction between their own practice and another, more 
121 mention Macherey in particular because he seems to be acutely sensitive to the tension 
between critique and skepticism, an important point overlooked, perhaps, by other, later 
literary theorists. 
13Paul Ricceur, "Mimesis and Representation"(1980) in Mario J. Valdes ed., A Ricoeur 
Reader: Reflection and Imagination (Hemel Hempstead: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1991), 
p.137. 
14Ricceur, "Mimesis and Representation", p.137. 
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naive way of understanding reality. Althusser's conflation of ideology 
with Cartesianism15 is particularly telling. Similarly, Derrida's critique of 
metaphysics cites the failure of the metaphysical to understand itself; it 
relies, then, on an unquestioned and unquestionable concept. The critical, 
then, confronts the naive, the metaphysical, the theological, the 
ideological; anything which seems to rely upon, propose, or accept without 
sufficient question a notion or model of the absolute, of the natural, or, to 
return to Descombes' definition of the critical with which we are working, 
of "the way it is." 
But when such critique is turned upon realism, it is necessary to ask 
whether such properties, such "ends," really belong to realism. Put 
another way, on the question of realism, have critical theorists properly 
identified their opponent, or are they, like Don Quixote, tilting at 
windmills? The critical syllogism that because of these "ends" the "end" of 
realism is necessary relies upon a conflation of realism with negative16 
philosophical linguistic, political and aesthetic commitments. Jameson's 
characterization of the age of realism as what Deleuze calls "decoding" 
pointedly evokes such a view, suggesting that the increasing emphasis on 
the social world during the nineteenth-century gave rise to a new "faith" 
in the absolute nature of the social world, of the Real. 
Descartes' separation of subject and object, Kant's idealistic critique, 
bourgeois ideology, and the literary phenomenon with which we are 
concerned, realism, then, become cousins in an extended family of 
uncritical or, as Eagleton puts it, natural attitudes and assumptions. To 
understand literature as realistic is to rely, somewhere along the line, on a 
position which according to one or another critical theory is 
philosophically, aesthetically, or politically untenable. 
But this conflation is, I suggest, mistaken. Realistic novels are not giants, 
and the "end" of realism is, then, a Quixotic attack which derives from a 
fundamental misapprehension. That there is such a misapprehension, 
however, cannot be established simply by criticizing critical theory, it can 
only be established by showing that realism is something other than what 
15 See Chapter 2 above. 
16The term "negative" is used here in a strictly evaluative sense. Functionally, it would be 
more accurate to suggest that realism is conflated with "positive" or positivistic 
commitments. 
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has been proposed. These critical theories, I suggest, betray their own 
critical shortcomings when it comes to the apprehension of realism, 
shortcomings which are most pointedly evident in the kind of literary 
criticism discussed in this chapter, critic ism which claims to have 
discovered, effected, or moved beyond the end of realism. 
In the following part I shall principally discuss three twentieth-century 
literary theorists whose work establishes the possibility of a synthesis 
between realism and critical theory. In doing so, I shall not only be 
reassessing the position of realism within literary theory but also 
suggesting that a critical ambition is more thoroughly realized in these 
kinds of theoretical approaches than in approaches which charge off to 
fight giants where there are only windmills. Indeed, while some of the 
critical projects discussed in chapters 1 and 2 are, to some extent, congenial 
with my own approach, critical theory often runs the risk of relapsing into 
the very reductionism and naivety against which it purports to set itself. 
This, without making too much of this point, is characteristic of the 
theories discussed in the first part of this chapter. 
This, however, is not to say that the theories to which we shall turn in the 
following part are flawless. Indeed, the case of Georg Lukacs, which is 
considered in chapter 4, is particularly vexed, marked by an uneasy 
mixture of enduring critical analysis and thoughtless polemical diatribe. 
Nonetheless, it is an important element of critical theory that it concedes 
that no critical position is inviolable, no perspective beyond revision. 
Such a concession, as we have seen, might also be said to be a property of 
some of the positions discussed above; of, for example, Derrida's critique of 
the human sciences, or of Macherey' s theory of the text. This similarity 
does not, of course, mean that Derrida's and Macherey's positions are 
equivalent to those of Lukacs, Auerbach, and Bakhtin, or even to each 
other. But the possibility of drawing such a parallel between them does 
suggest that a hard and fast antithesis between realism and critical theory 
is unsustainable. In order to bear out this suggestion, I shall take Lukacs, 
Auerbach, and Bakhtin, in turn, undertaking detailed analyses of their 





Realism: A Critical Background 
In the previous section of this study, the critical structures of theories 
which have challenged or questioned realism were explicated and 
analysed in some detail. While the various critical authors discussed focus 
upon different things, such as language or history, and employ different 
methods, they share a commitment to a particular idea of the critical. This 
idea of the critical is necessarily antithetical to any forms of knowledge 
which rest upon principles of essentialism. Both Adorno and Derrida, for 
example, characterize the phenomena against which they set their critique 
as quasi-theological; knowledge is conflated with belief or faith, which is 
either simply naive, or which masks a more sinister cultural 
phenomenon, such as ideology. 
The critical, to recall Descombes description, never takes "the way it is" for 
an answer, but sees it as a question. Belief or faith, it is suggested, are the 
antithesis of this attitude, they do take "the way it is" as an answer, and it 
becomes necessary then, for critical theory to undermine them. Derrida 
and Adorno, as we have seen, opt for strategies of radical negation, while 
other theorists search for new and different uses of language, different 
literary genres, or, as in the case of Macherey, new interpretive 
strategies which identify and juxtapose contrary ideas within objects. 
Generally, critical theories characterize knowledge, and other cultural 
phenomena, as problems to which there can be no final answer. 
The theories discussed in Part I generally implicate literary realism as a 
form of cognitive faith. According to such a position, the existence of the 
real social world is taken for granted and the representational capacity of 
literature is then simply exercised to achieve verisimilitude. The equation 
of literary realism with cognitive essentialism is most pointedly evident 
in Belsey' s suggestion that it is an empiricist-idealist presupposition which 
enables literary realism. Both empiricism and idealism - although they are 
very complicated ideas - seem to countenance the possibility of eventually 
recognizing, once and for all, "the way it is." Critical theory and realism, 
then, are necessarily antithetical. 
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This antithesis, however, is not unsurpassable. For the antithesis between 
realism and critical theory to be maintained, the correlation between 
realism and cognitive essentialism must be assumed. However, as I shall 
try to establish in this part, such a correlation is mistaken, and a more 
careful examination of both the theory and practice of realism can reveal 
that realism is itself a highly critical literary phenomenon. In this part of 
my thesis I shall explore and analyse the works of three critical authors in 
order to show that there is a synthetic congeniality between the realistic 
novel and critical theory, and I shall try to justify my preference for literary 
theory which makes productive use of the idea of realism. This does not, 
however, imply that realism is necessarily a preferable aesthetic. Rather, I 
suggest that theories which are able to make productive use of realism 
evince a critical awareness and an intellectual inquisitiveness which 
provide more interestir-g theoretical foundations from which to advance 
literary criticism in general. 
It is not the case that there is a simple antithesis between Parts I and II; as 
indicated in the short introduction to Part I, critical genealogies and 
affinities·, which traverse the boundaries between what might be called 
literature and the theory of literature, are complicated, and, as I suggested 
in the previous chapter, it is possible to trace such affinities between some 
of the material discussed in chapters 1 and 2 and the theories discussed 
and endorsed in this part. 
Such possibilities, however, are not specifically under examination here. It 
would be digressive, and perhaps impossible, within this study to try to 
argue the affinities between, say, Althusser's efforts to disembody critique 
and the early Lukacs' residual Platonism which tried similarly to get 
outside experience. Parallels such as this may be drawn in passing, but the 
purpose of this part is not to suggest that Adorno and Auerbach, for 
example, are somehow identical. Rather, the four chapters which compose 
this part are concerned with the background to the critical endorsement of 
realism which the theorists discussed evince. 
The "background", as we have seen, figures importantly in the method of 
this inquiry. It is, firstly, one of the characteristics of realism; realistic 




background. Then there is the background to this study itself, the contest 
over realism which has long occupied aesthetic theorists. But background 
is a curious phenomenon; instead of seeing the realistic novel as, say, 
replete with background, I have adopted Auerbach's phrase "fraught with 
background" to indicate the complexity of both of these kinds of 
background, that of the realistic novel, and that of the present inquiry. 
The idea of background is central to the logic of this study. Each study of an 
individual theorist will be an exploration of what we might call their 
critical background, the history and development of their theoretical 
positions. In the cases of Lukacs and Auerbach, the analysis of this 
background serves as an inquiry into why, in their aesthetic theories, 
realism held such an important position. Neither, of course, was 
concerned exclusively with realism, indeed, as we shall see, at one stage 
Lukacs' aesthetic tendencies steered away from the realistic. But realism in 
general, and the realistic novel in particular, according to both Lukacs and 
Auerbach, served important philosophical ends. 
My analysis of the work of Lukacs and Auerbach, then, will seek to 
understand why, and from what theoretical basis, each arrived at such a 
view of realism. More specifically, I shall try to show that the critical 
background to their preferences for realism coincides with what we are 
calling the critical. Their own critical backgrounds, I shall try to show, 
evince a critical apprehension of the idea of background which informs 
realism. This apprehension, which is no more satisified with "the way it 
is" than any of the approaches discussed in the previous part, generates, I 
suggest, a more critical appreciation of the realistic novel than is evident 
in the kinds of theories which propose the end of realism. This kind of 
view enables a synthesis of the two ideas with which this thesis is 
concerned; critical theory and the realistic novel. 
But Auerbach's theory is not infallible, and Lukacs' is certainly not. In the 
course of my analysis of their work I shall not be proposing a simple 
application of their theories, but rather trying to show how their 
complicated critical backgrounds might serve as yet another background to 
my own suggestions that such a synthesis is possible, that the previously 
maintained antithesis is unsustainable, and that contemporary literary 
theory is better served by such a background. 
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In Chapter 6 I shall turn to Mikhail Bakhtin, the analysis of whom 
requires a different approach to that taken towards Lukacs and Auerbach. 
A change is necessary because while, as I shall be suggesting, the 
intellectual backgrounds of all three theorists are not dissimilar, and their 
theories provide comparable backgrounds to the present study, the place of 
realism in Bakhtin's scheme is different. In the cases of Lukacs and 
Auerbach, I shall be proceeding from their endorsements of realism, and 
trying then to determine what kind of background to this endorsement 
might be inferred, and how such a background can be called critical. With 
Bakhtin, the procedure is, in a sense, reversed. I shall begin from his status 
and reputation as a critical thinker, proceed to try to determine what kind 
of critical method he employs, and then turn to how the realistic novel 
might fit into such a critical scheme. Bakhtin did not turn to realism 
nearly so much as Lukacs and Auerbach, although, as we shall see, it was 
among the many literary phenomena which he considered. I shall be 
suggesting, however, that the kind of critical method employed by Bakhtin 
also makes possible a synthesis of realism and critical theory. The kind of 
critical apprehension of the realistic novel which informs this thesis is 
compatible with the tenets of Bakhtin's critical theory. 
The final chapter in this part essentially concludes the theoretical section 
of this thesis. I shall try to make clear my own critical position regarding 
realism and show how it emerges from the critical background provided 
by the various critical theories discussed in this thesis. In so doing, I shall 
try to redefine the realistic novel from a theoretical position which 
preserves the representational claims of realism but simultaneously sees 
in these claims the starting-point of critical analysis. Rather than 
characterizing realism as a sort of critical other against which critical 
theory must operate, I shall try to show how, from a different critical 
background, realism can serve as an important literary idea from which 
critical theory can advance. The background of the question of realism is 
thus revised from an antithesis between realism and critical theory to a 
synthesis of the two, which, I suggest, enriches our understanding of both. 
Follwing this discussion, I shall turn to putting this theory into practice. 
Part III comprises two essays on two very different texts, of which realism 
is one important aspect. As we shall see, the theory of realism which is the 
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central thesis of this study depends upon a critical attitude which balances 
the possibilities and necessity of realism in literature with a constant 
critique of realism, a refusal to elevate realism to the status of a kind of 
literary objectivity. In my reading of Middlemarch, and of U.S.A., I shall 
try to show how such a theory can be employed in the reading of literary 
texts, which is, of course, the very substance of literary studies. The 
reconvergence of theory and practice is also among the ambitions of this 




The tragedy of Georg Lukacs 
0 sages standing in God's holy fire 
As in the gold mosaic of a wall, 
Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre, 
And be the singing masters of my soul. 
- W.B. Yeats 
In the case of Georg Lukacs, we can speak of "tragedy" in a number of 
ways. We might, for example, characterize him and his career as tragic in 
the sense that George Lichtheim characterized them as "disastrous," 
lamenting the corruption and eventual loss of a brilliant European 
intellect.1 This "tragedy" might then be extrapolated to the general tragedy 
of Marxism, its regression and eventual decline. Lukacs, it might be said, 
shared the fate of Marxism; hijacked by party orthodoxy he, like the very 
movement, strayed from his philosophical and moral ambitions, and 
purged his dissident thoughts, and those of others, as surely as dissident 
voices were exiled from, or silenced in, the contemporary political 
environment. 
However, tragedy also figures in Lukacs' work without reference to his 
political biography. As we shall see, for the early Lukacs, the tragic 
represented the possibility of achieving the kind of aesthetic epiphany 
which Yeats sought in Byzantium; the changeless, the essential. But the 
tragic is dangerously volatile ground on which to build, and Lukacs' 
pursuit of the essential became, in a sense, its own tragedy. His persistent 
search for what he variously called form, soul, totality, class consciousness, 
was accompanied by an awareness of the unattainability of these essentials. 
In a sense, the tragic flaw of Lukacs work is that his means preclude his 
end. It is in this ineluctable clash, I suggest, that the critical interest of 
Lukacs' contribution to literary theory lies. It is from this tension in Lukacs 
work that I propose to advance my analysis of his theory of realism, and to 
show how it contributes to the present study. 
1See George Lichtheim, "An Intellectual Disaster", in his The Concept of Ideology and 
Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1967). 
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Lukacs' defence of realism is well-known, especially in the context of his 
debate with Brecht, Bloch, and various members of the Frankfurt School.2 
At its worst, Lukacs' analysis of modern art is vulgar and thoughtless, and 
vacillates between apology for his classical and bourgeois tastes, Soviet 
orthodoxy and political expediency. On the other hand, it is necessary to 
try to place Lukacs' defence of realism in the context of his work as a 
whole. While, as we shall see, Lukacs' preference for realism is certainly a 
reactionary impulse, it is not only reactionary. If the different moments of 
Lukacs' literary theory are carefully considered, there is a discernible 
continuity which suggests that Lukacs' s preference for realism stems also 
from his original philosophical inquiries, inquiries which, while seriously 
flawed, are nonetheless motivated by a critical disposition. 
As a Marxist, of course, Lukacs sought to understand the problems of 
literature and history sociologically, an approach which took up a long 
tradition of Marxist criticism which leaned towards literary realism. Marx 
and Engels had famously expressed their preference for realism in 
literature, Lenin wrote on Tolstoy as the "mirror of the revolution", and 
Trotsky wrote against Formalism and on historical objectivity in art. Pre-
Soviet Russian liberals, such as V.I. Belinsky and N.G. Chernyshevsky 
similarly maintained an aesthetic of social realism.3 As the dynamic, 
developmental nature of Marxism and Communism gave way, under 
Stalinist autocracy, this "realist" aesthetic developed into Socialist realism, 
a literary sub-genre which certainly does claim to represent absolute truth, 
and with which Lukacs had, to say the least, a curious relationship. 
An analysis of Lukacs' understanding of the relationship between 
literature and social historical reality cannot be limited, however, to his 
2 I do not want here to suggest that Lukacs' antagonists were in any sense homogenous. 
Adorno, of course, was highly critical of Brecht, and of his relationship with Benjamin; see 
Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, pp.201-202; Adorno, Notes to Literature, pp.222-223. 
3For Marx and Engels, see their correspondence with Lasalle; Lenin, "Articles on Tolstoy"; 
Trotsky, "The Formalist School of Poetry and Marxism". These are anthologized in David 
Craig, Marxists on Literature: An Anthology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), and Lenin's 
articles are included in full as an appendix to the English translation of Macherey's A 
Theory of Literary Production, trans. Geoffrey Wall (London: Routledge, 1978). See also 
Leon Trotsky on Literature and Art, ed. Paul N. Siegel (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970). 
For Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, see Becker, Documents of Modern Literary Realism. A 
good analysis and discussion of literary realism in the early-Soviet context is provided in 
Andrew Milner, Cultural Materialism (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993), 
pp.24££. 
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later Marxist period. Unusual among heavyweight Marxist intellectuals, 
Lukacs committed himself to Soviet orthodoxy, and while the idea of a 
radical break in Lukacs' thought following his recantation of History and 
Class Consciousness is not, as we shall see, tenable, it is fair to say that the 
standard of his earlier writing is not maintained throughout his career.4 
Lukacs' biographical complexities notwithstanding5, the following analysis 
will consider a selection of Lukacs' work which ranges from his very early 
essays to his continued defence of realism in the post-Stalin era. In doing 
so I shall try to show how Lukacs' concern with the relationship between 
literature and reality is premised upon certain critical positions which 
imply a problematic theory of realistic representation. Gyorgy Markus, in 
arguing for a complex idea of culture as "the 'single' thought of Lukacs' 
life", suggests such an approach: 
The real link between the Heidelberg Manuscripts and 
the late Aesthetics is that both works, although they 
were separated by almost half a century, use 
completely different conceptual tools, and frequently 
4The question of whether or not there is a fundamental break - or more than one perhaps - in 
Lukacs' work is extremely important to this study. As will become apparent, I hold to the 
view that, while there are extremely important differences between, say, Soul and Form, 
and The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, the discernible continuities are more 
important. But this view is certainly not incontestable, and it has, indeed, been contested at 
length. George Lichtheim exemplifies the tendency to posit a break in Lukacs thought after 
History and Class Consciousness; see "An Intellectual Disaster" and Lichtheim, Lukacs 
(London: Fontana, 1970), at p. 58 and p.76 ff. Rene Wellek supports this view, arguing that 
there is a break between the early and late Lukacs and that to suggest otherwise runs the 
risk of characterizing Lukacs' Marxism as a kind of pretence; see Rene Wellek, Four Critics: 
Croce, Valery, Lukacs, Ingarden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), p.38. 
Lukacs himself seems to have been ambivalent on this point. On the one hand, he seems to 
have seen his intellectual progression as a series of philosophical revelations, which 
would suggest that important changes were made along the way. On the other hand, he 
also suggests that these changes were not necessarily fundamental, but rather stages in a 
continuous development. The view that Lukacs' work is continuous is expressed by Fredric 
Jameson, who argues that the myth of Lukacs' career needs reconsideration, and that the 
predominant view of his later work as aberrant is misconceived; see Jameson,Marxism and 
Form, pp.161-162. This view is supported by Gyorgy Markus in "Life and the Soul: the 
Young Lukacs and the Problem of Culture" in Agnes Heller ed., Lukacs Revalued (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1983). Markus' article canvasses both Lukacs' "conversion" to Marxism in 
1918, as well has his development as a Marxist. 
5The following works have been invaluable in placing Lukacs' work within a biographical 
context: G.H.R. Parkinson, George Lukacs(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); George 
Lichtheim, Lukacs ; Michael Lowy, George Lukacs - From Romanticism to Bolshevism, 
trans. P. Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1979); Lee Congdon, The Young Lukacs (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Arpad Kadarkay, George Lukacs: Life, 
Thought, and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Georg Lukacs, Record of a 




come to opposite conclusions, are nevertheless 
devoted to one and the same theoretical problem. 
Both are attempts to establish the place and function 
of art within the system of human activities and to 
explain its relationship with everyday life (in the 
terminology employed by the young Lukacs, its 
relationship with 'experienced reality') and with the 
'generic' forms of human activity and objectivation ... 
that shape and appropriate reality.6 
Apart from asserting a complex continuity in Lukacs' work. _, Markus also 
highlights Lukacs' concern with the human, cultural, constructive aspects 
of "reality." Neither naive empiricism nor sheer subjective idealism -
although Lukacs is in many respects an idealist - is an adequate approach 
to understanding this idea of reality, this idea of the social human world. 
Lukacs' concern, then, is with the kind of historical reality posited by Vico 
- to whom we shall return - a view of reality as fragile, incomplete, and 
contingent. Recalling, once again, Descombes' definition of the critical, 
Markus' account of Lukacs certainly suggests that his approach meets such 
criteria. For Lukacs, nothing is merely given, nothing is simply "the way it 
is." That he was uneasy with this insight generated his relentless idealism, 
his search for something beyond everyday reality. That he never found 
such a resolution was, at once, his most enduring philosophical legacy, 
and his tragedy. 
(a) Tragedy and irony in the early Lukacs 
The collection of essays Soul and Form, is marked by a deep Romantic 
aestheticism on Lukacs' part. 7 Essay after essay reveals a profound 
dissatisfaction with everyday life and a will towards an aesthetic perfection 
which would transcend ordinary life - what he calls a "longing for form." 
6 Markus, "Life and the Soul", p.3. 
7 The relationship between these essays and Lukacs' own life has been the subject of much 
critical commentary, particularly the importance of the tragic relationship between Lukacs 
and Irma Seidler. The following works discuss this in some depth: Agnes Heller, "Georg 
Lukacs and Irma Seidler", in Lukacs Revalued; Kadarkay, George Lukacs, p.114; Lowy, 
From Romanticism to Bolshevism, at p.103. Lowy cites Agnes Heller in support of the idea 
that Seidler's impact upon Lukacs' work was considerable. Lukacs himself acknowledges 
this, in a curiously abrupt statement in Record of a Life. He says: " Irma Seidler was related 
to the Polanyi family and I had an extremely important encounter with her in 1907. 
Whether it should be called love or not is another question, but she had a tremendously 
powerful influence on my development between 1907 and 1911. In that year she committed 
suicide"; Record of a Life, p.37. 
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His essay "The Metaphysics of Tragedy" puts his Romantic 
disillusionment in these terms: 
Life is an anarchy of dark and light: nothing is ever 
completely fulfilled in life, nothing ever quite ends; 
new, confusing voices always mingle with the chorus 
of those that have been heard before. Everything 
flows, everything merges into another thing, and the 
mixture is uncontrolled and impure; everything is 
destroyed.8 
Reviving a philosophical distrust of experience which might variously be 
seen in Plato, Kant, and Kierkegaard, Lukacs develops an antithesis 
between ordinary life and some sort of essential, pure idea of life - which is 
confusingly called, in English at least, "real" life - which is realized Lukacs 
says, in tragedy: 
The tragic experience, then, is a beginning and an end 
at the same time. Everyone at such a moment is 
newly born ... 
The reaity of such a (tragic) world can have nothing in 
common with that of temporal existence. Realism is 
bound to destroy all the form-creating and life-
maintaining values of tragic drama ... The inner style 
of drama is realistic within the medieval, scholastic 
meaning of the word, but this excludes all modern 
realism.(SF, p159)9 
In the essay on Kierkegaard, "The Foundering of Form Against Life", 
Lukacs was concerned with this same antithesis between life-as-experience 
and life-as-form. Again, Lukacs characterizes life as formless: 
... when a man looks about him he does not see roads 
and crossroads, nor any sharply distinct choices 
anywhere; everything flows, everything 1s 
transmuted into something else.(SF, p.31) 
Against this formlessness, he says, Kierkegaard - who "saw more clearly 
than any other the thousand aspects, the thousand-fold variability of every 
8Georg Lukacs, Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock (Budapest, 1910; Cambridge, Mass. : MIT 
Press, 1974), pp.152-153. Further references to this volume (hereafter, SF) will be included 
in the text. 
9The difference between the term realism as it is used in medieval philosophy and in 
modern literary criticism has been discussed above. 
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motive"(SF, p.28) - asserted the form-giving gesture: his inexplicable and 
unexplained rejection of his fiancee Regine Olsen. This "gesture," Lukacs 
argued, transcended ordinary life, gave an absolute, immutable "form" to 
Kierkegaard's life. In the world of experience Kierkegaard, perhaps, burnt 
his bridges, but metaphysically he entered the realm of the absolute, 
transcending the mere relativism of the experienced world. In trying to 
maintain his gesture, Kierkegaard sought to "create forms from life"(SF, 
p.40). 
This early Romantic inclination in Lukacs', his tendency, as Lichtheim 
puts it, to seek "refuge from actuality in the realm of art"10, seems at odds 
with his later commitment to realism. Two important aspects of Lukacs' 
aestheticism need, however, to be considered. Firstly, his early aesthetics 
display an acute awareness of the problematic aspects of "everyday life." 
Markus writes: 
According to Lukacs, the structures of our daily world 
of experience, of the "lived reality," and the general 
features of human communication ... appear to us as 
entirely natural, necessary and obvious. But these 
structures remain unproblematic only as long as we 
continue to accept this world in a dogmatic-uncritical 
way, so that this unproblematic acceptance is itself a 
categorical peculiarity of this engulfing sphere of 
experience. In fact, the fundamental constitutive 
characteristic of the lived reality is that it exhibits no 
maxims concerning the standard or "correct" 
construal of its objects. 11 
Secondly, there is Lukacs' curious "solution" to this problem. In the face of 
this "lack of truth" in reality, Lukacs opts for a distant aestheticism, 
strikingly similar to that of another early twentieth-century neo-
Romantic, whom I have already mentioned, W.B. Yeats.12 Lukacs wants 
art to be his "singing master" to provide him with transcendence. But the 
sustainability of this solution, of what he calls "aesthetic value-
10Lichtheim, Lukacs, p.18. 
11Gyorgy Markus, "On Georg Lukacs' Unpublished Aesthetics", The Philosophical Forum, 
3,3-4 (Spring-Summer 1972), p.310. Markus is not referring to Soul and Form, but to Lukacs' 
Heidelberg Aesthetics, a translated section of which follows Markus' article. Nonetheless, 
the aestheticism of this piece is similar to that of Soul and Form. 
12I'm not, of course, suggesting an identity or any mutual awareness between the two, but 
merely a kind of conceptual parallel. Compare, for example, Lukacs' "Metaphysics of 
Tragedy" with Yeats' Byzantium poems. 
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realization" 13 is questionable. In Soul and Form, the idea of artistic form, 
the realization of this aesthetic withdrawal from actuality, is constantly 
attended by a sense of its unattainability. The essay on Kierkegaard, for 
example, sees Kierkegaard's "form-giving gesture" - his reconciliation of 
life with an absolute - collapse eventually into further indeterminacy: 
And so he died. But his death left every question open 
... even Kierkegaard's death acquires a thousand 
meanings, becomes accidental and not really the work 
of destiny. And then his purest and most 
unambiguous gesture of his life - vain effort! - was 
not a gesture after all.(SF, p.41) 
What we might call Lukacs' transcendental aestheticism is, then, not 
transcendental at all. The relational, relativistic world of experience 
overcomes any sustained attempt to reconcile truth and reality. The poem 
may, perhaps, momentarily be absolute but the poet never will. 
If we overlook Lukacs' aestheticism, which strongly prefigures the kind of 
neo-Romantic avant-gardism evident in anti-realistic movements from 
the Frankfurt School to post-structuralism, we are left, then, with Lukacs' 
view that the real world has no essence. As Markus puts it, only a 
"dogmatic-uncritical" view of the world sees reality as anything other than 
problematic. Lukacs' critical attitude gives rise, at this stage, to this 
Romantic irrationalism, but the same critical attitude was to inform later 
developments in his thought, particularly his negotiations between neo-
Kantianism, lebensphilosophie, hermeneutics, and Hegelianism which 
gave rise to Lukacs' first "great" work, The Theory of the Novel. 14 
13Lukacs, "On the Phenomenology of the Creative Process", The Philosophical Forum, 3, 3-
4 (Spring-Summer 1972), p.325. This is the section of the Heidelberg Aesthetics mentioned 
above. 
14Some comment on this period of Lukacs' development is in order. Chapter 7, "In 
Bluebeard's castle", of Kadarkay's biography deals generally with this period. More 
specifically, Lowy discusses Lukacs' development in the period between 1911 and his 
"conversion" to Bolshevism in 1918 in terms of his relationships with George Simmel in 
Berlin, Weber and others in Heidelberg, and his growing interest in Dostoevsky; see Lowy, 
From Romanticism to Bolshevism, pp.38 ff. George Lichtheim makes more explicit the 
connection between Lukacs and Dilthey; see Lichtheim, Lukacs, pp.13-14. These connections 
bear out Markus' point regarding the centrality of problems of culture in Lukacs' life work, 
an orientation analogous to Dilthey's development of what he (Dilthey) called the 
'human sciences'; see note 3 above. Lukacs himself, in the 1962 preface to The Theory of the 
Novel, characterizes the period in the following terms: " I was then in the process of 
turning from Kant to Hegel without, however, changing any aspect of my attitude towards 
the so-called intellectual sciences' school, an attitude based on my youthful enthusiasm for 
the work of Dilthey, Simmel and Max Weber. The Theory of the Novel is in effect a 
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With the social-historical world gripped by the onset of the Great War, 
Lukacs' sense of the problematic nature of the world of experience, and of 
its spiritual poverty, is the dominant theme of The Theory of the Novel. 15 
Once again, Lukacs turns to aesthetics as refuge from the everyday world, 
although his aesthetic sense has shifted from the tragic Romanticism of 
his earlier essays to a historico-philosophical exploration of the novel as a 
possible resolution of the disunity of life. In a sense, Lukacs' aestheticism 
has reversed its orientation: whereas his sense of tragedy and of the form-
giving gesture suggests that form and life are irreconcilable, his analysis of 
the novel suggests that literature can realize and articulate a new kind of 
totality of life to supplement the unavailability of metaphysical totality. 
Lukacs begins by evoking a golden age - represented by the Greek world -
of integrated civilisation, in which metaphysics and epic aesthetics happily 
collude to give human life unified form: 
Happy are those ages when the starry sky is the map of 
all possible paths - ages whose paths are illuminated 
by the light of the stars. Everything in such ages is 
new and yet familiar, full of adventure and yet their 
own. The world is wide and yet it is like a home, for 
the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential 
nature as the stars; the world and the self, the light 
and the fire, are sharply distinct, yet they never 
become permanent strangers to one another, for fire is 
the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in 
light.(TN, p.29) 
typical product of that school"; see Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna 
Bostock (Berlin, 1916; London: The Merlin Press, 1971), p.12. Further references to this work 
(hereafter, TN) will be incorporated into the text. 
15 Apparently, The Theory of the Novel started life as a book on Dostoevsky, to whom 
Lukacs was drawn because of his concern with moral and spiritual problems in the secular 
world; see Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, pp.152-154; Lowy, From Romanticism to Bolshevism, 
pp.113 ff. As I shall discuss below, this is one of many striking parallels - although there 
are very important differences as well - between Lukacs and Mikhail Bakhtin, for whom 
Dostoevsky provides the model of aesthetic philosophy. Other parallels start with their 
shared sense of a distinction between the epic and the novel (which they also share with 
Auerbach), and their common nee-Kantian background. According to Kadarkay, Lukacs was 
one of many who turned, around this time, towards Dostoevskian concerns with the 
problems of the secular world; see Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p.171. Interestingly, while 
Lowy charts a general Russophilia amongst Ceman-speaking intellectuals (see Lowy, From 
Romannticism to Bolshevism, p.39, and p.53), Bakhtin biographers Clark and Holquist note 
the Germanic, and specifically nee-Kantian, influence on the intellectual environment from 
which Bakhtin emerged; see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin 
(Cambridge, mass.: Belknap Press, 1984), pp.57 ff. 
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This metaphysical unity and "homeliness" guarantees the essential being 
of humans within the world. Lukacs writes: 
It is a homogenous world, and even the separation of 
man and world, between 'I' and 'you', cannot disturb 
its homogeneity. Like every other component of this 
rhythm, the soul stands in the midst of the world; the 
frontier that makes up its contours is not different in 
essence from the contours of things ... 
Even if menacing and incomprehensible forces 
become felt outside the circle which the stars of ever-
present meaning draw round the cosmos to be 
experienced and formed, they cannot displace the 
presence of meaning; they can destroy life, but never 
tamper with being ... (TN, pp.32-33) 
In some ways, The Theory of the Novel, is an extended lament for the loss 
of this spiritual integration, and a renewed effort to find, in the aesthetics 
of the novel, a potential resolution to a metaphysical problematic. In the 
integrated Greek world life is inherently meaningful and aesthetics, 
accordingly, reflect what Lukacs calls the integration of essence and life. 
"Great epic writing gives form to the extensive totality of life ... the world 
at any given moment is an ultimate principle"(TN, p.46). But this given 
essence, even in the Greek world, eventually gives way. Lukacs argues that 
the invention of the productivity of spirit erodes this integration of 
human life and essence, an erosion which is charted by the history of 
aesthetic forms. While the epic represents the essential immanence of life, 
tragedy represents the awareness that life "had lost the immanence of the 
essence." For the tragic hero, then, "mere life sinks into non-being" and 
the hero must reach a "level of being beyond life." Finally, in philosophy, 
essence has "completely divorced itself from life"(TN, p.35),16 and has 
become irretrievable, even the tragic gesture is not adequate. 
161 have not followed Lukacs' argument entirely here. Lukacs' idea of the transition from 
form to form is clearly dialectical: epic achievement is only clearly understood in light of 
tragic problems, and tragic problems only fully realized in philosophical speculation. This 
idea is more fully developed in the following chapter of Lukacs' essay which he begins by 
claiming that "[a]s a result of such a change in the transcendental points of orientation, 
(within life, exceeding life, divorced from life) art forms become subject to a historico-
philosophical dialectic"; see pp.40 ff. 
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It is this loss of essence to which Lukacs' theory of the novel responds. 
Repeatedly, Lukacs characterizes the novel as the representative art form 
of the secularized world: 
The novel is the epic of an age in which the totality of 
life is no longer directly given, in which the 
immanence of meaning in life has become a 
problem.(TN, p.56) 
The novel is the epic of a world that has been 
abandoned by God.(TN, p.88) 
The novel is the form of the epoch of absolute 
sinfulness, as Fichte said, and it must remain the 
dominant form so long as the world is ruled by the 
same stars.(TN, p.152) 
The novel's response to the problematized and spiritually impoverished 
real world is, according to Lukacs, a kind of redefinition of the ideas of 
being, unity and totality. Whereas before the loss of immanent meaning 
these metaphysical properties were directly available, they are now only 
contingently available. Lukacs has shifted from a metaphysics of tragedy to 
what we might call a metaphysics of irony. 
Indeed, Lukacs says as much. The relationship between the problematized 
world and the novel is no longer the contiguity of essences, but of an 
imposition of unity against life: 
A totality that can be simply accepted is no longer 
given to the forms of art: therefore they must either 
narrow down and volatilise whatever has to be given 
from the point where they can encompass it, or else 
they must show polemically the impossibility of 
achieving their necessary object and the inner nullity 
of their own means. And in this case they carry the 
fragmentary nature of the world's structure into the 
world of forms.(TN, pp.38-39) 
It is still incumbent upon aesthetic form, then, to strive for totality, but 
such totality can only ever be fragile or temporary. The novel, Lukacs says, 
posits 
the fragile and incomplete nature of the world as 
ultimate reality by recognising, consciously and 
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consistently, everything that points outside and 
beyond the confines of the world.(TN, p.72) 
The novel is thus a form defined by a kind of precariousness: 
The danger by which the novel is determined is 
twofold: either the fragility of the world may manifest 
itself so crudely that it will cancel out the immanence 
of meaning which the form demands, or else the 
longing for the dissonance to be resolved, affirmed 
and absorbed into the work may be so great that it will 
lead to a premature closing of the circle of the novel's 
world.(TN, p.72) 
In order to negotiate this hazard, the novel is defined, by Lukacs, as a 
process rather than a product, it is, he says, "something in process of 
becoming"(TN, p.72). It establishes, he says, 
a fluctuating yet firm balance between becoming and 
being; as the idea of becoming, it becomes a state. Thus 
the novel, by transforming itself into a normative 
being of becoming, surmounts itself. 'The voyage is 
completed: the way begins.'(TN, p.73) 
The novel becomes, then, the form of the establishment of what we might 
call an ironic totality. The image of totality is conceptual, constructed 
illusory, and yet necessary. "Irony," Lukacs says, "is the objectivity of the 
novel" (TN, p.90). Essence is no longer changeless and static, as in the epic, 
but dynamic and transitory. The epic and its age witnessed, Lukacs 
suggests, a reconciliation of being and essence, whereas the novel must 
establish a rapport between becoming and essence. 
Having argued this historico-philosophical theory, Lukacs then discusses 
various ways in which the novel conducts its ironic search for totality. The 
form of the novel, its assimilation of historical time, its development of 
problematic characters17; each of these, in different novels, becomes the 
vehicle of totality. Ultimately, however, Lukacs wants the novel to 
become truly epic, comprehensively unified. Thus, he passes from 
considering what he calls novels of abstract idealism and Romantic 
17 As previously mentioned, Lukacs' reliance on the differences between the epic and the 
novel parallels a similar distinction in Auerbach and in Bakhtin, although, once again 
there are important differences between all three theorists. This will be discussed at 




disillusion, to novels which recreate more extensive synthetic totalities. In 
Goethe, for example, Lukacs sees the development of a totality which is 
based upon a kind of ideal of community, within which totality can exceed 
the merely subjective: 
Such community is not the result of people being 
na1vely and naturally rooted in a specific social 
structure, not of any natural solidarity of kinship (as 
in the ancient epics), nor is it a mystical experience of 
community ... it is achieved by personalities ... 
adapting and accustoming themselves to one another 
... the crowning process of education, a maturity 
attained by struggle and effort. 
The content of such maturity is an ideal of free 
humanity which comprehends and affirms the 
structures of social life as necessary forms of human 
community.(TN, p.133)18 
For Lukacs, Goethe represents an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to create the 
new epic, but, he says, reality resists such a process, remaining fragile and 
temporary, and the totality of community remains only, then, an ironic 
reflection on the problematic world. 
Tolstoy, too, tries to give the social world with which his novels are 
concerned a sense of epic unity. Tolstoy, Lukacs says, posits the unified 
natural world over against the problematic cultural world, trying to use 
the natural world as a kind of assurance that the problematic character of 
social life is not entirely ineluctable. Tolstoy seeks, Lukacs claims, "a 
position half-way between nature and culture"(TN, p.148). 
Tolstoy and Goethe, for Lukacs, point towards the possibility of achieving 
a sense of totality within the novel which can stand as an ironic reflection, 
and a corrective, against the problematic world. Their capacity to do so, he 
is arguing, stems from their orientation towards the social life of humans, 
towards their historical being, which can never be timeless or unchanging, 
but must be a process of becoming. While these two, particularly, realized 
the ironic totality, the seeming unity, of the novel, Dostoevsky, Lukacs 
seemed to be suggesting, realized the "breakthrough into a new 
18Lukacs would continue to turn to Goethe as an aesthetic model throughout his career. In 
Goethe and his Age, trans. Robert Anchor (Budapest, 1947; London: The Merlin Press, 1968), 
Lukacs adapted Goethe's concern with reconciliation of the individual and society into his 
own advocacy of realistic aesthetics. 
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epoch"(TN, p.152) at which Tolstoy, much like Lukacs himself, merely 
hinted through abstraction, nostalgia and polemics. Dostoevsky, Lukacs 
says, didn't write novels.19 Rather, his engagement with the problematic 
world, his apprehension of the problematic, seems to get beyond mere 
social life towards a regained totality. 
Lukacs goes no further, in this essay, into how Dostoevsky may have 
transcended the ironic totality of the novel and retrieved the unity of 
essence and life for which Lukacs so clearly yearns. These early works of 
Lukacs' clearly establish his feeling that the real world of experience is 
ineluctably problematic. The only possible reconciliation is in artistic 
withdrawal, into tragedy, as in Soul and Form, or into irony, as in The 
Theory of the Novel. Neither aesthetic unity, however, can recapture 
absolute essence. The tragic can relapse into ambiguity, as Lukacs said of 
Kierkegaard's death, and the ironic totality of the novel is doomed to 
collapse. 
Lukacs' theory of the novel, however, is seriously flawed, and it is 
necessary to examine these flaws. We have seen how The Theory of the 
Novel relies upon dialectical idealism. In this essay, Lukacs' standard of 
truth has shifted from a kind of combination of Platonism and Romantic 
irrationalism to the logic of the dialectic. Truth, then, is progressive and 
the ironic objectivity of the novel is possible because, for Lukacs, the novel 
represents the initial meeting between thesis and antithesis, before 
synthesis is achieved, in the dialectical progression of aesthetic form. A 
problem arises, however: because Lukacs relies upon the logic of the 
dialectic, his theory requires that there is a clear distinction between his 
thesis and his antithesis. In The Theory of the Novel, this means that the 
ancient world - the thesis - must be unified, integrated and whole. As we 
have seen, Lukacs certainly posits such a golden age as the basis of his 
analysis, but such a view seems to suggest that the ancient world lacked 
any social, political, or philosophical complexity, that the Greeks were 
merely epic characters, sure of themselves and of their destiny. As we shall 
see, both Auerbach and Bakhtin also perceived and proceeded from a 
distinction between the epic and the novel - or in Auerbach's case, the 
19This provides an interesting point of comparison between Lukacs and Bakhtin. Both see 
Dostoevsky as the barometer of a profound aesthetic and epistemological shift. Lukacs, 
however, sees this as potentially the end, or supercession, of the novel form, while 















Bible, which is a kind of stylistic precursor of the novel - but neither held 
to such a reductive view of the ancient world, and nor, it must be added, 
did Hegel, who provides the fundamental philosophical basis of Lukacs' 
essay. 
Lukacs' reliance on the dialectic as a ground of truth, then, leads him into 
a reductive analysis of the collision between the unified ancient world, 
and the disunified modern world - the thesis and antithesis of his analysis. 
His synthesis, of course, is a new epic, a modern epic which restores the 
(illusory) unity of the ancient world to the modern world. The novel, 
meanwhile, embodies the movement of the dialectic, and its transitional 
status, its irony, is a stage in the redevelopment, the resurrection, of the 
ideal. 
Because Lukacs is proceeding from so reductive a transposition of 
dialectics onto aesthetics, a question arises: does his theory of the novel 
maintain any credence at all? I suggest, however, that Lukacs' 
understanding of the novel is still remarkably acute, and that his 
metaphysics of irony is a very suggestive idea. His problem, such as it is, is 
in locating his understanding of the novel. Because of his philosophical 
commitments to, on the one hand, idealism, and on the other, the 
dialectic, he places his novel in a kind of passage from the old epic to the 
new epic and it is this context, rather than his view of the novel itself 
which is ill-conceived. 
Lukacs's shift from tragedy to irony, then, was only a kind of displacement 
of his pursuit of a defining ideal which could establish a kind of essential 
philosophical truth. Tragedy, as we have seen, was unsustainable as a 
ground of truth because of its irreconcilability with the social world. Irony 
was similarly unsatisfying because the reconciliation between unity and 
the social world was only conceivable within this flawed sense of 
dialectical progression. The movement of Lukacs' thought itself is tragic. 
What it needs to accomplish is confounded by its own sense of the 
impossibility of this accomplishment, and Lukacs must then resort to 
Romantic gestures, or to lost worlds, efforts which are ultimately futile. 
Although, at this stage of his career, Hegelian idealism, clearly evident in 
The Theory of the Novel's historico-philosophical dialectic of aesthetic 
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forms, set the possibility of essence against social life, Lukacs was 
nonetheless preoccupied by social life. In Goethe, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky 
Lukacs searched for principles which might have given form to the social 
world. This attention to the social world, to the kind of historical world 
theorized by Vico, coupled with Lukacs' contempt for the bourgeois society 
of his period, led him to revise his understanding of the dialectic. His 
philosophical orientation moved away from idealism towards 
materialism, from Hegel towards Marx, and from tragedy and irony 
towards history. 
(b) Lukacs, Marx and the idea of history 
Turning away from tragedy and irony, Lukacs', following his turn to Marx 
in 191820, began to emphasize a complex idea of history as his guiding 
philosophical and aesthetic principle. The outstanding achievement of 
this period, of course, is History and Class Consciousness, arguably Lukacs' 
most enduring intellectual contribution. 
The impact of _this collection of essays on the intellectual history of 
Marxism cannot easily be overstated.21 Widely influential and the source 
of much intellectual and political controversy, it warrants, even now, 
greater attention than the present study allows. In the context of this study, 
the aspect of History and Class Consciousness which is most important is 
the way in which Lukacs turned to history to overcome the dichotomy 
between life and art which had characterized his earlier work. 
Previously, Lukacs' disaffection with the social world had generated a 
series of antitheses between social life and aesthetic ideals such as "soul" 
and "form." The consequence of these antitheses was the Romantic 
aestheticism, the tragic and ironic metaphysics which consecrated this 
radical separation. The turn to history was a turn away from Romantic 
aestheticism towards greater engagement with the social world. As Lowy 
has noted: 
20Lukacs joined the Hungarian Communist Party in December 1918. This period of Lukacs' 
development is comprehensively discussed in Kadarkay, Georg Lukacs, p.193f.; Lowy, From 
Romanticism to Bolshevism, Chapter III "Lukacs' Leftist Period (1919-21); Markus, "Life 
and the Soul". 
21See Lowy, From Romanticism to Bolshevism, pp.168-169. 
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In The Theory of the Novel, with its tragic view of the 
world, Lukacs had spoken of 'the unbridgeable chasm 
between the reality that is and the ideal that should 
be'. But in History and Class Consciousness, this 
inflexible opposition ... is finally abolished ... 22 
While he held to this opposition between form and life, Lukacs' ideas of 
thought and action, of theory and practice, were incommensurable, and 
the work of art, trying to realize a philosophical ideal, was therefore 
divorced from the social world. 23 In his philosophical interpretation of 
Marx, Lukacs began to see how these seeming opposites might be 
reconciled. Indeed, for Lukacs, dialectical method is explicitly concerned 
with this possibility: 
Marx clearly defined the conditions in which a 
relation between theory and practice becomes possible. 
"It is not enough that thought should seek to realise 
itself; reality must also strive towards thought." Or, as 
he expresses it in an earlier work: "It will then be 
realised that the world has long since possessed 
something in the form of a dream which it need only 
take possession of consciously in order to possess it in 
reality." Only when consciousness stands in such a 
relation to reality can theory and practice be united.24 
Lukacs is, then, no longer concerned to escape the social world, but rather 
to theorize it, to understand it, in his own terms, in totality. Still 
concerned with the problematic structure of social life, he turns to 
historical consciousness as the basis for this project. In doing so, two 
important features of Lukacs' thought are made clear. The first is his 
continued concern specifically with the problems of the social world, 
evincing his affinity with the traditions of life-philosophy and the human 
sciences. He makes clear that sheer empiricism and procedures which 
claim scientific objectivity are inadequate methods for apprehending the 
social world: 
The blinkered empiricist will of course deny that facts 
can only become facts within the framework of a 
22Lowy, From Romanticism to Bloshevism, p.171. 
23See Markus, "Life and the Soul", pp. 9-10. 
24Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p.2. Hereafter, this volume will be 
referred to as HCC, and all references will be given in the text. 
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system - which will vary with the knowledge desired. 
He believes that every piece of data from economic 
life, every statistic, every raw event already constitutes 
an important fact. In doing so he forgets that however 
simple an enumeration of 'facts' may be, however 
lacking in commentary, it already implies an 
'interpretation' .(HCC, p.5) 
The shortcoming of this method of apprehending the social world is, 
according to Lukacs', "its failure to see and take account of the historical 
character of the facts on which it is based", and, thus, it "uncritically 
accepts the nature of the object as it is given and the laws of that society as 
the unalterable foundation of 'science"'(HCC, p.6). 
Against this method, Lukacs posits the dialectical method: 
In order to progress from these 'facts' to facts in the 
true meaning of the word it is necessary to perceive 
their historical conditioning as such and to abandon 
the point of view that would see them as immediately 
given: they must themselves be subjected to a 
historical and dialectical examination.(HCC, p.7) 
This sense of the historical world gives rise to what Lukacs calls "totality." 
Phenomena of experience must be understood as part of a historical 
structure in order to be understood completely: 
Only in this context which sees the isolated facts of 
social life as aspects of the historical process and 
integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the 
facts hope to become knowledge of reality. This 
knowledge starts from the simple (and to the capitalist 
world), pure, immediate, natural determinants 
described above. It progresses from them to the 
knowledge of the concrete totality, i.e. to the 
conceptual reproduction of reality. This concrete 
totality is by no means an unmedia ted datum for 
thought. 'The concrete is concrete,' Marx says, 'because 
it is a synthesis of many particular determinants, i.e. a 
unity of diverse elements.'(HCC, pp.8-9) 
Totality, then, is the sum of social forces which constitute phenomena of 
social life, and Lukacs' concern with the social world thus, as Martin Jay 
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has noted, underlines his affinities with Vico's idea of history,25 a point 
borne out both directly and indirectly in History and Class Consciousness. 
Lukacs not only refers, via Marx, to Vico himself, but also claims that 
"history is precisely the history of ... (social) institutions, of the changes 
they undergo as institutions which bring men together in societies"(HCC, 
p.48) 
The second important feature of Lukacs' theory of history is attendant 
upon the first. As we have seen, Lukacs is persistently concerned 
specifically with problems of the social world, evincing his position within 
the tradition of the human sciences. Previously, however, his response to 
the problematic nature of the social world was one of withdrawal or 
transcendence. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs, committed 
now to Marxism, is compelled to engage in a more direct critique. 
His critique of the social world derives from his view that bourgeois 
thought is incapable of coming to terms with the problematic social world. 
As we have seen, empirical scientific procedures, according to Lukacs, fail 
to comprehend the historical nature of social life. Similarly, 
metaphysically idealist approaches remain, Lukacs says, purely 
contemplative and so fail to connect with the real world. This is 
particularly the case with Kant, who, according to Lukacs, cannot 
overcome the antinomy of being unable to reconcile a critique of reason 
with a demand or desire for a universal system of reason. Kant's distrust 
of experience means that his categories of knowledge are necessarily 
divorced from experience. Lukacs writes: 
But the moment that the object is seen as part of a 
concrete totality, the moment that it becomes clear 
that alongside the formal, delimiting concept of 
existence acknowledged by this pure contemplation 
other gradations of reality are possible and necessary 
to thought (being [Dasein ], existence [Existenz], reality 
[Realitiit], etc. in Hegel), Kant's proof collapses: it 
survives only as the demarcation line of purely 
formal thought.(HCC, p.127) 
25Martin Jay , Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 
pp.108-109. 
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This pure formalism, Lukacs says, is the shortcoming of Hegel as well. 
While greatly indebted to Hegel, Lukacs' turn away from idealism required 
a revision of his position with regard to Hegel: 
Hegel's philosophy is driven inexorably into the arms 
of mythology. Having failed to discover the identical 
subject-object in history it was forced to go out beyond 
history and, there, to establish the empire of reason 
which has discovered itself.(HCC, pp.146-147) 
Against these shortcomings, Lukacs argues that Marx offers a truly critical 
philosophy which can "puncture the social illusion"(HCC, p.5) and which 
holds the key to getting beyond the problems of historical life from within. 
"[T]he central problem", Lukacs reminds us, "is to change reality"(HCC, 
p.3). 
Lukacs premises his critique upon the conviction that the social structure 
produced by capitalism encouraged non-dialectical, empiricist thinking. 
He argues that the development of the bourgeoisie makes possible the 
"recognition that society is reality"(HCC, p.19). The problem, however, is 
that, under capitalism, forms of social life, and particularly of economic 
life, become reified. That is, the social and historical nature of phenomena 
of experience is obfuscated and they appear as natural or given. Conceived 
of in such a manner, experience then reinforces an empirical objectivist 
approach to the apprehension of the social world. Lukacs bases his 
argument on his analysis of commodity-relations, the dominant mode of 
economic exchange in capitalist economics. He argues that "the structure 
of commodity relations can be made to yield a model of all the objective 
forms of bourgeois society together with all the subjective forms 
corresponding to them"(HCC, p.83). In other words, Lukacs is arguing that 
in bourgeois society, seemingly objective, natural forms of social reality 
and an empirical approach to them are encouraged. This, he goes on to 
argue, is due to the essence of commodity-structure: 
Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the 
character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom 
objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of 




This is what Lukacs calls the phenomenon of reification and this is the 
point with which Lukacs asserts Marxism as a genuinely philosophical 
advance over classical epistemology. The phenomena of reification, which 
have a materialist basis, become features of human consciousness. Marx's 
critical philosophy, on the other hand, 
implies above all historical criticism. It dissolves the 
rigid, unhistorical, natural appearance of social 
institutions; it reveals their historical origins and 
shows therefore that they are subject to history in 
every respect including historical decline. 
Consequently history does not merely unfold within 
the terrain mapped out by these institutions. It does 
not resolve itself into the evolution of contents, of 
men and situations, etc, while the principles of society 
remain eternally valid.(HCC, p.47) 
Lukacs' turn to history, then, is a return to experience as the basis of social 
critique. By breaking away from the objectivistic forms of bourgeois 
thought, Lukacs argues, it becomes possible to break down the classical 
dichotomy between subject and object, and to understand them as 
dialectically dependent upon one another. Thus, he goes on, we are able to 
understand "the problem of the present as a historical problem" (HCC, 
p.157). 
Once the present is understood as historical, social structure can be 
understood as a totality, as a convergence of historical forces. From this 
point, Lukacs advances his theory of class consciousness as a sense of this 
dialectic materialism. He argues that once the proletariat achieves 
dialectical class consciousness, it will marry its objective place in the 
totality of bourgeois society to a consciousness of the totality, and thus 
effect, in practice, a radical critique of bourgeois society. Lukacs in effect 
substitutes the materialism of the proletariat for the idealism of Hegel's 
Spirit. Such a move sees the constructed nature of social life become 
reconciled to a dynamic, reformative principle of social action, which is 
the very point of Lukacs' critique. 
Thus, Lukacs now seems to have found what we might call a productive 
critique of social life. Through the apprehension of the historical, social 
nature of human reality, Lukacs comes to the idea that "history is the 
history of the unceasing overthrow of the objective forms that shape the 
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life of man", and argues that this conviction must remain in place against 
tendencies in thought which cause "man to become frozen in a fixed 
objectivity"(HCC, p.186). This juxtaposition of consciousness and history is 
Lukacs' central ambition: 
This throws an entirely new light on the problem of 
reality. If, in Hegel's terms, Becoming now appears as 
the truth of Being, and process as the truth about 
things, then this means that the developing 
tendencies of history constitute a higher reality than 
the empirical jacts' . . . (The) image of a frozen reality 
... becomes meaningless when this reality is dissolved 
into the process of which man is the driving 
force.(HCC, p.181)26 
If we set aside the specific political intervention of History and Class 
Consciousness, we can see the shape of Lukacs' critique in the following 
terms. His first premise is the problematic, oppressive nature of the social 
world. His earlier works, motivated by this conviction, advocate a kind of 
aesthetic withdrawal. But between The Theory of the Novel and History 
and Class Consciousness we can see that Lukacs moved beyond Romantic 
aestheticism by developing a critical methodology which was specifically 
concerned with the social world. This is his second premise; the social 
world requires intellectual procedures which do not seek scientific 
objectivism, and which must find their resolution within the social world. 
There is a double edge to this development: on the one hand, Lukacs 
remains committed to a critique of the social world; on the other, he 
remains committed to the primary reality of the social world. His sense of 
historical consciousness implied that consciousness must always be aware 
of its own historical conditioning, conditioning which was itself subject to 
historical development. Like his earlier tragic idealism - destined never 
quite to realize itself - Lukacs' turn to history presupposed a rigorous and 
ongoing critique of social life, including one's own understanding thereof. 
26This characterization of Being as Becoming - which occurs also in The Theory of the 
Novel - betrays Lukacs' Hegelianism most pointedly. Hegel, for example, developing 
Heraclitus' notion of flux, writes: "This universal principle is better characterized as 
Becoming, the truth of Being; since everything is and is not" . See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on 
The History of Philosophy, Volume I, trans. E.S. Haldane (London: Routledge, 1955), p.283. 
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It is this critical dimension of Lukacs' thought which establishes a 
continuous thread throughout his various philosophical and political sea-
changes. On this basis, Markus writes that 
Lukacs' conversion to Marxism in 1918 was not a 
break, an irrational hiatus in the evolution of his 
ideas, but an attempt to find both a theoretical answer 
and a practical solution to the question ( of human 
culture) that had, in the final analysis, fuelled the 
whole of his early development.27 
And just as his critical theory turned towards human praxis, his aesthetic 
theory turned towards realism as the literary form which embodied the 
idea of historical totality which stood both as critique and as resolution of 
the problematic world of experience.28 From the early 1930s to 1957, Lukacs 
was almost exclusively concerned with literary theory and criticism, and, 
while his work of this period is perhaps less noteworthy than his earlier 
27Markus, "Life and the Soul", p.21. 
28This analysis overlooks the complexities of Lukacs' intellectual and political life 
following the appearance of History and Class Consciousness. Lowy provides a detailed 
theoretical analysis of the events surrounding Lukacs during this period (pp.189 ff.). 
Kadarkay gives a more thorough historical account (Chapter 12). Broadly, the relentlessly 
critical approach, motivated by philosophical idealism, of History and Class 
Consciousness collided with real political necessity, and was later abandoned by Lukacs. 
Lichtheim' s observations on Lukacs' conflict with other party intellectuals are extremely 
helpful. He writes: "As Lukacs ... saw the matter, Marxism was indeed ... the inheritor of 
classical German philosophy." This confounded Engels' codification of Marx which had 
been taken up by Lenin and Plekhanov as the cornerstone of Soviet Marxism. More 
philosophically sophisticated, Lukacs' interpretation of Marx precluded the possibility of 
exhaustive knowledge of reality, while the Party depended upon just such a possibility 
(see Lichtheim, Lukacs, pp.58-59). Lichtheim continues: "In effecting this return to the 
(Hegelian) position of the early Marx, Lukacs departed from orthodoxy and he 
compounded the offence by refusing to sanction the 'materialist' view of cognition as a 
mirror-image of an external world"(p.65). Generally, the radical edge of Lukacs' critical 
philosophy was gradually dulled, and the potential for resolution of historical conflict 
moved from an abstract ideal of History to a concrete political reality, the Party. 
Nonetheless, even if Lukacs, for various reasons, revised his position as to the possibility of 
resolving the problematic nature of the social world, History and Class Consciousness 
established an idea which sustained Lukacs' subsequent work in literary theory. Fredric 
Jameson argues that the implication of History and Class Consciousness for literary theory 
is that it introduced a critique which would undermine the seemingly natural, reified 
surface of the social world by dissolving it into "a coexistence of various and conflicting 
historical tendencies, a translation of immobile objects into acts and potential acts and into 
the consequences of acts. Indeed," he continues, "we are tempted to claim that for the Lukacs 
of History and Class Consciousness the ultimate resolution of the Kantian dilemma is to be 
found not in the nineteenth-century philosophical systems ... but rather in the nineteenth-
century novel"; see Marxism and Form, p.189. This would suggest a further continuity 
between the pre-Marxist Lukacs and the later Lukacs insofar as the resolution of the 
problematic social world is once again sought in literature. 
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writings, it is yet possible to trace the critical dimension of his thought 
within his theory of realism. 
(c) Lukacs and realism 
As discussed above, Lukacs work on realism was largely defensive, and, in 
many ways, evinced a greater degree of partisan commitment than 
intellectual rigour. His criticism of modern literature, for example, doesn't 
weather close critical scrutiny. It is clear that Lukacs not only disliked 
modern literature, but didn't understand it. His contemptuous 
characterization of T.S. Eliot as "[t]oday's spokesman for decadence"29 
betrays, to say the least, a reductive understanding of modern poetry. If, 
however, we set aside Lukacs' reactionary stance towards modern 
literature and attend closely to his preference for realism, it is possible to 
see the critical aspect of his earlier work manifested in his literary theory 
and criticism of this period. 
In "Art and Objective Truth" Lukacs discusses what he calls the 
"contradictory basis" of the apprehension of the external world. On the 
one hand, he opens the essay with the following claim: 
The basis for any correct cognition of reality, whether 
of nature or society, is the recognition of the 
objectivity of the external world, that is, its existence 
independent of human consciousness. Any 
apprehension of the external world is nothing more 
than a reflection in consciousness of the world that 
exists independently of consciousness. This basic fact 
of the relationship of consciousness to being also 
serves, of course, for the artistic reflection of 
reality.(W & C, p.25) 
On the other hand, he is concerned throughout this essay to make clear 
that this "objectivity of the external world is no inert, rigid objectivity 
fatalistically determining human activity ... it stands in the most 
indissoluble interaction with practice"(W & C, p.29). He argues that non-
29Georg Lukacs, "Healthy or Sick Art" in Writer & Critic, p.109. The essays collected in 
this volume originally appeared, according to Lukacs' 1965 preface, in Moscow and 
Budapest during the 1930's and 1940's. Further references to this essay will be given in the 
text and indicated by the abbreviation W & C. 
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dialectical epistemology fails to reconcile the objective world with an 
apprehension of the external world which does not simplify is dynamic 
nature. 
The dialectical method, he argues, manages to come to terms with this 
contradiction, and he goes on to posit an equivalence between dialectical 
epistemology and literary realism: 
The artistic reflection of reality rests on the same 
contradiction as any other reflection of reality. What 
is specific to it is that it pursues another resolution of 
these contradictions than science.(W & C, p.34) 
The equivalence between literary realism and the dialectical method 1s 
that neither claims an objective apprehension of the objective world. 
According to Lukacs, the fact that the world of the literary work is fictional 
- "every significant work of art creates its 'own world"'(W & C, p.35) -
constitutes its capacity to represent reality because the reader, by accepting 
the fiction of the work, "surrenders ... to the general effect of the work"(W 
& C, pp.36-37). Curiously, Lukacs suggests that the fiction of the work, the 
fact that it does not really correspond to reality, is an illusion, reversing 
the critical tendency to characterise the verisimilitude of the work as the 
illusion. This illusion, he says, is overcome by "the special character, the 
peculiar kind of reflection of reality there is in art"(W & C, p.36). This 
"peculiar kind" of reflection, involves, then, contradiction, and relies 
upon a dialectical epistemology which understands reality as, at once, 
objective, and nonetheless subject to an ongoing dynamic process. "The 
self-containment of a work of art", Lukacs says, "is therefore the reflection 
of the process of life in motion and in concrete dynamic context"(W & C, 
p.37). 
Clearly this formulation is problematic. Lukacs seems to be arguing that 
realism works on the following principles: firstly, the work seems to be 
fictitious, but this non-correspondence with reality is an illusion; then, 
because it is fictitious, readers are required, and able, to immerse 
themselves in and to experience the world of the work of art; following 
this immersion, the "truth" of literature emerges because readers, 
experiencing the dialectical process within literature, cross-refer this 
aesthetic experience to their own experience of the social world, and, 
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because the literary experience is more concentrated, more self-contained, 
readers then appreciate their own dialectical reality more acutely; in the 
aesthetic world, readers can see the real world beyond their own 
experience of it. 
Obviously, these are highly contentious suggestions. That literature is 
dialectical and so is life and that therefore art reflects life is a tenuous 
suggestion at best, and it is claims like this which have done so much to 
damage Lukacs' reputation as a literary theorist. But the flaws in his theory 
of realism, once again, can lead us back to what is valuable in his theory. 
His theory of realism revives many of the features of his earlier critical 
thought, and certainly makes many of his earlier errors. He begins by 
setting himself against procedures which accept the objective world as 
simply given, and, once again, turns to literature as the possibility of 
getting beyond this kind of epistemology. As Rodney Livingstone points 
out: 
It is ... now art and specifically realist art whose 
function it is to de-reify reality ... Lukacs's view of 
realism ... is then a form of essentialism.30 
While previously Lukacs had sought "essence" in tragedy, he now finds it 
in the dialectical representation of reality in literature, representation 
which recreates the historical totality of reality. But the isomorphism 
between dialectical epistemology and realism in literature is hastily and 
sketchily outlined. His theory once again is caught between the clarity of 
his perception of philosophical problems and his need to solve these 
problems. And, once again, the solution is flawed; his location of the 
novel in a philosophical progression from unity to unity, as we have seen, 
was flawed and, here, his account of realism as the portal to dialectical 
philosophy is fraught with problems. 
But the claims Lukacs' makes for realism do not necessarily invalidate his 
view of realism. There is a tension between Lukacs' understanding of 
what realism is, and what it does. As Livingstone points out, Lukacs wants 
to make realism an essence, the philosophical standard of truth. But 
30Rodney Livingstone, "Introduction" in Georg Lukacs, Essays on Realism, ed. Rodney 
Livingstone, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), pp.11-12. This 
volume is also a collection of Lukacs' essays dating from 1931-1940. 
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against essentialism, there is Lukacs' historicism. For Lukacs, realism is 
both essentially historical, insofar as it recreates historical materialism, 
and historicized, insofar as representation is not timeless but bound to a 
particular period. These two aspects of realism would seem contradictory. 
essentialism being changeless and historicity being concerned specifically 
with change. But Lukacs' theory of realism overcomes this seeming 
contradiction by characterizing essence as a philosophical method or form 
- dialectical materialism - and historicizing the material, or content, of 
realism. 
Once again, Lukacs' undoes the critical aspect of his literary theory by then 
making extravagant claims for his discovery. This tension between the 
essential and the particular, which might have been understood as 
grounds for limiting or at least moderating the claims made for realism, 
becomes the means whereby Lukacs makes his most ambitious claims for 
realism. This tension, he suggests, generates the illusion of non-
correspondence between the text and the world, which makes possible the 
readers' immersion in the text, and this immersion accounts for the 
verisimilitude of a text. Once again Lukacs has turned to art as the 
reconciliation of philosophical problems, a faith in art which is a kind of 
residual of the aestheticism which characterized his earlier work. Readers 
experience, Lukacs argues, both the particulars of the world of a literary 
work and something essential to their own historical experience, its 
dialectical nature. Thus, he suggests, readers become philosophically 
enriched because the limits of experience are transcended when readers 
are immersed in seemingly illusory experiences, but then, through this 
transposition, they are made aware of the fundamental elements, the 
essence of experience itself. Once again, Lukacs' critical acuity is tainted by 
his relentless idealism. 
But elements of Lukacs' apprehension of realism are still insightful. His 
sense of the tension between the essential and the particular motivates 
Lukacs' invective against naturalism. In "Narrate or Describe ?", Lukacs 
unfavourably compares Zola with Tolstoy. Zola's error, he argues, is to try 
to describe, to try to provide exhaustive detail, as if he were 
photographically recording certain data. Tolstoy, on the other hand, 




process outside of which it has no reality.31 While Lukacs admires Zola's 
talent, he suggests that his method, which overlooks the social context in 
which events must be understood, is fundamentally mistaken. Zola seems 
to claim a kind of scientific objectivity in representation which Lukacs, as a 
historicist and a former student of lebensphilosophie, considers to be 
unavailable. In a sense, Zola's essentialism is substantial - based on a kind 
of scientific reduction to basic elements - while Lukacs' is methodological -
based on the conceptual approach to the data. 
This argument of Lukacs' is reaffirmed in The Meaning of Contemporary 
Realism where Lukacs challenges literary modernism. Lukacs posits a 
distinction between two 
opposed views of the world - dynamic and 
developmental on the one hand, static and 
sensational on the other ... 32 
Again, Lukacs is commited to realism on the basis of its apprehension of 
the world as dynamic. He cites Aristotle's definition of humans as zoon 
politikon - social beings - to assert that human reality is socio-historical. 
Modernism, like expressionism and naturalism before it, fails to come to 
terms with this essential structure of human reality, seeking instead a 
kind of essential substance of the individual. Lukacs' Aristotelianism 
complements his earlier preference for narration over description, in 
which Aristotle's poetics are clearly echoed. 
While, again, Lukacs' arguments are somewhat vitiated by his poor 
understanding of modern literature33 his theory of realism still 
countenances a problematic apprehension of the world. Maintaining his 
emphasis on the specifically social and historical nature of human reality, 
Lukacs argues that literary representation does not merely correspond to 
reality, but methodologically coincides with what Lukacs considers to be a 
philosophically accurate apprehension of reality. Indeed, the complexity of 
31See W & C, pp.110-111. 
32Georg Lukacs, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, p.19. 
33 Adamo's critique of Lukacs, and particularly of this book, seem to me the most 
comprehensive review of Lukacs' shortcomings in this respect. Adorno contests Lukacs' 
claim that all modern art is decadent and anti-historical. Adorno goes on to suggest that 
Lukacs' work of this period is almost wilfully bad, as if he were registering a kind of 
hidden protest against the political environment in which he worked; see Theodor W. 
Adorno, "Extorted Reconciliation" in Notes to Literature, Vol. I. 
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realism acts as a kind of corrective for the apprehension of reality. Because, 
in realism, reality is at once objective and historicized, the aesthetic 
experience of this tension leads, Lukacs suggests, to a real apprehension of 
this tension which leads, in turn, to a dialectical epistemology as the only 
means of turning this tension into a balance. 
But these shortcomings notwithstanding, we can see that Lukacs' theory of 
realism is predicated upon an important conviction: the real social world 
cannot simply be accepted as it is; it is necessary philosophically to critique 
the social world. Lukacs is critical insofar as this insight is concerned but 
his need to "solve" the problematic social world - the sources of which are 
varied and complex - lead his critical faculty astray, encourage him to 
believe that certain philosophical and, indeed, political doctrines have 
achieved a vantage point which is beyond critique, which is, we might say, 
"the way it is." 
But the distinction between the static and dynamic apprehensions of the 
social world is still a useful one. In The Historical Novel, this was 
precisely how Lukacs distinguished between eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century realistic novels: 
even the great realistic novel of the eighteenth 
century, which in its portrayal of contemporary 
morals and psychology, accomplished a revolutionary 
breakthrough to reality for world literature is not 
concerned to show its characters as belonging to any 
concrete time. The contemporary world is portrayed 
with unusual plasticity and truth-to-life, but is 
accepted na:ively as something given: whence and 
how it has developed have not yet become problems 
for the writer. 34 
Here, Lukacs is arguing for literary representation which grasps and 
incorporates the historicity of human reality, and, more specifically, the 
materialist theory of history which he has developed. Once again, he relies 
upon Hegel to assert the historical character of the life of individuals, but 
criticizes Hegel's idealism. Whereas Hegel characterized certain key 
historical figures as manifestations of the historical spirit, which figures 
34Georg Lukacs, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Moscow, 1937; 
London: Merlin Press, 1962), p.19, emph. mine. Further references to The Historical Novel 
(hereafter HN) will be included in the text. 
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then determine the historical development of society, Lukacs argues that 
historical figures develop out of the historical materiality of their epoch. 
This is the historicism which he finds and approves of in the nineteenth-
century novel. Citing Balzac, he writes of Sir Walter Scott in the following 
terms: 
Scott's novels, he said, marched towards the great 
heroes in the same way as history itself had done 
when it required their appearance. The reader, 
therefore, experiences the historical genesis of the 
important historical figures, and it is the writer's task 
from then on to let their actions make them appear 
the real representatives of these historical crises. 
Scott thus lets his important figures grow out of the 
being of the age, he never explains the age from the 
position of its great representatives, as do the 
Romantic hero-worshippers. Hence they can never be 
central figures of the action.(HN, p.39) 
This, Lukacs argues, is the acievement of Balzac, James Fenimore Cooper, 
and, particularly, Tolstoy: their novels capture a broad sense of the 
historical materialism of social life. In War and Peace, Lukacs claims: 
The depiction of popular life is broader, more 
colourful, richer in characters. The emphasis on 
popular life as the real basis of historical happenings 
is more conscious.(HN, p.86) 
Lukacs' emphasis on realistic representation, and particularly on historical 
representation, is a continuation of his philosophical propositions about 
the kind of existence, of Being-in-the-world, which humans experience, 
and a development in his aesthetic search for resolution of the problems 
of this existence. 
(d) Rethinking Lukacs 
Lukacs' aesthetic theories can be seen now as contributing to the present 
study in three essential ways. The first is his sense of the social and 
historical nature of human existence. Furthermore, he understands this 
social world as problematic. The manner in which Lukacs theorizes this 
problematic develops throughout his career. He begins with a rejection of 
the world of experience, an aesthetic withdrawal into tragedy, and then 
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begins to articulate an idealistic reconciliation with it. These responses to 
the problematic social world inform his early writings in Soul and Form 
and The Theory of the Novel. Finally, Lukacs adopts Hegelian Marxist 
epistemology in an effort comprehensively to apprehend the nature of the 
social world. 
This last point emphasizes the second important feature of Lukacs' 
contribution to this study. Consistent both with his early introduction to 
Diltheyan human sciences and his later materialism, Lukacs maintains 
that human reality, being social and historical, requires discrete theoretical 
practices in order to apprehend it. As it is not merely given, its 
comprehensive apprehension can only be achieved through intellectual 
methods which incorporate a sense of its historical and social 
conditioning. This idea is evident particularly in Lukacs' later work in 
dialectical materialism, although in The Theory of the Novel, Lukacs' 
efforts to synthesize an approach to the social world is already evident. 
Thirdly, throughout his career, Lukacs turned to aesthetic theory as a 
critique of the problems of the social world. Initially, as we have seen, 
Lukacs counterposed art and life. He begins by seeking refuge in art but in 
his later works turns to art not as an escape from the problems of the social 
world but rather as the expression of the materialist philosophy which 
represents the possibility of reconciliation with the social world. In The 
Theory of the Novel, Lukacs' reliance on the irony of the novel begins his 
process of reconciliation with the social world. By The Historical Novel, 
he has come to view the realistic novel of the nineteenth-century as the 
very manifestation of a historical materialist approach to society. 
We can see, then, that Lukacs' amalgamation of the human sciences, 
dialectical philosophical approaches, historical materialism, and realistic 
aesthetics begins, but only begins, to constitute a profound challenge to 
anti-realistic aesthetics. The renunciation of realism in the name of critical 
theory, as we have seen in Part I, relies upon a characterization of realism 
which presupposes a non-problematic approach to human reality. Such an 
approach would exhibit little anxiety towards its own procedures and rest 
securely upon its own standards of objectivity. For Lukacs, however, such 
presuppositions are the very target of his critical practice. Rather, he 
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proceeds from a critical stance towards social reality, developing his 
aesthetic theory as a vehicle for critique. 
But Lukacs' critical theory is fraught with Lukacs' own conflicting 
impulses. On the one hand, his sense of the problematic social world 
generates his historical consciousness which leads him philosophically to 
abandon a notion of essential being, replacing it with the more fluid, 
dynamic concept of becoming. On the other hand, Lukacs is unwilling to 
embrace the problematic social world. His early retreats into tragedy and 
his lamentation over the passing of a (misconceived) golden age of 
spiritual wealth make clear that he is unwilling to accept the problematic 
social world and seeks, somehow, to resolve it. In his Marxist period he 
achieves this resolution by resorting not to substantial essentialism but to 
methodological essentialism. While the social world may be problematic, 
dynamic, historical, there is an approach which is universally appropriate. 
That is, of course, dialectical materialism, in which Lukacs locates the 
possibility of, at once, admitting the historical quality of reality and going 
beyond it. 
Lukacs', then, only explores the possibilities of realistic representation in a 
limited fashion. His apprehension of the social world - the background of 
realism - is problematic, complex and critical, but, in many ways, his 
response to the problematic world is simple and uncritical. We have seen 
how, throughout his career, some of Lukacs' critical premises were 
questionable. Such fundamental flaws certainly could not furnish him 
with the conceptual tools for achieving the essential philosophical 
position for which he longed. In his later phases, those most directly 
concerned with realism, Lukacs' commitment to dialectical materialism 
limits realism to an expression of the historical materialism of the world 
of the text, tying it to his claim that dialectical materialism is 
philosophically and politically unassailable. While he takes us beyond a 
simple, uncritical apprehension of the social world, his faith in the 
inexorable dialectical movement of history admits of no critique of itself. 
In terms of the present study, then, Lukacs represents only an initial stage 
in the reassertion of the critical possibilities of a theory of realistic 
representation. In the first part of this study I argued that anti-realism 
rested upon a reductive account of realism, upon constructing realism as a 
bastion of theoretical errors, the correction of which is the task of critical 
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theory. The challenge to such a view represented by Lukacs is, in a sense, 
an inversion of the same error. While Lukacs appreciates realism far more 
critically, his invective against other forms and genres is clearly reductive, 
and instead of constructing realism as an error, he makes of it a 
philosophical ideal and a paramount artistic achievement, which he tries 
to establish as the corrective of all other philosophical and literary errors. 
But Lukacs' critical approach to realism is helpful insofar as it is only 
concerned with the complexities of realism. As we have seen, many of 
Lukacs shortcomings derive from the same source as his strengths. His 
search for truth inspired his most critical moments in which he set 
himself against static, moribund habits of thought; his sense of the irony 
of the novel, his critique of the social world, his appreciation of the 
conceptual resources of the realistic novel. But his need successfully to 
conclude his search led him into his own dogma. We can say, then, that 
his tragedy is philosophical, because his philosophical strengths and 
weaknesses coincide. It is also possible to say that his philosophy is tragic, 
not because he is surrounded by a hostile philosophical cosmos, but 
because his philosophical development, which, as he have seen, begins 
with a commitment to the tragic, is motivated by this sense of inherent 
tension, of irreconcilable paradox. To try to overcome this paradox, Lukacs' 
theories move from one failed god to another, his need always to commit 
himself philosophically at odds with his keen apprehension of the 
indeterminacies of existence. 
Lukacs' contribution to this study, then, is a qualified one. On the one 
hand, Lukacs' commitment to realism, or, rather, the understanding of 
realism which informs his political and aesthetic commitment, shows 
how realism can be considered philosophically productive, how it can be 
considered within a critical framework. In this chapter we have seen how 
Lukacs' work, from his earliest writings, is based upon philosophically 
critical foundations, which lead in various ways to flawed conclusions. I 
have tried to show how his theory of realism, while in many ways the 
product of his least reflective period, emerges from his critical background 
as a critical theory. On the other hand, however, to so appreciate Lukacs' 
contribution requires a kind of excision of his more ambitious 
philosophical aspirations, his efforts to get beyond criticism, beyond 
history. While many of these imperatives in Lukacs' work derived from 
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his own historical and political milieu, it is fair to say that they were also 
implicit in his essential philosophical position. Lukacs asked, as it were, 
the right questions; it is in the questions he asked, rather than the answers 
he supplied, that his enduring theoretical contribution lies. 
In the following chapter we shall be concerned with another theorist of 
realism whose contributions, while perhaps less well-known than those of 
Lukacs, are more enduring. For Erich Auerbach, as for Lukacs, history 
became an important theoretical field. But unlike Lukacs, whose rigid 
commitment to dialectical thinking limited his critical insights, Auerbach 
conceived of history as more amorphous, more relativistic, and this view 
of history figures prominently in his literary theory, the cornerstone of 
which is, of course, his great study of realism. 
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Erich Auerbach and the world of nations 
... the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a dar kling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
- Matthew Arnold 
Erich Auerbach's anxious survey of the history of Western literature - his 
major work Mimesis - was, perhaps, a kind of gesture against what he saw 
as its imminent demise. Written during the Second World War while 
Auerbach was in exile in Turkey, and without recourse to proper 
scholastic resources, Mimesis, like the works of the early Lukacs, is, at least 
in part, a response to Auerbach's keen sense of cultural and historical 
crisis, his own "struggle and flight" seeming to parallel the siege under 
which his whole cultural environment was suffering. 
But while Mimesis may be understood as a reaction to specific 
circumstances, it is certainly not reactionary, in the ordinary sense, and its 
theoretical resonance cannot be limited to the circumstances of its genesis. 
Auerbach's focus upon "the interpretation of reality through literary 
representation" 1 is not so much a monument to realism (or to its 
memory) as a detailed exploration of the complicated relationship between 
literature and reality, the philosophical richness of each, and the ways in 
which literature has addressed these complexities. It is the loss of this 
complexity which Auerbach fears, and his study, in arguing for realism as 
a poignant focus for the study of this complexity, survives its specific 
milieu. In this chapter, I shall try to show how Auerbach's attention to 
realism rests upon complicated and fundamentally critical aesthetic and 
epistemological premises and how his work contributes to the present 
1Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. 
Willard R. Trask (Berne, 1946; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), p.554. 
Hereafter, all references to Mimesis will be incorporated into the text. 
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argument that such a view of realism contributes much to a critical 
approach to literature and to literary theory. 
Auerbach's approach, like that of the Lukacs of History and Class 
Consciousness, develops from a philosophical approach to history. Indeed, 
Auerbach advances his theories through his own literary historiography. 
But Auerbach's approach to history is certainly not naively empirical or 
positivistic. Fredric Jameson, for example, discussing the redefinition of 
literary history under the influence of contemporary critical theory 
suggests that the task of this revised kind of literary history 
is at one with that proposed by Louis Althusser for 
historiography in general: not to elaborate some 
achieved and lifelike simulacrum of its supposed 
object, but rather to "produce" the latter's "concept." 
This is indeed what the greatest modern or 
modernizing literary histories - such as Erich 
Auerbach's Mimesis - have sought to do in their 
critical practice, if not in their theory .2 
It is interesting that Jameson explicitly associates Auerbach with the kind 
of critical consciousness which has contributed to anti-representational 
aesthetics. His suggestion that this critical aspect of Mimesis is more a 
matter of its practice than its theory implies that it is almost unaware of its 
own critical possibilities. I suggest, on the contrary, that not only is 
Auerbach's critical practice based upon a profoundly critical approach, but 
that such an approach is implicit in his very theoretical underpinnings. 
The enduring implications of Auerbach's contribution to literary theory 
and history are certainly not, as Jameson seems to imply, accidental. 
Auerbach's aesthetics display some remarkable similarities to those of both 
Lukacs and, as I shall discuss below, Mikhail Bakhtin. These are not so 
explicit that common sources - except perhaps a general neo-Kantian 
origin - can be traced, nor do they seem to have been aware of one another 
to any significant degree.3 Rather, the similarities lie in their common 
2Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p.12. 
3That Lukacs and Auerbach were unaware of Bakhtin's work may be inferred from the 
circumstances of Bakhtin's working life, but Lukacs' wide currency would have been likely 
to have brought his work to the attention of Auerbach, though a reciprocal exchange would 
have been less likely. These, however, are speculations; I have come across no evidence in 
their works to support or refute them. Bakhtin's awareness of Lukacs, however, is 




attention to the aesthetics of realistic representation, and in that each 
proceeds from a distinction between classical epic narrative and the 
aesthetics of the novel. As we have seen, Lukacs' lament for the loss of the 
spiritual unity represented by the epic is problematic, and his 
understanding of the classical world is questionable. On the other hand, 
Auerbach and Bakhtin both tend to embrace the novel not as a possibility 
of regaining the sort of epic unity for which Lukacs longs - indeed, neither 
is so reductive in his account of the epic/novel contrast as Lukacs - but as 
the expression of a more sophisticated aesthetic which is more appropriate 
to the social and historical world. 
It is important to understand how Auerbach arrives at his view of the 
novel. Strictly speaking, of course, he doesn't actually draw a distinction 
between epic and novel, but between the epic and the Bible, which he sees 
as the progenitor of the stylistic line which leads to the novel. But his 
preference, on the basis of mimesis or realism, for the stylistic line which 
incorporates the Bible, Dante and the nineteenth-century novel, derives 
from his sense of the complexities and relativities of history. Realism, he 
suggests, is useful precisely because it presupposes such a sense of history, 
and because it sets itself against empirical or positivistic approaches which 
reduce or fail to appreciate these complexities. On this basis, we can say 
that Auerbach meets the criteria of the critical with which we have been 
concerned, because his apprehension of the historical world, the reality of 
literary realism, is not content with simply the way reality is. Rather, he is 
concerned with how reality comes to be the way it is, a question to which, 
as we shall see, he hopes not to find a final answer. 
Auerbach's commitment to historical relativism sustains the 
encyclopaedic consideration of the representation of reality in Mimesis, 
creating a kind of tension between his commitment to realistic 
representation and his own tendency to relativize realistic representation 
as an aesthetic principle. As I have indicated, my method in these chapters 
is to examine the critical background to various theories of realism, to 
determine how these theories were arrived at. Auerbach's attention to 
realism, as I have been suggesting, is incorporated into his general 
approach to the historical world, and the impetus for Auerbach's sense of 
history derives from his lifelong association with the thought of 
Giambattista Vico, whose theory of history constituted an important 
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contribution to the understanding of history as a specifically human 
problem. 
(a) Vico' s. development of the study of history 
Auerbach's intellectual relationship with Vico has been commented on at 
some length,4 and, more pointedly, given great weight by Auerbach 
himself. 5 Auerbach wrote several major essays on Vico, reviewed works 
on Vico, including Bergin and Fisch's well-known English translation of 
The New Science, and himself translated both Vico's The New Science 
and Benedetto Croce's study of Vico into German. The influence suggested 
by this relationship warrants attentipn. As we shall see, Vico's sense of 
historical relativism is developed by Auerbach into a critical theory of 
literary history and, of course, of mimesis. 
Firstly, it is important briefly to rehearse some of the central tenets of 
Vico' s "science." Vico' s concern, broadly, is with the limitations of human 
knowledge, limitations which he tries to articulate in order to challenge 
Cartesian principles of cognition. Pursuant to this, he posits a distinction 
between what he calls certainty and truth (certum and verum). 6 The 
distinction between the true and the certain precipitates further 
distinctions: knowledge and consciousness (scienza and coscienza); 
philosophy and philology. Paragraphs 137-139 of The New Science 
articulate this series of distinctions: 
4See Rene Wellek, "Auerbach and Vico", and Timothy Bahti, "Vico, Auerbach, and 
Literary History", both in Giorgio Tagliacozzo ed. Vico: Past and Present (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981); Luiz Costa-Lima, "Erich Auerbach: History and 
Metahistory", New Literary History, 19, 3 (Spring 1988). 
5See Auerbach, "Vico's Contribution to Literary Criticism"(1958) in his Gesammelte 
Aufsi:itze zur romanischen Philologie (A. Francke AG: Bern, 1967); Auerbach, "Vico and 
Aesthetic Historism"(1949) in his Scenes From the Drama of European Literature 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973). These two essays postdate the composition of 
Mimesis, but Auerbach's engagement with Vico in general predates Mimesis; see the 
bibliography of Auerbach's works which is appended to his last work Literary Language 
and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and the Middle Ages, trans. Ralph Manheim (Bern, 
1958; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). 
6The importance of this distinction is argued by, among others, Isaiah Berlin, who writes: 
"Vico' s fundamental distinction, as everyone with the least acquaintance with his writings 
knows, is between verum and certum." See" A Note on Vico's Concept of Knowledge" in 
Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White eds, Giambattista Vico: An International 
Symposium (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p.371. 
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Men who do not know what is true of things take care 
to hold fast to what is certain, so that, if they cannot 
satisfy their intellects by knowledge (scienza), their 
wills at least may rest on consciousness (coscienza). 
Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes 
knowledge of the true; philology observes that of 
which human choice is the author, whence comes 
consciousness of the certain. 
This axiom by its second part includes among the 
philologians all the grammarians, historians, critics, 
who have occupied themselves with the study of the 
languages and deeds of peoples: both at home, as in 
their customs and laws, and abroad, as in their wars, 
peaces, alliances, travels, and commerce.7 
Proceeding from this distinction, Vico undertakes two seemingly 
contradictory tasks. The first is to abandon the human pursuit of verum, 
to abdicate the kind of exhaustive knowledge claimed by philosophers. 
This would overcome what Vico calls the conceit of nations and of 
scholars. The conceit of nations, according to Vico, is a form of cultural 
essentialism: 
On the conceit of nations, there is a golden saying of 
Diodorus Siculus. Every nation, according to him, 
whether Greek or barbarian, has had the same conceit 
that it before all other nations invented the comforts 
of human life and that its remembered history goes 
back to the very beginning of the world.(NS, para.125, 
p.61) 
The conceit of scholars is a kind of cognitive parallel of this mistaken 
cultural essentialism: 
To this conceit of nations is added that of scholars, 
who will have it that what they know is as old as the 
world.(NS, para.127, p.61.) 
On the other hand, Vico' s second undertaking, which is indeed the greater 
ambition of The New Science, is to reconcile verum and certum, to 
7The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold 
Fisch (Naples, 1744; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp.62-63. Hereafter, The New 
Science will be abbreviated to NS, and paragraph and pages references to this edition will 
be incorporated into the text. 
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develop, as his title indicates, a new science (scienza). In paragraph 140, 
immediately after establishing the distinction between verum and certum, 
Vico contemplates this reconciliation: 
This same axiom (para. 138) shows how the 
philosophers failed by half in not giving certainty to 
their reasonings by appeal to the authority of the 
philologians, and likewise how the latter failed by half 
in not taking care to give their authority the sanction 
of truth by appeal to the reasoning of the 
philosophers. If they had done this they would have 
been more useful to their commonwealths and they 
would have anticipated us in conceiving this 
Science.(NS, para.140, p.63)8 
To approach this reconciliation, Vico turns to a kind of humanist social 
materialism as the material for his study, establishing this social 
materialism as the truth for which his new science is searching: 
But the philosophers have not yet contemplated His 
providence in respect of that part of it which is most 
proper to men, whose nature has this principle 
property: that of being social.(NS, para.2, p.3) 
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Investigating this social property of human existence leads Vico, 1n 
paragraph 331, to articulate his great distinction between the world of 
nature and the world of nations: 
... there shines the eternal and never failing light of a 
truth beyond all question: that the world of civil 
society has certainly been made by men, and that its 
principles are therefore to be found within the 
modifications of our own human mind. Whoever 
reflects on this cannot but marvel that the 
8Vico, of course, did not set out his task exactly in this fashion, but this seeming 
contradiction between these two aspects of his work is, it seems to me, extremely important. O" 
-ditti'tt hand, as Berlin notes, history - in the very broad sense which Vico employs - "falls 
on the scienza-verum side" of the division between truth and certainty, or, as Martin Jay 
argues, "he included knowledge of history in the verum category" . See Berlin "A Note on 
Vico's Concept of Knowledge", p.372; Martin Jay, "Vico and Western Marxism" in Vico: Past 
and Present, p.197. On the other hand, this reconciliation involves, as paragraph 140 
suggests, a rethinking of the nature of both truth and certainty. This is emphasized by 
Bergin and Fisch in their comprehensive introduction to The New Science: "The pursuit of 
coscienza of the certain is philology or history; the pursuit of scienza of the true or the 
common (eternal principles) is philosophy. Thus far, scienza in the narrow sense. But it is in 
a wider sense that the term scienza is used in the title of Vico's work, and in that wider 
sense it embraces both philology and philosophy"; see The New Science, p.xxx. Luiz Costa-
Lima's article "History and Metahistory" deals with this in some detail; see pp.473ff. 
philosophers should have bent all their energies to 
the study of the world of nations, or civil world, 
which, since men had made it, men could come to 
know.(NS, p.96) 
Vico, then, traces the development of social customs - religion, marriage, 
burial - in order to study the different historical and cultural ways in 
which they have become institutionalized. These institutions, however, 
are a matter of historical emergence, their nature, he says, is "a coming 
into being (nascimento) at certain times and in certain guises"(NS, 
para.147, p.64). In order to study these historical institutions, Vico proceeds 
"by severe analysis of human thoughts about the human necessities or 
utilities of social life ... our science is therefore a history of human 
ideas"(NS, para.347, pp.103-104). 
Very broadly, Vico claims two main achievements in The New Science. 
The first is his insistence on the priority of the social in human existence, 
as both the pursuit of his science and as what makes it possible as a 
science.9 The second of Vico's claims is more ambitious. Having identified 
the historical development of institutions as a response to the 
requirements of -society, Vico tries to find the universal principles of the 
world of nations. Thus, Vico establishes a tension between the 
9The priority of the social in Vico's science is one of the most suggestive aspects of his work, 
as it makes possible parallels between Vico and many other, later developments in 
philosophy. Perhaps the most important of these parallels is with Marxist historical 
materialism. As discussed above, Lukacs made several references to Vico, suggesting a 
relationship on which Martin Jay has commented at some length; see Martin Jay, Marxism 
and Totality, pp.107££. It is beyond the scope of this study to trace conceptual links between 
Vico and other traditions of thought and certainly to consider the question of direct 
influence. Nonetheless, it is important to see how an emphasis on the social and historical 
is a constant thread which runs through much of the work discussed in this part of the 
present study. Fisch and Bergin, for example, argue that "Vico shares with the Marxists 
and the existentialists the negative view that there is no human essence to be found in 
individuals as such, and with the Marxists the positive view that the essence of humanity · 
is the ensemble of social relations, or the developing social institutions"; see The New 
Science, p.xxxix. The relationship between Marxism and Vico is further discussed by Eugene 
Kamenka who suggests that while Vico's materialism presages Marxism there is no 
evidence of direct influence, Vico being more of a suggestive forerunner than a founder of 
developments in philosophy such as Marxism; see Eugene Kamenka, "Vico and Marxism" in 
Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium. Other suggestive parallels include Vico's 
similarities with the traditions of the human sciences, which, as we have seen, influenced 
the young Lukacs and are central to the development of contemporary hermeneutics; see 
H.A. Hodges, "Vico and Dilthey" in An International Symposium. Vico's thought is also 
concordant with aspects of Bakhtin's dialogic epistemology, which places great import on 
the social character of language; see Hwa Yol Jung, "Vico and Bakhtin: A Prologomenon to 
any Future Comparison", New Vico Studies, 3 (1985). 
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historicizing aspects of his science and the demand for universal 
principles which are the defining features of science: 
There must in the nature of human institutions be a 
mental language common to all nations, which 
uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in 
human social life and expresses it with as many 
diverse modifications as these same things may have 
diverse aspects.(NS, para.161, p.67) 
By arriving at this common mental language, Vico hopes to arrive at the 
scientific principles of history, which, he claims, establish a cyclical pattern 
of historical ages, within which the institutions of each nation follow 
certain developmental principles.10 
Vice's study of the world of nations, within his conception of cyclical 
history, takes the form of an analysis of various institutions - language, 
law, government - trying to show how each passes through particular 
phases of historical cycles, and how each has manifested itself as a 
universal principle of the social and historical development of nations.11 
Vico' s ambition to outline "an ideal eternal history traversed in time by 
the histories of all nations"(NS, para.393, p.124) notwithstanding, his 
method suggests that each phase of historical development is, at once, 
complete within itself, and yet relativized by the possibility of its historical 
development. The development of human institutions, which is the 
subject of his science, will always incorporate a sense of the changeability 
of these institutions. As Costa-Lima puts it: 
10The cyclical pattern which Vico identifies is what he calls the "course the nations run" 
from an age of gods, through an age of heroes, to an age of humans. Institutions develop in 
each of these ages and then undergo a "recourse"; see paragraphs 393-399, pp.124-126. It is 
beyond the scope of this study thoroughly to investigate Vico's understanding of cyclical 
history. Rather we are concerned with his development of a historicist method which is 
central to his approach to human institutions. 
11Vico's use of the idea of nations warrants some clarification. Following his 
philological/ etymological method, he defines a nation as the birth of a system of 
institutions. More specifically, by nation he means ancient historical civilisations -
Egyptians, Greeks, Romans. For complex reasons, he excludes the Hebrews from his analysis 
on the grounds that their traditions, being sacred, were always marked by a continuity 
between the sacred and the secular and that therefore the distinction between the two 
kinds of "worlds" from which he proceeds was inapplicable. 
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Truth is no longer identified with a single standard 
but is conditioned by a necessarily bifurcated 
knowledge. 
The commentary above already allows us to see that 
the reflection on the cert um, ass urning the 
enhancement of historical object, implies a 
conception of history - a relativistic conception of 
history. 12 
The principles of historical investigation in The New Science complement 
some of the ideas Vico had established in his earlier work On the Most 
Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. There Vico propounded perhaps his most 
well-known idea, the verum-factum principle. In this work, Vico follows 
a philological etymological method which establishes synonymic 
equivalencies between words and equivalencies between concepts 
associated with particular words which, he argues, establish the kind of 
ideas which he later developed as the study of the world of nations: 
For the latins, verum (the true) and factum (what is 
made) are interchangeable, or to use the customary 
language of the Schools, they are convertible. For 
them, the verb in tell igere is the same as "to read 
perfectly" and "to have plain knowledge." In addition, 
their cogitare was the same as our vernacular "to 
think" (pensare) and "to gather" (and a r 
raccogliendio). And for them, ratio meant the 
reckoning of arithmetical ratios as well as man's 
endowment by which he differs from and surpasses 
brute animals. 13 
This prefigures Vico's discussion of the "made" qualities of the human 
world, of which, although they are associated with the certum, by virtue of 
this conceptual equivalence between verum and factum, it is possible to 
establish certain truths. This rethinking of the idea of truth with regard to 
historical studies is the principal achievement of The New Science, and, 
importantly, the kind of philosophical approach which Auerbach 
12Luiz Costa-Lima, "Erich Auerbach: History and Metahistory", p.476. The reflection on 
the certum to which Costa-Lima refers is reflection on history before it is reintegrated into 
a new idea of verum. 
13Giambattista Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians , trans. L.M. Palmer 
(Naples, 1710; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.45. I have here acceded to the 
view that there is an important continuity between this work and The New Science, but the 
matter is certainly not without contention. Palmer's introduction to this volume discusses 




inherited and developed within the context of modern literary theory and 
criticism. 
(b) Auerbach as student of Vico 
Auerbach is extremely forthcoming about his relationship with Vico, and 
in "Vico' s Contribution to Literary Criticism" he makes clear the ways in 
which Vico's approach influenced his own. Auerbach begins by 
considering the general purpose of Vico's project, what Auerbach calls 
"Vico's historical epistemology." Auerbach reformulates paragraph 331 of 
The New Science, emphasizing the historical and political implications of 
Vico's thought. He writes that Vico's epistemology 
is based on the principle that there is no cognition 
without creation; only the creator knows what he has 
created himself. Thus, the physical world (il mondo 
della natura) has been created by God; therefore only 
God can understand it. But the historical or political 
world, the world of mankind (il mondo delle 
nazioni), can be understood by men, because men 
have made it. 14 
Importantly, Auerbach also pays particular attention to Vico's sense of 
what is meant by "history." He characterizes Vico as having expanded the 
subject matter of history: 
he enlarges the meaning of history to such an extent 
that it comprehends the whole of social life. His term 
il mondo delle nazioni includes not only political 
history in its specific sense, but also history of 
expression, of language, of script, of the arts, of 
religion, of law, of economics, since all these parts of 
human activity originate from the same conditions, 
i.e. the specific state of the human mind at a given 
time.("Vico's Contribution, p.260) 
Auerbach's understanding of the way in which Vico conceives of history 
leads him to endorse what he interchangeably calls Vico' s historicism or 
14Auerbach, "Vico's Contribution to Literary Criticism" (hereafter, "Vico's Contribution"), 
p.259. Further references will be included in the text. 
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"historism." 15 Differentiating between Vico and the anti-historical 
tendencies of his epoch, Auerbach argues that, despite his belief in an 
"ideal eternal history," Vico establishes a "historical relativism or 
perspectivism"("Vico's Contribution", p.260) and, moreover, that this 
historicism is the guiding principle of The New Science. Auerbach 
continues by emphasizing the complexities of this kind of historicism: 
Historicism is not eclecticism. It is a difficult and 
infinite task to understand the particular character of 
historical forms and their interrelations ... Each 
historian (we may also call him, with Vico's 
terminology, 'philologist') has to undertake this task 
for himself, since historical relativism has a two fold 
aspect: it concerns the understanding historian as well 
as the phenomena to be understood. This is an 
extreme relativism; but we should not fear it.("Vico's 
Contribution, p.262) 
History, then, the study of the certum, makes the historian and the history 
relative. But, as Auerbach is concerned to make clear, this relativism 
makes history even more rigorous, more important a scholarly pursuit. 
Finally, Auerbach echoes Vico's own arguments for the reconvergence of 
the certum and the verum, of philology and philosophy: 
Thus the truth for which philosophy is searching 
appears to be linked with philology, exploring the 
particular certa as well as their continuity and 
connection. This connection, the whole course of 
human history, la commue natura delle nazioni, is 
the subject of Vico's work, which therefore, may be 
called as well a philosophical philology as a 
philological philosophy - dealing exclusively with 
mankind on this planet. 
This is Vico' s idea of philology which I learned from 
him.("Vico' s Contribution", p.265) 
Auerbach thus acknowledges his debt to Vico, and, while he draws away 
from endorsing Vico's analysis without qualifications, his adoption of 
Vico's method is an important element of his own literary theory. This 
was made clear in an earlier essay, "Vico and Aesthetic Historism". Here 
15 Auerbach sometimes used the term historism, rather than historicism, to describe Vico's 




Auerbach emphasizes the importance of historical perspective 1n 
aesthetics: 
A critic who would condemn the art of Shakespeare 
or of Rembrandt or even the drawings of the ice age 
primitives as being of bad taste because they do not 
conform to the aesthetic standards established by 
classical Greek or Roman theory would not be taken 
seriously by anybody. 
This largeness of our aesthetic horizon is a 
consequence of our historical perspective; it is based 
on historism, i.e., on the conviction that every 
civilization and every period has its own possibilities 
of aesthetic perfection; that the works of the different 
peoples and periods, as well as their general forms of 
life, must be understood as products of variable 
individual conditions, and have to be judged each by 
its own development, not by absolute rules of beauty 
or ugliness. 16 
In this passage, Auerbach illuminates the problems, the absurdity even, of 
tendencies towards universalizing aesthetic claims and standards. His 
argument resembles Jakobson' s interrogation of the term realism, which 
suggested that realism is a shifting, or relative, concept. While such an 
understanding, to a certain extent, compromises the very ambition of 
realism, it also suggests that to characterize realism as a kind of aesthetic 
claimant of objectivity, or some other "essentialism," is to fail to 
appreciate the fundamental relativism which is built into all artistic 
representations. To claim objectivity for realism, and to charge it as 
making such a claim are the same kind of error, both of which would, 
Auerbach might have suggested, have been avoided if a properly 
historicist perspective were adopted. Auerbach goes on to relate this sense 
of aesthetic historicism specifically to Vico' s general historicism, closing 
the essay with a reaffirmation of Vico's characterization of human nature 
as historical: 
Against all contemporary theorists, who believed in 
an absolute and unchanging human nature as 
opposed to the variety and changes of history, Vico 
created and passionately maintained the concept of 
the historical nature of men. He identified human 
history and human nature, he conceived human 




nature as a function of history.(" Aesthetic Historism", 
p.198) 
As we shall see, it is a development of this kind of aesthetic historicism 
which sustains and motivates Mimesis, once again affirming the 
importance of Vico' s methodological influence on Auerbach. 
The placement of Auerbach within this context of philosophical 
historicism has led to important developments in the interpretation of 
Auerbach's work. Rene Wellek, surveying the evidence of the 
relationship between Auerbach and Vico, expresses serious reservations 
about Auerbach's use of Vico, as well as concerns about the implications of 
relativism for literary scholarship. Despite Wellek's ambivalence towards 
Auerbach's relativism (his review of Mimesis, as we shall see, was 
especially critical of these tendencies), his account of Auerbach's Vico 
scholarship reinforces the extent to which Auerbach's literary theory can 
be said to be predicated upon an insistence upon historical perspective. 
Timothy Bahti, and, more recently, Luiz Costa-Lima, develop Auerbach's 
historicism in a more complicated manner. Bahti recapitulates the 
suggestive resemblances between Vico and German historicism, citing 
Auerbach as an important convergence of the two traditions, particularly 
insofar as Bahti characterizes Auerbach as having Hegelianized Vico. He 
quotes Auerbach and emphasizes the idealist implications of Auerbach's 
historicism: 
the abundance of events in human life in secular 
time constitutes a totality, a complete course or an 
intelligible whole in which each particular happening 
is variously rooted and out of which each can find its 
interpretation.17 
This claim of Auerbach's clearly evinces a kind of Hegelian terminology, 
recalling Lukacs' Hegelian theory of history, as well as hinting at the 
hermeneutic implications of Auerbach's interpretation of Vico. Bahti then 
stresses how Auerbach's particular method of literary history realizes the 
17Bahti, "Vico, Auerbach and Literary History", p.101. In this article Bahti is considering 
a group of six essays which appear successively in Auerbach's Gesammelte Aufsiitze. Of 
these, the last two - "Vico' s Contribution to Literary Criticism" and "Vico and Aesthetic 
Historism" - were written in English. The quotation in Bahti is from Auerbach's 1932 essay 
"Vico und Herder". 
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complexities of his understanding of history which, as we have seen, 
characterizes the very nature of humankind. Auerbach, Bahti suggests, 
doesn't merely practice literary history, but insists upon literary history as, 
in a sense, the verum of literary criticism. 
This importance of literary historicism has a kind of reciprocal effect on 
the discipline of history itself, which is again traced to Vico's 
interpretation of myth as history. Bahti attributes to Vico the suggestion 
that the "historical interpreter makes history, the history or world of 
human society, in writing that very history."18 This idea, of course, has 
generated recent developments in the theory and philosophy of history 
which are concerned with the relationships between history, 
interpretation, and narrative, and which have been comprehensively 
explored by Hayden White who has developed the notion of 
"metahistory" to signify work in this area.19 
Luiz Costa-Lima suggests a relationship between Auerbach and this kind 
of historical thought. Costa-Lima rehearses Auerbach's relationship with 
Vico and the way in which he develops Vico's historicism. In particular, 
18Bahti, "Vico, Auerbach and Literary History", p.106. 
19It would, of course, be impossible to consider these matters in any depth in this study, but 
some notes are necessary. Hayden White's Metahistory is an extended discussion of the 
ways in which and the extent to which the understanding of history depends upon certain 
interpretive and philosophical presuppositions. In an introductory footnote, White 
conceives of his task as a kind of complement of literary theory. The interrogation of 
"realism" in literary theory - White indeed cites Auerbach - investigates the use of the 
historical in realistic art whereas he (White) asks: "what are the 'artistic' elements of a 
'realistic' historiography ?"; see Metahistory, p.3, n.4. In this book, and in two collections 
of essays - Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978) and The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) - White develops the 
notion that historiography is a constitutive element of what is understood. Moreover, 
historiographical interpretation depends upon certain kinds of figurative (tropical) 
relationships which determine the narrative structure of the history, and, in turn, evince 
the epistemological, ethical, and political implications of particular historical texts; see, 
for merely one example, "Interpretation in History" in Tropics of Discourse, p.70 ff. The 
study of the tropes of history is what White calls metahistory which, he suggests is 
responsible for the reconvergence of history and the philosophy of history, a move which 
recalls Vico's recombination of philosophy and philology; see the introduction to 
Metahistory, "The Poetics of History." White is not the only theorist of history to 
emphasize the interpretive and poetic aspects of historiography. E.H. Carr's What is 
History? (1961; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) is an important precursor to White's work, 
and historians such as Michel de Certeau display similar concerns to those of White; see 
Michel de Certeau, L'ecriture de l'histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); see also Robert H. 
Canary and Henry Kozicki eds, The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical 
Understanding (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
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Costa-Lima emphasizes how Auerbach inherits the tension, in Vico, 
between his emphasis on the particular, the certum, and his intention 
towards the eternal, the verum. He speaks of a double movement in The 
New Science: 
what seemed to be an iron circle, where the 
interpretation of historical material was contained 
within the limits of a relativistic approach, becomes 
now a delta, where specifically historical material and 
transhistorical constancies are blended. It is only 
through this intermingling that we may grasp, 
without violating the Viconian text, the double 
movement of his Scienza Nuova. 20 
Here Costa-Lima is reformulating the "newness" of the new science, its 
commingling of philology and philosophy. He goes on to suggest that 
Auerbach's theory of realism is indivisibly related to his sense of the 
tension inherent in historicism, and adds that it was a failure to appreciate 
the importance of this tension which led Wellek to review Mimesis 
unfavourably. 21 For Auerbach, he says, "[t]ruth is always displaced 
according to new temporal values and parameters."22 That is to say, at a 
conceptual level it is constant, but at a substantive level it is variable. He 
goes on specifically to relate this tension to Mimesis. This mediation 
between relativity and universality which, Costa-Lima says, "is an 
inheritance from Vico", 23 guarantees 
the singularity of the texts and, at the same time, the 
continuity that flows through them. This belief is 
consubstantiated in Mimesis and in the 
metamorphosis to which realism is subjected.24 
This tension between, in Viconian terms, the certum and the verum, the 
double movement towards the particular and the universal is the crucial 
element of Auerbach's literary history. Costa-Lima argues that Auerbach is 
interested in mimesis precisely because it provides an occasion for the 
development of a metahistorical dimension in aesthetics. Metahistory -
incidentally, Costa-Lima's use of this term certainly seems to evoke the 
2°Costa-Lima, "History and Metahistory", p.477. 
21Costa-Lima, "History and Metahistory", pp.469-470. 
22Costa-Lima, "History and Metahistory", p.484. 
23Costa-Lima, "History and Metahistory", p.494. 
24Costa-Lima, "History and Metahistory", p.485. 
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work of Hayden White - is carefully to be distinguished from extrahistory. 
Rather than standing outside history, immune to the effects of particular 
historical circumstances, a metahistorical perspective reconciles the 
particularities of history with an abstract constancy, that of the historicity 
of these particularities. Neither the certum nor the verum is meaningful 
in itself, each must be understood in terms of the other. Rather than 
representing an eternal "truth" or merely charting historical differences, 
the idea of mimesis intermingles each of these tendencies in a 
sophisticated critical approach which Costa-Lima calls metahistorical.25 
Placing Auerbach in the context of this kind of radical historicism 
emphasizes his critical awareness of the complexities of his own task and 
of the problems of realistic representation. His critical historicism lends 
his study of the representation of reality a similarly sophisticated 
theoretical underpinning that belies the supposed antithesis between 
mimetic aesthetics and anti-foundational critical thought. Furthermore, 
the ineluctable tension within Auerbach's historicism reveals the 
enormous complexities of realistic representation from which Auerbach 
proceeds. While conceptually the idea of realistic representation may be an 
aesthetic universal, Auerbach reveals and negotiates between the variables 
which contest within this idea. 
This sense of Auerbach's critical sophistication leads Michael Holquist to 
suggest that, despite Auerbach's subtitle reading like "a litany of terms 
now perceived as hopelessly atavistic", Mimesis can be understood as a 
"foundational document" of recent developments in cultural criticism.26 
Holquist's emphasis on the contemporary relevance of Mimesis proceeds 
from his placing Auerbach in the context of German neo-Kantian 
historicism. Holquist considers how each of Auerbach's terms -
25See "History and Metahistory", pp.494-495. Costa-Lima doesn't specifically invoke 
Hayden White, but the relationship between Costa-Lima's article and White's work is 
strongly suggested by Costa-Lima's title. The principle of mediation between the particular 
and the universal, which as I have discussed, is the very novelty of The New Science, has 
an interesting parallel in Bakhtin's linguistic theory, especially insofar as Costa-Lima 
calls this idea metahistorical. As I shall discuss below, Bakhtin/Voloshinov developed a 
theory of language which similarly mediates between the particular and the universal and 
which takes issue with linguistic theories which fail to account for the social character of 
language. This theory is called either translinguistics, or, more often, metalinguistics; see 
V.N Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and 
LR. Titunik (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
26Michael Holquist, "The Last European: Erich Auerbach as Precursor in the History of 
Cultural Criticism", Modern Language Quarterly, 54, 3 (September 1993), p.372. 
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Representation; Reality; Western; Literature - has been problematized by 
neo-Kantian thought. Beginning with "representation," Holquist suggests 
that Auerbach's terms must be understood in the context of neo-
Kantianism: 
Representation in Mimesis, then, is best understood 
within the tradition of concerns animating the Baden 
school. Thus, while Auerbach pays acute attention to 
style in the various authors he studies, the aesthetics 
of style concern him less than the power of a 
particular syntax, grammar, and vocabulary choice to 
represent a worldview in the technical, Diltheyan 
sense.27 
In particular, Holquist draws attention to parallels between Auerbach's 
approach and that of Dilthey. Of Dilthey's method, Holquist writes: 
By insisting on a "philosophy of life," he sought to 
highlight the sheer contingency of knowing. In doing 
so, he addresses the condition that current versions of 
cultural criticism often name "situ a tedness:' In 
Dilthey, however, experience is saved from the 
unsharable chaos of utter relativism because the 
subject, as conceived in the human sciences, is driven 
to know life not as disconnected episodes but as a 
whole. 
This is what Dilthey calls a "worldview," which, Holquist says: 
is a theoretical term for the fatedness in human 
perception of making experience always coincide with 
a meaning. Its emphasis betrays Dilthey's Kantian 
heritage. But worldview is neo-Kantian insofar as it 
legislates different meanings on the basis of different 
experiences. 
27Holquist, "The Last European", p.378. Holquist's article gives a brief account of the two 
main strains of neo-Kantian thought in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries; 
see p.374. For a more detailed treatment, see Thomas E. Willey, Back to Kant: The Revival 
of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1978), pp. 131 ff. Dilthey, as Holquist points out, was not so much a 
member of the Baden school, but rather an influential contemporary. Dilthey's 
development of the human sciences paralleled the Baden school's "single-minded 
concentration of history"; see "The Last European", p.374. 
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Dilthey, he says, "in effect systematizes Vico's verum factum" 28 principle, 
and Dilthey's - and Rickert's and Windelband's - theoretical problems are 
comprehensively reflected in Mimesis: 
Mimesis remains an important paradigm in the 
search for models of history because it so successfully 
realizes the theoretical aspirations of classical German 
Geistesgeschichte, particularly as articulated by 
Dilthey.29 
Moving on to the term "reality"," Holquist once more places Auerbach's 
sense of what reality means in the context of the Baden School's 
contemplation of the problem of how to synthesize individual sensory 
experience of the world with transpersonal consistency: 
Reality, as Auerbach specifically invokes 
Wirklichkeit, would seem to have at least two 
meanings, one that has to do with the reality of 
individual experience and another that bears on 
extrapersonal forces (social, economic, cultural) that 
shape history.30 
Holquist examines how Auerbach synthesizes these two ideas of "reality" 
by drawing a parallel between representation and experience. The 
distinction between unmediated experience and the meaning of that 
experience is overcome by the imperative to make experience meaningful. 
But, in the context of the human or cultural sciences,31 meaning, as 
28Holquist, "The Last European", p.375. These comments illustrate several complex 
consistencies between Auerbach and Dilthey, and suggest other important connections 
between the theorists discussed in this study. By characterizing Dilthey's project in terms 
of Vico's thought Holquist suggests a conceptual link between Dilthey and Auerbach, 
whose indebtedness to Vico is clear. Furthermore, this link between Dilthey and Auerbach 
establishes a connection between Auerbach and Lukacs, whose heritage includes both Kant 
and Dilthey. As I shall discuss below, Holquist points out that Mikhail Bakhtin's thought 
develops in the same intellectual context as Auerbach's and that both were strongly 
influenced by neo-Kantianism, although Bakhtin drew more upon Cohen and the Marburg 
school. Parallels between Bakhtin and Dilthey have also been suggested by Tzvetan 
Todorov; see Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle , trans. Wlad Godzich 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p.16 and p.22. Finally, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's Diltheyan heritage is very clear, indicating that his work, too, shares concerns 
with that of Lukacs, Auerbach, and Bakhtin. 
29Holquist, "The Last European", p.373. 
30Holquist, "The Last European", p.379. 
31These two terms relate to the different ways in which various theorists conceived their 
approach. Dilthey, of course, set out to develop the Geisteswissenschaften whereas, 
according to Holquist, "Rickert introduced the term Kulturwissenschaft, which drew 
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Holquist points out, is only available in a social, historical context. 
Stressing the neo-Kantian heritage of this aspect of Auerbach's work, 
Holquist rehearses Auerbach's version of this sense-making imperative: 
The world available to the senses consists of things in 
themselves that we cannot know as such: it must be 
organized into a perception. Erscheinung helps us, 
moreover, to grasp the subject of representation as a 
reality drenched in history, in other words, as 
something problematical in as much as it arises in a 
matrix of signs. Because experience must be rendered 
as a meaning, it will always be different; cultures are 
defined by their ability to experience sensation both as 
uniquely theirs and as meaning sharable internally 
and, ultimately, with other cultures. Thus reality is 
neither hopelessly relative nor hobbled by the 
arthritis of essentialism.32 
By placing Auerbach in another suggestive theoretical context - one which 
doesn't clash with the more familiar Viconian context - Holquist 
foregrounds the critical sophistication of Auerbach's thought; a 
sophistication which derives from, or at least is most fully expressed in, 
his study of the representation of reality. Auerbach's complicated 
philosophical education, as well as his own eventful history, turn towards 
the representation of reality as the aesthetic problem par excellence via 
which the problematic questions of experience, epistemology and 
literature may be explored. 
(c) Auerbach's "special" realism 
Rene Wellek's 1954 review of Mimesis criticized what he called 
Auerbach's "special" realism for its failure to make clear the unambiguous 
attention to extra personal social force as the most significant datum in historiography"; see 
"The Last European", p.377. 
32 Holquist, "The Last European", p.381, emphasis mine. The term Erscheinung, meaning, 
Holquist says, sensory sign, is, in a sense, the vehicle of this synthesis, although my account 
here doesn't incorporate Holquist's full analysis of how and why this is so. The important 
point is Holquist's suggestion that Auerbach conceives of reality as, at once, relative and 
meaningful. Furthermore, by drawing a parallel between Dilthey's and Auerbach's 
formulation of what he (Holquist) calls the "biographical principle," Holquist suggests 
that this mediation between individual experience and sharable meaning is a kind of 
epistemological imperative. That this synthesis takes place at the levels of culture and 
history means that culture and history are both necessary and relative, which is the basis 
of Holquist' s characterization of Mimesis as a precursor of more recent cultural studies. 
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meanings of some of its important terms - like reality.33 But as we have 
seen, this very complexity and ambivalence of the ideas associated with 
Auerbach's interest in realism constitute his most enduring contribution 
to literary theory and history.34 In Mimesis the critical elements of 
Auerbach's method develop through his history of the different ways in 
which the interpretation and organization of reality have been historically 
conditioned, and the differing standards of realistic representation which 
have followed. 
As is well-known, Auerbach begins Mimesis by positing a stylistic 
distinction between Homeric and biblical modes of representation, arguing 
that each style bespeaks, as Holquist suggests, a "worldview," a different 
mode of endowing experience with transpersonal meaning, a different 
way of understanding "reality." His assessment of the Homeric text 
resembles some of the arguments levelled against realistic representation 
by such theorists as Adorno and Althusser. The Homeric representation, 
he says, is cast in a "perpetual foreground": 35 
33Rene Wellek, "Auerbach's Special Realism", Kenyon Review, 16 (1954). 
34Timothy Bahti stresses the significance of the reconvergence of literary theory and 
literary history in Auerbach's Mimesis; see Timothy Bahti "Auerbach's Mimesis: Figural 
Structure and Historical Narrative" in Gregory S. Jay & David L. Miller eds, After Strange 
Texts: The Role of Theory in the Study of Literature (University of Alabama Press, 1985), 
p.127 and p.145. See also Holquist, "The Last European", p.372. On the other hand, 
however, Auerbach's endurance is not always attributed to his critical sophistication. Paul 
Bove, for example, considers Auerbach in terms of the extent to which his approach 
valorizes what seems to be a kind of "genius" theory, the appeal of which to professional 
academics is part of the reason for Auerbach's endurance; see Paul Bove, Intellectuals in 
Power: A Genealogy of Critical Humanism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
35Mimesis, p.11. Again, parallels between Auerbach's work and that of Lukacs and Bakhtin 
are noteworthy at this point. All three proceed by distinguishing between the epic and 
another, more complicated mode of representation. For Lukacs and Bakhtin the difference 
is between the epic and the novel, while Auerbach's analysis proceeds from a distinction 
between the epic and the bible which gives rise to two "stylistic lines" of literary 
development, the biblical line eventually evolving into the realistic novel of the 
nineteenth-century. Bakhtin develops a similar bifurcated view of literary history, 
characterized by the distinction between novels which try to suppress "heteroglossia" and 
those which embrace it; see M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. 
Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1981). The affinity between Auerbach and Bakhtin can also be seen in their analysis 
of the treatment of time in narrative. Auerbach says of Homeric heroes that their "destiny 
is clearly defined ... (they) wake every morning as if it were the first day of their lives"; 
Mimesis, p.12. This resonates with Bakhtin's notion of "adventure time" and the "image of 
the ready-made hero" as he articulates them in an essay on the bildungsroman; see M.M. 
Bakhtin, Speech Genres & Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, 
trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), p.11, p.20, and passim. 
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The Homeric poems ... are yet comparatively simple 
in their picture of human beings; and no less so in 
their relation to the real life which they describe in 
general. Delight in physical existence is everything to 
them, and their highest aim is to make that delight 
perceptible to us. Between battles and passions, 
adventures and perils, they show us hunts, banquets, 
palaces and shepherds' cots, athletic contests and 
washing days - in order that we may see the heroes in 
their ordinary life, and seeing them so, may take 
pleasure in their manner of enjoying their savory 
present, a present which sends strong roots down into 
social usages, landscape, and daily life. And thus they 
bewitch us and ingratiate themselves to us until we 
live with them in the reality of their lives ... And this 
"real" world into which we are lured, exists for itself, 
contains nothing but itself; the Homeric poems 
conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no 
secret second meaning. Homer can be analyzed, as we 
have essayed to do here, but he cannot be 
interpreted.(Mimesis, p.13) 
Bewitchment, ingratiation, and allure; these are the attributes of Homeric 
"realism," a suggestion which paradoxically recalls, or rather prefigures, 
arguments levelled against realism for its complicity with ideology. 
Macherey posits the idea of "illusion" as the aesthetic counterpart of 
ideology which, we might say, bewitches readers into acceptance. 
Similarly, Catherine Belsey's claim that realism is "ultimately reassuring" 
resembles Auerbach's suggestion that Homeric representation 
"ingratiates" itself with the reader.36 
But this kind of "realism" is not, of course, what Auerbach endorses. "It 
is," he says, "all very different in the Biblical stories"(Mimesis, p.14) . The 
biblical mode of representation, which develops into the stylistic line in 
Western literature which includes the realistic novel of the nineteenth-
century, is the antithesis of the epic mode. In contrast to the Homeric text, 
which is in the "perpetual foreground," the biblical text is "fraught with 
background." 
Auerbach amplifies this expression, deepening the contrast between the 
epic and the bible. While the lives of the Homeric heroes are, Auerbach 
36For references to Macherey's and Belsey's comments, see my discussion of their works in 
chapters 2 and 3 above. 
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says, "clearly defined", the Bible incorporates a more complicated sense of 
history into its representations: 
How fraught with background, in comparison, are 
characters like Saul and David ! How entangled and 
stratified are such human relations as those between 
David and Absalom, between David and Joab ! Any 
such "background" quality of the psychological 
situation as that which the story of Absalom's death 
and its sequel (II Samuel 18 and 19, by the so-called 
J ahvist) rather suggests than expresses, is unthinkable 
in Homer. Here we are confronted not merely with 
the psychological processes of characters whose depth 
of background is virtually abysmal, but with a purely 
geographical background too.(Mimesis, p.12)37 
The assimilation of this depth of background marks the distinction 
between the two representational modes. Auerbach contrasts Odysseus -
" on his return ... exactly the same as when he left Ithaca two decades 
earlier" - with, among others, David - "the harp player ... the old 
king"(Mimesis, p.17) . 
The entangled, stratified human relations which constitute the 
"background" of the biblical narrative make necessary the interpretation of 
the biblical text. While, Auerbach says, the perpetual foreground of the 
Homeric text makes analysis and explication possible, it is not possible to 
interpret the epic representation; lacking depth, it cannot provide deeper 
or more complex material. The Bible, on the other hand, does not merely 
enable interpretation, it requires it: 
In the story of Isaac, it is not only God's intervention 
at the beginning and the end, but even the factual and 
psychological elements which come between, that are 
mysterious, merely touched upon, fraught with 
background; and therefore they require subtle 
investigation and interpretation, they demand them. 
Since so much in the story is dark and incomplete, 
and since the reader knows that God is a hidden God, 
37That Auerbach characterizes the depth of background as "abysmal" prompts an 
interesting parallel with the development of the idea of the "abyss" in contemporary 
literary theory. Implying unfathomable depths of interpretive potential, the abyss has 
been used a metaphor for the deconstructive effects of post-structuralist theory; see, for 
example, Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press). 
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his effort to interpret it constantly finds something 
new to feed upon.(Mimesis, p.15, emph. mine) 
The primacy of interpretation, however, is tempered, in the case of the 
Bible, by the explicit truth-claim of the text. On the one hand the Bible is 
"deep" and "mysterious;" on the other, it must establish itself as true. This 
tension between the possibilities of interpretation - the interpreter 
constantly finding something new - and the claim to absolute truth, 
establishes, in a sense, the model of interpretation which will gradually 
emerge as the literary theory of Mimesis. The possibilities of 
interpretation, and the constraints upon interpretation, create a 
reciprocating process which takes new material and makes sense of it even 
as the criteria of sense-making are constantly renewed and revised: 
interpretation in a determined direction becomes a 
general method of comprehending reality; the new 
and strange world which now comes into view and 
which, in the form in which it presents itself, proves 
to be wholly unutilizable within the Jewish religious 
frame, must be so interpreted that it can find a place 
there. But this process nearly always also reacts upon 
the frame, which requires enlarging and 
modifying.(Mimesis, p.16) 
Interpretation itself, then, is subject to development which, as Auerbach 
sees it, accounts for the historicity of biblical representation, which, in the 
history of higher criticism, passes from the legendary-historical - when the 
events of the narrative are taken as phenomena of ordinary life - to the 
legendary - when the representations are taken as figurative. 38 The 
"realism" of the Bible, and its doctrinal truth, necessarily diverge. But, 
38 Auerbach's discussion of the nature of the legendary and the historical in this chapter 
reveals his Viconiart roots quite profoundly. Vico was concerned, as we have seen, to 
establish the social, political, and historical status of myths, which gave way to different 
ideas of the socio-historical according to the development of each nation within its 
cyclical pattern. The "maturity" of nations led them away from poetic/mythic 
representations towards more sophisticated modes of historical representation. Auerbach 
says that "[i]n the stories of David, the legendary, which only later scientific criticism 
reveals as such, imperceptibly passes into the historical", but historical distance reverses 
this juxtaposition, as the legendary becomes revealed as such. However, while Homer 
remains within the sphere of the legendary, with the biblical text, "even in the legendary, 
the problem of the classification and interpretation of human history is already 
passionately apprehended"; see Mimesis, p.20. The Homeric text merely illustrates the 
way in which legend and history coincide within certain contexts while the Bible, 
according to Auerbach, conceives of itself more problematically. It is, as Costa-Lima would 
seem to suggest, "metahistorical," after the fashion of Vico's new science itself. 
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nonetheless, the Bible, which exemplifies both the need for and the 
problem of interpretation establishes a kind of prototype of realistic 
representation which is a vehicle for critical literary theory. 
This prefigurative function of the biblical mode of representation 1s 
further evident in Auerbach's stylistic analysis of each text. The doctrine of 
the "separation of styles" is , for Auerbach, perhaps the major impediment 
to the development of realistic representation which embodies his sense 
of historical relativism. Mimesis, he argues, is served best at those points 
in literary history where this doctrine is eroded. The development of 
Western literature with which Mimesis is concerned is, as Auerbach sees 
it, roughly bifurcated between texts which maintain a separation between 
the everyday, or realistic, and serious representation, and texts which 
erode the separation of styles. Auerbach says that the rule of the separation 
of styles "specified that the realistic depiction of daily life was incompatible 
with the sublime and had a place only in comedy or, carefully stylized, in 
idyl". Although Homer is, Auerbach says, far from entirely beholden to 
this rule, "domestic realism, the representation of daily life, remains in 
Homer in the peaceful realm of the idyllic". In the Bible, however, daily 
life is "sublime, tragic, and problematic", breaking down the separation of 
styles and paving the way towards the development of the aesthetics of 
modern realistic representation. 39 When what we know as the realistic 
novel emerges, mimesis, the development of which Auerbach has been 
tracing, becomes a principal function of the text. 
As Auerbach points out, his comparative analysis of two ancient texts 
provides the basis, the "starting point," for his investigation of the 
representation of reality. Auerbach's stylistic analysis of the Homeric text 
leads him to suggest that the epic representation betrays a simple 
apprehension of reality which confounds Auerbach's own sense of 
problematic historicity. On the other hand, the style of the Bible reinforces 
his view of history. A stylistic analysis reveals 
39See Mimesis, p.22. Auerbach's sense of how the everyday is limited to comic or 
unproblematic, idyllic representation essentially reformulates the usual history of modem 
literary realism which began to include a broader social range of characters and events 
within serious prose narrative. Northrop Frye's analysis of the "high" and "low" mimetic 
modes - realism being a specific kind of low mimesis - deals with the same phenomenon 
within a different critical theoretical framework; see Anatomy of Criticism, pp.49 ff. 
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certain parts brought into high relief, others left 
obscure, abruptness, suggestive influence of the 
unexpressed, "background" quality, multiplicity of 
meanings and the need for interpretation, universal-
historical claims, development of the concept of the 
historically becoming, and pre-occupation with the 
problematic.(Mimesis, p.23) 
These concerns indicate the critical dimension of Auerbach's method. 
Parallels with Lukacs, and with Bakhtin, are once again evident in 
Auerbach's evocation of the idea of historical "becoming," a critical 
advance over the static "being" suggested by the Homeric text. Above all, 
the biblical mode of representation is concerned with the problematic, 
with the vagaries of everyday life, a concern which is, as Auerbach sees it, 
at the heart of the very idea of realistic representation. Hermeneutic 
tension, mediating between interpretive possibility and interpretive 
necessity, is the defining feature of Auerbach's historicist aesthetics which, 
like Vico' s science, seek to develop a philosophical approach which 
countenances both the verum and the certum. 
As Mimesis develops, Auerbach undertakes a historiographical series of 
stylistic analyses which proceed from the distinction established in his 
analysis of the Homeric and biblical texts. Each text is considered in terms 
of the extent to which it, like the Bible, overcomes the separation of styles 
and, thus, manages to integrate its representation with a critical and 
problematic apprehension of reality. In Gregory of Tours' History of the 
Franks, for example, Auerbach traces the evidence of a "fraught 
background" to the events of the narrative. The sixth-century historian, he 
says, has employed a conversational style in his narrative, including the 
direct discourse of the characters, which recreates a sense of actual 
participation in the events. Events are not entirely clear. A servant is 
killed, but the narrative does not supply a reason, and the identity of the 
killer can only be inferred. The events of the narrative step forward from 
an indistinct background. By using the spoken language of the people 
involved, Gregory's narrative, he says, breaks down the rigid separation of 
styles of discourse, integrating the literary and the vernacular which lends 




By contrast, Auerbach's analysis of the Chanson de Roland reveals a 
different representational practice at work. The narrative is presented as a 
series of vignettes with no assimilation of temporal development. 
Similarly, in the twelfth-century romance - represented in Auerbach's 
history by Chretien de Troyes' Yvain - the knightly ideal which sustains 
the knight's adventures stands against the representation of historical 
reality. Not only is a rigid separation of styles maintained between 
representations of different classes, but the narrative follows a temporal 
progression of "adventure time," which denies any sense of historical 
becoming. 
Auerbach's analysis traces the way in which representational practices 
which failed to embody a historical epistemology and which maintained 
the classical separation of styles, gradually gave way to mixed styles and 
historical situatedness in narrative. As Bahti points out, Mimesis, 
proceeding from the comparative analysis of the epic and biblical modes of 
representation, has two critical moments which most clearly evince 
Auerbach's theoretical convictions40 • These are the eighth and eighteenth 
chapters of Mimesis, which analyse, respectively, Dante's Inferno and the 
development of the realistic novel in the nineteenth-century. 
Dante, of course, is a key figure in the development of Auerbach's literary 
theory. In an earlier book, Auerbach argued that the Comedy represented 
the development of a mode of representation which apprehended the 
historical quality of human reality, and, more importantly perhaps, he 
hinted at what he saw as the implications of the Comedy for the very idea 
of aesthetic realism.41 Dante's claim of realism, as the epilogue to Mimesis 
notes, was one of the catalysts of Auerbach's interest in realism.42 Dante is 
an important figure in Mimesis because of the extent to which Auerbach's 
40Bahti, "Auerbach's Mimesis ", p.33. Bahti's article undertakes a detailed analysis of the 
importance of the idea of figura in Auerbach's work. Auerbach's long essay of 1944, 
"Figura", sets out an etymological analysis of the term figura, and goes on to develop the 
idea of figura as a complicated mediation between history and truth. Bah ti concentrates on 
this and argues for a relationship between Auerbach's analyses of Dante and Flaubert 
within which Dante establishes the idea of the figural and Flaubert establishes the 
fulfilment of the idea of the figural, establishing the figural as the true. 
41 Erich Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, trans. Ralph Manheim (Berlin, 1929; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp.178-179. 
42Auerbach writes that his "original starting point was Plato's discussion in book 10 of the 
Republic ... in conjunction with Dante's assertion that in the Commedia he presented true 
reality; Mimesis, p.554. 
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stylistic analysis reveals a concern in the Comedy with the problematic 
nature of reality and of representation. In Dante, Auerbach says, the 
antagonism between styles is clearly apparent; nowhere else, he says, "does 
mingling of styles come so close to violation of all style"(Mimesis, p.185). 
Dante's narrative is a stylistic concatenation: 
all imaginable spheres of reality appear: past and 
present, sublime grandeur and vile vulgarity, history 
and legend, tragic and comic occurrences, man and 
nature; finally, it is the story of Dante's - i.e., one 
single individual's - life and salvation, and thus a 
figure of the story of mankind's salvation in general. 
Its dramatis personae include figures from antique 
mythology ... allegorical personifications ... Apollo, 
Lucifer, and Christ ... Yet ... all these things are not so 
new and problematic as Dante's undisguised 
incursions into the realm of a real life neither selected 
nor preordained by aesthetic criteria. And indeed, it is 
this contact with real life which is responsible for all 
the verbal forms whose directness and rigor ... 
offended classicistic taste. Furthermore, all this 
realism is not displayed in a single action, but instead 
an abundance of actions in the most diverse tonalities 
follow one another in quick succession.(Mimesis, 
p.189) . 
But the crucial aspect of Dante's representational practice, according to 
Auerbach, is the way in which it seems to embody an important 
contradiction. On the one hand, Dante is concerned with the concrete 
historical qualities of earthly life. On the other, this earthly existence is 
superimposed upon the Christian paradigm of the eternal: 
Here we face the astounding paradox of what is called 
Dante's realism. Imitation of reality is imitation of the 
sensory experience of life on earth - among the most 
essential characteristics of which would seem to be its 
possessing a history, its changing and developing. 
Whatever degree of freedom the imitating artist may 
be granted in his work, he cannot be allowed to 
deprive reality of this characteristic, which is its very 
essence. But Dante's inhabitants of the three realms 
lead a 'changeless existence.' ... Yet into this changeless 
existence Dante 'plunges the living world of human 
action and endurance and more especially of 
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individual deeds and destinies.'(Mimesis, p.191, 
emph. mine)43 
Auerbach reiterates this point several times: 
Dante, then, took over earthly historicity into his 
beyond; his dead are cut off from the earthly present 
and its vicissitudes, but memory and the most intense 
interest in it stirs them so profoundly that the 
atmosphere of the beyond is charged with it.(Mimesis, 
p.193) 
This enables us to understand that the beyond is 
eternal and yet phenomenal; that it is changeless and 
of all time and yet full of history.(Mimesis, p.197) 
This contradiction within what Auerbach calls Dante's realism, the 
tension between the embodiment of historicity and the representation of 
the eternal, suggests two important points for consideration. The first is 
the way in which Auerbach sees in Dante's method the elaboration of 
what he (Auerbach) calls a figural schema. Auerbach's sense of a figural 
schema involves a relationship of signification which avoids privileging 
either the figure or its fulfilment. Referring to his earlier essay "Figura", 
Auerbach says that such a schema allows both figure and fulfilment "to 
retain the characteristics of concrete historical reality" (Mimesis, p.195) 
unlike symbolic or allegorical relationships which subordinate one to the 
other. 44 Within Dante's narrative the earthly reality, captured in its 
historical totality by Dante's mixture of styles, is the figure of eternal life, 
which is similarly marked by a sense of the social and historical, despite its 
changelessness. The characters speak and behave in the beyond as they do 
within earthly reality. The historicity of earthly reality is, thus, fulfilled, by 
being preserved in eternity. 
43The quotation in this passage is not referenced but I suspect it comes from Hegel's Lectures 
on Aesthetics, from which Auerbach derives the phrase "changeless existence." Geoffrey 
Green's study of Auerbach comments on Hegel's influence on Auerbach, particularly insofar 
as Auerbach's analysis of Dante is concerned. See Green, Literary Criticism and the 
Structures of History, Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982), pp.22-23. Timothy Bahti also details the Hegel connection arguing 
that Auerbach "Hegelianized" Vico, by concentrating upon the tension between the 
relative and the universal in Vico's own thought; see Bahti, "Vico, Auerbach and Literary 
History", p.103. 
44Bahti considers the many ways in which a figural relationship is evoked in Mimesis, 
and, as mentioned previously, posits Dante's realism as the figure and Flaubert's as the 
fulfilment of the representation of historical reality. 
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The second important feature at the heart of the idea of the figural 
relationship is the critical tension in Auerbach's theory. The image of 
eternal historicity in Dante's narrative parallels the complexity of 
interpretation which Auerbach articulated in his discussion of the Bible. 
Interpretation is at once relativistic and unifyingly meaningful, and so it is 
with Dante's text which represents the beyond as both earthly and eternal. 
This tension requires revised understandings of truth and of relativity, the 
very revision which informed Vico's development of his "new" science 
which mediated between the certum and the verum, the historical and the 
true. It is this tension that commentators have seized upon as the aspect of 
Auerbach's work which gives it its enduring quality. Importantly, this 
tension is not only an aspect of Auerbach's own method, but is, according 
to Auerbach, to be found in mimesis itself. 
As Mimesis progresses the tension between representations which 
continue the historicist method - such as those of Gregory of Tours and of 
Dante - and those which do not, continues to be the focus of Auerbach's 
analysis. Boccaccio, he says, fails to appreciate the problematic historical 
quality of everyday life, lapsing into classical comic or idyllic modes to 
represent contemporary reality. In the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries, 
Antoine de la Sale and Rabelais, Auerbach argues, develop the emphasis 
on the representation of the sensory. An important advance upon Dante's 
method is achieved by Montaigne, who, Auerbach says, "displays himself 
embedded in the random contingencies of life"(Mimesis, p.309). While 
Dante had emphasised the social and linguistic historicity of reality by 
transposing it into eternity, Montaigne, Auerbach claims, breaks through 
this reliance on the figural relationship imposed by a Christian 
framework: 
his creatural realism has broken through the 
Christian frame within which it arose. Life on earth is 
no longer the figure of the life beyond; he can no 
longer permit himself to scorn and neglect the here 
for the sake of a there. Life on earth is the only one he 
has.(Mimesis, p.310) 
Historical reality, then, becomes its own horizon, and, indeed, the 
secularization of world-view which Montaigne reflects makes the 
apprehension of the world problematic: 
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The disconcerting abundance of phenomena which 
now claimed the attention of men seemed 
overwhelming. The world - both outer world and 
inner world - seemed immense, boundless, 
incomprehensible. The need to orient oneself in it 
seemed hard to satisfy and yet urgent.(Mimesis, p.310) 
Once again, Auerbach is concerned with a sense of tension which is 
characteristic of the apprehension of the social world. Orientation, like 
interpretation, is at once difficult and yet necessary, even inevitable. This 
is what Auerbach calls the problem of orientation: 
the task of making oneself at home in existence 
without fixed points of support. In him (Montaigne) 
for the first time, man's life - the random personal life 
as a whole - becomes problematic in the modern 
sense.(Mimesis, p.311) 
Auerbach's terms and concepts resonate with those of the early Lukacs; a 
sense of spiritual homelessness, the problematic nature of social reality. 
Not only does his theory evince a sense of these problems, but he also 
insists, as did Lukacs, on the almost ironic necessity of confronting 
problematic social life, on the need to forge an artificial reintegration of 
phenomena of experience into a meaningful whole. 
This recognition of the onerousness of making sense of what possesses in 
itself no inherent meaning reaches its zenith in the realistic novel of the 
nineteenth-century. In his analyses of Stendhal, Balzac and Flaubert, 
Auerbach discusses how ordinary everyday life has not only become 
suitable for serious representation, i.e. the separation of styles 1s 
irreversibly broken down, but has also become the very essence of 
representation. In Stendhal, for example, 
characters, attitudes, and relationships of the dramatis 
personae . . . are very closely connected with 
contemporary historical circumstances; contemporary 
political and social conditions are woven into the 
action ... (Mimesis, p.457) 
Auerbach suggests that Stendhal's turn to realistic representation was 
occasioned by his own "homelessness." "For the first time," he writes, "the 
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social world around him became a problem"(Mimesis, p.461). This may be 
understood literally - Auerbach relates some of Stendhal's personal 
difficulties - but might more profitably be understood epistemologically -
apprehending the world becomes problematic. As a response, he turns 
towards that very world, in all its variable, historical detail, presaging the 
materialist aesthetics which Lukacs would develop in a similar response 
to the problematic world. Auerbach claims Stendhal as the founder of 
modern realism: 
Insofar as the serious realism of modern times cannot 
represent man otherwise than as embedded in a total 
reality, political, social, and economic, which is 
concrete and constantly evolving - as is the case today 
in any novel or film - Stendhal is its 
founder.(Mimesis, p.463) 
What Auerbach claims as Stendhal's achievement in his literary practice 
again coincides with Auerbach's theoretical achievements: a social 
materialism as the basis of the apprehension and representation of reality 
and an inherent tension between its concreteness and its historicity. 
Balzac, too, stands as a founder of realism in Auerbach's sense: 
He (Balzac) not only, like Stendhal places the human 
beings whose destiny he is seriously relating, in their 
precisely defined historical and social setting, but also 
conceives this connection as a necessary one: to him 
every milieu becomes a moral and physical 
atmosphere which impregnates the landscape, the 
dwelling, furniture, implements, clothing, physique, 
character, surroundings, ideas, activities, and fates of 
men, and at the same time the general historical 
situation reappears as a total atmosphere which 
envelops all its several milieux.(Mimesis, p.473) 
The necessity of these interrelations once again reveals Auerbach's 
insistence on the importance, in the face of extreme relativism, of 
developing a sense of concrete reality. And, again, the basis of this is the 
sense of historical materialism which informs all of Auerbach's literary 
theory. This historicity, according to Auerbach, is crucial to realism as it 
developed in the nineteenth-century novel. Balzac and Stendhal, he says, 
regard: 
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creative and artistic activity as equivalent to an 
activity of a historical-interpretive and even 
historical-philosophical nature ... (they conceive) the 
present as history - the present is something in the 
process of resulting from history.(Mimesis, p.480) 
This is the basis of modern realism as Auerbach understands it. At once, 
realism is concerned with historical representation even as it undermines 
its own representational claims by embodying a philosophical and 
interpretive historicism. What might be called the "embeddedness" of 
realism is, according to Auerbach, developed further by Flaubert whose 
representations emerge more gradually from their atmosphere than those 
of Balzac and Stendhal. 
These writers, or, rather, the representational methods of these writers, 
enjoy a certain privilege in Auerbach's literary history. More than other 
methods, the techniques and devices of nineteenth-century realism 
undertake seriously to represent everyday life; the classical separation of 
styles is broken down and temporal development is fully assimilated into 
narrative form. For Auerbach, this serious representation of social and 
historical reality inevitably presupposes the kind of historicist 
epistemology to which he holds: 
The serious treatment of everyday reality, the rise of 
more extensive and socially inferior human groups to 
the position of subject matter for problematic-
existential representation, on the one hand; on the 
other, the embedding of random persons and events 
in the general course of contemporary history, the 
fluid historical background - these, we believe are the 
foundations of modern realism, and it is natural that 
the broad and elastic form of the novel should 
increasingly impose itself for a rendering comprising 
so many elements.(Mimesis, p.487) 
Auerbach's summary of what he calls modern realism reveals the critical 
dimension which he imports to it: the "embeddedness" of the fictional 
action within historical background, which is itself, as he says, fluid, gives 
realism not an objective-positivistic basis, but a problematic-existential 
one. These elements are contained in a tension-filled relationship with 
the need for maintaining a sense of representational meaning. Finally, 

















degree, suggests that the novel is the form most particularly suited to this 
kind of anti-universalist representational practice. 
Auerbach's history of mimesis continues through and beyond the crucial 
nineteenth-century novel. The methods and styles of the Brothers 
Goncourt and of Zola are analysed and considered in terms of Auerbach's 
conception of realism as "a serious representation of contemporary 
everyday social reality against the background of a constant historical 
movement"(Mimesis, p.518). He also mentions, in passing, the 
development of this aesthetic in literatures other than those with which 
he is most familiar; German and Scandinavian literature, English and 
Russian. 
The final chapter begins with Virginia Woolf. Auerbach integrates 
Woolf's stream-of-consciousness into his theory of realistic representation. 
While narrative styles more commonly associated with realism 
presuppose the lack of a governing authority in the apprehension and 
representation of reality - the manque de base implicit in social reality -
their representational practices set themselves against this problem. This 
is the critical tension of Auerbach's theory, the admission of relativism 
counterposed against a demand for meaning. In Woolf, Auerbach says, 
this tension has been released and relativism overcomes meaning: 
there actually seems to be no viewpoint at all outside 
the novel from which the people and events within it 
are observed, any more than there seems to be an 
objective reality apart from what is in the 
consciousness of the characters. Remnants of such a 
reality survive at best in brief references to the 
exterior frame of the action ... (Mimesis, p.534) 
But Auerbach maintains that this representational style proceeds from the 
same basis as all realistic representation. That is, "that it is a hopeless 
venture to try to be really complete within the total exterior continuum 
and yet to make what is essential stand out"(Mimesis, p.548). Against this 
hopelessness, however, is Auerbach's drive towards meaning: 
We are constantly endeavoring to give meaning and 
order to our lives in the past, the present, and the 
future, to our surroundings, the world in which we 
live; with the result that our lives appear in our own 
conception as total entities - which to be sure are 
151 
...... 
always changing, more or less radically, more or less 
rapidly ... (Mimesis, p.549)45 
Auerbach sees realism as the holding-in-check of the collapse of meaning, 
a tension which derives from the very possibility of non-meaning. As we 
have seen, the basis for this is the historicist epistemology which 
Auerbach derives from Vico. The development of modern fiction as 
represented by Woolf is, then, a kind of surrender, a turn away from social 
and historical reality as a source of meaning. He still characterizes Woolf's 
narrative as realistic; but it is a reality of random occurrences, which, he 
says, constitute a human universality: 
It is precisely the random moment which is 
comparatively independent of the controversial and 
unstable orders over which men fight and despair; it 
passes unaffected by them, as daily life. The more it is 
exploited, the more the elementary things which our 
lives have in common come to light.(Mimesis, p.552) 
But this, Auerbach says, is a simple solution, too simple, in fact. The 
resolution of human reality into this common interiority confounds the 
historicism to which Auerbach holds. Here, Mimesis betrays its author's 
sympathies most clearly. Auerbach's philological expertise and his 
commitment to historicism lends most of Mimesis an impressive 
comprehensiveness which these latter analyses lack. His comments 
become increasingly perfunctory, nowhere more so than in this uneasy 
chapter on Virginia Woolf, which closes with an indication of the real 
source of Auerbach's anxiety. Woolf's reality is too simple, he says, for 
those committed to an abundance of life and a sense of history. However, 
45This is what Holquist refers to as Auerbach's version of the biographical principle, 
whereby chance and accident become meaningful within life; see Holquist, "The Last 
European ... ", pp.388-389. I have not discussed how Auerbach, like Lukacs, is wary of 
modernism because of its implicit resignation to meaninglessness. In Auerbach's case this 
must be understood in light of his own biographical imperatives. His sense of cultural 
apocalypse - a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany - challenges him to assert the worth and 
endurance of Western culture and history, which was then under extreme pressure. 
Auerbach closes Mimesis on a very personal supplicatory note, expressing his hope that 
scholars and scholarship will survive the trauma of the Second World War. This provides 
an interesting parallel to the way in which Lukacs and his contemporaries responded 
similarly to their own sense of cultural and historical trauma, a parallel which might also 
be extended to the aesthetics of withdrawal which emerged from the Frankfurt School, 




they are few in number, and probably they will not 
live to see much more than the first forewarnings of 
the approaching unification and simplification. 
(Mimesis, p.553) 
Some parts of Mimesis, then, are, by virtue of Auerbach's expertise in 
certain areas, more penetrating than others. But nonetheless, as I have 
tried to show, his analysis of realism reveals a literary concept much more 
complicated than a simple transposition of a self-evident reality into 
literary form. 
( d) History, aesthetics, and reality: Auerbach's philosophical contribution 
The importance of the historical moment of Mimesis notwithstanding, 
Auerbach's work suggests that an aesthetics of realistic representation is 
not necessarily incompatible with a theoretical perspective which merits 
being called critical. Indeed, the converse would seem to be the case. 
Auerbach's commitment to realistic representation springs from his 
opposition to approaches which claim universality or objectivity. For 
Auerbach, everything must be understood as historical, and this 
understanding is the motivation for, rather than an objection to, realistic 
representation. 
In his epilogue, as we have seen, Auerbach characterized the subject of 
Mimesis, as "the interpretation of reality through literary 
representation"(Mimesis, p.554). For Auerbach, interpretation is a 
complex process, a mediation between the need for meaning and all the 
different possibilities of meaning which the object of interpretation might 
deliver. Interpretation involves the reconciliation of a demand for 
cohesion with the impossibility of achieving exhaustive knowledge. 
Reality, according to Auerbach, must be "interpreted", and the practice of 
realistic representation is not only the product of such interpretation but 
is, perhaps more importantly, evidence of the necessity of interpretation 
before the idea of "reality" can have any substance. 
Auerbach's work, then, can be understood as a set of related philosophical 
propositions. Not only has he contributed to the body of texts known as 
literary criticism, but his commingled examination of aesthetics and 
history can be distilled into a theory of being-in-the-world which, like his 
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aesthetic theory, involves and relies upon a tension between the need for 
meaningful existence and the concession that existence has no inherent 
meaning. 
Auerbach's philosophy, like his literary criticism, rests upon fundamental 
contradictions, but these are not contradictions which Auerbach has failed 
to appreciate. Rather, he embraces contradiction because of its congeniality 
with his own anti-positivistic theory. Even his approach to contradiction 
involves a kind of paradox: on one hand, Auerbach's relativism suggests 
that these contradictions cannot be resolved; on the other, his interpretive 
imperative means that they must be addressed and their divergences must 
be mediated. Auerbach's sense of being, to return to Hegelian terms, is that 
it is a process of becoming. Auerbach's own sense of the broader 
implications of his literary criticism is clear. Taking Auerbach's work as a 
whole and placing his theory of realism against the background of his 
general theoretical convictions, we can see that his work is a kind of essay 
in historical interpretation and representation, occasioned by a heightened 
sense of cultural crisis. Auerbach's response to crisis was not to seek a 
resolution to conflicts between historical forces, but to develop a theory of 
culture which embraced contradiction. His own philological work, his 
historical analyses of ancient and less ancient texts, then traced the 
enduring presence of the tension between, broadly, meaning and non-
meaning in history, employing mimesis as a vehicle for analysis, and 
establishing the realistic novel as one particularly apposite historical 
instance of mimesis. 
Mimesis, then, is not only a history of realistic representation, but a theory 
of reality as mutable and as requiring interpretation. Auerbach's theory of 
reality embodies the tension which is so crucial to his aesthetic and 
historical theory. His Viconian heritage bestows upon him a revised 
understanding of the idea of truth; as we have seen, the subject of Vico' s 
"new" scientific investigation is the "made-truth," a convergence of the 
certum and the verum. As Auerbach makes clear, his adoption of Vico's 
thought is precisely due to its relativising possibilities, and the aesthetic 
theories which he develops are marked by a similar sense of tension. His 
analysis of the Bible brings together its hermeneutic possibilities and its 
claim to universality. His theory of the figure goes beyond simplistic 
divisions between truth and falsity and contemplates a representational 
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relationship which makes both the represented and the representation 
indivisibly reliant upon one another. 
The reason for Auerbach's emphasis upon realistic representation, then, is 
that it realizes the kind of anti-universalist epistemology to which he 
holds. His vision of reality is of an agglomeration of historical forces 
which require interpretation into a meaningful whole. As Auerbach sees 
it, mimesis, the literary symbol of this idea, is a testament to the 
ineluctability of historicist interpretation in the apprehension of reality 
which gives meaning to human experience. Consistent with Auerbach's 
sense of tension, this exercise is both necessary and incomplete, compelled 
to make sense of the world, and yet forced to confront the limitations of 
sense itself. 
By using history and complicated philosophies of history as grounds of 
critique, Auerbach and Lukacs provide some of the essential conceptual 
tools on which a new critical theory of realism might be founded. They are 
not by any means the only proponents of a critical philosophy of historical 
knowledge, but their particular importance for the present study is the way 
in which each juxtaposes a historical consciousness with the 
representation of social and historical reality, and each pursues his theory 
predominantly through literary criticism. Perhaps more importantly, the 
complexities of their respective theoretical enterprises establish that 
critical literary theory must embody a tension between the establishment 
of meaning and the contingencies of the historical conditions of meaning. 
That is, literary structures must, at once, be maintained and undermined. 
In the critical works of Lukacs and Auerbach the emphasis on historical 
becoming, on embeddedness, on narration and interpretation leads 
towards a conception of the representation of social and historical reality 
as critical thought itself. The supposed universalizing instincts, or naive 
empiricism, which are attributed to realism by those who argue for an 
anti-representational aesthetics, are, in fact, the very antithesis of the 
theoretical claims of Lukacs and Auerbach. As we have seen, the turn to 
history is a means of maintaining a critical perspective, rather than a 
proposed return to some sort of ground of immutable truth. 
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Auerbach's theoretical efforts to negotiate between a sense of historical 
relativism and a continued faith in what we might broadly call knowledge 
lead him to embrace a range of theoretical and interpretive strategies. His 
adoption and adaptation of Vico' s thought, among other things, provided 
him with a conceptual framework which addressed just this problem. As 
we have seen, Vico effected a convergence between two kinds of 
knowledge, the certum and the verum, creating a new concept of 
knowledge. 46 Auerbach's literary theory effects a similar synthesis, and 
achieves a cognate "newness." His various interpretive figures - the 
mimetic, the Christian, the figural - all reveal the complicated background 
of his attention to the representation of reality. 
In the following chapter, as I have already indicated, I will take a different 
approach to the theoretical material. Rather than proceeding from a given 
theory of realism and then trying to unravel its critical roots, in the case of 
Bakhtin I shall begin with an explication and interpretation of his critical 
theory, and then turn to how such a theory might be incorporated into the 
present study. 
46Indeed, the English "science" is, in general usage at least, quite different to the Italian 
scienza. The New Science might have been called The New Knowledge. 
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Mikhail Bakhtin and the life of the word 
... said words of the world are the life of the world. 
- Wallace Stevens 
Bakhtin's work is pervaded by multiplicity; as a scholastic approach, as an 
intellectual theme, and as a biographical/bibliographical condition. As 
Michael Holquist points out, "[a]ll of Mikhail Bakhtin's work stands under 
the sign of plurality, the mystery of the one and the many."1 This plurality, 
or rather, these pluralities, on the one hand, recommend Bakhtin's 
thought to the present study. Encompassing many disciplines, issues, and 
approaches, Bakhtin's keen apprehension of heterogeneity certainly 
renders his theories "critical," insofar as he never, to recall Descombes' 
criterion, takes "the way it is" as an answer. More particularly, as I shall 
discuss, Bakhtin's sense of multiplicity - or differences or plurality, to 
employ other terms - is particularly sophisticated, involving a constant 
mediation between, in terms used by Holquist, the one and the many. Put 
very broadly, Bakhtin' s project might be understood as an ongoing effort 
to think both the one and the many, without privileging nor sacrificing 
one or the other. 
On the other hand, Bakhtin's "pluralism" must give pause to any further 
scholarship. The rapid and prodigious dissemination of Bakhtin' s ideas in 
recent scholarship makes the integration of his thought into the present 
study a sensitive and complicated task. Reflecting upon this phenomenon, 
Holquist writes that "[i]n the great market-place of ideas, Bakhtin has 
obviously risen very high." 2 Bakhtin scholarship, we might say, is, 1n 
1Michael Holquist, "Answering as Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin's Trans-Linguistics", 
Critical Inquiry, 10, 2 (December 1983), p.307. This issue of Critical Inquiry was specially 
devoted to Bakhtin. The articles from this issue, and other related articles, were 
subsequently collected in Gary Saul Morson ed., Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Further references to articles other than 
"Answering as Authoring" will be to this volume. 
2See Michael Holquist, "Introduction" in M.M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late 
Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1986), p .ix. Elsewhere Holquist points out that Bakhtin is among the three 
most frequently mentioned names in manuscripts edited to PMLA; see Michael Holquist, 
Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World (London: Routledge, 1990), p.195. A scan of 
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every sense, "fraught with background." It is precisely the emphasis on 
pluralism which motivates the burgeoning interest in Bakhtin's work; 
debates about interpretation of Bakhtin, contested implications and 
applications of his work, and historico-biographical disagreements have 
generated the wealth of critical investigations to which Holquist refers. 
Bakhtin's wide currency makes necessary several preliminary 
qualifications, as well as clearly demarcated objectives, before my own 
analysis proper of Bakhtin can proceed. This caution is necessary because, 
given the great critical interest in Bakhtin, several issues must be side-
stepped. The first of these is the matter of Bakhtin's bibliographical 
plurality: the disputed texts. Rather than take a real position on this 
matter, I have chosen simply to accept that the works are thematically 
concordant, treating them as a related series of works to which I refer 
according to the ascribed author or authors in the English translation from 
which I am working. 3 But a second, and more important, matter i~ li-h~ 
bibliographic resources will confirm this tendency, the relatively recent MLA CD-Rom 
database reveals - in mid-1995 - well over 900 articles concerning Bakhtin. 
3 Although the matter of the disputed texts is not, as I have indicated, one of the primary 
concerns of the present study, it is certainly not an unimportant question and it is helpful, 
therefore, briefly to consider some of the arguments which have been forwarded by various 
Bakhtin scholars. The dispute turns on the question of the extent to which Bakhtin was the 
author of works published under the names of his associates, I.I. Kanaev, P.N. Medvedev, 
and V.N. Voloshinov. The most important of these are the two books attributed to 
Voloshinov - Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, and Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, and that attributed to Medvedev - The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship. 
The matter is complicated by the intellectual environment in which Bakhtin and his 
colleagues worked in the 1920's, prior to Bakhtin's arrest and exile, a thoroughly 
"dialogic" immersion in debates and discussions, collaboration and cooperation which 
certainly would have blurred intellectual property borders. 
A detailed treatment of this issue and its important implications - such as the relationship 
between Bakhtin and Marxism - is beyond the scope of the present study. Briefly, opinion 
ranges from seeing Bakhtin as sole author of the disputed texts through theories of co-
authorship to considering him no more than an influence on Voloshinov and Medvedev. 
English-language scholarship is particularly divided. Bakhtin biographers Clark and 
Holquist have maintained, on the basis of research in the Soviet Union, that Bakhtin was 
the author of the texts which were, for various reasons, published under his friends' names; 
see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin , Chapter 6, "The Disputed 
Texts". This view is challenged by Emerson and Morson in their introduction to Rethinking 
Bakhtin, where they canvass a number of objections to Clark and Holquist's position; see 
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson eds., Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges 
(Evanston, Ill. : Northwestern University Press, 1989), pp.31££. Morson and Emerson make 
their case again, and more extensively, in their study of Bakhtin, Mikhail Bakhtin 
Creation of a Prosics, (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1990), Chapter 3, "The 
Disputed Texts". Ken Hirschkop also summarizes the debate, listing its major participants 
and the extent to which their conclusions are based upon biographical "evidence" or upon 
analysis of the texts themselves; see Ken Hirschkop, "Critical Work on the Bakhtin 
Circle: a bibliographical essay", in Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd eds, Bakhtin and 
Cultural Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p.196. Tzvetan Todorov 
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interpretation of Bakhtin, of which the authorship dispute is an important 
element. Although I don't propose to debate the matter at any length, it 
will be clear that my own analysis of Bakhtin relies upon certain 
interpretive conclusions about his work, conclusions which are by no 
means beyond debate. 
( a) Bakhtin 's words: problems of interpretation 
The disputed texts are but one aspect of the curious history of Bakhtin' s 
thought, which, particularly in Western scholarship, has given rise to two 
major questions or problems regarding the interpretation of his work. The 
first is the question of how his work should be understood in itself; how 
his various different phases, and the different concerns he addressed, 
relate to one another.4 Once again, the matter is particularly fraught with 
debate. A very crude rendition of the major point of contention is whether 
there is a kind of continuity of thought between the major phases of 
Bakhtin's career, or whether the transitions were occasioned by major 
conceptual watersheds. The first view is suggested by the synoptic studies 
of Bakhtin by Todorov and by Clark and Holquist. Todorov suggests a kind 
of structural consistency to all of Bakhtin' s endeavours. His earlier book 
on Bakhtin admits and emphasizes a "systematic perspective"5 which, he 
concedes, is more a matter of his own approach than something 
necessarily immanent to Bakhtin's work. Todorov suggests that it is not 
only possible to trace a kind of deep structural consistency between all the 
various periods and concerns, but that there is also a kind of overall 
also sets out each point of view, arguing that the disputed texts are , in important ways, 
markedly different to those signed by Bakhtin himself. They are more self-contained, he 
argues, and more aggressively political. Nonetheless, he concedes that the body of work 
which includes the disputed texts and those not in dispute displays a homogeneity of 
thought which makes considering them as a body of work appropriate; Tzvetan Todorov, 
Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, pp.5-7. Soviet and Russian sources, on which 
much of this work is based, has been similarly divided. Recently, S.G. Bocharov has 
reasserted Bakhtin's authorship, once again on testimonial evidence; see S.G. Bocharov, 
"Around and About One Conversation", trans. Marian Schwartz, Russian Studies in 
Literature, 31, 4 (Fall 1995). 
4Notwithstanding the major differences in the interpretation of Bakhtin which inform the 
most well-known commentaries, there is a general agreement that his career comprises four 
major periods. For a full account of these "periods" of activity in Bakhtin's life, and the 
different concerns and methods of each, see Clark and Holquist Mikhail Bakhtin. For a 
more compressed account, see Todorov, The Dialogical Principle, pp.11-12. Morson and 
Emerson actually provide a chart which details the works and concerns of each period; see 
Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.66. 
5Todorov, The Dialogical Principle, p.13. 
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structure to Bakhtin' s work, an interdependence between his various 
periods and concerns. In a slightly later essay on Bakhtin, Todorov 
reiterates his sense of the consistency of Bakhtin' s work. He suggests that 
Bakhtin never stopped seeking what may now appear 
to us to be something like different languages 
intended to express a single thought. 6 
The field of inquiry might change, Todorov suggests, as might the 
language or vocabulary in which Bakhtin expresses himself, but 
fundamentally, the investigations are the same. 
A different version of the continuity thesis is offered by Clark and 
Holquist, and by Holquist on his own. Discussing one of Bakhtin' s earliest 
essays, Holquist argues that 
it must be kept in mind that it contains, in embryonic 
form, every major idea Bakhtin was to have for the 
rest of his long life. 7 
In their critical biography of Bakhtin, Clark and Holquist reinforce this 
interpretation, suggesting that fundamentally Bakhtin was concerned with 
the long-standing philosophical problem of "stasis and change"8 and that 
despite his keen apprehension of heterogeneity and multiplicity, and his 
concern never to resort to abstract systematizing, this problem lends his 
various investigations a kind of philosophical unity. Chief among his 
various inquiries, or, rather, his various achievements, is, of course, his 
highly original philosophy of language; dialogism. In a sense, dialogism is 
his most successful effort to come to terms with the philosophical 
problems which preoccupied him throughout his life. 
In a comparative analysis of Lukacs and Bakhtin, Eva Corredor 
exemplifies the continuity thesis by contrasting the two thinkers. Lukacs' 
intellectual career certainly was marked by significant sea-changes 
(although, as we have seen, it is possible to trace consistencies in his 
6Tzvetan Todorov, Literature and Its Theorists, p. 82. 
7Michael Holquist, "The Politics of Representation", in Stephen J. Greenblatt ed., Allegory 
and Representation: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979-80 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981), p.171. 
8Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.8. 
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work). Corredor suggests that Bakhtin's career stands in contrast to that of 
Lukacs because it is not marked by similar detours and reversals.9 
The continuity thesis, however, has faced serious challenges. Ken 
Hirschkop, for example, claims that all interpretation of Bakhtin is 
necessarily and unavoidably selective, privileging some aspects of his 
work over others. Interpretation of Bakhtin, then, must be understood as 
an appropriation of some aspects of his thought, rather than as a holistic 
overview. He makes clear that this is his approach to Bakhtin: 
Inevitably the interpretation I shall offer privileges 
some texts and formulations of Bakhtin over others ... 
This is a methodological necessity in all criticism, but 
it is particularly true for Bakhtin: there is no unified 
meaning behind these texts and any act of 
interpretation must perforce endorse certain 
statements and reject others.10 
Morson and Emerson contend the continuity thesis more extensively, 
taking issue with what they call the structuralist approach taken by 
Todorov, with Clark and Holquist's '"embryonic' model" 11, and with other 
attempts to, as they put it, "reduce Bakhtin's thought to a systematic 
unity. " 12 Against the continuity thesis, they posit a career marked by 
"watersheds." They argue, specifically against Clark and Holquist, that 
Bakhtin abandoned and "outgrew" his early philosophical influences; he 
discovered the word, began to meditate on the vast possibilities of 
dialogue, and finally set about recapitulating his various investigations, 
tying together his various interests in a professional academic 
environment. 13 Morson and Emerson suggest a "mature" Bakhtin, who 
breaks decisively from _ his philosophical background to effect his own 
Copernican revol u tion. 14 
9See Eva Corredor, "Lukacs and Bakhtin: a dialogue on fiction", The University of Ottawa 
Quarterly, 53, 1 (1983), p.106. 
10Ken Hirschkop, "Dialogism as a Challenge to Literary Criticism", in Catriona Kelly, 
Michael Makin, and David Shepherd eds., Discontinuous Discourses in Modern Russian 
Literature (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.20; emphasis mine. In a footnote to this passage 
Hirschkop sets his argument that Bakhtin's oeuvre cannot be considered uniform in any 
way against the efforts of Clark and Holquist to trace consistencies in Bakhtin's thought. 
11Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.6. 
12Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.7. 
13See Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, pp.64-68. 
14Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.53. 
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The differences between these two interpretations of Bakhtin recreate 
other interpretive conflicts over other thinkers. In this study, for example, 
we have seen Althusser positing a similar sort of distinction between the 
"early" and "mature" phases of Marx's development. But Lukacs' (early) 
interpretation of Marx relies upon a continuity between Marx's Hegelian 
background and his position in Capital. Lukacs himself has been the 
subject of interpretive debate; no-one denies that there are major shifts in 
Lukacs' position over his career, but the extent to which these shifts 
represent a fundamental break is certainly not a concluded matter. 
I do not propose to explore the relative merits of one or another of these 
interpretations of Bakhtin. As will become clear, my reading of Bakhtin's 
material - like my interpretation of Lukacs - suggests that there is a 
discernible consistency to his thought. This doesn't mean, of course, that 
there are not important differences and changes in his work, and I don't 
believe that proponents of the continuity thesis have ever suggested 
otherwise. I suggest, rather, that there is a recognizable pattern to Bakhtin' s 
approach in each of his phases. Each of his inquiries - from his early 
exercises on traditional philosophical topics to his redefinition of 
aesthetics and the theory of the novel - begins from a sense of tension 
between unity and multiplicity, and he tries, in each phase, to synthesize 
an approach which simultaneously countenances both. It is not so much 
that the ideas he develops with regard to ethics or epistemology lead 
directly to dialogue or to his theory of the novel, but that they are similar 
sorts of responses to questions with which Bakhtin was persistently 
concerned. Certainly there were changes as Bakhtin moved away from 
traditional philosophical concerns to a highly original focus on language, 
and his individual voice does emerge more strongly as he progresses, but, 
as I shall try to show, the idea of participatory being which dominates his 
ethical inquiries has clear links with the idea of dialogue which, in the 
final analysis, stands as his most important theoretical15 development. 
15Throughout this discussion, the terms theory and theoretical need to be treated with 
extreme caution. Any characterization of Bakhtin's work as theoretical must take into 
account that to do so requires a fundamental revision of the idea of theory. Bakhtin, of 
course, is highly critical of theoreticism and theory (see particularly Toward a Philosophy 
of the Act, ed. Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1993), p.55). If dialogics is to be considered a "theory," theory 
must be understood as a descriptive complement to practice or experience, rather than as a 
non-experiential basis of knowledge, which is how it used, for example, by Althusser. 
Holquist makes this point in his introduction to a volume which contains several early 
Bakhtin essays; see Michael Holquist, "Introduction: The Architechtonics of 
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If the question of the internal relationships of Bakhtin's thought is a point 
of contention, the second problem of interpretation is perhaps even more 
fraught. Whether Bakhtin's thought is conceived of as continuous or 
otherwise, the question of what kind of thought it is has been the subject 
of much controversy. It would be difficult here comprehensively to 
canvass this issue, but once again, it is necessary briefly to place my own 
interpretation of Bakhtin against this background. There are essentially 
three points to be considered: the first is the position, within Bakhtin's 
thought, of the idea of carnival, and its significant omission from the 
present study; the second relates to the different critical contexts into 
which Bakhtin' s thought has been placed; the third might be called the 
question of Bakhtin' s radicalism. As we shall see, these three issues are 
intimately related to one another. The position of the idea of carnival 
bears very heavily upon the context into which Bakhtin is placed which, 
in turn, informs the subversive capacity of Bakhtinian thought. 
There is, not surprisingly, a difference of opinion over the importance of 
carnival within Bakhtin's thought as a whole. On the one hand, carnival 
has been perhaps the most enthusiastically mobilized of Bakhtinian 
categories, and it is helpful briefly to examine the features of carnival, and 
of Bakhtin's study of Rabelais, which might account for this. Basically, 
carnival has been understood as the most radical or subversive of 
Bakhtin's theories. The images of carnival are decidedly uncomfortable; 
the grotesque, the scatological, the hysterical. Such images, as well as the 
manifest concern with popular culture, allow Bakhtinian thought to be 
exercised outside traditional academic disciplines such as philosophy, 
linguistics or literary criticism. It countenances a revolt by the "low" 
against the "high" and, accordingly, facilitates attempts to revise the high 
culture/ popular culture dichotomy upon which great traditions are 
supposedly founded. 
It is in this spirit that carnival is often evoked, as a radical practice which 
subverts official doctrines and discourses, an image which appeals to 
cultural theory which understands itself as transgressive, radical or 
subversive. But the widespread use of carnival has drawn criticism from 
Answerability" in M.M Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, ed. 
Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1990), p.xx. 
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several quarters. Holquist, for example, protests against an overeagerness 
to appropriate carnival (and, indeed, all Bakhtinian categories) which 
amounts to "nothing more than a liberating licentiousness", 16 and 
elsewhere comments upon the imbalance which has resulted from the 
loss of most of a manuscript on the Bildungsroman which, dating from 
the same period as Rabelais and his World, moderates the view of Bakhtin 
suggested by the book on Rabelais. 17 
Morson and Emerson not only criticize the overuse of carnival but go so 
far as to argue that, within Bakhtin's oeuvre, the idea of carnival in 
general and Rabelais and his World in particular, are inferior: 
This carnival mode is the canonic base for a number 
of very peculiar appropriations of Bakhtin, from 
Marxist to deconstructionist, and, in our view, it has 
tended to obscure the larger and more consistent 
shape of his thought. Generally speaking, Bakhtin was 
much less concerned with millenarian fantasies and 
holy foolishness than with the constraints and 
responsibilities of everyday living. Carnival, while 
offering a profound insight into much of Rabelais and 
some of Dostoevsky, ultimately proved a dead end. In 
his last period, laughter but not the idealization of 
carnival anarchy remained - and the functions of 
laughter were more closely specified.18 
In my analysis of Bakhtin, as will become clear, carnival is notably absent. 
The reasons for this absence are that I tend to accept the view that carnival 
is not central to Bakhtin' s philosophical project, and that its efficacy must 
be limited to the analysis of specific kinds of cultural activity and that the 
literary concept with which we are concerned here - realism - falls outside 
the reach of the carnival. Indeed, as we shall see, the Bakhtinian text 
which is most explicitly concerned with realism is the remaining fragment 
of the manuscript on the Bildungsroman which Holquist suggests acts as a 
counterweight to carnival. 
But it is not just a question of whether or not the Rabelais book is to be 
counted among Bakhtin's major works. As I have indicated, the 
application of carnival is one of the features which reveal the kind of 
16Holquist, Dialogism, p .108. 
17See Holquist, "Introduction" in Bakhtin, Speech Genres, p.xv. 
18Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.67. 
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Bakhtin which is envisaged by different critics, it is one of the indices used 
to locate Bakhtin within contemporary critical debates. Bakhtin's emphasis 
on pluralities has suggested countless relationships between Bakhtin and 
any number of critical theories and theorists. Congenialities and antitheses 
between Bakhtin and other thinkers, his status as precursor of 
contemporary critical debates have been discussed at length, and, 
disconcertingly, there has been a tendency to adopt Bakhtin as a kind of 
11 saviour"19 in the post-deconstruction critical epoch. The complexities of 
this question, however, must be checked at the door. Bakhtin has been 
claimed for many contemporary critical traditions, from Marxism, with 
which he certainly had an important relationship, to postmodernism, 
with which his relationship is entirely a matter of eduction. 
Comprehensively to canvass these applications of Bakhtin's thought is 
beyond the scope of this study.20 
But Bakhtin's place in this thesis places him, of course, in particular 
conceptual company, and explores his contribution only to literary theory 
and criticism. My reading of Bakhtin, as we shall see, also tends to 
emphasize not only the unity of his thought, but the place for unity 
within his thought. Once again, however, this interpretation of Bakhtin 
needs, if only briefly, to acknowledge challenging interpretations. In what 
follows I have insisted upon what might be called Bakhtin's 
11 constructiveness," placed him in the company of Lukacs and Auerbach, 
and applied his thought to a traditional concept in literary criticism. In 
doing so, I have offered a reading of Bakhtin which runs contrary to 
interpretations of Bakhtin which, either through differing interpretation, 
19The blurb to a recent collection of essays loosely inspired by Bakhtin, for example, begins 
by asking "is there life after deconstruction?" The implied answer is "Yes - Bakhtin." 
20A few references, however, are not. Ken Hirschkop's "bibliographical essay" (see note 3 
above) is a good overview of some of the ways in which Bakhtin's thought has been linked 
with contemporary critical theory, to which the contributions to the Hirschkop and 
Shepherd volume Bakhtin and Cultural Theory can be added. Nancy Glazener, for 
example, claims that "Bakhtin's attempt to subvert the categories of meaning and identity 
greatly resembles the project of deconstruction"; see Nancy Glazener, "Dialogic subversion: 
Bakhtin, the novel and Gertrude Stein", in Hirschkop and Shepherd eds., Bakhtin and 
Cultural Theory, p.115, emph. mine. Malcolm Jones, in a review article of Morson and 
Emerson's Creation of a Prosaics, refers to the different approaches taken to Bakhtin by 
critical theorists and Slavists. Bakhtin, he says, is often "welcomed aboard as a guest and 
ally by those who have percieved his usefulness"; Malcolm V. Jones, "The creation of a 
prosaics: Morson and Emerson on Mikhail Bakhtin", Comparative Criticism 15 (1993) p.245. 
Sub hash J aireth rehearses some differences between recent Russian readings and non-
Russian readings of Bakhtin; Subhash Jaireth, "Russian and Non-Russian Readings of 
Bakhtin: The Contours of an Emerging Dialogue", Southern Review, 28, 1 (March 1995). 
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or through a greater emphasis on carnival, or arguing affinities with 
different thinkers, contemplates a more radical or subversive Bakhtin. 
Hirschkop, for example, argues that the tenets of dialogism, which are 
fundamentally subversive, constitute a pro.found challenge to the 
institutional practice of literary criticism.21 Elsewhere he vigorously 
challenges what he sees as an ideological appropriation of Bakhtin, 
particularly by Morson, Emerson, and Holquist, "the ultimate effect of 
which is to evade the most radical aspects of his work in favour of an 
interpretation that renders him useful in the argument against the recent 
advances of post-structuralism and recent literary theory in general."22 He 
goes on to claim that such an appropriation "has blunted the most radical 
aspects of his thought" evincing a trend "toward an assimilation of 
Bakhtin into a liberal schema that he opposed".23 
Certainly there is a radical and subversive tendency in Bakhtin' s thought, 
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but, as I shall try to show, there are equal tendencies within Bakhtin's , 
work which must be simultaneously considered; the one, to return to the 
image with which this chapter began, and the many co-exist in Bakhtin' s 
thought. Hirschkop's point that the interpretation of Bakhtin can amount 
to a kind of recruitment of Bakhtin seems to overlook his own interested 
rejection of what he calls a "liberal schema." This is pointed out by 
Morson who, in his response to Hirschkop, argues that "the words 'radical' 
and 'liberal' (like 'cold war' elsewhere) are compounds of vagueness and of 
a misplaced political appeal - the sort of approach that one of my friends 
labels 'lefter than thou."'24 
Clearly, the matter of which is the more appropriate image of Bakhtin -
the "liberal" or the "radical" - cannot be debated here. My own "use" of 
Bakhtin concerns simply two related problems: the position of realism 
with regard to critical theory; and the efficacy of different kinds of critical 
theory. The use of Bakhtin in this context confounds both more radical 
interpretations of Bakhtin qua Bakhtin, and the employment of his 
thought in literary theory which rejects realism. However, as I shall try to 
21See Hirschkop, "Dialogism as a Challenge to Literary Criticism". 
22Ken Hirschkop, "A Response to the Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin", in Morson ed., Bakhtin: 
Essays and Dialogues on His Work, p.74. 
23Hirschkop, "Response", p.79. 
24Gary Saul Morson, "Dialogue, Monologue, and the Social: A Reply to Ken Hirschkop", in 
Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work, p.87. 
show, although I have not set out to refute alternative interpretations, 
Bakhtin's thought does have a place in the present study. 
This lengthy preamble has essentially been by way of qualification. With 
so contentious a body of work as Bakhtin's, any new interpretation runs 
the risk of being challenged at every turn, and I have tried to show that my 
interpretation doesn't claim to be definitive. My aim here will be to try to 
establish that the peculiarly tensile quality of Bakhtin's critical thought 
lends itself to my thesis which concerns the relationship between critical 
theory and literary realism. In order to do so, I shall set out a particular 
interpretation of the critical dimension of Bakhtin's thought, and 
concentrate upon its significance for the interpretation and theory of 
literature. Bakhtin's own literary theory is, of course, of great importance 
in this project and I shall try to show how this material supports my own 
application of Bakhtin's thought. Finally, I shall try to show how Bakhtin's 
thought complements the work of the other theorists discussed in this 
section, contributing to the development of the present thesis. 
(b) Dialogue as action: Bakhtin 's critical philosophy 
Bakhtin, as is well-known, contributed numerous terms to the critical 
vocabulary, as well as giving existing terms complex new inflections: 
answerability, utterance, speech genre, text, chronotope, heteroglossia, 
polyphony, discourse, the novel. Most important, of course, is dialogue, 
Bakhtin's master category, the figure which essentially informs all of his 
theoretical investigations. 25 Before we turn to the idea of dialogue, 
however, it is necessary to explore, in a sense, its background, Bakhtin's 
early philosophy, in order to show what kind of critical presuppositions it 
rests upon and what kind of critical method it suggests. 
As we shall see, dialogue, as an activity of language, and as a kind of trope 
of human existence, rests upon Bakhtin' s apprehension of human life as 
social and relational. The importance of the social and relational is very 
clear in Bakhtin's early, more specifically philosophical writings, even 
25The critical literature emphasizes and articulates Bakhtin's notion of dialogue and 
explicates its range of applications in his work. The works by Clark and Holquist (Mikhail 
Bakhtin), Holquist (Dialogism), and Todorov (The Dialogical Principle) stress the 
centrality of dialogue to Bakhtin' s whole conceptual schema while Morson and Emerson 
include dialogue as one of what they call Bakhtin' s global concepts. 
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though, as Morson and Emerson point out, dialogue doesn't really emerge 
until Bakhtin's second period of activity and the first version of the book 
on Dostoevsky. The presence or otherwise of dialogue in these early 
writings is, in fact, one of the main points of contention between the 
continuity thesis and the watershed thesis. 
Emerging from a strong neo-Kantian background26 Bakhtin's concerns are 
the stuff of traditional philosophy: ethics and epistemology. Exploring 
these areas, Bakhtin' s relational thought is readily apparent. In Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act Bakhtin mounts a critique of various forms of what 
he calls "theoreticism." Bakhtin argues against what he calls the 
theoretical world in which cognition, including ethical judgments, is 
divorced from experienced being: 
In that world we would find ourselves to be 
determined, predetermined, bygone, and finished, 
that is, essentially not living. We would have cast 
ourselves out of life - as answerable, risk-fraught, and 
open becoming through performed actions - and into 
an indifferent and, fundamentally, accomplished and 
finished theoretical Being (which is not yet completed 
and is yet to be determined only in the process of 
cognition, but to be determined precisely as a given) ... 
Any kind of practical orientation of my life within the 
theoretical world is impossible: it is impossible to live 
in it, impossible to perform answerable deeds.27 
The targets of Bakhtin's philosophical critique are any attempts 
theoretically - that is, divorced from experience - to determine categories of 
consciousness. Ethics, for example, cannot be theoretically conceived: 
Actually, one cannot speak of any kind of moral, 
ethical norms, of any ought with a determinate 
content (we shall develop this in detail later on). The 
ought does not have any determinate content; it does 
not have a specifically theoretical content.(TP A, p.5) 
26For Bakhtin's relationship - intellectual and biographical - with Kant and neo-
Kantianism see Clark and Holquist, "The Influence of Kant in the Early Work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin", in Joseph P. Strelka ed., Literary Theory and Criticism (Bern: Peter Lang, 1984); 
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, pp.57££. and passim; Holquist, Dialogism, pp.17££. 
27M.M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p.9. This unfinished text dates from 
c.1919-1921, but was among the last of Bakhtin's published works. All further references to 
quotations from this work (hereafter TP A) will be given in the text. 
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For Bakhtin, included in the idea of "theoreticism" are, as we have seen, 
ethical schemes, certain kinds of aestheticism28 , and what he calls 
pragmatism, which we might understand as various forms of 
determinism. 29 
Bakhtin's emphasis on the experiential motivates his critique of 
theoreticism. Experience, moreover, is relational; it depends upon the 
positioning of the experiencing subject. Bakhtin's classic statement on 
individual perception emphasizes this point: 
When I contemplate a whole human being who is 
situated outside and over against me, our concrete, 
actually experienced horizons do not coincide. For at 
each given moment, regardless of the position and 
the proximity to me of this other human being whom 
I am contemplating, I shall always see and know 
something that he, from his place outside and over 
against me, cannot see himself: parts of his body that 
are inaccessible to his own gaze (his head, his face and 
its expression), the world behind his back, and a 
whole series of objects and relations, which in any of 
our mutual relations are accessible to me but not to 
him. As we gaze at each other, two different worlds 
are reflected in the pupils of our eyes. 30 
Bakhtin's sense of the unique individuality of perception - which extends 
to all facets of being - constitutes the plurality with which theoreticism 
cannot, in his view, come to terms. He sets out, then, to try to develop a 
theory of what we might call participative thinking.31 Towards this, 
Bakhtin identifies the fundamental relations which constitute 
28Bakhtin' s critique of what he calls the "aestheticization of life" needs to be 
distinguished from his own approach which is also aesthetic. What he objects to is the 
conflation of the aesthetic with the theoretical, as opposed to his conflation of the 
aesthetic with the practical or participatory; see TPA, p.13. See also Art and 
Answerability, pp.64ff. The difference between these two kinds of aesthetics can be 
illustrated by Morson and Emerson's term "prosaic." Morson and Emerson detail how 
Bakhtin's aesthetic theory, for which they coin the term prosaics, is a challenge to the 
conflation of the aesthetic with the poetic. Poetics, they suggest, reduces aesthetics to the 
singular and unusual, and privilege verse. Prosaics, by contrast, privileges the novel, and 
concentrates on the ordinary, thereby changing the orientation of the aesthetic from a 
transcendence of life to a kind of co-extension with it. 
29 See TPA, p.12. 
30Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, pp.22-23. Further references to this text will be included 
in the text and indicated by the abbreviation AA. 
31 See TP A, p.8. 
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participatory being32 and some of the experiential material through which 
these relations are conducted. His long discussion of corporeality, for 
example, considers the function of the body in participatory being.33 In an 
important preview of what would become a major preoccupation, Bakhtin 
says that language, too, implies, or at least should if it is being properly 
contemplated, what he calls participatory thinking.34 
Proceeding from this opposition between theoreticism and the 
complicated idea of participation, Bakhtin develops several early 
theoretical figures which, in a sense, constitute a theory of the 
participatory. These are the ideas of answerability35 and architectonics. For 
Bakhtin, answerability is a kind of category of relational being. It is at once 
an activity, a way of being responsive in the world, and the philosophical 
description of such being. At this stage, Bakhtin is clearly concerned with 
the ethical implications of relational being, or, rather, with the 
contribution to ethics of his theory of relational being. But answerability 
also has cognitive/ epistemological implications, which are particularly 
suggestive of the method of Bakhtin's critical philosophy. 
For Bakhtin, answerability, the necessity of thinking of ourselves in terms 
of answerability, is an ontological responsibility. The terms in which 
Bakhtin' s idea of answer ability reflect this: the "non-alibi in being" (TP A, 
32These are the relationships between "I and the other" - I-for-myself, the Other-for-me 
etc. - which Bakhtin discusses throughout these early essays; see, for example, TP A, p.54. 
As Holquist points out, Bakthin's work at this stage resembles phenomenological and 
existential thought, particularly that of Sartre; see Holquist, "Introduction: The 
Architectonics of Answerability", pp.xxviii-xxx. 
33 See AA, pp.47££. 
34See TPA, p.31. Bakhtin's emphasis here on the relational quality of language, although 
it certainly hasn't reached the complexity of dialogue is, I suggest, a major point in favour 
of the continuity thesis. 
35The English translation of the Russian word otvestvenost has also been a point of 
contention. Clark and Holquist prefer to use "answerability," which, as well as making 
clear the ethical implications of Bakhtin's thought, also suggests a slide into a language-
based approach, making Bakhtin' s early work strongly prefigurative of his later use of 
dialogue. Vadim Liapunov, the translator of Bakhtin's early works, similarly prefers 
answerability. He writes that he uses '"answerability' instead of 'responsibility' in order 
to foreground the root sense of the term - answering; the point is to bring out that 
'responsibility' involves the performance of an existential dialogue"; see TPA, p.80, n.9. 
Morson and Emerson contend that the more accurate translation is "responsibility," which 
makes clear the specifically ethical concerns and does not imply dialogue. This, they 
argue, makes clear that there was a "watershed" in Bakhtin's thought in the late 1920s 
and to use the word "answerability" is an anachronistic "reading-back" which makes it 
seem as if the early works are continuous with the later work on dialogue; see Creation of a 
Prosaics, pp.114-115. 
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p.40), "obligative (ought-to-be) uniqueness"(TPA, p.42), "our principled 
relationship to things and to the world"(AA, p.5).36 We have, then, the 
first indication of a peculiar kind of tension in Bakhtin's thought. On the 
one hand, he sets out a radical critique of ethics, of abstract "theoretical" 
ethical schemes, arguing that they are fundamentally inadequate because 
of their failure to take account of participatory Being. On the other hand, 
however, the critique of ethics becomes a very strong demand for ethical 
behaviour, and participatory Being involves a constant ethical demand, to 
behave ethically without an abstract set of guidelines. The act, then, is 
liberated from abstract rules of behaviour, but bonded to its own 
answerabili ty. 
In a more general philosophical sense, answerability can be understood as 
the "truth" of participatory, multiplicitous Being. By thinking of unique 
experience as answerable to its environment, the uniqueness of 
individual experience, activity, or perception can be incorporated into 
universal ideas of experience: 
In its answerability, the act sets before itself its own 
truth [pravda] as something-to-be-achieved - a truth 
that unites both the subjective and psychological 
moments, just as it unites the moment of what is 
universal (universally valid) and the moment of 
what is individual (actual). This unitary and unique 
truth [pravda] of the answerably performed act is 
posited as something-to-be- attained qua synthetical 
truth [pravda]. 
What is ... unfounded is the fear that this unitary and 
unique syntheical truth [pravda] of the performed act 
is irrational. The actually performed act in its 
undivided wholeness is more than rational - it is 
answerable. Rationality is but a moment of 
answerability, [2-3 illegible words] light that is "like 
the glimmer of a lamp before the sun" (Nietzsche). 
(TPA, p.29) 
We can see, then, in the figure of answerability, the shape of Bakhtin's 
critical method. Proceeding from an apprehension of plurality, Bakhtin 
36Despite Bakhtin's "pluralism," these early writings imply a very tough ethical 
rigorousness in Bakhtin's thought, which suggests yet another parallel with Sartre, whose 
ideas of radical freedom and faith were similarly demanding. Bakhtin reinforces the 
ethical non-alibi by arguing that even acting as a representative does not diminish one's 
personal answerability; see TP A, p.52. 
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develops the idea of answerability, not to overcome plurality, but to 
reconcile plurality with unity. Answerability, once again, can be 
understood in terms of "the one and the many." It is, on the one hand, the 
relation of the one to the many, but it is also the overarching category of 
truth, the unifying principle of an otherwise multiplicitous Being. 
Understanding Being as answerable then leads Bakhtin to consider what 
he calls "architectonics," the way in which the world is put together out of 
all the different perspectival and axiological beings which constitute it. 
Architectonics is the concept which Bakhtin uses to account for concrete 
unique experience. While Bakhtin's apprehension of plurality means that 
the whole world cannot be reduced to one or another perspective on the 
world, he insists that the world does seem unified from any particular 
perspective: 
This world is given to me, from my unique place in 
Being, as a world that is concrete and unique. For my 
participative, act-performing consciousness, this 
world, as an architectonic whole, is arranged around 
me as the sole centre from which my deed issues or 
comes forth ... (TPA, p.57) 
Architectonics, in a sense, is what every individual perspective -
perceptual and axiological - shares, what every world-view has in 
common: 
... these concretely individual and never repeatable 
worlds of actual act-performing consciousness ( of 
which, qua real components, unitary and once-
occurrent Being-as-event comes to be composed) 
include common moments - not in the sense of 
universal concepts or laws, but in the sense of 
common moments or constituents in their various 
concrete architectonics.(TP A, p.54) 
These common moments, he goes on to say, are the apprehension of the 
fundamental relationships which compose Being: the I-for-myself; the 
other-for-me; and I-for-the-other. What each individual being must do, is 
put his or her world together, and appreciate that such a world is but one 
of an infinite number of architectonic wholes. 
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More significantly, perhaps, Bakhtin explicitly traces a kind of homology 
between the architectonics of the actual world and the architectonics of 
aesthetic activity. He uses what he calls the "world in aesthetic seeing" as a 
"description of the actual, concrete architectonic of value-governing 
experiencing of the world"(TPA, p.61). The architectonics of aesthetic 
creation - the authoring of a world, and the reading (seeing) of that world, 
occur necessarily around a particular value-centre, that of the hero. The 
particularly objectified quality of aesthetic activity brings its architectonics 
into high relief, and, furthermore, makes clear that the unity of the world 
depends upon its relationship to that which is specifically human: 
The unity of the world in aesthetic seeing is not a 
unity of meaning or sense - not a systematic unity, but 
a unity that is concretely architectonic: the world is 
arranged around a concrete value-center, which is 
seen and loved and thought. What constitutes this 
center is the human being: everything in this world 
acquires significance, meaning, and value only in 
correlation with man - as that which is human.(TP A, 
p.61) 
The architectonics of the art work - which are actualized by the author, or 
by the reader - parallel the architectonics of the actual world: 
Architectonics - as the intuitionally necessary, 
nonfortuitous disposition and integration of concrete 
unique parts and moments into a consummated 
whole - can exist only around a given human being as 
a hero.(AA, p.209) 
All human beings, in a sense, are the heroes of their own novel, but, in 
the actual world, the series of relationships which make up the world are 
more complex and varied than in the art work. In the art work, the world 
takes shape in its relation to the hero, but in the actual world 
architectonics must encompass the consciousness of the possibility of 
other values-centres, relationships can never be closed because, as Bakhtin 
puts it, the 
highest architectonic principle of the actual world of 
the performed act or deed is the concrete and 
architectonically valid or operative contraposition of 
the I and the other. Life knows two value-centers that 
are fundamentally and essentially different, yet are 
correlated with each other: myself and the other; and 
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it is around these centers that all of the concrete 
moments of Being are distributed and arranged.(TPA, 
p.74) 
The relationship between aesthetic architectonics and what we might call 
cognitive or epistemological architectonics is that the stylized art work 
highlights the architectonics of the world, which without an awareness of 
architectonics in general, it is more easy to overlook. Aesthetics is a kind 
of description of architectonics in general, of which, according to Bakhtin, 
human beings are epistemologically and ethically obliged to take account. 
The notion of architectonics in general and the concomitant homology 
between aesthetics and Being are particularly significant on two counts. 
The first is the implications of this early work for Bakhtin's thought in 
itself. On the one hand, architectonics suggests that Bakhtin's sense of 
pluralism is "constructive," rather than "deconstructive," his 
apprehension of plurality leads him towards new unities. In this, 
Bakhtin's movement of thought is not dissimilar to Vico's development 
of a "new" science, with a revised notion of truth. The development of 
these early theoretical figures - answerability and architectonics - is the 
means whereby Bakhtin seeks to reconcile the pluralities of Being, within 
Being, rather than resorting to abstract theoreticism.37 
This suggests that Bakhtin, alongside his apprehension of infinite 
plurality, nonetheless insisted upon the need for unities, even if they are 
constructed and necessarily inconclusive. Whether this tendency 
continues into his later work is, once again, a point of contention. Morson 
and Emerson contend that there is a decisive break. They argue that 
Bakhtin abandoned these early figures: 
37Bakhtin's insistence on participation in Being, as well as suggesting affinities with 
historical materialism also anticipates one of the key features of contemporary 
hermeneutics. Gadamer's notion of the "rehabilitation of prejudice" is not dissimilar to 
Bakhtin' s sense of axiology as a determinant of Being; see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, second, revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New 
York: Continuum, 1989), pp.277 ff. There are, of course, important differences between 
Bakhtin and the the German hermeneut. At this stage of his work, Bakhtin's focus is upon 
the individual, more like Heidegger or Sartre - especially insofar as Being seems to be a 
kind of burden - than Gadamer or other contemporary hermeneuts such as Habermas, whose 
historicist heritage lends their analyses a more sociological element. Later, Bakhtin would 
begin to draw closer to this approach, particulary in those essays which might be 
considered literary history, such as "Discourse in the Novel." 
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When he discovered dialogue, Bakhtin largely 
abandoned this model. His early term for the complex 
of action was architectonics ... but this must have 
seemed too static a metaphor ... 38 
Architectonics, they suggest, not only fails to anticipate dialogue, but is 
actually fundamentally different, revealing a preference for what they call 
finalizability, which is antithetical to the concept of unfinalizability which 
emerges in Bakhtin's later work and which they characterize as one of his 
three II global concepts" (the other two being prosaics and dialogue): 
If we compare the idea of the architectonic act with 
the later (and more familiar) 11 dialogic word" two 
differences immediately come into view. First, what is 
remarkable about the act is its high degree of closure ... 
In marked contrast to the novelistic word, which 
Bakhtin will come to define as open, unfinalized 
the act is valuable as a concrete closed event ... 39 
But the extent to which concrete architectonics implies finalization and, 
conversely, to which dialogue precludes the concrete, is still debatable. The 
relationships between 11I and the other" have, of course, no determinate 
content, as Holquist points out, for Bakhtin, 11I" is a II shifter" and while it 
makes possible the concrete, it could be argued that its shifting content 
precludes any finalization. 40 Similarly, as we shall see, later Bakhtinian 
figures, such as speech genres and the chronotope, perform a distinctly 
concretizing function. 
As well as suggesting (arguably) a kind of reconciliatory tendency in 
Bakhtin' s method, these early figures can also be seen as foreshadowing 
some of Bakhtin's later developments. 41 The commingling of aesthetic 
with epistemological concerns anticipates Bakhtin's later development of 
38Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.54. 
39Morson and Emerson, Creation of a Prosaics, p.70. In their table of Bakhtin's career, 
Morson and Emerson characterize this period as favouring finalization over 
unfinalizability; see p.66. 
40See Holquist, Dialogism, p.23. The idea of the "shifter" is adopted from Roman Jakobson, 
and indicates a unified concept which has no determinant content. While I always means 
the same thing, it always indicates a different person, a different architectonic 
orientation. 
41This is, again, a contentious point. If they do, as I shall contend, foreshadow later 
elements of Bakhtin's thought, the continuity thesis is reinforced, but it must be 
acknowledged that, without specific attention to this problem, my argument cannot claim 
to be in any way definitive. 
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his theories of the novel. Bakhtin uses aesthetics, specifically literature, as 
a kind of focus of these early figures. After his decisive turn towards 
language he continued to use literature as a focus because it represents a 
particularly concentrated form of language. The early use of literature 
might be said to connect with his later use of literature, between which, of 
course, is his major innovation, the conception of dialogue. Certainly, 
there are differences: his early work uses a poem in which to explore 
architectonics, while his later work privileges prose, one of the major 
shifts in his aesthetic theory. But the persistent use of an aesthetic model -
first for architectonics, and then for language - highlights the importan 
congeniality of literature and Being which stands as one of Bakhtin's 
major presuppositions. 
These two questions - the reconciliatory, concretizing aspect of Bakhtin' s 
thought, and the co-extension of literature and life - have, as I have said, 
another significant resonance, which bears upon the specific concerns of 
this thesis. The emphasis in architectonics on the concrete world relies 
upon Bakhtin's sense of a kind of synthetic unity in the world. As we have 
seen, both Lukacs and Auerbach countenance similarly synthetic unities 
which, particularly in Auerbach's case, emerge from a background of 
multiplicity (Lukacs' dialectic synthesis emerges, of course,-only from a 
duplicity, which greatly limits the relativism of his thought). Not only 
that, but the possibility of synthetic unity is one of the enabling conditions 
of realistic representation, upon which Auerbach relies. The constructed 
world, particularly in aesthetic seeing, which is the result of architectonics 
is exactly what verisimilitude relies upon, a represented, or reconstructed, 
world. 
This relation to realism is reinforced by Bakhtin's correlation of aesthetics 
and Being. As we have seen, the relation of the world in literature to 
Being-in-the-world, is ~~r1e <dochal, the aesthetic world concentrates the 
properties of the real world. But this sense of aesthetics relies upon a 
synthetic relationship between literature and the actual world. This, in a 
sense, is Bakhtin' s argument against Formalism. By developing the idea of 
prosaics as one of Bakhtin's "global concepts,"42 Morson and Emerson 
have summarized this tendency in Bakhtin. Not only does prosaics imply 
42See particularly, Creation of a Prosaics, pp.lSff. Morson and Emerson suggest that this 
concern with the "prosaic" is not only a matter of aesthetics, but is one of Bakhtin's major 
philosophical convictions; see p.23. 
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an aesthetics which privileges prose over verse (reversing the implied bias 
of the term poetics), but it also, as they suggest, implies a concern with the 
ordinary and the everyday, as opposed to the unique and extraordinary. 
Prosaics countenances a parallel between the stuff of aesthetics and the 
stuff of life, as opposed to defining art against life, which, as we have seen, 
has been a definition which has informed many different aesthetic 
approaches which oppose realism. 43 A prosaic aesthetic, coupled with 
architectonics, would seem to countenance realism, which, as we have 
seen, relies upon a similarly conceived relationship between literature and 
reality. 
These early writings, then, both contribute directly to Bakhtin' s relevance 
to a theory of realism, and go towards establishing what might be 
understood as his general philosophical principles; his radical insistence 
on experience, and on differences within experience, and his focus on 
aesthetics to clarify the workings of Being. Bakhtin's early philosophy, 
then, is one which seeks a kind of synthetic unity or truth, and for figures 
which describe this unity. This is what is evoked in the early figures of 
architectonics and answerability, and the latter has, upon one reading, 
important linguistic/ semantic connotations (Bakhtin does briefly discuss 
language as a participatory, relational activity), which become Bakhtin's 
major preoccupation in his later periods. 
( c) The development of the dialogic: a critical lexicon 
Dialogue, as I have indicated, is Bakhtin' s most important concept, and 
might be understood as a theoretical44 figure of his conviction, which we 
have explored, that all human activity is social and relational. In this 
sense, dialogue is a kind of trope of human existence. But the idea of 
dialogue also indicates the centrality of language and, consequently, 
literature in Bakhtin's schema. Because Bakhtin conceives of being as 
social and relational, language, as the social activity par excellence, is 
central to his entire philosophical project. 
43 See Part I of the present study. 
44The caution with which the term theoretical must be treated has been mentioned 
already, but a reminder is timely. Without such caution, this description of dialogue as 
theoretical would constitute a serious misrepresentation. 
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_......... 
While the ideas of answerability and architectonics emerge as Bakhtin' s 
contributions to issues of "first philosophy," taking their place within a 
philosophical context of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, Bakhtin's 
sense of the inescapably relational character of human activity - his 
commitment to practice over theory - required the development of a more 
complicated and individual approach which refined his sense of the 
relational into his sense of dialogue. Thus, Bakhtin gradually developed 
numerous dialogic figures which would guide his inquiries in a range of 
scholastic fields. These figures constitute a kind of critical armoury and, I 
shall try to show, each essentially follows the same pattern as was evident 
in Bakhtin's critical philosophy. Bakhtin proceeds from his sense of the 
relational, concedes, or rather insists upon, the irreducible multiplicity of 
possibilities, and then mediates between these possibilities and the need 
theoretically to limit them through one or another dialogic figure. Most 
importantly, perhaps, this is clear in Bakhtin's philosophy of language. 
For Bakhtin, language, like being (indeed, very like being), is rel_ational, 
and the nature of that relationship is, like answerability, dialogic. 
Bakhtin's analysis of language aims to unite the idea of language with the 
function of language. That is, the instance of language which he takes as 
the focus of his analysis is language in action, speakers in dialogue. 
Bakhtin develops what has been called meta- or trans-linguistics which is 
the analysis of language conceived as a dialogue.45 In his monograph on 
Dostoevsky, Bakhtin makes clear his sense of the difference between 
linguistics and his own approach: 
... we have in mind discourse, that is, language in its 
concrete living totality, and not language as the 
specific object of linguistics ... 
For what matters here is not the mere presence of 
specific language styles, social dialects, and so forth, a 
presence established by purely linguistic criteria; what 
matters is the dialogic angle at which these styles and 
dialects are juxtaposed or counterposed in the work. 
Yet this dialogic angle is precisely what cannot be 
measured by purely linguistic criteria, because dialogic 
relationships, although belonging to the realm of the 
45 As well as the general introductions cited above, there are several detailed analyses of 
Bakhtin's theory of language; see Susan Stewart, "Shouts in the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-
Linguistics" in Morson ed., Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work; Holquist, 




word, do not belong to the realm of its purely 
linguistic study. 
Dialogic relationships ... are the subject of 
metalinguis tics. 46 
In conce1v1ng language as dialogue, and developing a method for the 
study of dialogue, Bakhtin's attention is once again drawn to the 
relational. Furthermore, Bakhtin's preoccupation with axiology and 
individual differences, once again, emerges very strongly. Bakhtin 
characterizes the word - or discourse47 - as an "ideological sign," by which 
he means that a word comes forth from its social position, carrying with it 
a particular set of social relations.48 Given that the word is social-
ideological, Bakhtin/Volosinov says, existing linguistic approaches are 
inadequate, and he sets out articulating his theory of metalinguistics. 
Metalinguistics, we can say, is a discipline which mediates between the 
need to understand language, and the infinite multiplicity of language 
situations. Again, Bakhtin's method is to proceed from a sense of 
multiplicity and differences towards theoretical figures which allow this 
multiplicity to be preserved within a unified concept. In the philosophy of 
language, the key figure is the utterance.49 
Bakhtin distinguishes metalinguistics from other philosophical 
approaches to language by identifying the verbal unit, the utterance, as a 
social phenomenon. For Bakhtin, language is only language when it is 
embodied in a dialogue; it cannot be reduced either to a "system of 
normatively identical forms" or to the "individual psychological or 
psychophysiological conditions of the speaker"(MPL, p.65).50 A philosophy 
46Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp.181-182. All future references to this 
volume (hereafter PDP) will be given in the text. 
47The Russian word slovo means both "word" and "discourse", allowing Bakhtin to utilize 
the greater resonances of this more charged word to make his case for a relational theory of 
language. 
48See V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, pp.11-12. References to 
this work (hereafter MPL) will be included in the text. 
49The monograph Marxism and the Philosophy of Language deals in some detail with the 
idea of the utterance but the most complete articulation of the importance of the utterance 
as a "real unit" of language is in "The Problem of Speech Genres" (1952-53) in M.M Bakhtin, 
Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Quotations from essays contained in this volume will 
be referred to with the abbreviation SG, and will be included in the text. 
50See MPL, pp.65ff. and passim. This, according to Volosinov /Bakhtin, is the failing of 
"abstract objectivism" of which the Saussurean privileging of langue over parole is a 
pointed example. 
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of language based upon the utterance, however, avoids these 
shortcomings: "[t]he utterance is a social phenomenon"(MPL, p.82).51 
The utterance, as a dialogic figure, again evinces Bakhtin's mediation 
between the one and the many. Splitting the utterance into what he calls 
"theme" and "meaning," Bakhtin implies that the utterance is, at once, 
stable and universal (the meaning) and specific, contextual, individual 
(the theme)52 • In the figure of the speech genre, Bakhtin further develops 
this mediation, identifying particular ways in which the radical 
unrepeatability of the utterance is stabilized by communicative 
conventions.53 
The utterance, speech genres, and the idea of metalinguistics ( trans-
linguistics ), then, can be understood as examples of, and as the study of, 
the dialogics of language, just as answerability was both a way of being and 
a description of being. The figures of the utterance and speech genres 
incorporate the experiential, relational basis of all Bakhtin's theory, even 
as they constitute philosophical categories within which all individual 
utterances can be grouped. But, again, these categories do not efface or 
destroy the individuality of the experience of and participation in 
language. In metalinguistics, we see another way in which Bakhtin, in a 
sense, revises not merely existing standards, but the very idea of a standard 
by which to measure philosophical inquiry. 
This "revision" of standards points towards another important feature of 
Bakhtin's critical method. As we have seen, philosophically Bakhtin takes 
his material to be various kinds of human activity, presupposing a kind of 
social basis for all his inquiries. Indeed, insofar as Bakhtin's work is 
po\e""'-;cct \, he is concerned to reassert as social activities, such as cognition 
itself, which had been abstracted from experience. We have seen that 
dialogics, proceeding from this fundamental apprehension, requires a 
different epistemology, a different linguistics. Generally, Bakhtin's theory 
requires a revision of its field of inquiry; it must study humanity in 
practice. 
51This is the tendency of "individual subjectivism" to characterize language as the mere 
expression of individual experience, which is incompatible with Bakhtin's view that 
experience can never be entirely individual. 
52 See MPL, pp.100 ff. 
53See "The Problem of Speech Genres". 
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Dialogics, then, concerns the specifically human sciences, recalling his 
emphasis on the specifically human basis of architectonics. Like Dilthey 
before him, and many others since, Bakhtin draws a sharp distinction 
between the human sciences, with which he is concerned, and the natural 
sciences. 54 Where Bakhtin advances his thought according to this 
distinction, dialogics can be understood as a hermeneutics. And the 
material of hermeneutic inquiry, of course, is textual. Bakhtin, like many 
other theorists whose work proceeds from an analysis of language, asserts 
that social activity, with which he is concerned, is fundamentally textual. 
Bakhtin's exposition of what he calls "the problem of the text", makes 
clear that text, or textuality, is another dialogic figure. Bakhtin's sense of a 
"text" must be understood within the context of his general critical 
method and his sense of the dialogic construction of human reality. Like, 
for example, Derrida, Bakhtin asserts that everything is textual. But where 
Derrida claims that there is no "outside-text" - with which Bakhtin would 
agree - such an assertion takes its place alongside Derrida's conception of 
writing as the space of illimitable differences.55 Bakhtin, on the other 
hand, understands the text as dialogic, as containing differences within 
unity. The play of difference evoked by the notion of radical ecriture must 
be distinguished from the relations of dialogue and answerability 
suggested by Bakhtin. 
Bakhtin' s unfinished essay on the problem of the text sets out both his 
apprehension of textuality and his conception of the human sciences: 
The text (written and oral) is the primary given of all 
... thought in the human sciences and philosophy in 
general (including theological and philosophical 
thought at their sources). The text is the unmediated 
54The obvious parallels are, of course, with Gadamer, whose Truth and Method is 
predicated on just such a distinction, and with Dilthey, which parallels are discussed by 
Todorov; see Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, chapter two, "Epistemology of 
the Human Sciences." It would, }:lowever, be erroneous to suggest that the distinction is 
absolute. Holquist, for example, discusses Bakhtin's interest in science, and the 
relationship between dialogism and various developments in physics - particularly those 
advanced by Einstein - and in biology; see Holquist, Dialogism, pp.20-21. 
55For an analysis of possible comparisons and contrasts between Derrida and Bakhtin, see 
Michael Holquist, "The Surd Heard: Bakhtin and Derrida" in Gary Saul Morson ed., 
Literature and History: Theoretical Problems and Russian Case Studies (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1986). 
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reality (reality of thought and experience), the only 
one from which these disciplines and this thought 
can emerge.(SG, p.103) 
The primacy of the text, Bakhtin says, necessitates a method which 
apprehends human reality as textual: 
The human sciences are about man and his specific 
nature, and not about a voiceless thing or natural 
phenomenon. Man in his specific human nature 
always expresses himself (speaks), that is, he creates a 
text (if only potential). When man is studied outside a 
text and independent of it, the science is no longer 
one of the human sciences (human anatomy, 
physiology, and so forth) ... 
The human act is a potential text and can be 
understood (as a human act and not a physical action) 
only in the dialogic context of its time (as a rejoinder, 
as a semantic position, as a system of motives).(SG, 
p.107) 
Bakhtin's assertions may seem like another version of "the world is a 
text," especially when his extended sense of text - "any coherent complex 
of signs"(SG, p.103) - is considered. Additionally, his emphasis on 
understanding, or comprehension, over against explanation56 , resembles 
the Diltheyan hermeneutic project to revise the very idea of knowledge in 
the human sciences. But the text, or, rather, Bakhtin's idea of the text, like 
all dialogic figures, indeed like all dialogue and discourse, comprises both 
multiplicity and specificity. The text, Bakhtin says, is an utterance, not a 
thing, and like all utterances, it is at once individual and trans-individual. 
Bakhtin's text has, in his terms, two poles. The first is the language system 
which generates the meaning of the utterance; the second ·is the unique 
performance of the utterance, which generates its concrete, practical 
theme. This simultaneous duality of the text is well-noted by Bakhtin: 
And so behind each text stands a language system. 
Everything in the text that is repeated and reproduced, 
everything repeatable and reproducible, everything 
that can be given outside a given text (the given) 
conforms to this language system. But at the same 
time each text (as an utterance) is individual, unique, 
and unrepeatable ... (SG, p.105) 
56See, for example, SG p.111, where Bakhtin says that explanation cannot be dialogic, 
whereas understanding is always dialogic. 
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A dialogic approach to the text, according to Bakhtin, must negotiate 
between these two poles, must preserve the individuality of any text, as 
well as appreciate its more stable qualities; generic boundaries, language 
systems, grammar, syntax, and so forth. 
Bakhtin works in many different fields of inquiry and develops a series of 
figures which he uses to focus his thoughts in each field. In a sense, 
Bakhtin devises a kind of critical lexicon, developing, adapting, and 
inventing terms, such as text, chronotope, architectonics, and so forth, 
which express the ambivalence and complexities of his ideas. In so doing, 
Bakhtin can be understood as having left behind not a doctrine but rather 
a series of meditations upon a well-known problem. In this short analysis 
of some of Bakhtin's most common figures, I have tried to show that these 
meditations follow a common pattern. On the one hand, Bakhtin 
perceives, feels, and hears the infinite possibilities of Being. On the other, 
he is unwilling, indeed unable, to resign Being to absolute relativism. He 
is deeply skeptical of what he calls theoreticism, favouring an immersion 
in the practical world, but in many ways Bakhtin's project is to arrive at a 
theoretical description of that world. These contrapuntal inclinations filter 
through into each dialogic figure, each of which similarly tries to 
represent, simultaneously, the one and the many. 
I have not yet discussed Bakhtin's literary theory in any detail, except to 
have noted his turn to literature as a kind of model for his thought. 
Literature, however, is particularly important: firstly, the present study is 
about literature, and, secondly, Bakhtin's thought, as we have seen, 
fundamentally revolves around literature. But literature is a special case, 
both for Bakhtin and for this inquiry. With the sense of dialogue outlined 
above in place, it is now possible to turn more directly to Bakhtin's literary 
theory, and to the possibility of a dialogic theory of realistic representation. 
( d) The special case of literature: Bakhtin and the novel 
The importance of literature for Bakhtin cannot be overemphasized. 
Throughout his investigations he turned to literature and to writers to 
substantiate his claims regarding the dialogic quality of Being. In Bakhtin' s 
early philosophical work literature is a kind of paradigm for being. 
183 
Concerned with relations between self and other, Bakhtin turns to the 
relationship between an author and a hero as an exemplary case of the way 
in which dialogic perception reaches some sort of objective stability. 
Holquist discusses the correlation between literature and dialogic Being, 
suggesting that literature, or rather literary authorship, is analogous to 
participation in answerable interhuman relations: 
literature is important because it gives the most 
rigorous on-the-job training for a work we must all as 
men do, the work of answering and authoring the text 
of our social and physical universe.57 
The transgredient position of the author with regard to the hero, indeed to 
the whole work of literature, makes possible an analysis of the problems of 
relations between self and other. The various ways in which literature is 
determined by the author's consciousness elucidate various ways of 
constructing - architectonically - the relationship between humans. We 
can see, then, that Bakhtin conceives of aesthetics as constructive activity, 
and, as such, as a particularly condensed example of dialogic architectonics. 
In this, especially when he writes of "aesthetic self-activity"(AA, p.41), 
Bakhtin' s ideas seem to resemble similar ideas proposed by Michel 
Foucault58 • But where Foucault's sense of aesthetic self-creation proceeds 
from a kind of ethos of resistance to the agglomeration of social forces at 
work on one's subjectivity, Bakhtin is, as always, concerned to come to 
terms both with the fragmentary and the whole. It is the prima facie 
"wholeness" of literature which prompts Bakhtin' s investigation: 
What makes a reaction specifically aesthetic is 
precisely the fact that it is a reaction to the whole of 
the hero as a human being, a reaction that assembles 
all of the cognitive-ethical determinations and 
valuations of the hero and consummates them in the 
form of a unitary and unique whole that is a concrete, 
intuitable whole, but also a whole of meaning.(AA, 
p.5) 
A reaction to the world is, according to Bakhtin, a similar process of 
consummation and determination. But these wholes, the hero, the world, 
57Holquist, "Answering as Authoring", p.318. 
580n similarities between Bakhtin and Foucault, see David Patterson, Literature and 
Spirit: Essays on Bakhtin and his Contemporaries (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1988). 
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are wholes of meaning, and meaning, as we have seen, is constructed. Or, 
rather, it is dialogic, its unity proceeds from its multiplicity. 
But beyond conflating Being with aesthetics, Bakhtin also investigated 
aesthetic production itself, an aspect of his scholarship which, as well as 
advancing his general philosophical claims, also contributed certain 
dialogic figures to literary theory. These are the ideas of polyphony, 
heteroglossia, the chronotope, and the novel. It is in his long monograph 
on Dostoevsky where Bakhtin begins to set out both his literary 
preferences and the philosophical basis of these preferences. 
Dostoevsky's importance is immediately clear. Bakhtin attributes to 
Dostoevsky the creation of "a completely new type of artistic thinking ... 
provisionally called polyphonic" (PDP, p.3). For Bakhtin, the idea of 
polyphony means the presence, within a text, of fully realized voices. 
Which is to say, recalling the idea of aesthetic consummation discussed 
above, that the author allows each semantic centre of consciousness fully 
to develop without objectifying it. Generally, what Bakhtin is saying is that 
Dostoevsky allows his heroes a life of their own, but there is more to this 
than merely a preference for "rounded" over "flat" characters in a novel. It 
is rather, Bakhtin says, that by sacrificing semantic authority, Dostoevsky 
achieves a dialogic orientation to the world, an orientation which refrains 
from objectifying the world or overprivileging one's own semantic 
position: 
what unfolds before Dostoevsky is not a world of 
objects, illuminated and ordered by his monologic 
thought, but a world of consciousnesses mutually 
illuminating one another, a world of yoked-together 
semantic human orientations.(PDP, p.97) 
In sum, Bakhtin attributes to Dostoevsky a dialogic approach to the world 
which then takes shape in, or rather gives shape to, his poetic, or, as 
Morson and Emerson suggest, his prosaic, forms. What Bakhtin calls 
Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel embodies a dialogue of voices, each of 
which, according to Bakhtin' s philosophy of language, calls forth a 
particular semantic position. This dialogue is, Bakhtin says, unfinalizable, 
representing a view of the world which is similarly contingent and 




"Reality in its entirety," Dostoevsky himself wrote, "is 
not to be exhausted by what is immediately at hand, 
for an overwhelming part of this reality is contained 
in the form of a still latent, unuttered future 
Word."(PDP, p.90) 
But alongside Dostoevsky's appreciation of and respect for different 
semantic positions and alongside the double-voicedness of Dostoevsky's 
discourse, we can again see Bakhtin's attempts to theorize these conditions 
of plurality. The very figure of polyphony itself embraces this duality 
within Bakhtin's thought: 
The essence of polyphony lies precisely in the fact that 
the voices remain independent and, as such, are 
combined in a unity of a higher order than in 
homophony.(PDP, p.21) 
Polyphony and dialogic discourse - which, incidentally can exist in the 
very smallest utterance, a single word59 - then, are ideas which encompass 
the infinite differences which are possible in human reality. As the above 
quote suggests, polyphony is a unity, but a special kind of unity which 
embraces multiplicity. Bakhtin, despite his rigorous and relentless critique 
of monologue, of oppressive discourses, and of too-quickly arrived at 
definitions, is nonetheless concerned with unity and with truth. But the 
kind of truth which he learns from Dostoevsky, like all dialogic ideas, "can 
only be the subject of a living vision, not of abstract understanding"(PDP, 
p.153). 
Dialogic aesthetics - of which Dostoevsky, according to Bakhtin, is among 
the most influential representatives - also find strong expression in 
Bakhtin' s theory of the novel. Indeed, the novel emerges as one of 
Bakhtin's most important theoretical categories, reinforcing the 
correlation between literature and Being in Bakhtin' s thought. Like 
Lukacs, Bakhtin seized upon the novel as the occasion for philosophical 
investigation, but where Lukacs placed the novel in a dialectical historical 
context, Bakhtin seems to value "novelness" as a literary-philosophical 
quality which corresponds to a dialogic philosophy.60 
59See PDP, p.184. For a more detailed exposition, see MPL, p.103. 
60The relationship between Lukacs' theory of the novel and Bakhtin's has, of course, been 
commented on by many critics. See, for example, Michel Aucouturier, "The Theory of the 




The novel, as Bakhtin describes it, has a very close relationship with the 
dialogic nature of reality which he is so keen to reveal: 
The novel is not merely one genre among other 
genres. Among genres long since completed and in 
part already dead, the novel is the only developing 
genre. It is the only genre that was born and 
nourished in a new era of world history and therefore 
it is deeply akin to that era ... 61 
The novel, according to Bakhtin, is a genre of unfinalizability, which 
concords with a dialogic epistemology which, while utilizing permanent 
categories, is similarly inconclusive. Bakhtin, then, argues that there is a 
correspondence between the literary historical emergence of the novel as a 
genre, and the development of polyglot societies. Such an idea is very 
similar to Lukacs' contrast between the epic and the novel, and Auerbach's 
history of what he (Auerbach) called the separation of styles. But Bakhtin, 
as I have said, is interested in novelness, which is not to be identified in 
novels as such, but in particular aesthetic attitudes and forms. As he traces 
the history of polyglossia Bakhtin seems once again to be identifying 
aesthetic tendencies to implement the kind of tensile, contingent unity 
which characterizes his own dialogic figures. This is the importance of the 
novel for Bakhtin: it is the literary form which best represents his own 
theoretical and philosophical concern to come up with figures and forms 
which reconcile multiplicity and unity. 
from Pushkin to Pasternak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Holquist, Dialogism, 
pp.73££.; Ken Hirschkop, Introduction: Bakhtin and cultural theory" in Ken Hirshkop and 
David Shepherd eds., Bakhtin and Cultural Theory , p.33; Graham Pechey, "On the 
borders of Bakhtin: dialogisation, decolonisation" in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, p.55-
57. 
The general view of the similarities between Bakhtin and Lukacs is that while both saw 
the novel as a philosophically important genre, they differed fundamentally insofar as 
Lukacs lamented the loss of spiritual unity which the novel heralded while Bakhtin 
embraced the resulting possibilities of difference and dialogue; see Clark and Holquist, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, p.288. According to Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin had begun a translation 
of Lukacs' Theory in 1924 and Bakhtin's theory of the novel is an implicit response not only 
to The Theory of the Novel but also to official theories of the novel which were largely 
guided by the now-Marxist Lukacs who, resident in Moscow during the 1930s, was extremely 
influential in Soviet literary studies; see Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.271. 
61 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p.4. Hereafter DI, with page references included in 
the text. 
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In "Discourse in the Novel" Bakhtin introduces the figure of heteroglossia 
to advance his theory of the novel. Heteroglossia - which obviously has 
much in common with polyglossia - is essentially a social phenomenon. 
Speech types, which correspond to various social conventions, are 
commingled in the novel, and the essence of the novel is that these 
speech types, each of which represents a verbal-ideological world-view, is, 
by virtue of being placed into a dialogic context with other world-views, 
stripped of its unitary privilege. In other words, the truth claim of any 
particular view in a novel is undermined. Bakhtin describes literary 
history as a dialogue between literary forms which suppress the 
possibilities of this kind of dialogue and those which emerge from it. Like 
Auerbach's, Bakhtin' s criteria for distinguishing between these two lines 
of development are stylistic. Bakhtin identifies various stylistic forms 
which introduce heteroglossia, including the speech of characters, the 
incorporation of other generic forms, and particular character types. The 
specifics of these stylistic techniques are less important than Bakhtin' s 
conviction that heteroglossia, which dialogizes the novel, is the generic 
task of the novel. Heteroglossia is not only the defining characteristic of 
the novel, it is the philosophical responsibility of the novel. 
The heteroglot novel, then, is the most complete aesthetic expression of 
dialogic philosophy, and a tension between the one and the many is once 
again evident. Bakhtin's sense of multiplicity, and of the philosophical 
importance of respecting multiplicity, is clear: 
The novel is the expression of a Galilean perception 
of language, one that denies the absolutism of a single 
and unitary language - that is, that refuses to 
acknowledge its own language as the sole verbal and 
semantic center of the ideological world. It is a 
perception that has been made conscious of the vast 
plenitude of national and, more to the point, social 
languages - all of which are equally capable of being 
"languages of truth," but, since such is the case, all of 
which are equally relative, reified and limited, as they 
are merely the language of social groups, professions 
and other cross-sections of everyday life.(DJ, p.367) 
The novel, then, takes its place in Bakhtin's critical lexicon as an extension 
of the utterance. As an utterance, it makes certain claims, but as a dialogic 
form, it simultaneously reveals the limits of these claims. It is, Bakhtin 
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says, fundamentally "auto-critical." 'But the apprehension of multiplicity . 
which characterizes heteroglossia, and dialogism in general, is not a 
resignation to multiplicity. Once again Bakhtin seems to have in mind a 
kind of arduous mediation between the one and the many: 
Languages of heteroglossia, like mirrors that face each 
other, each reflecting in its own way a piece, a tiny 
corner of the world, force us to guess and to grasp for a 
world behind their mutually reflecting aspects that is 
broader, more multi-leveled, containing more and 
varied horizons than would be available to a single 
language or a single mirror.(DI, pp.414-415, emph. 
mine) 
Here we see Bakhtin's demand that we not only get beyond our own 
unitary language and perception but that we try to contemplate the whole 
range of the dialogue; ourselves, the others, and the unity of ourselves 
and others. Indeed, the novel, deriving from an apprehension of 
inconclusiveness, displays a demand for formal closure which is, 
according to Bakhtin, evidence of the novel's inconclusiveness: 
The absence of internal conclusiveness and 
exhaustiveness creates a sharp increase in demands 
for an external and formal completedness and 
exhaustiveness, especially in regard to plot line. The 
problems of a beginning, an end, and "fullness" of 
plot are posed anew.(DI, p.31) 
Once again, the contrapuntal tendencies of dialogic thought are evident; 
the demand for closure springs from a sense of openness. 
The characterization of the novel as dialogic does not, however, mean that 
all novels are necessarily dialogic. As we have seen, Bakhtin is ready to 
characterize as novels forms and works which are not usually so 
understood. Rather, Bakhtin's idea of the novel can be understood as an 
aesthetic consolidation of Bakhtin's philosophical principles which can 
occur in a variety of literary forms. The novel, then, is a form which 
embodies a complex tension between the unifying and diversifying 
impulses which characterize all dialogic thought. 
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( e) Dialogics and the problem of realism 
The ambition of the realistic novel - to represent a section of social and 
historical reality - poses, I suggest, an interesting problem for dialogic 
thought. Bakhtin's simultaneous concern with multiplicity and unity 
suggests a kind of paradoxical approach to realism. Bakhtin' s embrace of 
differences would seem to be antithetical to realism's claim to 
verisimilitude. Certainly his theory of carnival would suggest that this . 
might be the case, as would the emphasis on the interiority of the hero 
and on parody and satire as means of introducing heteroglossia into the 
novel. Indeed, at one point Bakhtin says as much: 
Realism frequently reifies man, but this is not an 
approach to him. Naturalism, with its tendency 
towards a causal explanation of man's acts and 
thoughts (his semantic position in the world) reifies 
man even more.(SG, p.112) 
Clearly, Bakhtin is opposed to reductive accounts of Being. His approach is 
relentlessly critical, always concerned to undermine the self-evidence and 
self-sufficiency of scholastic approaches, of philosophical propositions, and 
of representations. 
However, as we have seen, each of Bakhtin's theoretical figures is a device 
which allows him to contemplate the unity of the differences which he 
perceives, or rather hears. Furthermore, Bakhtin also holds to a view of 
the novel as ineluctably tied to social reality. Among what he calls the 
basic characteristics of the novel, Bakhtin includes the capacity of the 
novel to make contact with reality when he speaks of 
the new zone opened by the novel for structuring 
literary images, namely, the zone of maximal contact 
with the present (with contemporary reality) in all its 
openendedness.(DI, p.11) 
Again, Bakhtin's dialogic approach straddles these seemingly exclusive 
tendencies. The novel, as Bakhtin understands it, is representational but, 
at the same time, it abdicates the authority of its own representational 
properties. This is argued by Ann Jefferson who suggests that dialogism is 
interdependent with what she calls the "will to reference" in Bakhtin's 
theory of discourse, locating Bakhtin somewhere between the theories 
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advanced by Ian Watt on the one hand, and Roland Barthes, on the other. 
She concludes by claiming that dialogism is a productive advance upon 
theoretical discussions of realism and referentiality: 
Dialogism and the concept of a will to reference might 
offer ways of linking the post-modernist text to the 
real from which its own theoretical polemic has 
severed it; but, equally, the reassessment of 
referentiality opens the way to more problematising 
and radical readings of realist texts but without 
necessarily destroying the mimesis which has always 
tied them to the real. 62 
My argument is in agreement with Jefferson on this. Bakhtin's reluctance 
to resign heteroglossia to absolute relativism does suggest a strong 
interrelationship between reference and dialogism. Moreover, what 
Jefferson calls reference - the relationship between an utterance and an 
object - to which we might add all sorts of ideas with which Bakhtin is 
concerned - perception, meaning, representation - is, in Bakhtin's schema, 
unavoidable. As we have seen, for Bakhtin, any form of disembodied 
knowledge is no form of knowledge at all. We are bound to understand 
things from our point of view simply because point of view, as a cognitive 
limit, is not merely a means of comprehension but is comprehension 
itself. In articulating his various theories of dialogue, Bakhtin is not 
dispensing with reference, but rather revising its conditions and 
emphasizing its limitations. The theoretical achievement of dialogics is to 
reconcile determinate, practical knowledge with its own shortcomings. 
We can understand realistic representation, then, as a special kind of 
utterance. Or, rather, representation can be developed as another dialogic 
figure. In representation we have a statement to the effect that this or that 
novel is a realistic representation of this or that social and historical 
reality. Like all utterances, however, the realistic novel is riven with its 
own internal dialogic relationships, and the reality which it purports to 
represent is also, Bakhtin would say, dialogically charged: 
Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the 
object at which it was directed already as it were 
overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged 
62 Ann Jefferson, "Realism Reconsidered: Bakhtin's Dialogism and the "Will to Reference" 
Australian Journal of French Studies ,23, 2 (1986), p.183. 
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with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -
or, on the contrary, by the "light" of alien words that 
have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, 
shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, 
alien value judgments and accents. The word, 
directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated 
and tension-filled environment ... (DI, p.276) 
None of this, however, displaces the representational validity of a novel, 
it merely deprivileges or qualifies it. Indeed, the realization of the 
heteroglot nature of a novel is dependent upon its representational 
validity because, without the reader assuming a concrete position, the 
dialogue has nowhere to begin. 
Of particular importance to a dialogic theory of realistic representation is 
Bakhtin's figure of the chronotope, through which he charts the spatial 
and temporal representations of literature. Bakhtin's preoccupation with 
time and space - which reveals his Kantian heritage - again follows the 
general pattern of dialogic thought. Time and space are, at once, 
permanent philosophical categories and singular, unrepeatable moments 
of experience. To reconcile these two senses of time and space, Bakhtin 
develops the idea of the chronotope, which is a shifting63 category of time-
space organization in literature. 
The surviving fragment of what was to have been a history of realism 
provides a demonstration of Bakhtin's method of chronotopical analysis.64 
Predominantly concerned with Goethe, Bakhtin proposes a typology of 
subgenres of the novel, to be distinguished by their integration of time and 
space. Identifying different time-space patterns Bakhtin discusses what he 
calls the travel novel, the novel of ordeal and the biographical novel, 
measuring their time-space organization against his understanding of real 
historical time. His analysis of these literary types is similar to Auerbach's, 
whose analysis, as we have seen, proceeds from a similar distinction 
between the Homeric and Biblical modes of representation. 
Bakhtin' s "historical typology" reaches an important point when he comes 
to analyse the Bildungsroman. The importance of the representational 
63"Shifting" is used here in the sense discussed above in relation to the "I"; see footnote 41 
above. 
64See Holquist, "Introduction", in Speech Genres, p.xiii and p.xxii, n.8. 
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practices of this mode - the fragment is titled "The Bildungsroman and its 
Significance in the Development of Realism" - is clear from the way in 
which Bakhtin introduces what he calls the "problem" of the 
Bildungsroman: 
The main theme of our essay is the time-space and 
the image of man in the novel. Our criterion is the 
assimilation of real historical time and the 
assimilation of historical man that takes place in that 
time. This problem is mainly theoretical and literary 
in nature, but no theoretical problem can be resolved 
without concrete historical material. Moreover, this 
problem as such is too broad, and it must be delimited 
somewhat in both its theoretical and historical 
aspects. Hence our more specific and special theme -
the image of man in the process of becoming in the 
novel.(SG, p.19) 
Bakhtin's terminology here recalls the Hegelian influences in Auerbach 
and Lukacs. The idea of becoming, to which Bakhtin returns several times, 
implies a historicist epistemology which, rather than seeing the nature of 
human being and the relationship between humans and the world as 
static understands them as fundamentally historical. Bakhtin explores this 
mode of representation in Goethe's "novels of apprenticeship" arguing 
that the "type" of novel represented by Goethe represents heroes within 
their historicity: 
He emerges along with the world and he reflects the 
historical emergence of the world itself.(SG, p.23)65 
65The Bildungsroman and many of the other genres discussed by Bakhtin involve, of course, 
hero figures, and Bakhtin focuses a great deal of attention on the hero, in this essay, and in 
many others, most notably "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity", which appears in Art 
and Answerability. This feature of Bakhtin's work derives, perhaps, from his critical 
expertise and preferences. Ancient literature is predominantly heroic, and the works of 
Goethe, Dickens and Dostoevsky - some of the modem authors discussed by Bakhtin - often 
feature "heroic" figures. In making use of Bakhtin's thought, however, I have taken the 
view that singular heroes - in the Odysseus or Prince Myshkin mould - are not absolutely 
necessary and I suggest that two possible reasons for the emf ~asis on the hero may be 
adduced. The first is that the figure of the hero and the hero's activity are vehicles for the 
analysis of the assimilation of time and space. This is suggested by the essay on the 
chronotope and by the fragment of the f:>~ldo"c.µr~~ essay. The second reason, suggested 
mainly by the "Author and Hero" essay is thaf the relationship between author and hero 
is a particularly pregnant manifestation of the fundamentally relational quality of Being, 
and as such, provides material via which Bakthin can articulate his wider philosophical 
claims. 
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This analysis of realism in terms of the "essential becoming" of human 
experience suggests that dialogism is a kind of historicism. Realistic 
representation, such a theory might run, is realistic because it - as is the 
case with Goethe - assimilates real historical time and space.66 
Time and space are given more detailed treatment in another essay from 
the same period which commits very similar textual analyses to those of 
the Bildungsroman essay to the development of one of Bakhtin's most 
important theoretical figures: the chronotope. As a theoretical figure, the 
chronotope allows Bakhtin to pursue the study of time and space in 
literary works. Once again, the importance of time and space indicates 
Bakhtin's Kantian background although, as a note to the essay makes clear, 
while time and space, for Kant, were transcendental elements designed to 
get beyond the vagaries of experience, Bakhtin sought, as it were, to 
relocate time and space in experience as "forms of the most immediate 
reality"(DJ, p.85, n.2).67 
As he develops the idea of the chronotope, a number of important 
features of Bakhtin's literary theory become clear. Bakhtin's literary theory, 
as his almost exclusive interest in the novel makes obvious, is a theory of 
narrative. The narrative structure of literary texts is the occasion of his 
analysis but the complexities of narrative and the correlation between 
narrative and human experience develop what might be understood as a 
poetics into a more ambitious literary philosophy. The chronotope figures 
66See SG, p.20. Bakhtin's distinction between, on the one hand, adventure time-space and 
ordeal time-space, and, on the other, historical becoming is very similar to the criterion by 
which, in Mimesis, Auerbach distringuishes between realism and its various historical 
antitheses. Citing this Bakhtin piece, Todorov, for these reasons, points out the convergence 
of the two thinkers' work; see Todorov, The Dialogical Principle, p.77. This essay also 
reinforces some of the similarities between Bakhtin and Lukacs, particularly insofar as 
Goethe joins Dostoevsky as one of the authors through whom theoretical claims are 
advanced. 
67 As I have already mentioned,Clark and Holquist have comprehensively discussed 
Bakhtin's relationship with Kant and with Neo-Kantianism; see note 26 above. The way 
in which Bakhtin distinguishes his own sense of time and space from that of Kant might be 
understood as a general model of his assimilation of Kant's thought and Neo-Kantianism. 
Beginning with a Kantian or Neo-Kantian problem - time and space, ethics and the 
philosophical centrality of ethics, philosophy and faith - Bakhtin seemed to be 
sympathetic to the idealistic imperatives implicit in these problems but would then "stand 
Kant on his head," trying to reconcile the problems without resorting to the transcendence 
of experience. Introducing Bakhtin's difficult early notes on ethics, Holquist described 
Bakhtin as attempting to "detranscendentalize Kant"; see Michael Holquist, "Foreword", 
in Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, ed. p.ix. 
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prominently in this aspect of Bakhtin's thought. The original material on 
the chronotope offers this definition: 
In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and 
temporal indicators are fused into one carefully 
thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, 
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; 
likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the 
movements of time, plot and history. This 
intersection of axes and fusion of indicators 
characterizes the artistic chronotope.(DI, p.84) 
It is through the chronotope, then, that the narrative is developed. 
Bakhtin identifies various historical manifestations of time-space 
organization; adventure chronotopes, biographical chronotopes, the 
chronotope of the family. Bakhtin's discussion is wide-ranging, not only 
in its broad range of references, but also conceptually. Chronotopes seem, 
at times, to be typical plots, such as the adventure or ordeal tale. At other 
times they are social units, such as the family, or events, such as the ritual 
funeral known as an encomium. At still others, characters seem to serve 
as chronotopic devices; servants, rogues, and thieves, who highlight the 
division of space into public and private spheres. 
As Bakhtin's historical typology continues, he comes to what we might 
understand as more sophisticated chronotopes. The complexities of the 
chronotopes which Bakhtin identifies in Rabelais', and the image of the 
carnival, are discussed in detail, Bakhtin arguing that the increasing 
potential for instability bespeaks a greater assimilation of actual diversities 
in existence. In the conclusion, written in 1973, Bakhtin identifies several 
chronotopes with more exactitude than is evident in the earlier part of 
this essay. Discussing several nineteenth-century novelists, Bakhtin 
suggests that roads, castles, parlours and salons, towns and, more 
abstractly, thresholds, serve as literary devices which shape the narrative. 
More importantly, these chronotopes organize the narrative because they 
are real chronotopes, real figures within which social and historical reality 
takes shape. 
Bakhtin emphasizes the representational significance of the chronotope 
towards the end of the essay: 
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They are the organizing centers for the fundamental 
narrative events of the novel. The chronotope is the 
place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied. 
It can be said without qualification that to them 
belongs the meaning that shapes narrative. 
We cannot help but be strongly impressed by the 
representational importance of the chronotope. Time 
becomes, in effect, palpable and visible, the 
chronotope makes narrative events concrete, makes 
them take on flesh, ca uses blood to flow in their 
veins.(DJ, p.250) 
Chronotopes, then, might be understood as the hubs of the narrative, and 
the complexity of these hubs, the extent to which they represent real time-
space organization might then be advanced into a chronotopic theory of 
realistic representation. The chronotope doesn't suggest an empirical 
correspondence between the world and the text, nor does it simplify or 
naturalize the textuality of literature. Rather, it represents reality as 
similarly chronotopic, and the increasing assimilation of historical time 
through literary chronotopes increases the verisimilitude of the literary 
text. 
The essay on the Bildungsroman and parts of the essay on the chronotope 
seem to work towards just such a theory of realistic representation. 
Bakhtin asserts the non-identity of the real world and the represented 
world. Readers and authors, he says: 
are all located in a real, unitary and as yet incomplete 
historical world set off by a sharp categorical boundary 
from the represented world in the text.(DJ, p.253) 
But these worlds, too, are chronotopic, which makes possible a dialogue 
between chronotopes: 
Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which 
serve as the source of representation) emerge the 
reflected and created chronotopes of the world 
represented in the work (in the text).(DJ, p.253) 
Representation, then, is a dialogue between the chronotopic situation of 
the reader, and the chronotopes of the text, a formulation which, again, 
parallels the historicism of Lukacs and Auerbach which attributes the 
representational properties of a text to the extent that they assimilate the 
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essentially historical nature of reality. Bakhtin claims that this kind of 
representational relationship - a dialogue of chronotopes - makes possible 
a theory of realism which avoids basing itself upon a simple 
correspondence: 
As we have already said, there is a sharp and 
categorical boundary line between the actual world as 
a source of representation and the world represented 
in the work. We must never forget this, we must 
never confuse - as has been done up to now and as is 
still often done - the rep resented world with the 
world outside the text (naive realism) ... But it is also 
impermissible to take this categorical boundary line as 
something absolute and impermeable ... (DI, p.253) 
The inherent tension of dialogic literary theory in general and the 
chronotope in particular is very evident in these passages. A simple 
correspondence between the represented world and the actual world is 
ruled out, because it fails to take account of the different realms, and acts, 
essentially, to close the real world. But at the same time, Bakhtin has once 
again used aesthetics as a kind of model for a general philosophical claim, 
which means that while the represented and real worlds must not be 
identified with one another, they are still conceptually parallel. 
The chronotopes of the text, because of their peculiarly concentrated form, 
highlight the quasi-narrative qualities of the real world. Because the 
reader is necessarily outside the chronotopes of the text their status as 
organizing principles is more easily appreciated. They can act, then, as a 
conceptual tool which, by alerting readers to the importance of time-space 
organization, reveals the similarly chronotopic organization which makes 
the real world concrete. This is a typically Bakhtinian use of aesthetics to 
bring a philosophical issue into high relief, a manoeuvre which recalls a 
similar turn to aesthetics in his earlier work. 
To facilitate this interaction between the real and created chronotopes, 
Bakhtin suggests another chronotope, a creative chronotope within which 
the contact between the world of the text and the real world takes place, 
which makes possible a representational dialogue. In the peculiar time-
space of reading, of entering and so creating the chronotopes of the text, 
the reader bridges the gap between the explicitly chronotopic structure of 
the text and the implicitly chronotopic structure of the real world, bringing 
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the real world into the text and applying a kind of chronotopic analysis to 
the real world. The different realms, then, are interrelated, which doesn't 
simplify or reduce the relationship between them, but does bring them 
into contact with one another. 
It would, perhaps, be possible at this stage to advance what might be called 
a chronotopic theory of realism, which would perhaps have found 
expression had the monograph on realism taken its place in a fuller 
history of realism. Such a theory would suggest that realism depends upon 
the extent to which time and space were realistically assimilated in the 
chronotopes of the text; that is, the extent to which the text employed the 
same organizing principles as the social and historical world. An 
adventure hero, for example, organizes time and space in a manner which 
is patently unrealistic because it fails to take account of historical 
development. By demonstrating that concrete elements of a text - a town, 
a school, a battlefield - are not merely reflected but are important 
constructed conjunctural points, a text would represent the way in which 
social and historical reality is similarly organized through chronotopes. 
Such an approach would seem effectively to refute the suggestion that 
realistic representation relies upon impossible standards of objectivity. 
But it is clear, even from this short discussion, that the chronotope is a 
problematic idea, and the problematic nature of the chronotope might 
more profitably be considered in the development of a theory of realism 
based upon Bakhtinian thought. As Holquist points out, the chronotope is 
at once very important for Bakhtin and a very slippery concept, and part of 
the problem is that the chronotope is implicated as both a figure of 
historicity, and as a poetic figure, which, Holquist says, seems to imply an 
impossible contradiction.68 But this kind of contradiction, as we have seen, 
is a feature of all dialogic figures, and, essentially, is the motivation for all 
of Bakhtin's thought; dialogics is a theory of the one and the many. 
A dialogic analysis of realistic representation then would take account of 
both the validity of representational claims and the limits of such claims. 
As an utterance, the realistic novel is directed towards its object - reality -
but it cannot claim to be an authoritative representation. The 
68See Holquist, Dialogism, pp.108-114. The "problem," as it were, of the chronotope is 
discussed at some length within the context of the general problem of the historical and the 
poetic in Bakhtin's work. 
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verisimilitude of the representation depends not upon absolute truth nor 
upon the kind of ideological or linguistic naivety which has been 
implicated, but upon the contingent organizational means through which 
dialogics achieves a sense of unity. Historical and geographical boundaries, 
for example, are generic stabilizers which delimit human experience. The 
realistic novel achieves its verisimilitude by including discourses of 
history and geography into its heteroglot structure and by limiting its time 
and space within these generic boundaries. Thus, a novel like Gulliver's 
Travels, while representational, includes organizational figures which do 
not conform to the genres which customarily organize experience, and is 
not, therefore, realistic. At least, that is, it is not entirely realistic in the 
terms of this study. Some of the organizing features of Gulliver's Travels, 
such as the idea of government, do allow for a continuity between these 
features as chronotopes and the organization of the social and historical 
world. However, other chronotopes, such as the islands, confound the 
organization of the real world, and thus the representational significance 
of the novel is changed. 
Dialogic theory, then, takes the prima facie achievements of realistic 
representation and then looks beyond them. It complements the 
historicist theses advanced by Lukacs and by Auerbach by developing an 
approach which is based on language which contemplates a complex array 
of social situations which contribute to the tensile quality of realism. In a 
sense, while Auerbach held to Vico's extended understanding of history as 
extending to the whole of social life, Bakhtin takes up this extension with 
a vengeance. For Bakhtin, the world is a social situation, a dialogue. 
Literature, too, is a dialogue, of characters and environments, of time and 
space. In the dialogue between the two there is space for a theory of 




Towards a critical realism 
... I am always secretly aware that 
there are other things in the world 
besides me. 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
In the opening lines of War and Peace, we, as readers, are abruptly 
introduced to the world of the St Petersburg aristocracy. Anna Pavlovna, if 
not quite in mid-sentence, certainly greets Kuragin, whose arrival 
occasions our presence at these events, as if she were in the middle of an 
ongoing conversation. The matter of her speech, the spectacular rise of 
Napoleon, prefigures some of the most important events and concerns of 
the whole novel, and some of the novel's most outstanding 
representational achievements. 
As this scene gradually unfolds, the deep background to this conversation 
gradually emerges: the date is mentioned; the occasion for the meeting 
detailed; Anna Pavlovna's dedication to fashionable Petersburg habits 
alluded to; Kuragin's reserved manner described. Each of these evoke 
further depths of background: the persuasiveness, even oppressiveness, of 
social custom in the era; the transitional phase of Russian culture and 
society; the function of languages in a polyglot society; the imaginary but 
tangible demarcation between Petersburg and Moscow; the looming 
shadow of the French incursions which will touch Kuragin's family, and 
indeed the whole social structure of which he is a part. 
This opening is typically realistic: the social and historical milieu pervades 
the fictional action, and, in return, the fictional action provides a conduit 
through which readers are presented with a "picture of the age." But the 
hermeneutic structure of this seemingly very simple episode is highly 
complex, although this complexity is belied by the accessibility of the 
representational dimension of the text. 
In the first place, for example, we arrive at the scene through Kuragin's 
arrival, it is only through him that any of this becomes available. His 
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arrival and the long standing relationship between him and Anna 
Pavlovna in turn encourages her forthright references to the pressing 
questions of the day. His easy response to her unconventional greeting 
takes us then slightly outside him, allowing the narrator to reflect upon 
Kuragin and his particular situation. As readers, then, we are required to 
adopt and adapt to a variety of interpretive purviews. At first, we depend 
upon characters for access to the environment, upon Kuragin to bring us 
to Anna Pavlovna's, and upon their relationship to introduce important 
historical details. But then our dependence upon the characters recedes, 
and, rather than the prism through which the social environment is 
represented, they become features of that environment. 
The interpretive shifts which emerge upon a close analysis of a scene like 
this are often almost imperceptible, but they are vital. Reading a scene like 
this, and by extrapolation a novel like War and Peace is a dynamic 
interpretive process, initiated by a dynamic text which embodies a great 
variety of strategies and techniques . Through their complexity, these 
techniques are strong evidence of the critical and technically and 
philosophically problematic concepts which inform literary realism. I shall 
not here discuss War and Peace any further. My aim has been only to 
introduce briefly the kind of interpretive situation which is involved in 
realism, to suggest that it is a particularly concentrated amalgamation of 
some of the critical issues which preoccupy literary studies. 
More particularly, I shall try to show that this situation, and all the issues 
which it involves, are fundamentally critical. Rather than being an 
example of the wilful simplicity often attributed to literary realism, the 
opening of this novel is a good illustration of how realism is particularly 
critical. The synthesis of the reader's perspective and Kuragin's, which 
gradually gives way to a a kind of tension between his perspective and that 
of the narrator, for example, immediately introduces a kind of 
phenomenological reflection on subjectivity. We know what Kuragin 
knows, but we also know far less, and at the same time far more. Our 
experience of this short episode is so mixed as to encourage a meditation 
upon the problems and possibilities of experience. The simple categories of 
subject and object, of representational and represented, cannot adequately 
describe the subtle processes which this representation involves. 
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We might, then, in a number of senses, call this situation critical. The 
subtle irony of the narrator's description of Kuragin, for example, evinces 
one of the most salient features of most ideas of realism. This is the 
general tendency for realism to be critical, in the ordinary sense, of reality. 
In the introduction to his anthology of examples and descriptions of 
modern literary realism, G.J. Becker recounts an exchange between Gorky 
and Tolstoy in which the older man reluctantly reconciles himself to the 
representation, in the service of greater realism, of such uncomfortable 
spectacles as drunken women.1 Becker suggests that realism is motivated 
by an assumption that the kind of existence of the greatest number of 
people is the most "real," which necessitates an expansion of the subject 
matter of representation to include a range of social environments, the 
inequalities between which are then made more obvious. This, of course, 
accounts for the employment of realism by, among others, socially-
conscious and politically active writers, who used it to criticize reality by 
showing its more uncomfortable aspects; the Chicago stockyards, Victorian 
workhouses, strikes, and so forth. 2 
In this study, however, we are working with a different sense of critical 
realism, one which concerns not simply the content of a representation, or 
the social attitudes which might be adduced, but rather goes to the very 
possibility of realism in the first place. In War and Peace the realism of the 
novel depends on, among other things, the establishment of society and 
history as cornerstones of the reality towards which the text is intended. 
The realism of the novel depends upon the recognition that the regulating 
effects of society pervade and inform what the characters understand as 
reality. The emergence of this idea of reality and the ways in which it is 
represented are illustrations of the problems which ideas such as society, 
and history involve. History and society are given determinate form in 
the representational structure, but at the same time they are made 
available for critical analysis; we are able to understand history not as a 
simple series of objective facts, but as a complicated negotiation between 
different ways of understanding and characterizing human experience. 
This idea of critical realism, then, countenances a kind of ambivalence in 
the idea of realism. Indeed, this ambivalence is at the very heart of its 
1Becker, Documents of Modern Literary Realism, p.22. 
2Becker, Documents of Modern Literary Realism, p .25. 
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critical qualities. Within this idea of realism there are two contrapuntal 
interpretive possibilities. On the one hand, realism necessarily creates and 
sets out to communicate a determinate image of social and historical 
reality, suggesting that reality can be understood, can be known. On the 
other, however, this knowledge is inextricably tied to the questioning of its 
own possibility. As the determinate reality emerges, so too do the 
structures and processes which render it determinate, suggesting that 
reality can only ever be a provisional idea. To recall one of the critical 
concepts discussed above, reality is a kind of "shifter"; it is always at once 
determinate and indeterminate, concrete and abstract. 
This chapter concludes the theoretical discussion of this study. In what 
follows I shall recapitulate the various stages of my argument in order to 
reaffirm the idea of realism I have tried to develop, and the implications 
for critical theory of such an idea. I shall show how the surveys and 
analyses of various movements and developments in critical theory 
which comprise the first two parts of this study establish the propositions 
advanced in the introduction to this study. These, to recall, are the 
continued usefulness of the idea of realism in literary studies, and the 
benefits to literary theory qua theory which are made possible by the 
productive use of the concept of realism. 
(a) Anti-realism: the problem of theory in practice 
"Critical," as we have seen, means a relentless susp1c1on towards 
seemingly determinate ideas, events, or situations. To be critical means 
never to be satisfied with "the way it is." Critical theories, then, or, more 
specifically, critical literary theories seek to infuse literary criticism with 
this kind of suspicion, to take it (and perhaps literature) away from any 
structures of meaning which show traces of, variously, positivism, 
idealism, empiricism, humanism, or anything else which seems to 
countenance an essential standard according to which literature, the 
reading of literature, and the criticism of literature can be determined. 
But alongside critical theory, we have the concept of the realistic novel, 
which involves the representation of a determinate, concrete, and 
transpersonal reality; the realistic novel is a detailed account of "the way it 
is." As we have seen, critical theories of various orientations have 
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observed just this sort of connection, or, rather, break, between efforts to be 
critical and the realistic novel (or at least its realistic efficacy). Realism 
depends upon determinations of reality, conceptual and practical. The 
conceptual determination involves relying upon certain discourses as 
realistic - the historical, and geographical - and the necessary 
circumscription and selection of reality in a novel acts as a kind of practical 
determination. But determinations of all kinds - such as the determinism 
of "human nature," or the overdeterminations of ideological structures, -
are the very target of these critical theories. 
This antithesis between critical theory and realism, and between theories 
and practices which abjure realism and those which do not, is, I suggest, 
misconceived. As I have tried to show, critical theories which, either 
explicitly or implicitly, attack realism exhibit several important 
shortcomings. At times critical theory seems little more than aestheticism 
or avant-gardism, a stance which can, with some justice, itself be 
theoretically criticized as solipsistic or simply objected to as elitist. Adorno, 
for example, conflates the ideological (which serves as a target for political 
and philosophical critique) with philistinism (which implies a kind of lack 
of cultivation). The distrust of, or even contempt for, "public opinion" or 
"common sense" exhibited variously by Genette, Todorov, and Belsey are 
further examples of how the claims of literary theorists to be critical often 
run the risk of sliding into simple boasts to know better than everybody 
else. At other times, the failings of various critical theories are more 
complicated. Althusser and Derrida, for example, must confront the 
problem that their critical perspective cannot take account of that which it 
seeks to criticize without being tainted by the necessary proximity. 
These problems of theory qua theory are compounded by the frequent 
misrepresentation of realism when it is used as a conceptual target at 
which critical points are aimed. The range of theories which were 
discussed in Part I is not, by any means, homogenous. Shklovsky and 
Tomashevsky, for example, redefine art to exclude the realistic, and 
Adorno and Benjamin, similarly exclude the realistic from the artistic, 
denying it the philosophical (and supposedly political) emancipatory 
capacity they ascribe to art. This exclusion of realism on the basis of its 
supposed linguistic or philosophical positivism (for want of a better term) 
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is motivated by a new regime of absolutism, a privileging of the critic on 
the basis of her or his greater acuity. 
Realism, however, is not always excluded. Barthes, for example, makes 
very important use of realism, and his analyses, which are perhaps slightly 
tongue-in-cheek, of Flaubert and of Balzac are designed to reveal that 
realistic novels are not only realistic, and that the persistent privileging of 
the realistic over the semiotic needs to be redressed. While his rejection of 
realism is not so strident3 as Shklovsky' s or Adorno' s, Barthes is still 
implicating realism as one of a number of disingenuous and/ or hubristic 
artistic practices, which claims its representational achievements with 
little anxiety about its procedures or effects. Similarly, Macherey didn't so 
much reject the forms commonly associated with realism as propose a 
new way of understanding them which focused not upon their realism 
but the extent to which they parodied ideological production.4 
But the critical theories discussed in Part I have got it wrong, at least with 
regard to realism. It is not, I suggest, necessary for critical theory either to 
propose a different aesthetic model or to "deconstruct" realism in order for 
it to achieve or maintain its philosophical inquisitiveness and rigour. 
Indeed, the anti-realistic tendency of much twentieth-century critical 
theory has been one idea which reveals the shortcomings of these 
theories. Where a particularly reductive account of realism is used as a 
critical target, critical theory is necessarily similarly reductive, and what 
should be a dialogue becomes a simple binary opposition between, say, 
James Joyce and George Eliot. Another major shortcoming is the 
privileging of the critic, a claim somehow to have got outside the 
congeries of competing truth-claims, and found an authoritative vantage 
point. As we have seen, such manoeuvres, Althusser's anti-experiential 
anti-humanism, for example, rarely weather close scrutiny.5 It is this kind 
of critical orthodoxy which occasioned Raymond Williams' critique of 
3This is not to say that structuralism didn't have its own avant-gardism which did, Young 
Turk style, seek not merely to re-read the old guard, but to forge a new era in aesthetics. 
4At the risk of seeming to hedge my bets, I should reiterate that Macherey's theory of the 
implicit duality of all texts has been highly instructive, and I would not want my critique 
of his work to be read as an outright rejection or condemnation. 
5E.P. Thompson's long essay "The Poverty of Theory" is a particularly good illustration of 
this. At the beginning of the essay he establishes the key points of his thesis, among which 
is the charge that Althusser "has no category (or way of handling) 'experience"'; see E.P. 





critical theory, an account of which is given by Andrew Milner. According 
to Milner, Williams detects a "formalist dogmatism at work in the newly-
emerging anti-realist orthodoxies" which encourages a kind of second-
order cultural criticism at the expense of cultural production (in this case 
realistic films) itself.6 Milner goes on to suggest that Williams' critique is 
"very close to what should have been the last word on post-structuralist 
anti-realism."7 
Critical theory, then, cannot profit, or even sustain itself, by relying upon 
reductive accounts of its supposed opposites, nor by failing to turn its own 
critical eye upon itself. Fredric Jameson, as we have seen, traces a 
continuity between the anti-realism of the Frankfurt School and that of 
post-structuralism and then suggests that the Realism/Modernism debate 
of the 1930s has been reformulated in terms of a Platonic attack on 
representation. The invocation of Plato is particularly telling. Plato's 
suspicion of mimesis, of course, derived from his conviction that it was 
essentially false, a position which presupposed that he knew what was 
true. In a sense, the capacity of contemporary critics similarly to reject 
realism depends upon their faith in their own access to something like the 
truth. Critical theory, I suggest, needs a different approach, of which the 
position of the concept of realism can serve as an index. A rethinking of 
realism, then, is interdependent upon a kind of revision of critical theory 
itself. 
Of course, a re-evaluation of realism doesn't necessarily require any 
attention to theory at all, it may simply reject or deny the suspicious 
tendency of literary theory, and hold to a seemingly very simple faith in 
the representational capacity of literature. But the most productive 
accounts of realism, such as that of Auerbach, do not depend upon such 
faith. Indeed, as I shall try to show, an approach is possible which values 
realism precisely because of the extent to which it depends upon 
philosophical and literary theories which are truly critical. 
6Milner, Cultural Materialism, p.98. 
7Milner, Cultural Materialism, p.98. 
(b) Realism as theory: reality and the"way it is" 
As I tried to show at the beginning of this chapter, the hermeneutic 
situation precipitated by literary realism is particularly complicated. The 
simple situation with which War and Peace opens is, in Auerbach's great 
phrase, fraught with background, and the vagaries, problems and conflicts 
which underpin the scene constitute a vast indeterminate structure upon 
which the fragile reality of the text is based. The knowledge of reality 
which readers achieve is not, then, the kind of authoritative and 
(supposedly) objective overview presupposed by anti-realism. Rather than 
the cognitive mastery which critical theory is intended to discourage, 
realism provides an interpretive engagement with a particular idea or 
model of reality, of which readers achieve only a partial, surrogate kind of 
knowledge, limited and incomplete. 
There is more to this situation. Rather than characterizing the knowledge 
countenanced by realism as limited or partial, it might be better to speak of 
it as fictional. Rather than an experience which is authentic or truthful, 
readers achieve a kind of synthetic knowledge of reality, and the vehicle of 
that synthesis, of course, is fiction. Historical social environments, strata of 
reality, paradoxically come to the reader through the sheer artifice of 
fiction, a point which warrants careful consideration. 
In a series of relatively recent works, the three volumes of Time and 
Narrative, Paul RicCEur has investigated some of the complexities of 
representation, particularly insofar as narratives - historical and fictional -
act as a figure of temporal experience. He suggests that the experience of 
time is the organization of time into a narrative, which makes it accessible 
to human consciousness. In the course of his study, RicCEur describes what 
he calls the hermeneutic arc, which encompasses the different dimensions 
in which human action is figured: it is prefigured, understood in the first 
place; configured, rendered into tangible narrative form; and refigured, the 
configured human action being then reinterpreted specifically as human 
action. 
While RicCEur's study, as I have already mentioned, has much in 
common with my own, it is not my intention here to consider the 
reinterpretation of Augustine and Aristotle upon which he bases his 
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analysis of the "truth-claims" of fictional and historical narratives. 
Nonetheless, a brief glance at a few of his points is instructive, as it serves 
to illustrate the kind of phenomenon with which we are dealing when we 
speak of literary realism. Ricceur identifies what he calls a "triple 
mimesis"8, three narrative moments which correspond to the three stages 
of the hermeneutic process. Of these, the second, mimesis II, is particularly 
important. 
Ricceur uses mimesis II to refer to the text itself; while all experience is 
narrative, this is the actual narrative, the story set out in textual form. But 
the human experience reflected in the text is a special kind of experience: 
With mimesis II the realm of the as if opens up. One 
could say, in accord with current usage in literary 
criticism, the realm of fiction. 9 
In the second volume of the series, Ricceur amplifies his analysis of 
mimesis II, specifically with regard to fictional narratives, and begins also 
to consider the question of realism, as distinct from the concept of 
mimesis which encompasses a different range of considerations. 
Throughout, Ricceur is concerned to explore the figurative resources of all 
representational narratives insisting that these, and not some immutable 
origin, constitute the referential capacity of language.10 
Without recapitulating Ricceur's argument at any length, I want to stress 
that his theory of narrative countenances a particularly tensile 
relationship between the need for and unavoidability of interpretation 
and the concession that interpretive structures cannot claim any kind of 
universality or originary basis. Mario J. Valdes, in his introduction to an 
edited collection of Ricceur' s essays suggests that Ricceur represents a kind 
of post-structuralist alternative to deconstruction. Derrida and Ricceur 
agree, he says, that meaning is not found but made in patterns of 
reiteration and that language is ineluctably polysemic, but they disagree on 
the extent of the resulting absence of semantic order. Deconstruction sets 
8See Paul Ricceur, Temps et recit, Tome I, Paris: Seuil, 1983, p.85. 
9Ricceur, Temps et recit, I, p.101, trans. mine. 
10See Ricceur, Temps et recit, Tome II, Paris: Seuil, 1984, pp.23££. 
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itself against order of all kinds, but Ric~ur countenances a kind of creative 
or tensional order, 11 of which the as if is a particularly good example. 
The knowledge and experience of reality, the "truth" implied by the idea 
of the true-to-life, even the reality itself, which are implicit in the concept 
of the realistic novel, belong, I suggest, to this realm of the as if. Rather 
than claiming something like truth, which, if it means anything at all, 
means something which is eternal and universal, realism then claims 
only to synthesize something like a particular fictional knowledge of 
reality. In the realm of the fictional, claims are necessarily cautious; or, 
rather, they are claims of a different kind to the philosophical and political 
absolutes attributed to realism by the critical theories represented in the 
first part of this study. 
This synthetic realm of the as if, or the fictional, I suggest, is a good 
illustration of the fundamental limits to the claims to truth and 
knowledge upon which reaism depends. By working within these limits, 
realism not only qualifies its own claims, but also highlights the very 
problems of truth and knowledge which are the predominant concerns of 
critical theories of all kinds. By producing a kind of fictional knowledge 
and experience, realism, I suggest, demonstrates perhaps not the 
fictionality of all knowledge and experience, but at least their synthetic 
qualities. By synthetic I do not mean (only) fictional. The idea of synthesis 
suggests that knowledge and experience are the results of the blending and 
melding of different ideas, rather than processes or products of simple 
discovery. In a dialectical sense, of course, synthesis is the final step in an 
on-going process of development. But the simple binary of the dialectic 
does not exhaust the idea of synthesis, which can here be understood as 
the concentration and transformation of many and different theses. 
In the case of realism, some of these theses are the very problematic ideas 
with which literary theory has grappled. A model or concept of the real 
world, language and textuality, representation and literary form; the 
achievement of the realistic novel is to synthesize these so as to produce 
knowledge of a particular social and historical reality. Readers, who 
necessarily have their own real world, must be familiarized with a 
11See Mario J. Valdes, "Paul Ricceur's Post-Structuralist Hermeneutics", in Mario J. Valdes, 
ed., A Ric<Eur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, pp.21-25. 
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particular model of the real world synthesized in a given work of realism, 
with its fundamental structures and organizing principles. Reading the 
text, then, is a kind of temporary relocation of oneself, a relocation made 
possible by the fictional status of the text, in order to achieve both a 
simulacrum of experience of the fictional location, and a kind of distant 
overview of it. 
These are, admittedly, highly abstract suggestions, and, in the following 
section I hope to make them more concrete through the analysis of two 
substantial novels specifically in terms of their realism. At this stage, 
however, even these abstractions are enough to illustrate the 
extraordinary complexity of literary realism, a complexity which belies the 
reductuve and regressive concept of realism against which many critical 
theories have been directed. Rather than a simple faith in the "way it is", 
realism can be understood as a kind of essay on the "way it is." By 
achieving a determinate representation of a specific stratum of social and 
historical reality, realism relies upon and highlights some of the more 
perplexing properties of the ideas around which the real is built. History, 
politics, geography, and society; these and other ideas associated with the 
real world are, in the realm of the as if, brought into high relief by realism. 
(c) Realism and theory: towards a synthesis 
The fraught situation of the as if, the idea of reading texts as if they 
represented the real in some absolute sense, aware, however, that they do 
not, returns us to the idea of the theory of realism. I have argued that the 
structures of the critical methods discussed in Part I do not provide a 
satisfactory conceptual framework within which the complexities of this 
situation can properly be explored. In different ways, these critical methods 
posit an idea of realism which presupposes some very simple conceptual 
procedures, based fundamentally upon a very uncomplicated 
philosophical apprehension of the ideas of reality and of literature. This 
crude cognitive simplicity then provides a ready target for critical theory, 
which sets about claiming greater philosophical acuity according to the 
extent to which it is able to distance itself from the crushing objectifying 
and reifying procedures of realism. 
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In Part II, however, I turned to a different group of critical theorists, each 
of whom offers a body of critical work which constitutes an important 
challenge to this kind of critical logic. The possibility of exploring and 
amplifying these challenges, moreover, is not always realized. This is due 
sometimes simply to oversight, or sometimes to the different ways in 
which the work of these critical theorists, particularly that of Bakhtin, is 
itself interpreted. In any case, Part II was designed to illustrate how the 
very complicated philosophical procedures of these critical authors are 
susceptible to incorporation into a different idea of realism. 
My discussions of Lukacs, Auerbach and Bakhtin were intended to restore 
some of the complexity of the idea of realism by placing it against the 
background of the critical premises of each of these theorists. In the case of 
Lukacs, such an approach is not entirely successful, but it does nonetheless 
show how realism is not necessarily dependent upon a simple cognitive 
empiricism. Indeed, as we have seen, Lukacs' earliest work is motivated by 
an extreme anxiety about the coherence of the social and historical world, 
the very opposite of the bourgeois self-satisfaction from which realism is 
sometimes said to have emerged. 12 This cognitive anxiety is the 
motivation for Lukacs' turn to aesthetics, although at the time of Soul and 
Form his aesthetic preferences were, loosely, Romantic rather than 
realistic. 
Lukacs' dialectical turn, or rather turns (to Hegel and then to Marx), 
occasioned a revision of his aesthetic preferences. His faith in dialectical 
thinking changed the position of literature with regard to his 
philosophical concerns: whereas Soul and Form suggested that art was a 
kind of escape, Lukacs' later work used art as an emblem of the 
philosophical approaches which he saw as making possible a coherent 
apprehension of the social world. History and society, according to 
dialectical thinking, were necessarily in motion and Lukacs argued that 
realism depended upon, and so represented, this kind of understanding. 
But Lukacs' preference for realism, as we have seen, is problematic. In the 
first place, it is prescriptive, conflating literature with realism as 
dogmatically as his Frankfurt School opponents had excluded the realistic 
120ne must, of course, concede that there is a general historical contemporaneity, but the 
characterization of realism as a bourgeois form usually implies a more fundamental 
identity between the two. 
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from the realm of the artistic. More importantly, his theory of realism, 
while it did not rest upon an unproblematic apprehension of reality, did 
seem to involve a fairly unproblematic notion of the interpretation of 
literature. He seems to suggest that the dialectical materialism of realism 
would simply be there for all to see, the emergence of the hero from a 
historical totality perfectly obvious as just that. 
To make use of Lukacs, then, requires a certain degree of manipulation, a 
selection of some of his productive insights and an abandonment of some 
of his failings. In The Theory of the Novel, for example, we have, perhaps, 
Lukacs' most interesting suggestion: the ineluctable irony of the novel. 
The novel, Lukacs argues, represents what might be called ironic unities. 
Dealing with concrete and determinate representations, such as, for 
example, social and historical reality, the novel necessarily undermines its 
own representations through its irony. It is not merely that the concrete 
representations of the novel can be negated by a critical perspective, but 
rather that they are essentially self-negating, they represent their own 
dissolution. But the implications for the interpretation of literature in 
general of such an insight are vitiated by Lukacs' need to place it into a 
dialectical progression. The irony of the novel, then, is useful only insofar 
as it represents a transitionary stage between the (misconceived) unity of 
the epic which has passed, and the (idealistic) unity which is to come. 
Lukacs, in a sense, cannot settle for irony. 
The irony of the novel, as I have said, was perhaps Lukacs' most 
suggestive idea. It might have given rise to a theory of interpretation 
which demands determination - the interpretation must arrive at some 
sort of concrete representation - but never overestimates its authority. As 
we have seen, however, when Lukacs turns to realism, it is as the literary 
adjunct of his dialectical "solution" to the problems of history and society, 
rather than as a representation of the problems themselves. If we were to 
cobble together, anachronistically, some of Lukacs' ideas, a more searching 
theory of realism might be inferred. His sense of the problematic social 
world, the irony of the novel, and a preference for realism might be 
combined to articulate a theory of realism which, as well as jettisoning 
Lukacs' tendency to parody other literary forms, such as the epic or 
modernism, might have served the needs of this study very appropriately. 
To do so, however, important aspects of Lukacs' theory would have to be 
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overlooked. The contribution to this thesis of his work, then, is necessarily 
limited and qualified. 
Lukacs' work shows how realism can be conceived of as emerging from a 
problematic apprehension of the social world. If the background to Lukacs' 
preference for realism is considered, and the consistencies in his thought 
traced, we can see that Lukacs, until, perhaps, the politically fraught essays 
of the 1930s and 1940s, considers reality, or "the way it is," an extremely 
complicated problem, a problem which is not entirely solved by the 
relatively unproblematic notion of realism at which he arrives. 
Nonetheless, the supposed essentialism of realism, the rejection of, or at 
least the failure to appreciate, the idea of reality as a problem, is not 
something which can be traced in Lukacs' thought. His most interesting 
contribution to a theory of interpretation, the irony of the novel, is 
eventually lost, and was originally flawed by its dialectical framework. But 
Lukacs, as perhaps the most ardent theorist of realism in the twentieth-
century, shows, at least in part, how attacks on realism have often been 
misconceived. 
With Auerbach and Bakhtin, on the other hand, the relationship between 
literature and reality, and the problems of interpretation, are more 
sensitively appreciated. For Auerbach, the necessity of interpretation in 
the comprehension of reality cannot be satisfied by recourse to a kind of 
underlying structure of social and historical reality. Neither the dialectical 
approach preferred by Marxists nor even the cyclical approach outlined by 
Vico is sufficient to explain the constructed, interpreted quality of reality. 
Yet if reality is no more than a barrage of existential phenomena, not 
guided by an essential movement of history, the necessary limits of 
human cognition give rise to a need for interpretation. In his discussion of 
Montaigne, for example, and the idea of autobiography, Auerbach suggests 
that the randomness of the experienced world and the impulse to orient 
oneself within experience and so order and determine the flow of 
experience, are mutually indicative. Each is evidence of the other. 
For Auerbach, the relationship between realism and reality is that realism 
is similarly in need of interpretation. Interpreting a text as realistic 
becomes a way of illustrating the complexities of an idea of interpretation 
which is not a search for the single underlying meaning of a text, but the 
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process of making meaning where there is none. Realism, or more 
properly mimesis, takes its place alongside Auerbach's other interpretive 
strategies, such as historicism and figural interpretation. This not only 
suggests that realism cannot be conflated with simple self-evident 
positivism, but also that the very interpretation of texts must be 
understood as a process of determination, rather than discovery. The 
social embeddedness, the attention to background which is characteristic of 
the realistic novel, Auerbach suggests, is not a positivistic impulse, but an 
illustration of how reality is interpreted in the first place, how conceptual 
figures such as history serve to interpret the world, to make reality 
concrete. 
Auerbach, then, problematizes reality, realism, and the interpretation of 
literature. All of these, he suggests, need to be determined, but all of these 
determinations derive from an apprehension of indeterminacy. While 
they proceed, in a sense, from propositions about the "way it is" - concrete 
historical environments, the background to a particular story - his 
approach is truly critical because all of these concrete ideas, including the 
capacity of the critic to arrive at a final determination of a text, are under a 
question mark. For Auerbach, the interpretation of literature is an activity 
which is necessarily meaningful, but not authoritatively so, an activity 
which parallels the apprehension of reality itself. Realism takes its place in 
such a scheme as a particularly pointed example of the problem of 
interpretation. 
For Bakhtin, indeterminacy looms even larger. Much of his critical theory 
is devoted to revealing the shortcomings of authoritative theories which 
seek definitively to define human activities. Ethics, epistemology, 
language and literary theory are all redefined by Bakhtin as activities 
which cannot be guided by a priori principles. On the other hand, even if 
there can be no definitive determination, as I have tried to show, Bakhtin 
is still very concerned with determinate concepts, including literary 
representation. Interpretive figures, such as the chronotope or 
heteroglossia, incorporate both dimensions of Bakhtin's critical theory, his 
concern with the interpretation of literature and his "sideways glance" 
which always relativizes interpretive statements by acknowledging their 
dialogic status. 
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The three critical au th ors discussed in Part II, then, provide material for 
the basis of an idea of critical realism. As I have tried to show, the 
philosophical and literary concerns of each are entirely consistent with the 
problematic, suspicious, interrogative demands of critical theory. For each, 
the "way it is" is a problem; a question rather than an answer. Alongside 
these critical concerns, however, each entertains the idea of realism as a 
creative adjunct to this problem. 
The progression from Lukacs through Auerbach to Bakhtin, furthermore, 
charts the increased degree to which each might be said to have realized a 
comprehensively critical theory. Lukacs, for example, cannot be said to 
have considered realism an aesthetic problem or question. Indeed, 
throughout his career he persistently turned to art as an answer, and, 
more particularly, as a final answer to the philosophical problems which 
troubled him. Nonetheless, the analysis of Lukacs' work which I have 
tried to set out in Chapter Four shows how Lukacs' own thought 
undermines the philosophical claims he makes for art in general, and for 
realism in particular. Lukacs' tendency to cry "Eureka," as it were, is belied 
by the fact that his questions are so much more thoughtfully expressed 
than his answers. In the case of realism, his simple correspondence theory 
is undermined by the extent to which he conceives of society and history, 
which are the representational lynchpins of realism, as fundamentally 
unfinalizable. The totality of which he speaks, and which holds, he 
suggests, the key to cognitive certainty, is an abstract ideal, the 
achievement of which is not seriously complicated. Not only is Lukacs' 
claim for realism relativized by being placed against the complex 
background of his theories of irony and of the dialectic, but his dogmatic 
prescriptions and proscriptions, largely responsible for the critical 
disrepute into which he has often fallen, must also be placed against the 
fraught background of his own political biography. 
Auerbach, on the other hand, doesn't make such extravagant claims for 
realism. Rather, his fundamentally historicist approach negotiates 
between what he sees as a human necessity to make sense, to make 
meaning, and his conviction that any structures founded upon these 
human certainties are only fragile edifices within the world of nations. For 
Auerbach history requires such structures, as do personal histories, 
according to what Holquist calls the biographical principle. But history and 
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biography also undermine and eventually deconstruct these human ideas, 
and it is this fundamental ambivalence which Auerbach traces in literary 
history and places at the heart of the idea of realism he holds. 
Bakhtin, perhaps more comprehensively than Lukacs or Auerbach, 
develops a critical theory which is fundamentally preoccupied with 
ambivalence and tension. The idea of the dialogic, and all the associated 
theoretical figures of which Bakhtin speaks, are, as I have tried to show, 
different ways of entertaining and understanding seemingly contradictory 
possibilities. Realism, as we have seen, arises as one of Bakhtin's concerns, 
but it is also possible to develop the theory of the dialogic to include an 
idea of realism which mediates between the determinate claims of 
representation and the relativizing tendencies of dialogic critique. In 
Chapter Six, I have tried to detail such a development through an analysis 
of much of Bakhtin's work in which the tension and critical 
inquisitiveness of dialogic thought were extended to the idea of literary 
realism. 
The theoretical idea of realism which I have tried to develop in this study 
draws upon all of these critical foundations. Realism, I suggest, requires 
that a particular model or idea of reality is posited specifically as the real. It 
becomes, in a sense, a working model. This reality is built around and 
upon certain concepts, certain points of reference. These include ideas of 
history and of geography, of society and of politics. These organizing 
principles form general concepts and the particular model or idea of reality 
presupposed by a realistic novel will give these general concepts concrete 
form, setting its fictional action in a particular social and historical 
situation, a determinate time and space. 
But this determinate structure, this reality, of which the reader achieves a 
certain degree of synthetic knowledge, is then set against the different 
relativizing strategies suggested by the kinds of critical theories discussed 
in Part II. Locations, such as Anna Pavlovna's drawing room, are not only 
realistic, they are also examples of what Bakhtin calls chronotopes, dialogic 
structures which provisionally but effectively make narrative concrete. 
The idea of reality which makes literary realism possible, then, allows the 
very idea of reality itself critically to be explored, to be, using the terms of 
the critical theories discussed, historicized, ironized, dialogized. 
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Such a theoretical approach and reading strategy suggests that the 
determination and representation of social and historical reality, rather 
than being a point of closure, provides an ingress for the critical 
exploration of that environment, and of the idea of reality of which it is an 
example. Realism, from such a point of view, is critical not (only) because 
it provides troubling representations of Victorian workhouses, or of the 
plight of the urban poor, but because it brings the very idea of reality into 
critical relief. By achieving what really could be called the impossible, 
communicating knowledge of reality across time and space, realism 
involves and explores the ineluctable ambivalence of such seemingly 
determinate ideas as history, society, knowledge, and, ultimately, reality. 
(d) Realism and reality - a critical relationship. 
In my discussion of Adorno in the first part of this study, I quoted his 
remark that proponents of realism are 
guilty of a lie: the lie of delivering ... (themselves) 
over to the world with a love that presupposes that 
the world is meaningful ... 13 
Adorno's remark is puzzling, and can perhaps be explained through a 
correlation of his theoretical positions with his precarious historical 
situation. Such a possibility notwithstanding, in this study I have tried to 
show that realism is not guilty of such a "lie." By "the world is 
meaningful" Adorno, I suppose, means something like inherently 
meaningful, divinely ordered, objectively knowable. Realism "loves" the 
world, he suggests, which suggestion we might amplify by proposing that 
realism believes in the world, or has faith in the world. 
But while Adorno is correct to question such attitudes, I have tried to 
show that realism certainly doesn't rely upon them. It is not, I suggest, that 
the world is inherently "meaningful," but rather that it is inevitably full of 
meanings, full of ideas, and among these the idea of reality is one of the 
most important and most complicated. Realism and critics who would 
continue to speak of it do not "love" the world in the unreflective fashion 
described by Adorno. Rather, they deliver themselves over to the world 
13See pp.48-49 above. 
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with curiosity, inquisitiveness. The world, or more particularly, reality, is 
not an objective entity in which we are to believe, but it is the 
environment in which human activity, which we cannot avoid, takes 
place and takes shape. The complicated interpretive transmigration upon 
which realism relies, then, is not necessarily the theoretical equivalent of 
blind faith. By seeking to correlate the enormously complicated ideas of 
literature and reality, realism, I suggest, can be one way in which the 
possibilities and problems associated with the ideas of literature and 
reality, and the relationship between them, can be explored. 
In the following part of this study I shall try to supplement the theoretical 
argument advanced in this chapter with two essays in literary criticism. In 
each case, the idea of realism and the realistic achievements of the novel 
will serve as the focus of my inquiry. The procedures and structures of the 
two novels are markedly different and I hope to exploit these differences 
in testing my theoretical contentions against what is, after all, the very 
substance of literary studies, the reading of texts. These essays serve more 
adequately to conclude this study. While I have been engaged in a study in 
literary theory, it is always necessary for literary theory actually to 
contribute to the reading of literary texts. By focusing upon realism I shall 




Reading Realism: Theory and Practice 
In previous chapters, and particularly the last, I have been advancing the 
theoretical claims of this thesis. Critique of various directions in literary 
theory, claims about the position of the concept of realism in literary 
theory, and further claims for and about literary theory in general have 
been set out in order to establish two related propositions: a theory of 
realism; and a theory, as it were, of literary theory. So far, however, these 
theoretical claims have been just that - theoretical - by which I mean both 
that I have made these claims within the generic discipline of literary 
theory, and that they are, as yet, disembodied, not related to the practices of 
realism, to novels. A glance at Bakhtin's mistrust of what he called 
"theoreticism" should be enough to remind us, then, that the validity and 
usefulness of these claims is as yet unproven: a critical theory of literature 
is not only critical insofar as its intellectual rigour is concerned, but it is 
also, properly speaking, a theory of literary criticism, of the reading and 
interpretation of texts which then is articulated as criticism. 
This part will redress this "theoreticism." As we have been concerned 
with literary theory, it has been necessary to concentrate largely upon 
theoretical material. But my discussion of literary theory has culminated 
in claims about realism and about literary criticism which can only 
properly be supported, and tested, by what might be called practical 
criticism. 
The two chapters in this final part concern literary texts from different 
cultures and eras, and by authors of different genders. This is not to say, 
however, that the claims which I have made are universal; theoretical 
questions about gender, about race, about nationality, have not properly 
been considered in this thesis, and would sustain separate studies in 
themselves. Rather, my theoretical claims concern the questions raised 
within the theoretical material addressed in this thesis; questions about 
the apprehension of the social world (in general, rather than this or that 
particular world), the interpretation of history, the uses and possibilities of 
219 
language. The theoretical terrain is general and formal, and the two texts 
chosen for explication provide general and formal contrasts as well as 
important specific cultural contrasts, and it is the former with which we 
are here concerned. 
The first novel discussed is George Eliot's Middlemarch. The rationale for 
the inclusion of this text is fairly simple; it has figured significantly in 
discussions of literary realism virtually since its first appearance. Insofar as 
the period concept of realism is concerned, Middlemarch is often evoked 
as the English model, and, for very similar reasons, it has the distinction 
of having been a central text over which the realism debate, such as it is, 
has been conducted, at least in English language criticism. Its usefulness 
for the present study, then, is fairly clear, it is the kind of text which 
initiated the controversy which forms the background of this study. 
Coupled with Eliot's and Lewes' critical preference for realism, these 
reasons make Middlemarch an ideal test case. 
My reasons for including John Dos Passos' USA are less self-evident. 
There are, perhaps, more appropriate examples of realism in twentieth-
century American literature; Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, or Edith 
Wharton, might have offered novels which are closer to standard ideas of 
realism. Dos Passos is more often considered in terms of his formal 
experimentation or his political biography than of his formal realism, 
classed variously among the American modernists or the proletarian 
writers. Certainly his experiments in cross-generic representation - the 
impact of journalism and of film upon U.S.A. are examples of this - or his 
common ground with poets such as e.e. cummings, his Harvard colleague, 
or his significance in the history of the American Left, may make my 
choice to concentrate on his realism seem curious. 
However, while it may be curious, it is not, I suggest, outlandish. In U.S.A. 
we see not only formal experimentation but also a project to try 
realistically to represent the lives of individuals within a concrete 
historical environment. Sections of U.S.A. for example, taken in isolation, 
are similar in method to the work of naturalistic contemporaries of Dos 
Passos such as James T. Farrell. In U.S.A., there is the same attention to 
social detail and to the assimilation of historical events as in, say, War and 
Peace, where the historical background of Napoleon's invasion of Russia 
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influences each narrative scene just as J. Ward Moorehouse, Dick Savage, 
and Joe Williams, for example, live out their stories against the Great 
War. U.S.A. is not only realistic, but among other things, it does evince a 
realistic dimension. 
The less realistic, or experimental, properties of the novel do not, I suggest, 
negate the realism of the novel. The different narrative levels are an 
implicit acknowledgement that the apprehension and representation of 
reality is a complex matter, and the questions of genre which might be 
raised with regard to U.S.A. certainly can influence the representational 
effect of a text. However, while these matters are more immediately 
evident in U.S.A., similar ideas can be traced in more conventionally 
realistic narratives. Technical questions such as the assimilation of speech 
into the realistic novel, or, more pointedly, of the importance of the 
epistle in the development of the realistic novel in England, are not 
entirely dissimilar issues to those regarding narrative structure in U.S.A. 
As I shall try to show, the experimental qualities of U.S.A. complicate, but 
do not overshadow, the broad realistic panorama of the historical world 
which it presents. The different narrative levels, are reliefs of the overall 
picture which the novel presents. Rather than an antithesis between, to 
put it crudely, its form and its content, there is an important interrelation 
between the two. The ordinary lives are set off by the fragmented and 
highlighted representations of different perspectives, or of highlighted 
elements of ordinary life, but the overall realism of the novel 
contextualizes, and so assimilates, the narrative intrusions. The multiple 
characters and multiple plots, furthermore, are not without precedent in 
more conventional narratives. Similar tendencies are evident in Dickens' 
novels, or in Jane Austen's, although in U.S.A. they are more clearly 
signalled by their sub-headings. 
While Chapter 9 is certainly not an exercise in specialist Dos Passes 
criticism, my inclusion of U.S.A. gestures against critical tendencies to 
overstate the experimental in the novel at the expense of the realistic. This 
shall be taken up in due course. At this stage, it is necessary only to set out 
some of the reasons for my inclusion of these two particular texts. While 
the texts which might have been included in this part are innumerable, 
Middlemarch and U.S.A. have been chosen for their similarities and for 
their differences. They are similar insofar as each is intended towards the 
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representation of the social and historical world. We might say that 
Middlemarch tends more towards the social and U.S.A. towards the 
historical, but each has, in a sense, a theory of the apprehension of the 
world. But their narrative approaches are, of course, markedly different. 
For Eliot, the social becomes both a representational horizon and, as we 
shall see, a feature of the narrative method. Dos Passos' world is historical 
and political, and his narrative techniques, including his experimentation, 
assimilate and represent this historical world. 
Despite their differences, then, these two novels are encompassed by the 
idea of realism which I have developed. They certainly differ from other 
kinds of novels which might not be regarded as realistic. In Ulysses, for 
example, while some parts of the text are fairly conventional narrative 
realism, formal experimentation sets an imaginative/ symbolic structure 
over and against the representation of the social world. By contrast, in 
Gulliver's Travels formal conventionality collides with a fantastic content, 
which generates a different kind of representational relationship with the 
social world. 
The differences between the two texts not only challenge the theoretical 
claims of this thesis to accommodate such divergent texts but also 
illustrate the range of literary texts which can still be considered in terms 
of realism. The representation of the "real world," a world which is both 
individually and collectively available, a social and historical reality, is 
still among the literary concepts of which literary criticism and theory can 
make productive use. The following chapters are exercises in this kind of 
criticism. I am not suggesting that realism is necessarily preferable to, say, 
the Gothic, or to postmodernism; narrative to lyric; the novel to the 
nouveau roman. Rather, as I have tried to show, these essays will try to 
establish my contentions that the critical antagonism to realism is 
misplaced, and that literary theory and criticism can profit from the 





'At the Green Dragon': realism and the social in Middlemarch 
This is, and is not, Cress id. 
Within my soul there doth conduce a fight 
Of this strange nature that a thing inseparate 
Divides more wider than the sky and earth; 
And yet the spacious breadth of this division 
Admits no orifex for a point as subtle 
As Ariachne' s broken woof to enter. 
- Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida. 
George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871-72) "is, and is not," a lot of things. The 
complexity of the novel has generated a long history of vastly divergent 
critical responses. Henry James, in his well-known review, seemed not 
quite sure what to make of the novel. Like Troilus contemplating Cressida 
and Diomedes, James is caught between conflicting sentiments, his 
response is deeply ambivalent: "Middlemarch is at once one of the 
strongest and one of the weakest of English novels." 1 
James' ambivalence is particularly pregnant. His mixed response 
prefigures the history of Middlemarch criticism, which has been marked 
by divergent and contradictory appraisals. 2 But, more importantly, the 
novel itself validates this kind of ambivalence. Not, I suggest, because it is 
at once weak and strong, but because, in many ways, it embodies the same 
kind of seeming oxymoron. Many elements of the novel can be pursued 
to different interpretive ends just as they could, if such were the critical 
purpose at hand, be characterized either as strengths or weaknesses. 
The matter here, of course, is the question of realism in the novel, the 
manner in which it represents the social and historical reality of 
provincial life during the brief period just before the first Reform Bill in 
which it is set. A cursory glance at critical treatment of this question 
1Henry James, unsigned review, in David Carroll ed., George Eliot: The Critical Heritage 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), p .353. 
2Dorothea Barrett, writing about Eliot criticism in general, comments upon this, arguing 
that, until recently, the predominant critical view of Eliot led to critics either embracing or 
disparaging her and her work; see Dorothea Barrett, Vocation and Desire: George Eliot's 
Heroines (London: Routledge, 1991), p.l. 
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reveals that it, too, has its share of controversy and ambivalence. J. Hillis 
Miller, for example, in two important essays on Middlemarch, sets claims 
about the novel as "perhaps the masterwork of Victorian realism" against 
searching deconstructionist analysis which undermines that very claim.3 
But it is not just a matter of conflicting critical evaluations of the realism 
of the novel. In the following analysis I shall try to show how 
ambivalence is a critical feature of the realism of the novel, and that 
realism in Middlemarch is an important ingress into the complexities of 
the novel. To try to determine whether the novel is or is not realistic, or 
that, if so, its realism is or is not a productive element of the text, is, I shall 
try to show, to overlook the critical possibilitites of Middlemarch and of 
realism in general. In order to do so, it is necessary to look closely at the 
text to establish what kind of realism is at work in Middlemarch. 
( a) Public Rooms: the primacy of the social 
The reality towards which the narrative of Middlemarch is intended 
might be called a reality of the social. Middlemarch and its environs are 
represented in concrete detail and the narrative aims to capture a sense of 
what the narrator calls the "subtle movement" of provincial life. At the 
beginning of Chapter 71 (1871-72), a fairly typical example of life in the 
town is introduced: 
Five days after the death of Raffles, Mr Bambridge was 
standing at his leisure under the large archway 
leading into the yard of the Green Dragon. He was not 
fond of solitary contemplation, but he had only just 
come out of the house, and any human figure 
standing at ease under the archway in the early 
afternoon was as certain to attract companionship as a 
pigeon which has found something worth pecking at. 
In this case there was no material object to feed upon, 
but the eye of reason saw a probability of mental 
sustenance in the shape of gossip.4 
3J. Hillis Miller, "Optic and Semiotic in Middlemarch" in Jerome Buckley ed., The Worlds 
of Victorian Fiction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.127; see also 
Miller, "Narrative and History", ELH 41 (Fall 1974). 
4George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), 
p.769. All further page references to Middlemarch are taken from this edition and will be 
included in the main text. 
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When Mr Bambridge stations himself under the archway of the Green 
Dragon he precipitates an episode in Middlemarch which is particularly 
illustrative of the narrative techniques which constitute the realism of 
Middlemarch. The episode begins with Bambridge standing alone and, a 
few pages later, the scene has become one of lively social activity within 
which the narrator places the reader. The voices of the characters, their 
concerns, the activity in the street; all these social details are included in 
the passage to establish certain representational claims. This social activity 
is the "reality" presupposed by the realism of the novel; the extent to 
which it achieves a concrete representation of this social reality is the 
extent to which the novel itself is realistic. As Auerbach might have put it, 
the characters and events are embedded in their background, and the 
gradual accumulation of Middlemarchers increases the depth and density 
of this background, augmenting the realism of the episode. The 
concentration of social activity around Bambridge further suggests that 
this kind of episode and the "realness" of the social are inevitable. It is, we 
are told, "certain" to occur, the very substance of Middlemarch life. 
Close attention to the narrative techniques of this episode illustrates some 
of the complexities of how this social reality is concretized and 
represented. The archway of the Green Dragon acts as what Bakhtin would 
have called an important chronotope at which the narrative gathers itself. 
Moreover, it is a particularly suggestive image of the convergence of 
different elements of Middlemarch society. It is a threshold5 between, 
obviously, the street and the yard of the Green dragon, but also between 
social categories such as respectability and disrepute. Like the Green 
Dragon itself, the archway bridges the gap between such categories, 
compromising and undermining them, placing them in dialogue with 
one another. As it becomes increasingly crowded, the archway acts as a 
kind of vortex of social discourse; Hopkins the draper, then miscellaneous 
other listeners, and finally Mr Hawley join Bambridge under the archway 
before Bulstrode passes and Bambridge relates the details of his fateful 
meeting with Raffles. 
5 Bakhtin develops the idea of the chronotopic siginificance of the threshold in his 
analysis of Dostoevsky. The threshold, he suggests, is a particularly important chronotope 
because of its intermediary quality, it always evokes what is on either side of it; see, for 
example, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.175 and p.299. 
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As the scene progresses, more important listeners congregate around 
Bambridge. The "importance" of these listeners, we presume, is to 
Bambridge, and as his social priority consequently decreases, the narrative 
focus moves away from his point of view and begins instead to assimilate 
his discourse, representing Bambridge rather than organizing the 
representation of the gathering through him: 
Gentlemen present were assured that when they 
could show him anything to cut out a blood mare, a 
bay, a rising four, which was to be see at Doncaster if 
they chose to go and look at it, Mr Bambridge would 
gratify them by being shot 'from here to Hereford'. 
Also, a pair of blacks which he was going to put into 
the break recalled vividly to his mind a pair which he 
had sold to Faulkner in '19 ... (p.769) 
Here the narrator has partly adopted Mr Bambridge' s way of speaking and, 
at the same time, also placed the narrative at an ironic distance from 
Bambridge's sales talk. The narrative is moving in two different 
directions: the accumulating crowd, and Bambridge's voice in the 
narrative place the reader within the social reality of Middlemarch, but 
the narrative shifts which accommodate different perspectives within this 
reality relativize each representational position. 
When Mr Frank Hawley happens along, the narrative again shifts to 
accomodate him within the group. "He was not a man", we are told, "to 
compromise his dignity by lounging at the Green Dragon, but ... "(p.770). 
This we can understand as partly Hawley's own sense of himself - the 
narrative has again changed focus - and partly as a reflection of the 
informal stratification of Middlemarch society which takes its place within 
another stratum which extends to the gentry of the novel. Hawley's 
"dignity" is preserved by his commercial pretext and this recalls many 
other incidents in the novel where the scene, represented in concrete 
detail, is juxtaposed with a representation of the social construction of 
Middlemarch life. When, by chance, Bulstrode passes, Bambridge takes the 
opportunity to impart his "bit of curious information ... free of 
expense"(p.770). 
At this stage, the direct discourse of the characters becomes more 
prominent. The narrative having established a variety of perspectives 
226 
_......-
from which to understand this scene, the voices are allowed more 
discursive space, and they are represented from outside the group. But the 
narrator's parenthetical comments are still particularly telling. At first, 
Hawley, whose commercial pretext allows him to join the group, stands a 
little apart, "with his back to the street"(p.770). The social distances which 
pervade Middlemarch society are evoked by the detailed description of 
physical distance. Mr Hawley has crossed the street, but he has not left it 
entirely. The images of movement and transition which accompany 
Hawley represent the many levels at which the social in Middlemarch is 
established by movements and exchanges. 
When Bulstrode passes, however, and Bambridge takes the opportunity to 
tell his story, Hawley's position, literally and figuratively, changes. The 
narrator moves from representing Hawley as only provisionally part of 
the scene to quoting his series of increasingly familiar interrogatives. We 
are told that Hawley originally crossed the road "to ask the horse-dealer 
whether he had found the first-rate gig-horse which he had engaged to 
look for" (p.770). The narrative distance from the scene recreates Hawley's 
unwillingness fully to become part of the scene; Bambridge is "the horse-
dealer" with a specific brief. After Bambridge casts his discursive bait, we 
hear Hawley's voice, and, significantly, he steps forward into the archway, 
and the increased physical proximity of the scene parallels the increasing 
social interests which are represented. The realism of the scene is also 
served by the details of Mr Hawley's interest; his casual movements - his 
hands in his pockets, his knitted brow - are detailed and the conversation 
is reported in its entirety. Hawley's engagement is represented as complete 
when he presses Bambridge for more information. "'Go on, Bambridge,' 
said Mr Hawley, insistently. 'What did this fellow say about 
Bulstrode?"'(p.771). Hawley addresses Bambridge by name, his original 
sense of him as the "horse-dealer" having given way to the more personal 
relationship suggested by the use of his name. Hopkins, too, finds his 
position altered. His trade has brought him into contact with the events of 
Raffles' death and he, therefore, also becomes part of the scene, his voice 
not only contributing to the representation of conversation but also 
providing extra details about the events. 
By this time Bulstrode has passed this group, but the narrator briefly 
returns to that instant in order more comprehensively to represent the 
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complexity of this brief set of convergences. Bulstrode, whose chance 
appearance occasions the discussion which we have been examining, is 
also, by chance, thinking about the same events. The narrator adopts 
Bulstrode's uneasy faith that Providence would protect him and his 
interests. He had not, we are told, "confessed to himself that he had done 
anything" (p.772) to hasten Raffles' death, or, at least, it "was impossible to 
prove" (p.772) that he had. The weakness of Bulstrode's rationalization is 
emphasized not only by the irony of his error, of which we are aware 
because of our earlier view of this episode, but also because the narrator 
recreates Bulstrode's own internal doubt. Providence, even within his 
own professed moral scheme, owes him nothing. The image of not 
having confessed to himself evokes a dualism within Bulstrode - he is 
both judge and defendant - which is confirmed by his belief not that he 
was not guilty but, to continue with the juridical metaphor, that he would 
not be convicted. 
The narrative complexity of this passage - the axiological shifts, the 
temporal changes - are an indication of the narrative complexity of the 
whole novel. To achieve a realistic representation of the social 
environment, the narrative moves to accomodate the reader essentially 
within the social environment, rather than trying to summarize or 
overview the social scenario. 
Events like this, which work in a similar fashion, occur throughout 
Middlemarch. Public-houses are merely one kind of chronotope used to 
create narrative realism. Dinner-parties are another. It is a dinner-party, 
albeit a very small one, which introduces Casaubon to Dorothea, and into 
the story. Once again, the scene is narrated through subtle axiological and 
perspectival shifts. It begins in the middle of a conversation, and 
alternates the exchanges of the characters with free indirect discourse the 
focus of which moves almost imperceptibly. After Brooke's first outburst, 
the narrator recreates Dorothea's assessment of the environment, her awe 
of Casaubon, condescension towards Chettam, and embarrassment over 
Brooke. There is, however, a trace of irony in the narrator's voice, 
particularly insofar as Dorothea's comparison of Casaubon to the portrait 
of Locke is concerned. 
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Later in the episode, this irony is beginning to speak for itself more 
audibly, and Dorothea's misapprehension of Chettam's (original) interests 
and intentions regarding her and her sister is juxtaposed with her own 
point of view. Later still, after Casaubon's description of his research, the 
narrator's tone has changed distinctly. The contrast between Brooke and 
Casaubon is partly a reflection of Dorothea's earlier discomfort, but owes 
more to a move away from the scene, taking Casaubon's and Brooke's 
comments out of their immediate context. Casaubon's precise speech is 
compared to a "public statement" (p.40), and he is pointedly contrasted to 
Brooke who, of course, is the one who will eventually be called upon to 
make a public statement. Thereafter, however, the narrator returns to 
Dorothea, and by abandoning the "precision" of earlier comments, 
expands the narrative perspective. Whereas previously, the narrative 
focus was, to a certain extent, a matter of inference, the narrator now 
chooses to signal it more clearly: 
Dorothea said to herself that Mr Casaubon was the 
most interesting man she had ever seen, not 
excepting even Monsieur Liret, the Vaudois 
clergyman who had given conferences on the history 
of the Waldenses. To reconstruct a past world, 
doubtless with a view to the highest purposes of truth 
- what a work to be in any way present at, to assist in, 
though only as a lamp-holder.(p.40) 
The narrative, which previously relied upon Dorothea's perspective, is 
now placed at a distance - Dorothea said to herself - which ironizes her 
reflections. The irony is reinforced by the hyperbole of her observations -
the most interesting man, more so even than M. Liret. There are, 
additionally, several oblique references, such as Dorothea's attraction to 
the persecuted, and, of course, her function later in the novel as an actual 
lamp-holder. 
This social scene, like that which takes place outside the Green Dragon is 
rendered in concrete detail through a kind of narrative fluidity. The full 
resonance of the environment, its "realness," cannot be achieved through 
simple objective representation but requires a negotiation between 
different perspectives, as well as between direct and indirect discourse. 
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With the introduction of Mrs Cadwallader, as well as Chettam and 
Casaubon, the number of social locations increases, as the world of the text 
reaches out to encompass Freshitt Hall and Lowick Manor, each of which 
acts as a kind of narrative knot. The peripatetic Mrs Cadwallader is 
particularly interesting. Her social mobility, according to the narrator, 
creates little "thought and speech vortices" (p.83) which sustain her. The 
various locations which are gradually revealed to the reader act in a 
similar fashion. Each location serves to create a strong sense of social 
activity, and the narrative recreates a sense of that activity, a perspective 
which allows the reader to appreciate the scene in concrete detail. 
Shortly before the Casaubons leave for Rome, there is another dinner-
party at Tipton which serves, at that point, to broaden the social horizon 
of the novel, by bringing Middlemarchers and the landed gentry together, 
and to introduce a second significant narrative development, the story of 
Lydgate. The range of representational sites, or chronotopes, is accordingly 
expanded. Not only are more characters introduced, but the social horizon 
is broadened. As a result of Brooke's dinner-party, we are introduced to 
Bulstrode, and so to the bank and the hospital; to Viney, and so to his 
house and breakfast- and dinner-tables, and, indirectly, to Stone Court, the 
Garths' house; and to recurrent social themes, such as the distinction 
between coursing and hunting. Breakfast tables, dinner-parties, sitting 
rooms, and public houses are all sites of important social occasions and 
environments which allow the narrative to develop a concrete 
representation of social life. Even Reverend Farebrother's drawing-room 
and study are evoked in extensive detail, a parallel being drawn between 
the environment and its inhabitants (p.198). 
The importance of the social as a kind of realistic horizon is reinforced 
not only by the repeated evocations of social environments, but also by 
strong narrative parallels between different episodes. At the Green Dragon 
alone, parallel episodes can be seen. Many other characters are drawn into 
the Green Dragon under similar circumstances to those which bring 
Hawley and Bambridge together. Lydgate, Fred and young Hawley find 
themselves at the Green Dragon on another occasion. Lydgate, for 
different reasons to Fred and Mr Hawley, is also seeking Bambridge to 
trade in horses and decides that to "run up to the billiard-room, as he was 
passing, would save time."(p.722) But there is a contrast between this 
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time-saving, which comes to us as a judgement on Lydgate's part, and the 
social view of the Green Dragon with which we have just been presented; 
who goes there, how they are regarded, what happens there, what, in 
short, is "generally known in Middlemarch" (p.721) of the Green Dragon. 
The social becomes a general method for comprehending reality. 
Moreover, the Green Dragon is not the only pub in the area. Fred, for 
example, is mixed up with Bambridge, not at the Dragon but at the Red 
Lion in Houndsley but, like Hawley and Lydgate, has a pretext; the 
"sustaining power of nomenclature ... determined that the pursuit of 
these things was 'gay' "(p.269). 
The broadening of the social environment, then, deepens the 
contextualizing of the reader. What Lukacs might have called the 
"immersion" of the reader in the reality of the text is not a simple matter 
of representing the truth of events but rather a process of asserting the 
"reality" of the social and then recreating the complex movements of 
social activity. Not only is the social environment "broadened" but it is 
also "deepened" through a series of temporal returns. We have seen how 
the scene outside the Green Dragon relies upon such a narrative 
manoeuvre, but it is worth noting the extensive use of narrative return. 
Many of the early chapters begin with a sense of diachronic temporal 
progression. Chapter 12, for example, begins with Fred and Rosamond 
taking their planned ride to Stone Court: "The ride to Stone Court, which 
Fred and Rosamond took the next morning ... "(p.131). Following Fred's 
interview with Featherstone, the narrative progresses to Mr Vincy's 
intercession on his behalf, and "the next morning a letter came" (p.161). 
Similarly, Lydgate attends Vincy's dinner-party, and "the next evening" 
(p.198), he visits Farebrother. "Some weeks" (p.207) later, the vexed 
question of the hospital chaplaincy then arises for Lydgate. Things happen, 
and are represented as taking place, one after the other. 
Chapter 19, however, marks a significant change. As we have seen, the 
occasion of Dorothea's engagement to Casaubon facilitates a spatial shift 
from country to town. Dorothea becomes a topic of conversation and then, 
we are told, leaves for Rome, following which Middlemarch and its affairs 
become the representational focus. In Chapter 19 we return to Dorothea, 
although she is now in Rome. The introduction to Dorothea in Rome 
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departs from the narrative habit of placing events into a temporal 
sequence, and begins instead to communicate a sense of simultaneity: 
When George the Fourth was still reigning over the 
privacies of Windsor, when the Duke of Weliington 
was Prime Minister, and Mr Viney was mayor of the 
old corporation in Middlemarch, Mrs Casaubon, born 
Dorothea Brooke, had taken her wedding journey to 
Rome.(p.219) 
Not only are the events of the story thus temporally correlated, but the 
story itself is placed into a series of historical contemporaneities. The 
expanding space, as it were, of the novel is thus complemented by a 
deepening temporal structure. At the same time as the events in and 
around Middlemarch are taking place, and the narrator is leading the 
reader through them, elsewhere, inside and outside, other events are 
taking place. That this change of temporal representation takes place in 
Rome is not accidental. Rome provokes greatly different responses from 
each of the three characters involved in this particular plot-line. Casaubon 
fails to appreciate it, Ladislaw revels in it, and Dorothea fails to 
understand it. Rome, we might say, is a particularly fraught chronotope, 
and the hermeneutic significance of Rome has often been critically 
noticed. 6 It is, however, worth considering briefly what, specifically, it is 
about Rome which is so challenging: 
The weight of unintelligible Rome might lie easily on 
bright nymphs to whom it formed a background for 
the brilliant picnic of Anglo-foreign society; but 
Dorothea had no such defence against deep 
impressions. Ruins and basilicas, palaces and colossi, 
set in the midst of a sordid present, where all that was 
living and warm-blooded seemed sunk in the deep 
degeneracy of a superstition divorced from reverence 
... (p.225) 
Rome, essentially, is too historically concentrated, there is too much 
history still present, and both history (as Dorothea understands it) and the 
present are complicated by their proximity to one another. "Rome, the city 
6For a recent and particularly relevant discussion of Rome in Middlmarch, see David 
Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp.244££. 
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of visible history" (p.224), acts as a kind of symbol of the novel's own use 
of simultaneity. 
As we have seen with regard to the episode ouside the Green Dragon, the 
narrator begins to make use of temporal returns to deepen the social 
environment. Bulstrode passes the Green Dragon, and the following 
conversation is represented, and then we return to the moment of 
Bulstrode's passing by. That episode, of course, takes place fairly late in the 
novel; it is with the return to Dorothea that narrative simultaneity really 
begins to feature. 
When Dorothea is "found" sobbing in her boudoir, the narrative, which 
previously has been moving generally forward, begins essentially to move 
backwards in time. From Dorothea's tears we return to previous events, 
most notably the argument between Dorothea and Casaubon, and then 
return to Dorothea crying in her boudoir, whereupon Will makes his first 
visit. 
After the narrative then returns to Middlemarch, and to Fred Viney, the 
story progresses through Fred's illness to the romance between Lydgate 
and Rosamond. Pursuing this development in the story, the narrative 
finds them coincidentally together on the Lowick Road where Sir James' 
man intercepts him, requesting him to attend Casaubon: 
Only a few days later, when he (Lydgate) had 
happened to overtake Rosamond on the Lowick Road 
and had got down from his horse to walk by her side 
until he had quite protected her from a passing drove, 
he had been stopped by a servant on horseback with a 
message calling him in to a house of some 
importance where Peacock had never attended. The 
servant was Sir James Chettam' s and the house was 
Lowick Manor.(p.305) 
Once again, the focus shifts from town affairs to those of the gentry, and 
the narrative returns to Casaubon and Dorothea at a point antecedent to 
Lydgate's and Rosamond's meeting, tracing a different sequence of events 
leading up to Lydgate's attendance on Casaubon. The tension within 
Dorothea's mariage, the textual antithesis between Ladislaw and 
Casaubon, as well as Celia's engagement are introduced, and then, the 
narrator returns to the point in time which was reached in what might be 
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called the other plot of the novel. The contrast between the two 
representations of the same moment highlights the complexities which 
are introduced through the use of narrative simultaneity: 
So Mr Lydgate was sent for and he came wonderfully 
soon, for the messenger, who was Sir James 
Chettam's man and knew Mr Lydgate, met him 
leading his horse along the Lowick Road and giving 
his arm to Miss Vincy.(p.318) 
This kind of temporal reversal promotes what we might call narrative 
density. As we have seen, the applicability of Bakhtin's notion of the 
chronotope to the narrative of Middlemarch is one way in which the 
representational methods of the novel might be illustrated. The narrative 
gathers around particular locations, using them to familiarize the reader 
with the world of the text, to enter, as it were, the society of the novel. 
Other theoretical descriptions are also helpful. The spatial and temporal 
fabric of the novel is what Lukacs might have called a totality, the reality 
of the novel is established through the interrelation of all its constituent 
parts, the different places and different lives are represented as parts of a 
whole. Each representational figure, each character and location, is 
embedded in a social background, which is not merely a kind of backdrop 
to what the novel represents, but actually enables the concrete 
representations of the novel to emerge as such. The realism of the novel, 
then, depends upon a model of reality which is constituted by the social 
world. Such a world, however, is not simply given by the narrative, it is 
not simply a matter of representing the way things are in Middlemarch. 
There is certainly a certain degree of unreflective faith in the social world 
represented in the novel, Mrs Cadwallader' s warning to "call things by the 
same name as other people call them" (p.581) and Mrs Plymdale's distrust 
of strangers (p.329) are particularly pointed examples of how the social 
world is not only real but can also be said, in Lukacsian terms, to have 
become reified. But the narrative doesn't rely upon any sort of objectivity 
of the social world. It posits the social world through, as we have seen, 
narrative shifts and negotiations, greater or lesser assimilation of the 
direct speech of the characters, and through the accumulation of different 
but parallel examples of social behaviour. Repetition and parallels are 
evident at almost every level of the narrative; characters and their values 
are compared, and narrative topoi are repeated. There are, for example, 
three love problems, which goes towards suggesting the ubiquitousness of 
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courtship rituals, not merely as an individual concern, but as a social one. 
The characters and the events in which they participate are represented as 
being embedded in a larger, transpersonal social fabric, many metaphors 
for which can be traced in the novel. In a sense, the social realism of the 
novel does not work through exhaustive coverage of the social world, but 
rather through a kind of circular negotiation between positing the social 
as an epistemological category, and then textually recreating it. 
But this kind of realistic circle is not unbroken. To evoke a sense of social 
reality, the text, as we have seen, relies upon a series of chronotopes which 
organize the narrative, and make possible its development. Social 
gatherings, public-houses, and so forth, serve both to evoke the social and 
to contract the events of the narrative into a coherent pattern. As this 
narrative consistency is achieved, the social function of these 
organizational centres, or events, is brought into relief. The synthetic 
world in and around Middlemarch, then, acts as a kind of critical 
examination of the very idea of the social upon which it relies, and 
therefore the epistemological status of the social is similarly brought 
under the critical microscope. 
That the real is conflated with the social, thus making possible the realism 
of Middlemarch, leads to an examination of the synthetic structure of the 
social. The possible contribution of a critical reading of Middlemarch to 
such an examination, is what we now turn to. 
(b) "By Jove, Nick, it's you !": the social function of chance 
If we return to the events outside the Green Dragon, we can see how both 
realism and other aspects of the novel make their presence felt at the same 
time. This social event, as we have seen, is not entirely accidental, it is 
exactly the kind of thing which frequently occurs. Thus, we have, on the 
one hand, the familiarity and regularity of social life in Middlemarch. On 
the other hand, we have the particulars of this particular meeting, which 
rely, to say the least, on chance. 
The chance meeting of Bambridge and Hawley, as well as Bulstrode's 
passing by, allow the narrative to be, as it were, realistic. But this realistic 
episode makes possible an important plot development which contributes 
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to the overall narrative design of the novel. Now, the intricate plot of the 
novel, in many ways, is not at all realistic, and it is equally importantly 
served by this passage as the realistic ends of the novel. This, in turn, 
contributes to potential moral implications of the novel. Bulstrode' s fate, 
for example, bears upon Lydgate's, which makes Lydgate's marriage to 
Rosamond an object of analysis which then invites comparison with 
other relationships in the story, bringing the very ideas of marriage and 
gender relations to the foreground of inquiry. 
The scene in the archway of the Green Dragon, then, serves mixed ends. 
The attention to social detail places this scene within a realistic mode of 
representation within the novel. But this same scene contributes to the 
extraordinary series of coincidences which make possible the 
development and resolution of the plot which acts as a vehicle for other 
achievements of the novel. The episode is an evocation of the social, 
which is marked by a sense of familiarity, regularity and inevitability. 
Bambridge, whose trade, habits, and social standing - in short, his identity 
- are bound to social customs, relies upon the social. He does not, we 
know, like to be alone, but he knows that he will not be long alone in such 
circumstances. Yet, at the same time, the episode also includes 
information regarding what doesn't happen very often: the coincidence of 
Bulstrode, Rigg, Raffles, and Ladislaw sharing a curiously eventful history. 
It is, at once, both typical and atypical, it represents the ordinary and 
encompasses the extraordinary. The singularity of the novel's plot sits 
alongside the regularity of its realism. 
This is, perhaps, the most important feature of this passage: it serves its 
mixed ends simultaneously, and relies upon chance in the service of both. 
Within the one scene, different interpretive emphases are possible, rather 
than one or another predominating. This, I suggest, is the case with 
Middlemarch as a whole. Alongside what we can call its realism, there are 
melodramatic, mythical, and ethical implications, each of which may be 
critically explored. Just as the novel's social realism and its decidedly 
artificial plot, or at least one strand of it, are equally represented in the 
passage with which we have been concerned, Middlemarch operates in a 
number of different representational modes. 
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But these different ends or modes, of course, cannot be so neatly divided, 
nor can they be simply counterposed to one another. In Daniel Deronda, 
Eliot's last novel, there is, perhaps, a clearer distinction between the 
different representational ends pursued in that particular novel, between, 
for example, the representation of Gwendolen's enthusiasm for hunting 
and of Deronda's conversations with the mystically-inclined Mordecai. In 
Middlemarch, however, the different ends of the novel are often served 
by the same textual techniques and devices. 
In the episode with which we started, as I have said, the element of chance 
is particularly important. It is chance which brings together Bambridge 
and Raffles, then Hawley, and, finally, Bulstrode. Chance, then, makes 
possible or at least contributes to the realistic depth of this scene. Hawley, 
we are told, happened to be passing, and Bulstrode might, after all, have 
been '"the Riverstone Coach"'(p.770). These events assimilate the random 
into the narrative, but while they may be accidental they are certainly not 
astonishingly so. That Hawley and Bulstrode are passing is quite plausible, 
quite realistic. It is, of course, a street, along which people, and the 
Riverstone Coach, will inevitably pass. 
Chance pervades the novel. Countless other incidents in the novel 
happen, as it were, by accident. Shortly after Dorothea and Casaubon 
confirm their engagement, Casaubon, leaving Tipton Grange, happens to 
cross paths with Mrs Cadwallader, who after a short exchange with the 
housekeeper, then uses her new and accidentally acquired information in 
her conversation with Brooke and Celia (p.75ff). When Fred is ill, 
Rosamond sees Lydgate, "stopping to speak to some one."'(p.293). When 
Casaubon is ill, Sir James sends his man for him, and once again, Lydgate 
is bumped into, this time accompanying Rosamond, a consequence, at 
least in part, of his attendance on Fred (p.318). 
But while these accidental occurrences are unobtrusive, and often serve to 
introduce scenes which provide opportunities to advance the realistic 
dimensions of the novel, chance sometimes works in quite a different 
fashion. When Bulstrode passes the group at the Green Dragon he, to 
labour the point, happens to be thinking of the very circumstances the 
details of which Bambridge has come across. These circumstances -
Bulstrode's first marriage, Featherstone's illegitimate son, Raffles, and so 
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forth - of course, are so coincidental as to be highly unlikely or 
implausible. Whereas the chance meeting of Bambridge and Hawley, and 
so forth, is realistic, the element of chance in the plot is not. Not only are 
Bulstrode and Ladislaw, to limit the participants to just two, tenuously 
connected, but Raffles' persistence in and around Middlemarch owes itself 
to the happy accident of his flask being loose in its covering and his using 
the stray letter from Bulstrode to Rigg to secure it (pp.452-3). 
Chance in Middlemarch is double-edged. On many occasions it makes 
possible the attention to social detail which increases the depth of realism 
in the novel and it allows the narrative to move from scene to scene -
Hawley, for example, rushes to Lowick to discuss the matter with 
Farebrother - which broadens the realism of the novel by allowing it to 
encompass a kind of panorama of social scenery. But it also motivates the 
various lines of plot development, often unrealistically, which lends the 
novel its didactic, sentimental, and allegorical dimensions. But this 
double-edge is more complicated than merely something which can "cut 
both ways." Certainly, we can see chance playing an important part in 
aspects of the novel which might be considered antithetical, it works, we 
might say, in different directions. But it is also working, in a sense, 
unidirectionally. Chance clearly has a place in the social world, making 
possible certain social events and activities. In a sense, it acts to determine 
the social world; once it has played its part, the progress of social activity is 
less random. It also contributes to the narrative's capacity to recreate the 
social world, occasioning social events, and bringing different characters 
into contact with one another. It acts as a narrative device which organizes 
the novel. But it also slides from this level of organization or 
determination into what we might call overdetermination. Aspects of the 
plot are too chancy, and thus they go through the socially realistic aspect of 
the novel into others, into those aspects which are, on the one hand, 
concerned with moral questions, and, on the other, those which clearly 
mark Middlemarch as bound by particular conventions of narrative and 
fiction. 
The kind of differences implicit in the treatment of chance in 
Middlemarch are evident in other concepts of which the novel makes use. 
There is a similarly equivocal use made of myth throughout the novel. At 
times, myth is evoked as a symbolic parallel to the events of the novel, 
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and at other times it becomes material for the novel. Casaubon's magnum 
opus, of course, is an effort to rationalize, to unify, the implications of 
mythology, but the different uses made of myth in the novel constitute 
one of the reasons why his task is inevitably unsuccessful. 
Because the possibility of tracing antithetical implications of features of 
Middlemarch extends to central features of how the novel achieves its 
realism, the realism of the novel in general becomes similarly 
ambivalent. Just as chance contributes both to the realism of the novel 
and to elements of the plot which disrupt that realism, the realistic 
tendencies of the novel rely upon a certain model of reality and yet seem 
to interrogate that model. This, I suggest, is the theoretical interest of 
realism in general, and particularly in Middlemarch there is a kind of 
ambivalence which prevents the novel from being understood too 
simply. Everything which contributes to the realism of the novel, both 
general devices such as the assimilation of chance and specific passages 
and events in the novel, can simultaneously be pursued to quite different 
but equally supportable conclusions. If chance is one idea with which we 
might explore this tendency in the novel, there is another which is, 
perhaps, even m_ore complicated. 
( c) The import of the word: language, the social, and realism 
Theorists such as Bakhtin, as we have seen, make particulo.1\~ productive 
use of the idea of language. In my analysis of Bakhtin, I have tried to show 
that Bakhtin's theory of language and of literature derives from his sense 
of language as an index of the social relations which constitute the human 
world. Literature, particularly the novel, is then a further refinement of 
his theoretical focus. Language acts as an index of the social and relational 
quality of existence, and the novel as an illustration of the complexities of 
language and as a means of relating language to the social world. 
If we return, once again, to the events at the Green Dragon, the relevance 
of these ideas to Middlemarch can be explored more fully. One of the key 
elements of this episode is, in a very broad sense, language. The narrator 
suggests that gossip is to Middlemarch society as food is to pigeons; it is 
"mental sustenance"(p.769) When the narrator allows Bambridge's 
perspective of these events to be most evident in the narrative, the value 
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of language, or rather discourse, is clear. When he is joined by Hopkins, 
the roving narrator settles into Bambridge's social purview. Bambridge 
shows the draper scant regard, the narrator tells us that Bambridge feels 
that "Hopkins was of course glad to talk to him, but that he was not going 
to waste much of his talk on Hopkins."(p.769) Bambridge's concern to 
conserve his speech is particularly telling. It implies that social activity is a 
kind of commerce, discourse is a resource which must be wisely and 
profitably put to use. When Bulstrode passes, Bambridge offers "a bit of 
curious information ... free of expense", and adds that when first he 
picked Raffles up, he "slipped through ... (his) fingers" (p.770). These 
phrases of Bambridge's reinforce his sense that his "bragging showed a 
fine sense of the marketable."(p.771). 
The social value of gossip is asseverated by repetition throughout the 
novel. Hawley sends a clerk to Stone Court, who speaks to Mrs Abel, and 
Hawley then becomes a vehicle for the information. In many other 
episodes, a similar reliance upon gossip is represented as integral to 
Middlemarch life. When Dorothea and Celia are discussing Chettam' s 
matrimonial intentions, Celia's predilection for gossip once again brings 
gossip to the fore as a figure of the relationship between language and the 
social: 
'Pray do not make that mistake any longer, Dodo. 
When Tantripp was brushing my hair the other day, 
she said that Sir James' s man knew from Mr 
Cadwallader' s maid that Sir James was to marry the 
eldest Miss Brooke.' 
'How can you let Tantripp talk such gossip to you, 
Celia ?' said Dorothea, indignantly, not the less angry 
because details asleep in her memory were now 
awakened to confirm the unwelcome revelation. 
'You must have asked her questions. It is degrading.' 
'I see no harm at all in Tantripp's talking to me. It is 
better to hear what people say ... (pp.58-59) 
The conversation between the two sisters is thus set against the 
background of general social conversation. Gossip is not only what they 
talk about, but it intrudes into their own apprehension of Middlemarch 
society. Dorothea's sleeping suspicions, or, rather, suspicions which she 
refuses to countenance, are confirmed by the gossip which reflects the 
general social view of the situation about which she and Celia are 
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speaking. This brief exchange is placed in a broader and deeper social 
context - it extends, in a sense, horizontally to Sir James, and is deepened 
by the presence of the gossip of the servants, which is a crucial element of 
the realism of the novel. Each figure in the novel, each character or event, 
is understood as part of a larger social whole; it is gossip which makes this 
understanding possible. 
Elsewhere, we see similar use made of gossip. At Brooke's dinner party, 
Dorothea's exit from the dining-room occasions a discussion about 
women in general amongst several prominent Middlemarchers (p.115); a 
similar gathering, this time at Mr Toller's, exchanges news about Lydgate 
(p.690); and peripatetic Mrs Cadwallader is an extremely important 
conduit of gossip. At the Tankard in Slaughter Lane, another tavern, Mrs 
Dollop presides over similar exchanges of opinion. When Lydga te 
becomes the subject of discussion, Mrs Dollop asserts, as "a known 'fac' 
that he had wanted to cut up Mrs Goby"(p.481). Mrs Dollop's misuse of the 
word fact is an indication of how language, or at least gossip, takes on a 
kind of a life of its own. 
Dinner parties, sitting-rooms, and public houses, which, as we have seen, 
contribute greatly to the realism of the novel, are also significant insofar as 
they are where the social life of Middlemarch is made verbal. The 
circulation of gossip allows the novel to place its story within a broad 
social context which extends from the estates of the late Georgian 
aristocracy to the various strata of commercial society in a developing 
manufacturing centre, from professionals to traders to the clergy. It is one 
agent, we might say, of realism in the novel, attesting to the social 
embeddedness of the story. 
However, like Mrs Dollop's "known 'fac'", there are limits to the "truth" 
of gossip. The epigraph to Chapter 71, with which we started this 
discussion, is an interesting allusion to these limits. Pompey and Froth, 
before the wise arbiter Escalus, are telling their tale of events which 
happened at the Venetian counterpart to the Green Dragon. The epigraph 
ends with Pompey's wish that "here be truths." But, of course, "here" be 
nothing like the truth. The judicial proceedings are frustrated by Elbow's 
pervasive misuse of words. Trying to make his case to Escalus, Elbow 
inverts his words, saying the opposite, although only just, of what he 
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means. Elbow's ineptitude illustrates the malleability of language, of truth, 
and, finally, of authority. In Measure for Measure, these ideas are 
"problems," h'.,c \\.0, p~ 1:S c.o """'~t re[1J.J.,5 q"problem play." But in 
Middlemarch, the representational ena.s of which are very different to that 
of the drama, these ideas, upon which realism might be said to rely, are no 
less problematic. Gossip, for example, the circulation of half-truths at the 
green Dragon, or the Tankard, is, of course, one kind of language use. The 
gossip, as we have seen, contributes to the realism of the novel, but it also 
brings the problem of truth in language to the fore, a point which is 
reinforced by other reflections on language in the novel. 
In the Garth kitchen, a very telling conversation takes place. '"I hate 
grammar. What's the use of it ?'" (p.276) asks young Ben Garth of his 
mother. To which she replies, with "severe precision", that it provides the 
standard of correct speech and writing, the instruments of accurate 
communication. Should Ben, she asks, "like to speak as old Job does ?" 
(p.277). 
'Yes', said Ben stoutly; 'it's funnier. He says, "Yo Goo" 
- that's just as good as "you go".' 
'But he says, "A ship's in the garden", instead of a 
sheep",' said Letty, with an air of superiority. 'You 
might think he meant a ship off the sea.' 
'No you mightn't, if you weren't silly,' said Ben. 'How 
could a ship off the sea come there ?'(p.277) 
As Mrs Garth points out, Ben's reasoning is not entirely convincing. The 
conversation between Ben and Letty is about pronunciation, rather than 
grammar, and Job, Mrs Garth maintains, need not be overly concerned 
with either punctuation or grammar because he "has only to speak about 
very plain things"(p.277). 
This brief, comic exchange between the younger Garths is not of great 
consequence. It represents a familiar feature of the family life of the 
Garths; recurring frequently and paralleling a similar theme in the other 
important Middlemarch family, the Vincys. It also implies, perhaps, 
something about the position of the Garths in provincial society; on the 
one hand, the younger Garths are schooled at home, and Mary and Christy 
are self-supporting, while on the other, Mrs Garth's attitude towards old 
Job seems some what unreflective. But, once again, we can see antithetical 
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possibilities of the incorporation of language into the novel. The 
conversation between the Garths contributes to the realism of the novel; it 
is a strong evocation of their family life, and places their situation in the 
broader social context of the period. The parallels between the Garths and 
the Vincys, to whom we shall shortly turn, are particularly important in 
this respect. The social differences and distance between them struggle, of 
course, against Fred and Mary's irresistible romance, but the similarities 
between their family lives also reinforce a kind of commonality between 
them. This commonality acts as a kind of resolution of social differences, 
suggesting, perhaps, something essential about social life. At the same 
time, the substance of the conversation highlights, once again, the 
malleability of language. 
Letty and Mrs Garth insist upon the possibility of correct communication, 
an exact science of langauge which, if one is sufficiently schooled, allows 
orte to say exactly what one is thinking. Grammar is one of Mrs Garth's 
"favourite ancient paths", and she is trying to instruct Ben in the 
appreciation of what she calls "the import of the word as conveying unity 
or plurality of idea" (p.276) . Words, however, convey both unity and 
multiplicity of idea, and Ben's fragmented response is one instance in the 
novel of how this seeming antithesis is borne out. 
For Ben, the context of an utterance is all important. Accurate grammar, 
or pronunciation, is no match, he argues, for "not being silly." While Letty 
wants to explain Job's simple speech, which can't be done according to the 
rules of grammar and punctuation with which she is being educated, Ben 
claims that he can understand what Job says - by considering a statement 
and its context he is able to interpret Job's statement, and realize that it 
refers to a sheep, not a ship. 
As their lesson continues Ben begins to tell the story of Cincinnatus, 
interrupted periodically by Letty, intent upon rendering the details 
"straight on, as mother told it ... "(p.277). Ben's rendition is full of what we 
might call contextualizations - "he was a farmer ... he was ploughing ... he 
was a wise man, like my father ... "(p.277). For Ben these details constitute 
the reality of Cincinnatus, particularly insofar as he is able to identify him 
with his father. Ben gives a scattered account of events: 
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'Well - oh - well - why, there was a great deal of 
fighting, and they were all blockheads, and - I can't 
tell it just how you told it - but they wanted a man to 
be captain and king and everything -'(p.278) 
When Letty interrupts to provide the correct appelation for such a man, 
Ben reasserts the ambiguity of language - dictator, he says, is not a good 
word because of its other potential meaning. Ben's obvious struggle with 
the story is particularly interesting. On the one hand, his sense of the 
ambiguity of language leads him to break up the original story, he cannot 
really understand it because he cannot place it in relation to himself. On 
the other hand, language is, of course, the vehicle of meaningful 
communication and his struggle to render the story of Cincinnatus gives 
rise to his embellishments which place the story in a context that is 
meaningful to him. He initiates what Bakhtin might have called a 
dialogue between his own position and the story, rather than accepting the 
representational authority of the story. 
As I have mentioned, another pair of siblings, Fred (whose arrival at the 
Garths' house brings the exchange between Ben and Letty into the 
narrative) and Rosamond Viney hold a similar debate. 
' ... All choice of words is slang. It marks a class.' 
'There is correct English: that is not slang.' 
'I beg your pardon : correct English is the slang of prigs 
who write history and essays. And the strongest slang 
of all is the slang of poets.' 
'You will say anything, Fred, to gain your point.' 
'Well, tell me whether it is slang or poetry to call an 
ox a leg-plaiter.' 
'Of course you can call it poetry if you like.' 
'Aha, Miss Rosy, you don't know Homer from slang 
... ' (p.126) 
Fred insists upon the malleability of language, upon social and genenc 
registers which militate against an absolute standard of correct English. 
Fred and Rosy continue to bicker: 
'I don't make myself disagreeable; it is you who find 
me so. Disagreeable is a word that describes your 
feeling and not my actions.' 
'I think it describes the smell of grilled bone.' 
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'Not at all. It describes a sensation in your little nose 
associated with certain finicking notions which are 
the classics of Mrs Lemon's school. .. '(127) 
Here, Fred is arguing that the meaning of 'disagreeable' is contextual; a 
discourse between his actions and Rosy's feelings, between the smell of 
grilled bone and Rosy's finishing school education. His juxtaposition of 
language and the sense of smell reinforces his participatory view of 
language. To recall some of the theoretical characterizations of this kind of 
view, we might say that the word disagreeable, over which Fred and Rosy 
disagree doesn't describe the smell of grilled bone, but narrates it, placing it 
in the dialogic context of Rosy's education and Fred's predilection for late, 
hot breakfasts. Fred, like Ben, is a contextualist, and not only with regard 
to language. His actions, too, vary according to their context. He can get up 
early to go hunting because, he says, he likes it, while on other days, he 
simply can't get up early. Fred is lacking, perhaps, in rationale, but not in 
rhetoric. 
These debates, such as they are, resonate with another episode in the 
novel during which Will Ladislaw and his German artist friend, 
Naumann, animated by Dorothea's presence in Rome, debate the relative 
merits of language and painting as media of representation. Will 
maintains that '" ... painting and Plastik are poor stuff after all .. . Language 
is a finer medium"'(p.222). He goes on to say that "'Language gives a fuller 
image, which is all the better for being vague ... "'(p.222). While Naumann 
seems to have great faith in his representational powers, Will argues that 
representation is always somehow imperfect. While, of course, we must 
read his argument \" t~ ~\~\ of his incipient romance with Dorothea, Will 
speaks of movement and tone, differences, mercuriality, ephemerality -
qualities, he argues, which resist representation, or at least problematize it. 
What follows is also interesting. In Naumann's studio, Casaubon and 
Dorothea are entreated to pose as studies for Aquinas and Santa Clara, to 
which they assent. The irony of Ladislaw's and Naumann's machinations 
aside, and "Naumann's jokes at the expense of Mr Casaubon", this 
episode, like the debates between Fred and Rosy, Ben and Letty, reinforces 
a suggestion in the novel that questions of representation are ne:Nr ei:.s;~ 
nor readily answered. 
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Language, as these examples suggest, serves an important but equivocal 
function in the representational scheme of Middlemarch. The novel 
makes its representation in language but it also concentrates upon 
language, undermining the possibility of authoritative representation. 
Furthermore, language, itself is an important element of the "reality" of 
Middlemarch life. From the gossip which takes the story from the streets 
of the town to the parlours of the gentry, to the artistic debates between 
Ladislaw and Naumann, the ways in which people speak to one another 
becomes an important part of the novel's representation of social life. 
This last point warrants further attention. In an early episode of the novel, 
Brooke, Chettam, and the newly-arrived Casaubon, as well as Dorothea 
and Celia, are dining at Tipton Grange. As with the episode at the Green 
Dragon, which is prefaced by the lines from Measure for Measure, the 
famous debate between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza which introduces 
this chapter heightens the complexity of the scenes which follow. 
The narrator introduces this scene in media res, in the middle of Brooke's 
conversation. Brooke and Casaubon are counterposed to one another; at a 
later stage, Brooke claims Will Ladislaw, who is more explicitly 
Casaubon's textual foil, as an alter ego (p.551). An index of the differences 
between Casaubon and Brooke, is their verbal manner. Brooke is 
profligate in his use of language, his "impetuous reason" (p.39) generates 
several habits of speech which indicate the waywardness of his thoughts; 
his "having gone into" various matters, "having known" historical 
persons, randomly acquired and recalled bits of information with which 
he peppers his conversation. These traits are well-known in 
Middlemarch; Mrs Cadwallader, regarding Brooke's acquiescence in 
Dorothea's first marriage, bitterly remarks, "as if you could ever squeeze a 
resolution out of Brooke"(p.82), and Lydgate calls him "a leaky-minded 
fool"(p.695). Certainly, Brooke's "impetuosity" when it comes to speaking 
has no greater testament than when he threatens to include Virgil in his 
wide circle of acquaintances (p.78). 
By contrast, Casaubon is one of the characters in the novel whose 
commitment to one or another model of essential truth is dramatized in 
the story. Dorothea's "plans," and Lydgate's search for the primitive tissue 
are the other important examples of this aspect of the novel, what might 
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be called the St. Theresa principle. Like Theresa, Casaubon has here come 
across "domestic reality ... in the shape of uncles" (p.25), or at least 
Dorothea's uncle, and Brooke's frustration of Casaubon's higher pursuits 
is evident in the discourse over the dinner table. 
Again, the conversation between the diners is an element of the realism 
of the novel. Each personality is presented in the context of this very 
ordinary social occasion. However, we see again the way in which this 
realistic device is also typical of the simultaneous analysis of its own 
features which is evident in the novel. That Brooke and Casaubon see 
things as differently as Don Quixote and Sancho is represented by the 
conversation which takes place, or, rather, doesn't take place between 
them. Casaubon, as Celia later remarks, "talks very little"(p.41). Addressed 
by Brooke, his first response is as follows: "'No,' said Mr Casaubon, not 
keeping pace with Mr Brooke's impetuous reason"(p.39). He then goes on 
to deliver his speech regarding, among other things, his intention to 
reconstruct the ancient world "in spite of ruin and confusing 
changes"(p.40). His speech is what we might call monologic, it bears little 
relation to the remark which was addressed to him, and sits outside the 
dialogue. There is no verbal response to his precise statement, only 
Dorothea's mental response which is, of course, destined to be confuted. 
The narrative then turns to Sir James' contribution to the conversation 
which is quintessentially social. He turns to engage Celia in the 
conversation. But Dorothea is not listening and, meanwhile, Mr Brooke 
continues to talk at Casaubon, who is similarly not listening. The 
narrative includes little of this background noise, but returns to it when 
Brooke again addresses Casaubon directly: "' ... Do you know 
Wilberforce?"' (p.41). Whereas the previous question had occasioned 
Casaubon's delivery of a short monologue, the narrative this time 
emphasizes the lack of communication in this exchange: "Mr Casaubon 
said, 'No."'(p.41) Brooke, of course persists with the conversation, and Mr 
Casauon's next response is paraphrased by the narrator: "Mr Casaubon 
bowed, and observed that it was a wide field"(p.41); his voice 1s now 
entirely withdrawn from the representation of this episode. 
Conversation, in this episode, is an important figure, and, once again, 
serves mixed ends. The scenario is realistic, insofar as the characters are 
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placed in an ordinary social environment, and the conversation is a 
particularly important feature of this context. But the complexities of the 
way in which this conversation is represented, as well as the contrast 
between Casaubon and Brooke, makes that very social activity a subject of 
inquiry. Conversation is both an emblem of the social reality towards 
which this episode is intended and an analytic figure which allows this 
social reality to be the object of critical analysis. If we consider what might 
be called the verbal destinies of these two men, the point is reinforced. 
On the one hand, Brooke's impetuous reason is a serious impediment to 
his reformative inclinations and his aspiration towards public life. The 
incident at Dagley' s is, perhaps, the most telling indictment of Brooke's 
general ineptitude1 of which his verbal inadequacy acts as a kind of 
symbolic index. The conversation between Dagley and Brooke, like that 
between Casaubon and Brooke, gets nowhere, but the incident takes place 
against Brooke's unease regarding unfavourable comments made about 
his attitudes and capacities as a landlord in a rival political newspaper. 
Accordingly, the narrator sets about describing Dagley's tenant farm in 
some detail, but dwells upon the differing interpretations of the scene, 
reflecting that Brooke's political context determines h ~J ~t sees Dagley's 
as "never ... before so dismal" (p.429) rather than as picturesque. The 
words of Sir James and the Trumpet speak across his apprehension of the 
scene, his own changed context bears upon the narrator's critique of the 
poor condition in which the rural poor live. 
The narrative then places Dagley himself within his own context, he is "a 
figure in the landscape" (p.429), but Dagley's extravagance at the Blue Bull 
has compromised his willingness to remain so, and as Brooke draws 
physically nearer to Dagley and his environment, Dagley begins to become 
the determining voice in a verbal exchange, rather than a figure in the 
landscape at which Brooke is looking. Similarly, the narrator draws nearer 
to the events of this episode, allowing the voices of the characters to be 
heard. Again, a conversation is the basis of the realism of the scene;the 
way in which each speaks, Dagley' s dialect, the tone and volume of their 
voices, the dog at Dagley's heels, Mrs Dagley's appearance and her chagrin 
towards Dagley, her wariness of the landlord, Dagley' s fierceness towards 
her .. An these elements which arise from Brooke's intention to speak to 
Dagley endow this episode with a depth of background which alludes to 
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the complex social environment in which the events of Middlemarch are 
set. Reality, as I have been arguing, is understood in this novel as a social 
environment which places people and events in a particular context in 
which they are to be understood. The events at Dagley's are a very pointed 
example of how the narrative evokes this context by concentrating upon 
social activity, or, more specifically, social discourse. 
Once again, however, the presence of the social in this episode is 
ambivalent. Instead of the context of this exchange being entirely 
determined, as if it were a graphic representation of a landscape, the 
conversation between Dagley and Brooke presents two irreconcilable 
positions within this landscape. Once again, it is language which is the 
vehicle of this interpretive collision. Mr Brooke begins by addressing 
Dagley as "my good fellow" (p.430). Dagley's antagonistic response is to 
echo Brooke's supercilious words: "'Oh, ay I'm a good feller am I ? Thank 
ye, sir, thank ye,' said Dagley with loud snarling irony"(p.430). Brooke's 
next words reflect his utter incapacity to "converse" with Dagley: 
Your little lad Jacob has been caught killing a leveret, 
Dagley: I Have told Johnson to lock him up in the 
empty stable an hour or two, just to frighten him, you 
know. ·But he will be brought home by-and-by, before 
night: and you'll just look after him, will you, and 
give him a reprimand, you know? (p.430) 
But while Brooke's words are phrased as a question, it is clear that he 
anticipates no response; his speech, in Bakhtinian terms, lacks 
answerability. He asks Dagley to "look after" the boy, and immediately 
suggests how this may be done. But in the charged relationship between 
Brooke and Dagley, between landowner and tenant in Georgian England, a 
vague phrase like "look after" is open to interpretation. While what 
Brooke actually says bespeaks a certain desire to appear the benevolent 
gentleman, Dagley hears a very different suggestion, and responds 
accordingly: 
'No, I woon't: I'll be dee' d if I'll leather my boy to 
please you or anybody else, not if you was twenty 
landlords istid o' one, and that a bad 'un.'(p.430) 
Not only do Dagley's words indicate the extent to which he and Brooke are 
not really speaking to one another but his reflection on Brooke's adequacy 
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as landlord adds another echoing voice to the chorus of similar 
sentiments which were troubling Brooke just before this incident. 
The exchange continues in this fashion; turning to Mrs Dagley, Brooke 
says that he doesn't want them to "give him the stick," (although he 
assumes that he would be within his rights to make such a demand) and 
Dagley again responds as if Brooke were suggesting quite the opposite. Mrs 
Dagley emerges from her environment to stand in the doorway, and to 
ask, quite firmly, what her son has done. But when her voice enters the 
conversation it is quickly silenced by Dagley. Her incidental appearance 
adds to this social collision an extra dimension: Brooke, in his capacity as 
landlord is talking about property and propriety; Dagley, the tenant 
farmer, speaks of generations of hardship, and Mrs Dagley, who 
significantly emerges from her kitchen, is concerned with her domestic 
difficulties. Their different perspectives, concerns, and voices, never, in 
this episode, coincide. The most telling indication of their lack of 
communication is when Dagley, attacking Brooke, appeals to the 
"Rinform," the very idea and word upon which Brooke so relies. 
The episode at Dagley's, then, highlights how the great attention to social 
detail works, simultaneously, in different ways. On the one hand, the 
narrative achieves a certain amount of realistic depth by including such 
details as where Dagley had been, what he had been doing, why Mrs 
Dagley appears, even the i Ml kt~ve.. actions of the two dogs. 
Moreover, the whole scene might be said to be entirely incidental. 
Certainly it doesn't contribute, like the episode outside the Green Dragon, 
to the plot, although it does contribute to the growing impression that 
Brooke's "miscellaneousness" is perhaps more serious than mere absent-
mindedness. On the other hand, however, these social details exemplify 
the extent to which this social reality depends upon the perspectives of the 
participants, and their voices are a kind of index of the cohesion, or in this 
case'"incohesion'; of the social world. Dagley, by dint of being drunk, has 
managed to give expression to his usually "tongue-tied"(p.430) discontent; 
his "having his say" means that this particular conversation at once 
contributes to the realism of the novel through its attendant attention to 
social details, and yet by representing the dissonance between Brooke, 
Dagley, and Mrs Dagley also invites a critique of the very conditions of 
these social details. 
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Dagley's "loud, snarling irony"(p.430) is revisited when Brooke's efficacy 
as a public man and as a speaker is put to another, more challenging test: 
his speech before the electors of Middlemarch. Again, this episode is 
firmly embedded in a social context, and certainly in a specific historical 
context. Mr Brooke's public life, or rather prospective public life, must be 
understood within the discourse of electoral reform in the late Georgian 
era. The detail with which this episode is presented makes this 
contextualization very strong. Brooke and Ladislaw, discussing Brooke's 
election strategy, touch on many historical details such as Brooke's 
allusion to ten-pound householders. Additionally, an important 
divergence between Brooke and Ladislaw is also becoming apparent at this 
stage, a marked distinction between them which is best represented by the 
fact that Brooke's failure in public life occasions Ladislaw' s own eventual 
success in that arena. 
When Brooke and his allies gather at the White Hart, once again the 
narrative includes what seem to be incidental details but are also highly 
analytical references. The White Hart is, it seems, right in the middle of 
town; it overlooks the market-place, the surrounding streets lead towards 
it. While these are realistic descriptive details, they also allude to the 
negotiations and exchange which make up public life in Middlemarch. 
Bambridge, as we have seen, knows how to market his discourse; Brooke 
is about to try his hand at what Bambridge, later in the novel, does so 
successfully. The details and location are anything but neutral, and the 
suggestion that Brooke's speech is a kind of commerce, reinforced by his 
overview of the market-place, his commercial alliances with Plymdale 
and Viney, as well as the general concern in the novel with negotiation 
and exchange, makes this very clear. Counterposed to Brooke at the White 
Hart are, of course, Hawley and his associates at the Green Dragon. In this 
casual reference the narrative conflates social life in Middlemarch, 
represented by the two taverns, with a broader view of historical and 
political reality. This, again, generates a realistic aspect to the narrative, but 
similarly, by establishing social life as a realistic horizon while 
simultaneously symbolizing the architectonics of social life, how it is 
made and what it is made of, the narrative becomes ambivalent. These 




Brooke's speech is exactly what we would expect: 
'I am a close neighbour of yours, my good friends -
you've known me on the bench a good while - I've 
always gone a good deal into public questions -
machinery, now, and machine-breaking - you' re 
many of you concerned with machinery, and I've 
been going into that lately ... (p.547) 
Needless to say, Brooke, "[p ]lying among his recollections in this way" 
(p.547), makes a poor speech. As he meanders along, however, a highly 
suggestive interruption emphasizes his shortcomings. The effigy of 
Brooke and a "parrot-like, Punch-voiced echo of his words" (p.547) which 
interrupt his speech are of dual significance. These reinforce the realistic 
dimension of this episode, they are an evocation of the kind of thing that 
happens at the hustings. But at the same time they contribute to the 
possible analysis and critique of this kind of social occasion, once again 
because, as in the case of Dagley, it is Brooke's speech, his language, which 
is being turned against him. The scene, which began as a speech, or 
perhaps a monologue, becomes a cacophony of heckling, Brooke's own 
voice, the mocking echo; "whistles, yells, bellowings, and fifes made all 
the greater hubbub because there was shouting and struggling to put them 
down"(p.549). Mr Brooke and his effigy, his "image" become, in a sense, 
indistinguishable, as the eggs begin to strike both of them 
indiscriminately. 
This scene vindicates Mrs Cadwallader's warning to Brooke against 
standing for election. In response to Brooke's explanation of his sale of 
land to Catholics, itself linguistically interesting - "persecuted for not 
persecuting" - Mrs Cadwallader previsions what eventually befalls 
Brooke: 
'There you go ! That is a piece of clap-trap you have 
got ready for the hustings. Now, do not let them lure 
you to the hustings, my dear Mr Brooke. A man 
always makes a fool of himself, speechifying: there's 
no excuse but being on the right side, so that you can 
ask a blessing on your humming and hawing. You 
will lose yourself, I forewarn you. You will make a 
Saturday pie of all parties' opinions, and be pelted by 
everybody.' (p. 77) 
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Mrs Cadwallader's prediction is unerringly accurate; a Saturday pie 1s 
exactly what Brooke delivers to the electors of Middlemarch, and he is, 
indeed, pelted. Brooke's incapacity to speak coherently is an index of his 
general inadequacies. His use of language, on the one hand, makes 
possible the detail and depth of this scene, but at the same time, there is a 
conflation of public life and a social environment with language. Social 
life depends upon a process which is entirely unlike Brooke's manner of 
speaking. Will's comparative success in the novel, as the eventually 
requited lover and as a figure in public life, can be attributed to the fact 
that he, despite Brooke's determined patronage of him, is quite unlike 
Brooke. In Middlemarch, for example, he is an editor, his task is to 
negotiate in and with language, and in public life. Despite his 
apprehension of the malleability of language - evident in his debate with 
Naumann - he nonetheless concerns himself with its application. Will's 
impatience, anxiety, and, finally, anger in this episode are an implicit 
critique of Brooke's semantic dissoluteness. 
But beyond Ladislaw, at what we might call the other end of the semantic 
scale, is of course Mr Casaubon. As the narrator suggests, Casaubon's 
manner of speaking provides a striking contrast to Brooke's: 
He delivered himself with precision, as if he had been 
called upon to make a public statement; and the 
balanced sing-song neatness of his speech, 
occasionally corresponded to by a movement of his 
head, was the more conspicuous from its contrast 
with good Mr Brooke's scrappy slovenliness. (p.40) 
Casaubon's philosophy of language, which gives rise to his manner of 
speaking, is an example of what Bakhtin characterized as abstract 
objectivism. He writes that "dead, written, alien language is the true 
description of the language with which linguistic thought has been 
concerned. " 7 Casaubon' s expertise is in Greek and Latin, and he agrees to 
7See Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p.73. We have seen above how 
abstract objectivism overlooks the social, interactive character of language which Bakhtin 
sees as the defining characteristic of language. Casaubon's shortcomings include, certainly, 
such an oversight. Were the application of Bakhtinian categories to be pursued, we might 
say that Brooke represents the other tendency in linguistics against which Bakhtin sets 
himself: individual subjectivism. Once again, the problem is a failure to comprehend the 
social quality of language, and Bakhtin's attribution of individual subjectivism to 
Romanticism makes Brooke's references to Shelley and Wordsworth particularly telling. 
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teach Dorothea the characters of these languages; constant reading, of 
course, threatens his eyesight. But Casaubon's problem, we might say, is 
not that his sight is deteriorating, or that his "taper stuck before him" 
(p.230) will never provide sufficient illumination. Casaubon's problem is 
not visual or optical, but verbal; it isn't that he cannot see, but that he 
cannot hear. Casaubon's problem, of course, is not only verbal, but his 
difficulties with language act as an index of his shortcomings in general. 
When Will criticizes Casaubon and his ambition, the substance of his 
critique is linguistic. Casaubon, we know, doesn't read German (p.240), 
and, in addition, he is not an Orientalist, and he seems to fail to appreciate 
that the subject of his study, is, according to Will, "as changing as 
chemistry" (p.254). He must cease, Will seems to be suggesting, to seek to 
see his material, as if it were an inert and entirely determined object, and 
begin to listen to it. Even Brooke hits the mark when he suggests that 
'"Casaubon has been a little too narrow ... "'(p.321). 
Casaubon, however, won't listen; his own anxiety reveals this. His 
periodic communications on his subject, his parerga, which, he suspects, 
are not being read, are complicated by "the rivalry of dialectical phrases 
ringing against each other in his brain"(p.315). A misplaced dedication, he 
feels, has compromised his work, an uneasiness on Casaubon's part which 
reflects that the historicism of scholarship is something to which he is 
unable to reconcile himself. 
The Casaubons' trip to Rome is the apogee of Casaubon's battle against 
"ruin and confusing change" (p.40). "[L]iving and warm-blooded"(p.225), 
Rome, as we have seen, becomes the setting for some of the novel's most 
poignant and pregnant moments. On the one hand, the wedding-journey 
to Rome is integrated thoroughly into the realistic dimension of the 
novel. There is an abundance of descriptive detail, as well as a plausible 
background to their arrival in Rome. On the other hand, this realistic 
location opens, once again, a variety of interpretive possibilities. The first 
is the difference in the responses to Rome of the principals. Will, we 
know, negotiates Rome with little difficulty, he enjoys "the very 
miscellaneousness of Rome, which made the mind flexible with constant 
comparison, and saved you from seeing the world's ages as a set of box-
That Brooke and Casaubon have trouble communicating at all makes the dinner party at 
the Grange, where they try to communicate with one another, a good illustration of their 
respective shortcomings. 
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like partitions without vital connection"(p.244). The contrast between 
Will's response and Casaubon's is emphasized by the narrative which, 
paraphrasing Will's words, makes clear that such a view, despite Will's 
reassurance to the contrary, is exactly what Casaubon holds to. Casaubon's 
response to Rome lacks all vitality. He speaks of Rome to Dorothea in a 
"measured official tone" which does little for "the glories of the Eternal 
City"(p.229), and always distances himself from any suggestions he makes 
about things that she should see. Regarding Raphael, Casaubon observes 
that "' ... most persons think it worth while to visit ... "'(p.229) his frescoes 
which, he believes, are highly esteemed. 
As for Dorothea, Rome occasions and introduces several important 
features of her story. It is where she and Will begin their relationship. But 
more symbolically, it is where "domestic reality" meets her Theresa-like 
idealism. The figure of Theresa, which introduces the novel and 
Dorothea, anticipates both Dorothea and Lydgate. Earlier in the novel, 
Dorothea, in a fashion, mimics the events described in the preface. 
Theresa's early collision with her uncles anticipates a similar event in 
Middlemarch. Contemplating the possibility of marrying Casaubon, 
Dorothea is walking through the woods at the Grange when she, too, is 
met by domestic reality; not her uncle, but James Chettam and the ill-fated 
puppy, which Dorothea would fear to tread on. While Chettam literally 
interrupts her, Rome and the events in Rome present a far more 
profound challenge to her idealism, because there her meddlesome 
domestic reality and her idealism coincide, at least in part; Casaubon is the 
focus of both. 
The treatment of language in the novel, as with the use of chance, is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, it is a vital constituent of the social 
environment which is the reality of the novel. On the other, language 
which acts as a kind of metonym for social behaviour, is represented as 
such a problem that it necessarily problematizes the social world of the 
novel. We have, then, the seeming paradox of the concrete 
representational horizon of the novel being undermined by the very 
narrative figures which constituted it in the first place. The social begins to 
undo itself. 
(d) A huge whispering-gallery: the unreliability of the social world 
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The realism of Middlemarch, then, is ambivalent. It relies on language 
and on coincidence, and in doing so introduces readers to the social world 
which it seeks to represent. But these two constitutents of the realism of 
the novel also tend to undo its realistic efficacy. Chance, as we have seen, 
not only determines the social world, but also overdetermines it, making 
the social world, to a certain extent, objective, which renders it more easily 
represented. The narrator's concern to select and demarcate the 
representational horizon of the novel - "It would be well, certainly," the 
narrator says of the characters in the novel, "if we could help to reduce 
their number"(p.448) - has the effect of making the world of the text not 
only manageable, but also unrealistic, the reduction in numbers is too 
reliant on chance and coincidence. Language in the novel works in the 
other direction. If language is as volatile as it seems to be, what can we 
make of the narrator's own testimony? 
This last question, I suggest, goes to the very heart of the question of 
realism in Middlemarch. The matter of the letter which falls into Raffles' 
hands has already been mentioned as an example of implausible 
coincidence in the novel. But it might, perhaps, be considered more 
symbolically. Introducing the scene in which Raffles takes up the fallen 
letter, the narrator asks a particularly poignant question: "Who shall tell 
what may be the effect of writing ?" (p.448). The reference is of course to 
Joshua Rigg Featherstone's letter to Bulstrode, a "bit of ink and paper 
which has long been an innocent wrapping"(p.448) but which accidentally 
comes to have dramatic consequences. But the novel, too, is a form of 
writing, and while Raffles' was the "one pair of eyes which have 
knowledge enough to turn (the letter) into the opening of a catastrophe" 
(p.448), the opening of Middlemarch to historically distant readers might 
have less determinate consequences. 
However, the consequences are not indeterminate. As we have seen, the 
careful construction of a social reality, and the narrative evocation of that 
reality, makes the novel, at least in part, a work of realism. That is, it is, to 
a certain extent, determinate. But this determination is ambivalent, 
because it hovers between the over-determination of the novel, the 
necessary contraction of the world of the text to accomodate the plot, and 
indeterminacy, the malleability of its representational medium. 
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This, of course, is the kind of determinacy which I have discussed as a 
theoretical concept with regard to Lukacs, Auerbach, and Bakhtin. 
Understood in this fashion, the realism of Middlemarch, then, can be seen 
as an illustration of the theoretical claims developed in the previous parts 
of this thesis, as both a redirection of literary theory towards the concepts 
outlined particularly in Chapter 7, and as a re-evaluation of the concept of 
realism within such literary theory. The social world, as we have seen, 
provides the determination of a reading of the novel, but that same social 
world is, we might say, unreliable. The use of language, and the discussion 
of language, within the social world threatens to undermine it because, 
elsewhere in the novel, the tension in language between determinacy and 
indeterminacy, is considered. The same can be said of the use of chance. 
Mrs Farebrother comments, at one one point, that "Fortune is a woman 
and capricious" (p.584), and indeed, Fortune, or chance, in the novel is, if 
not capricious, not entirely consistent. Sometimes it satisfies the realistic 
requirements of the novel - chance meetings will, after all, take place - and 
sometimes it serves other requirements - Bulstrode's unlikely 
comeuppance, for example, contributes to a critique of institutionalized 
morality. Other narrative figures work in similarly ambivalent fashions. 
Myth, for example, is both part of the substance of Middlemarch life -
Farebrother is always making mythological references, and Casaubon, of 
course, is preoccupied with mythology. But it also serves as a kind of 
pattern which determines the story. Lydgate and Dorothea, the heroes of 
the novel, are placed against mythological backgrounds and even, 
occasionally, as is the case with Dorothea's meeting with Sir James and the 
unfortunate puppy, are represented as physically recreating mythology. 
It is clear, then, that Middlemarch embodies several representational 
modes, including realism, but also melodrama and mythology, as well as 
romance and even, occasionally, farce (Featherstone's vigil-keepers, for 
example, and Featherstone himself, brandishing his cane and pulling his 
wig over his ears, are certainly comic figures). The theoretical interest of 
the novel, or at least its interest for the present study, is that these modes 
are served by precisely the same narrative devices. The social world, 
which contributes to the realism of the novel, slides almost imperceptibly 
into the romance of the novel. The three love problems, which are part of 
the processes of parallelism which increase the density of the social world, 
have very different solutions: Fred and Mary's, we might say, is idyllic-
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pastoral; Will and Dorothea's romantic; and Rosamond and Lydgate's 
realistic. 
The realism of the novel, then, must sit alongside other ways of 
determining the novel. The novel certainly is, as Bakhtin might have put 
it, a consummated vision of the social world. The fluidity of the narrator 
allows the social world to be represented from outside, but, at the same 
time, such a vision is necessarily synthetic. The synthetic qualities of the 
realism of the novel, which include, of course, its very fictionality, 
illustrate the synthetic structure of reality itself. Reliance on the social 
world is accompanied by the representation that each chronotope of the 
social world, each representational background, is like "a whispering-
gallery" in which the idea of Truth, as such, is abandoned, and a new, 
social regime of determinacy is established. Realism, then, can be 
understood not as the dogmatic antithesis of critical theory, but as a 
concept within which the philosophical tension between indeterminacy 
and determinacy is realized. Its relationship to the idea of reality itself 
becomes both critical and representational, relying upon the real world as 
well as conferring its own problematic status upon it. 
When the narrator returns to Dorothea in the finale of the novel, the 
original representation of an antithesis between Dorothea/Theresa and 
the social world has given way to a telling reconciliation between the two. 
The determining acts of Dorothea's life are, the narrator suggests, the 
"mixed result of an imperfect social state, in which great feelings will 
often take the aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion"(p.896). 
But many of Dorothea's great feelings are erroneous, and her faith 
illusory. The realism of Middlemarch is a kind of insistence on the 
primary reality of the social state, which is, of course, imperfect. It is not a 
case, then, of choosing between realism and other modes of 
representation, either in Middlemarch or as a general theoretical position. 
It is rather that realism, like Middlemarch, or Cressida, is ineluctably 




'We hold these truths': history, fiction, and realism in U.S.A. 
Wonderful cities and free nations we shall fetch as we go. 
- Walt Whi trnan 
History and fiction are uneasily juxtaposed in John Dos Passos' U.S.A. and 
the relationship between these two discursive registers generates a 
hermeneutic tension which necessarily problematizes the idea of 
representation in the text. Different interpretations of this relationship 
result in very different ways of understanding the text. On the one hand, 
the historical and fictional discourses can be woven into a consistent 
representation. The historical figures and events referred to in the 
Newsreel and biographical sections can be correlated with events in the 
fictional narratives, and the different dimensions of the text tied together 
to generate a determinate representational pattern. On the other hand, if 
the disrupted experimental form of the text is given primacy, the text 
becomes a radical critique of the historical discourse which it incorporates, 
emphasizing and criticizing the extent to which the idea of history is or 
can be dominated by conventional forms of historiography. 
The concept of realism for which this thesis has argued is predicated upon 
the possibility of simultaneously entertaining different interpretive 
possibilities. The tension between the two hermeneutic directions which 
can be taken in approaching U.S.A. is, as I shall try to show, a good 
illustration of the synthetic properties of this idea of realism. Rather than 
either taking the social and historical background of the text "as it is," or 
engaging in a radical critique of the ideas of society and history, thinking of 
U.S.A. in terms of the idea of realism for which I have argued both 
recognizes the cognitive volatility of the historical background and allows 
the text to establish a determinate representation of it, without 
overestimating the epistemological and semantic authority of such a 
representation. 
(a) The function of history 
In U.S.A., as I have suggested, the tension inherent in this idea of realism 
derives from the different understandings of history which might be 
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adduced. One interpretive possibility is to consider history as a kind of 
referential framework for the text. As historical events and figures are 
incorporated into the text they perform a contextualizing function which 
hermeneutically frames the fictional narratives. If history takes this kind 
of place in an interpretive scheme, the individual fictional lives with 
which readers become familiar are lent a degree of historical 
verisimilitude, making U.S.A. seem, at least to a certain extent, realistic. 
This interpretive tendency can be seen in the way in which historical 
events and figures act to condense the action of the fictional narratives. 
The First World War, for example, concentrates most of the fictional 
characters in and around Paris, and the personal narratives are played out 
against the background of the peace conference and Woodrow Wilson's 
visit to Paris and Rome. The Russian revolution and its implications also 
lurk meaningfully in the background. When Dick Savage returns to Paris 
after the war, this narrative concentration around historical references is 
clearly evident: 
The hub of this Paris was the Hotel de Crillon on the 
Place de la Concorde, its artery the Rue Royale where 
arriving dignitaries, President Wilson, Lloyd George, 
and the King and Queen of the Belgians were 
constantly parading escorted by the Garde 
Republicaine in their plumed helmets; Dick began 
living in a delirium of trips to Brussels on the night 
express, lobster cardinal washed down with Beaune 
on the red plush settees at Larue's, champagne 
cocktails at the Ritz Bar, talk full of the lowdown over 
a demie at the Cafe Weber;1 
In Paris, Dick meets J. Ward Moorehouse and his associate Ed Robbins, 
whom he eventually replaces as Moorehouse's right-hand man. Speaking 
of Paris, they have the following exchange: 
'Still I'm glad to be back in little old Paree,' said Dick, 
smiling and stretching his legs out under the table. 
'Only place in the world to be right at present,' said 
Robbins. 'Paris is the hub of the world ... unless it's 
Moscow.'(p.633) 
1John Dos Passos, U.S.A. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p.631. All references are to this 
edition and will be included in the text. U.S.A. was first published as three separate novels 
- The 42nd Parallel, 1919, and The Big Money - in 1930, 1932, and 1936 respectively. The 
collected trilogy was first published in 1938. 
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Historical Paris is both the hub of the narrative at this stage and, as 
Robbins suggests, the conceptual centre of the world. It acts in U.S.A. as a 
kind of Bakhtinian chronotope, representing the organization of the real 
world, and binding the narrative sections of the text together. Later in the 
text, the historical and narrative focus shifts to New York. '"It's curious," 
Eveline Hutchins says, "' After the war New York .... nobody can keep away 
from it"'(p.781). 
If history is interpreted in this fashion then it acts primarily as the 
background to the fictional events. The participation of the fictional 
characters in a historical process allows readers vicariously to engage with 
the historical world. Interpretive focus is provided by the fictional 
characters and the text becomes a fictional conduit through which the 
social and historical background of the text becomes hermeneutically 
available to the reader. 
If interpretation is approached through the fictional characters in this 
fashion, it is possible to relegate history to a kind of passive background to 
their individual lives. All the characters are fairly ordinary people, they 
emerge from their historical environment in the manner described by 
Lukacs as the defining quality of the historical novel.2 Woodrow Wilson 
may appear in Rome (see p.645), but only as part of the background of 
Dick's story. It is worth noting also the way in which the fictional 
characters function in the backgrounds of other characters' narratives. Joe 
Williams, for example, appears sporadically in Janey's narrative, and 
significantly in Dick's when they coincide in Genoa. In turn, Janey appears 
in other narratives as Miss Williams, Moorehouse' s personal secretary. 
Moorehouse himself is perhaps the most salient example of this feature of 
the text. There are three sections in The 42nd Parallel devoted to him, after 
which, as he becomes increasingly successful as a propagandist and 
advertising magnate, he appears only in other characters' narratives. The 
2See, for example, Lukacs' discussion of Scott in The Historical Novel, pp.33££, and my 
discussion of Lukacs in Chapter 4 above. One must be cautious, however, in suggesting 
parallels between Lukacs' theory and Dos Passos' practice. Lukacs had responded 
antagonistically to Brecht's endorsement of Dos Passos' avant-gardism (in Manhattan 
Transfer); see Lukacs, Essays on Realism, p.176. Elsewhere he certainly seemed to consider 
Dos Passos on the modernist side of the realism/modernism debate; see Lukacs, The 
Meaning of Contemporary Realism, p.58. As we have seen, however, understanding and 
employing Lukacs' critical insights often requires a degree of latitude, given the overtly 
partisan quality of much of his work. 
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nature of Moorehouse's work makes him increasingly a part of the 
historical process which the text represents, and as such, his personal 
experience of the historical process recedes into the background of the text. 
His life is represented through the perspectives of other characters. When, 
after a brief romantic liaison, Eveline Hutchins asks him why he is so 
distant, his response is telling: " ... he said quickly, 'I never write personal 
letters,' and changed the subject"(p.599). 
But this is certainly not the only way of understanding the function of 
history in U.S.A. While it is possible to consider history as the background 
of the fiction, the unusual form of the text, its disruptedness and generic 
experimentation, unsettles such a relationship. Certain kinds of 
historiographical discourses are foregrounded in U.S.A. in such a way as to 
encourage a critique of the discourses through which the idea of history 
itself is established. By isolating fragments of historical discourse, and by 
presenting them in unusual forms - such as the poetic biographies of 
historical figures - the text, in a sense, defamiliarizes history, questioning 
the extent to which it provides a determinate representational framework 
for the fictional narratives. Rather than the fiction of the text relying on 
history to organize and concretize it, the fictional discourse and the textual 
structure of U.S.A . engage in a a critique of the idea of history. The 
Newsreel sections, for example, include fragments of journalistic 
discourse such as Moorehouse might have invented. Newsreel 35 
includes this headline: LENIN SHOT BY TROTSKY IN DRUNKEN 
BRAWL (p.618), an echo of Moorehouse's confident, but erroneous, 
assertion that the Soviet Union will be short-lived: '"No, I have reliable 
information that Lenine (sic) and Trotsky have split and the monarchy 
will be restored in Russia inside of three months"'(p.587). 
Rather than history contextualizing the fiction, U.S.A. begins to articulate 
what we might call the poetic structure of history.3 This is emphasized by 
the way in which the text represents history as a kind of dehumanizing 
and irresistible force which dominates the lives of the fictional characters. 
Moorehouse who, as we have seen, slides from being a narrative focus to a 
background presence in other narratives, exemplifies the processes of 
interested disinformation in the historical environment. 
3Hayden White's introduction to Metahistory, a key text in contemporary critique of 
history and historical knowledge, is entitled "The Poetics of History." 
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There is also a persistent sense of inevitable degeneration throughout the 
text, to which many of the characters are sacrificed. Dick Savage is a good 
example of this aspect of the text. Originally a pacifist, scholar, and aspiring 
poet, Dick gradually abandons any authenticity or good faith in these 
pursuits for a combination of hedonism and commercial ambition. 
Shortly before he first returns to America from Europe, Dick is 
reprimanded for voicing anti-war sentiments. "'Don't monkey with the 
buzzsaw"'(p.508), he is told. But back in Paris for the Peace Conference, 
Captain Savage meets Ripley, one of his friends from the ambulance 
service, who tells him that another of their group, Steve Warner, has been 
jailed in Boston for refusing to register for the draft. When Dick first 
arrived in Paris as Captain Savage, he had wondered "what had happened 
to Steve" (p.631). When he meets Ripley, however, the other man's 
cynicism alarms Dick: 
This kind of talk made Dick feel uneasy: 'Mefiez-
vous,' he quoted. 'Les oreilles ennemis vous 
ecoutent.' 
'And that's not the half of it.' 
'Say, have you heard anything from Steve Warner?' 
Dick asked in a low voice. 
'I got a letter from Boston .. . I think he got a year's 
sentence for refusing to register ... He's lucky ... A lot 
of those poor devils got twenty years.' 
'"Well that's what comes of monkeying with the 
buzzsaw,' said Dick out loud.(p.652). 
Dick's warning to Ripley is a quote of the wartime advice which, 
previously in the text, Eveline Hutchins reads on a sign on the wall, and 
his response to Steve's fate is a mocking echo of the reprimand once given 
to him. Similarly, Dick's poetic aspiration degenerates into a tendency to 
come up with vapid doggerel (p. 626) and parodies of French rhymes 
(p .635), and later manifests itself in his publicrelations (sic) talents. 
Dick's poetry and pacifism are not the only ideological casualties in U.S.A . 
Dos Passos engages in a critique of many aspects of American culture and 
society. Particularly, U.S.A. dramatizes the corruption of the American 
left. G.H. Barrow appears intermittently throughout the text, and his 
vacuous endorsement of what he calls the "art of life" represents the 
betrayal of the American labour movement. Don Stevens, who similarly 
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moves 1n and out of the narrative, consolidates his position within the 
Communist Party, and is a thinly disguised symbol of Dos Passos' 
disillusionment with the political left.4 Mac's commitment to the I.W.W. 
waxes and wanes, and Charley Anderson's repeated claim to be "just a 
mechanic" rings increasingly hollow as he becomes both richer and more 
dissolute. It is not only the political left that is targetted in U.S.A. The 
portrayal of Moorehouse, as I have already mentioned, and Eleanor 
Stoddard contributes to the relentless critique of other aspects of American 
society, while Joe Williams and Eveline Hutchins, among others, are 
represented as literal casualties of their historical circumstances. 
In my discussion of Lukacs I canvassed his development of the concept of 
reification, the way in which particular historical circumstances turn 
human subjects into almost inert objects. In U.S.A. Dick Savage almost 
ironically gives voice to the way in which the text illustrates what we 
might understand as the reification of history and its dehumanizing effect. 
After he convinces Anne Elizabeth Trent not to expect him to marry her -
an episode about which, he muses, he might "write a poem and send it to 
her" (p.663) - she, pregnant with his child, becomes recklessly despairing. 
After an all-night drinking session with some French aviators, she 
convinces one of them to take her for a joyride at dawn. The plane crashes 
and she is killed. Dick tries to rationalize his indifference to Eleanor 
Stoddard: "' ... When history's walking on all our faces is no time for pretty 
sentiments"'(p.717). Dick's callousness and his feeling that the pressure of 
his historical circumstances preclude him from feeling remorseful are 
emotional illustrations of a reified social structure. Before A11ne 
Elizabeth's death, one of Dick's reasons for not wanting to marry her was 
the burden that a wife and child would place upon him in his new career 
in publicrelations (sic). 
4Many studies of Dos Passos detail his political journey from left to right; a good overview 
is provided by Barry Maine in his introduction to Barry Maine ed., Dos Passos: The Critical 
Heritage (Routledge: London, 1988). U.S.A., and particularly The Big Money, is an 
important landmark in this transition. Dos Passos' representation of Communism is 
discussed by, among others, the American Marxists Granville Hicks and Michael Gold, who 
place it in the context of Dos Passos' experience of the Spanish Civil War; see Gold, "The 
Keynote to Dos Passos' Works", and Hicks, "The Moods and Tenses of John Dos Passos", both 
in Dos Passos: The Critical Heritage, and, particularly, Hicks, "The Politics of John Dos 
Passos", in Andrew Hook ed., Dos Passos: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p.113. 
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In contrast to the first interpretive possibility which employs history as a 
context for the fictional action, this use of history invites a radical critique 
of that idea. The cycle of despair and alienation which is asseverated 
throughout the fictional narratives, the sacrifice of the individual to the 
social and historical, is represented as an inevitable consequence of the 
historical process. Jean-Paul Sartre notes the disruptive effect which 
results from this critical juxtaposition of history and fiction: 
Their significance ( the characters in 1919) is fixed. 
Close your eyes and try to remember your own life, try 
to remember it that way; you will stifle. It is this 
unrelieved stifling that Dos Passos wanted to express. 
In capitalist society, men do not have lives, they have 
only destinies. He never says this, but he makes it felt 
throughout. He expresses it discreetly, cautiously, 
until we feel like smashing our destinies.5 
Sartre's observation is borne out by the shift in historical focus from Mac, 
the I.W.W., the Goldfield strike, and revolutionary Mexico; through Dick 
Savage, Harvard, and Paris; to Charley Anderson, New York, and Detroit. 
This development in the text evinces an interpretation of American 
history as the gradual emergence and triumph of the forces of industrial 
capital over democratic egalitarian principles. The pattern of the 
accompanying historical biographies reinforces this interpretation. In The 
42nd Parallel, industry, development, and labour relations are posited as 
the crucial social and historical dynamics of the twentieth-century, and, 
accordingly, it includes biographies of labour leaders such as Eugene Debs 
and Bill Haywood; pioneer businessmen and industrialists, Minor Keith 
and Andrew Carnegie; scientists and inventors, Thomas Edison and 
Luther Burbank. In 1919 Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and the 
Morgans exemplify the growing international significance of the United 
States, and particularly their intervention in the war. The Big Money 
details spectacular examples of the rapid development of particular sectors 
of American society; manufacturing, Henry Ford; popular cinema, 
Valentino; industry, Samuel Insull. 6 
5Jean-Paul Sartre, "John Dos Passos and 1919" (1938), in his Literary Essays, trans. Annette 
Michelson (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press), 1955, p.92. 
61 should acknowledge that this pattern doesn't encompass all the historical biographies. 
In The Big Money, for example, alongside Ford and Insull there are biographies of 
dissenting voices such as Thorstein Veblen, or of tragic figures such as Isadora Duncan, and 
the alienated Frank Lloyd Wright, "not without honour, except in his own 
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History is not, then, the passive objective background of a novel, but 
represented as an active and destructive process which the commodifying 
forces of American capital come to dominate. This model of history is of 
reified social relations within which human lives become predetermined; 
lives, as Sartre suggests, become destinies. By dramatizing the 
confrontation between individuals and this idea of history, U.S.A. can be 
understood as a critique of received ideas of history, an effort to interrupt 
or at least protest against its inexorable movement. The textual dissonance 
which results from the fragmented quality of the text is an effort to move 
beyond the simple representation of history, and to challenge it, in Sartre's 
terms, to smash destiny. 
These different functions of history in U.S.A. are seemingly antithetical, 
and critical responses have certainly tended to choose between them. They 
suggest what we might call a realist and a modernist interpretation of 
U.S.A. In terms of American literary history Dos Passos and U.S.A. do 
represent a kind of transitional point between these different aesthetic 
tendencies. But, as I have indicated, the idea of realism for which I have 
argued is an attempt to get beyond the dichotomy between realism and 
modernism, and the corresponding antithesis between realism and critical 
theory. In order to suggest how U.S.A. might synthesize the two different 
interpretations of history which I have set out above, it is instructive 
briefly to consider how other critics have characterized the relationship 
between fiction and history in the text. 
(b) Between realism and modernism 
Beginning with Manhattan Transfer and extending through the three 
novels which comprise the U.S.A. trilogy, Dos Passos developed and 
employed the experimental techniques for which he is perhaps most well-
known. By breaking the trilogy into different narrative sections, and 
systematically including fragments of extraliterary discourse, Dos Passos 
obviously departed from traditional narrative models ("what would 
Henry James say ?", one critic rhetorically wondered7), because of which 
country" (p.1080). Generally, however, the emergence of figures such as Ford overshadows 
the increasingly disillusioned representations of these historical dissidents. 
7Delmore Schwartz, "John Dos Passes and the Whole Truth" (1938), in Dos Passos: The 
Critical Heritage , p.183. 
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his work has often been discussed in terms of its generic experimentation, 
or placed in the context of literary modernism. The relationship between 
U.S.A. and film, for example, is one of the most pointed examples of Dos 
Passos' manipulation of generic conventions and techniques. The 
Newsreel and Camera Eye sections have been described as "properties ... 
borrowed from the motion picture" and the whole trilogy as "an 
experiment in montage." 8 Parallels with experimental writers, and 
particularly Joyce, have also been frequent9, and certainly justifiable, as 
U.S.A. often betrays Joyce's influence, stylistically and thematically. Buck 
Mulligan's ambition to Hellenise Ireland in Ulysses, for example, is 
echoed ( or prefigured) by Dick Savage's faux aestheticism. Reflecting upon 
the American presence in Europe after the Great War, Dick suggests that 
he and his compatriots are "' ... the Romans of the Twentieth Century"', 
while he "' ... always wanted to be a Greek"(p.646). 
These properties of the trilogy certainly set U.S.A. apart from simple ideas 
of the realistic novel, and this idea is well represented in Dos Passos 
scholarship. Charles Marz, for example, claims that the "usual criterion of 
realistic style, that it vanishes before the reality of the subject, does not 
apply to its pages."10 Stanley Corkin, discussing The 42nd Parallel, 
similarly argues that its "modernist form explicitly ruptures the realist 
conventions of naturalism and disrupts its potentially quieting effect." 11 
8Horace Gregory, "Dos Passos Completes His Modem Trilogy"(1936), in Dos Passos: The 
Critical Heritage, p.131. For a more general study of the influence of the cinema in Dos 
Passos' novels, see Claude-Edmonde Magny, L'age du roman americain (Paris: Seuil, 1948), 
p.68££; Alan Spiegel, Fiction and the Camera Eye: Visual Consciousness in Film and the 
Modern Novel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Presss, 1976), p .177. 
9Melvin Landsberg notes that Dos Passos had read Ulysses in 1922, and Joyce's name 
frequently appears in reviews and criticism of Manhattan Transfer and U.S.A.; see Melvin 
Landsberg, Dos Passos' Path to U.S.A.: A Political Biography 1912-1936 (Boulder: 
Colarado Associated University Press, 1972), p.117. Among the critics and reviewers who 
have compared Dos Passos with Joyce are Sinclair Lewis and Michael Gold, who note 
similarities and view Dos Passos' work favourably; see Sinclair Lewis, "Manhattan at 
Last", and Michael Gold, "The Education of John Dos Passos", both in Dos Passos: The 
Critical Heritage at p.68 and p.115 respectively. Bernard de Voto goes so far as to posit Dos 
Passos' reading of Joyce as a watershed in his career: "Mr Dos Passos published his second 
and bad novel; he read Joyce, and in 1925 Manhattan Transfer appeared"; in Dos Passos: 
The Critical Heritage, p.123. 
10Charles Marz, "U.S.A.: Chronicle and Performance", Modern Fiction Studies, 26, 3 
(Autumn 1980), p.399. 
11Stanley Corkin, "John Dos Passos and the American Left: Recovering the Dialectic of 
History", Criticism, 34, 4 (Fall 1992), p.5948. Corkin's article is a good example of what I 
have referred to as the modernist interpretation of U.S.A. His analysis, which places The 
42nd Parallel into the theoretical and historical contexts of Hegelian Marxism and 
American history, relies upon an antithesis between critical theory and American 
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As often as the experimental, modernist qualities of U.S.A. are cited, 
however, its realism is also discussed. Delmore Schwartz, for example, 
claims that "[w]hatever else we may say of American life as represented in 
these narratives, there is one statement which we must make first; it is so, 
it is true" .12 Robert P. Weeks states clearly that U.S.A. can be considered a 
work of realism, 13 and Corkin, whom I have cited as maintaining that The 
42nd Parallel disrupts realistic form, concedes nonetheless that it can be 
considered in terms of the "conventional realist devices of its fictional 
sections", 14 although he advocates a different approach. 
My inclusion of U.S.A. in this study obviously gestures against critical 
tendencies to overstate the experimental in the novel at the expense of the 
realistic. Despite its various multiplicities and its unusual form, U.S.A. is 
certainly less abstract a novel than Manhattan Transfer, in which 
narrative Expressionism dominated the representation of New York. 
Indeed, Alfred Kazin is quite harsh in his criticism of Manhattan Transfer 
and its imperfect Expressionism, and goes on to say of U.S.A. that its 
achievement lies in its narrative sections which allow readers to "see each 
life perfectly at the moment it passes by" .15 Kazin argues against 
overstating the importance of the formal experimentation of the trilogy: 
Technically U.S.A. is one of the great achievements of 
the modern novel, yet what that achievement is can 
easily be confused with its elaborate formal structure. 
naturalism which resembles the arguments levelled against realism which this thesis 
contests. He uses terms such as "reify" and "naturalize" which evince his affinities with 
skeptical theories, and argues that U.S.A. is primarily a reaction against these political 
and aesthetic tendencies. In a footnote, Corkin refers to another of his articles in which he 
argued that the "realist form of American naturalism may, despite the explicit intentions 
of its practitioners, reify a positivist definition of self and the world"; p.609, n.10. 
American naturalism, represented, for example, by Theodore Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis, 
is, in my view, a kind of literary realism, committed to the same representational 
ambitions as what is generally known as realism, with important sub-generic 
particularities. Such a view is supported by Becker's suggestion that in the twentieth-
century, literary realism was most pointedly evident in American fiction; see Becker, 
Documents of Modern Literary Realism, pp.18-20. By contrast, however, some views of 
literary history posit a fundamental distinction between realism and naturalism. Lukacs, 
as I have discussed above, certainly held to such a view. 
12Schwartz, "John Dos Passos and the Whole Truth", p.183. 
13See Robert P. Weeks, "The Novel as Poem: Whitman's Legacy to Dos Passos", Modern 
Fiction Studies, 26, 3 (Autumn 1980), p.445. 
14Corkin, "Dos Passos and the American Left", p.595. 
15 Alfred Kazin, "Dos Passos, Society and the Individual" (1942), in Andrew Hook ed., Dos 
Passos: A Collection of Critical Essays , .p.113. 
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For the success of Dos Passos' method does not rest 
primarily on his schematization of the novel into 
four panels, four levels of American experience - the 
narrative proper, the "Camera Eye," the 
"Biographies," and the "Newsreel." That 
arrangement, while original enough, is the most 
obvious thing in the book and soon becomes the most 
mechanical. The book lives by its narrative style ... 16 
Edmund Wilson expresses a similar preference for The 42nd Parallel over 
Manhattan Transfer. Praising Dos Passos for his incorporation of 
"colloquial American" into the novel, and for conveying a sense of 
his people's lives: their friends and the members of 
their families, their amusements and their periods of 
stagnation, the places where they work and how 
much they get, the meals they eat, the beds they sleep 
in.17 
Or, to recall Chekhov's Kostia, with whom we started this study, how they 
walk, talk, and so forth. 
These conflicting critical perspectives attest to the equivocal function of 
history in the text. On the one hand, U.S.A. incorporates realistic narrative 
and its general ambition certainly seems to be the kind of social and 
historical representation which characterizes realism. On the other hand, 
the form of the novel strains at the consistency of realism, incorporating 
extra-literary influences18, threatening to obscure the "reality" towards 
which it is intended. Certainly, the unusual experimental form of the 
trilogy disrupts the consistency of the narrative and, among other things, 
contributes to the interrogation of historical discourses with which the 
trilogy is concerned, criticizing what Adorno or Althusser might have 
called "ideology." This is the dimension of the text which motivates 
Corkin's juxtaposition of The 42nd Parallel with Hegelian Marxism, a 
16Kazin, "Dos Passos, Society and the Individual", pp.112-113. 17Edmund Wilson, "Dahlberg, Dos Passos, Wilder" (1930) in his The Shores of Light: A 
Literary Chronicle of the Twenties and Thirties (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1952), 
p.448. 
18It is worth noting that Bakhtin, in "Discourse in the Novel", characterizes the 
incorporation of extraliterary discourse as one of the principal means of introducing and 
realizing heteroglossia which is one of the defining features of the novel; see M.M. 
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, pp.261-262. Dos Passos' multi-voiced trilogy, then, 
would seem to be an apposite example of what Bakhtin had in mind by heteroglossia. 
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manoeuvre which, in contrast to Kazin's assessment, relies upon the 
proposition that the novel's "most notable feature, its innovative form, 
acts as Adorno' s ideal modernist text ... (it) ruptures the apparent solidity 
of realist conventions of representation". 19 
But the idea of realism for which I have argued involves a synthesis of 
representation and critique. In the case of U.S.A. this synthesis is only 
possible if equal interpretive weight is given to both the individuated, 
fictional narratives, and the collective juxtaposition of these fictional 
narratives with other representational discourses. As I shall try to show, 
such an approach countenances both the realistic and the critical 
dimensions of U.S.A., sim ul taneousl y entertaining these previously 
opposed views of the text. The juxtaposition of fiction and history in the 
text creates the kind of realism for which this thesis has argued. Rather 
than proceeding from an antithesis between the two - and, by extension, 
between realism and theoretical critique - we can consider U.S.A. in terms 
of a creative synthesis of fiction and history, which is at once realistic and 
critical, allowing readers to avoid choosing between the realist and 
modernist interpretations of U.S.A. and between understanding history as 
either context or critical target. 
(c) The speech of the people: narrative in V .S.A. 
The individual narratives in U.S.A., as I've already suggested, are the most 
accessible vehicles of realism in the text. But, as I shall try to show, these 
narratives evince a negotiation between different interpretive 
perspectives, and the dynamic interaction between these perspectives 
recreates the tension between the two understandings of history which I 
have been discussing. What I have provisionally called the realist 
interpretation privileges the individual focus of the narratives over the 
collective discourse of history, while the modernist interpretation sets 
history over against the individual lives. But within the narrative sections 
the individual and collective perspectives must be considered at the same 
time. 
The narrative focus in the fictional sections is particularly unstable. Dos 
Passos uses a mixed focus which both assimilates and represents the 
19Corkin, "Dos Passos and the American Left", p.595. 
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consciousness of the particular character in question. In the narrative of 
Mac, the first fictional character, this narrative technique is readily 
apparent: 
When the wind set from the silver factories across the 
river the air of the gray fourfamily frame house 
where Fainy McCreary was born was choking all day 
with the smell of whaleoil soap. Other days it smelt of 
cabbage and babies and Mrs McCreary' s washboilers. 
Fainy could never play at home because Pop, a lame 
cavechested man with a wispy blondgray mustache, 
was nightwatchman at the Chadwick Mills and slept 
all day. It was only around five o'clock that a curling 
whiff of tobaccosmoke would seep through from the 
front room into the kitchen. That was a sign that Pop 
was up and in good spirits, and would soon be 
wanting his supper. 
Then Fainy would be sent running out to one of two 
corners of the short muddy street of identical frame 
houses where they lived. 
To the right it was half a block to Finley's where he 
would have to wait at the bar in a forest of 
mudsplattered trouserlegs until all the rank brawling 
mouths of grownups had been stopped with beers and 
whiskies. Then he would walk home, making each 
step very carefully, with the handle of the pail of suds 
cutting into his hand.(p.22) 
The narrative images in this passage derive from a variety of perspectives. 
The passage begins by placing Fainy within his domestic environment, but 
then begins to assimilate his view of that environment, referring to 
people with the names by which he knows them. Similarly, his 
environment is mapped out by the distances and directions with which he 
is familiar, and the names of the landmarks which he recognizes. The 
image of "a forest of mudsplattered trouserlegs" is particular evocative of 
this mixed narrative perspective. It literally evokes Fainy's perspective, 
what he sees before him. But at the same time the figurative language goes 
beyond Fainy's perspective, and the narrative focus subtly shifts to 
represent the environment from a different perspective, a critical 
overview which provides a different view of the bar. 
When Fainy's mother dies, the narrative synthesis of a position within 
Fainy' s consciousness and a transgredient position can clearly be seen: 
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The strike was not popular on Orchard Street. It 
meant that Mom had to work harder and harder, 
doing bigger and bigger boilerfuls of wash, and that 
Fainy and his older sister Milly had to help when they 
came home from school. And then one day Mom got 
sick and had to go back to bed instead of starting in on 
the ironing, and lay with her round white creased face 
whiter than the pillow and her watercreased hands in 
a knot under her chin. The doctor came and the 
district nurse, and the whole flat smelt of doctors and 
nurses and drugs, and the only place Fainy and Milly 
could find to sit was on the stairs. There they sat and 
quietly cried together.(p.24) 
Between two neutral representations, the strike and Fainy and Milly 
sitting on the stairs, is the narrative recreation of Fainy's making sense of 
these events. The strike, the unpopularity of which has already been 
established by the conversation which precedes this passage, is then 
represented in terms which are intelligible to Fainy, the burden placed 
upon him, his sister, and, most importantly, his mother. Pop's 
unemployment translates into "bigger and bigger boilerfuls of wash", the 
child-like syntax representing Fainy's understanding of the strike. Fainy, 
through his snowball fights with "Bohunks and Polaks", does have some 
understanding of ethnic tension, but the social implications of the strike -
it has been initiated, apparently, by '" ... damn lousy furreners ... "'(p.24) -
are only rendered intelligible for Fainy by the visibly enlarging loads of 
laundry. The narrative assimilates Fainy's comprehension of the strike, 
and of his mother's death, and then moves away from him to represent 
him from the outside, as a small scared boy, crying with his sister on the 
staircase. 
This mixed narrative focus leads towards an interpretive ambiguity. The 
characters of each narrative are both represented and representing. 
Discussing character in 1919, Sartre suggests that the fictional characters are 
peculiarly synthetic representations: 
Dos Passos' man is a hybrid creature, an interior-
exterior being. We go on living with him and within 
him, with his vacillating, individual consciousness, 
when suddenly it wavers, weakens, and is diluted in 
the collective consciousness. We follow it up to that 
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point and suddenly, before we notice, we are on the 
outside.20 
Reading the novel, Sartre suggests, is a constant negotiation of these 
narrative shifts. He begins by evoking the metaphor of the novel as a 
mirror, and goes on, throughout his essay, to illustrate how U.S.A., or at 
least 1919, involves a constant transition back and forth from one side of 
the mirror to the other. 
Sartre's observations are extremely instructive, particularly insofar as he is 
exclusively concerned with the fiG.h 'onal narratives in the text. The 
hermeneutic experience of the individual fictional lives is highly 
synthetic, a hybrid of engagement and detachment, of immediate 
experience and retrospective assessment. This hybridity, I suggest, parallels 
the hybrid structure of the text as a whole, the way in which it juxtaposes 
the individual fictional lives with the collective discourse of history. This 
hybridity both contextualizes the fictional discourse, generating narrative 
realism, and limits the fictional discourse, encouraging a critique of the 
historical process. This can be seen more clearly if we consider more 
closely the representational effects of the hybrid fictional narratives. 
In Mac's narrative, which is the most discrete and one of the longest 
stories in the text, the peculiarly mixed narrative focus of U.S.A. is quickly 
established. When Mac's story starts to coincide with historical events, the 
tensile realism of U.S.A. is readily observed. In Goldfield, Nevada, Mac 
joins an I.W.W. strike. Before he leaves for Nevada, Mac had become 
involved with Maisie, his future wife, who had tried to dissuade him 
from going. When he first arrives, the narrative focus is situated outside 
him, and much of his direct speech and that of other characters is 
incorporated into the narrative: 
At the end of the alley was a small house like a 
shoebox with brightly lit windows. Young fellows in 
miners' clothes or overalls filled up the end of the 
alley and sat three deep on the rickety steps. 
'What's this, a poolroom?' asked Mac. 
'This is the Nevada Workman ... Say, my name's Ben 
Evans; I'll introjuce (sic) you to the gang ... Say, yous 
20Sartre, "John Dos Passos and 1919", p.96. 
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guys, this is fellowworker McCreary ... he's come on 
from Frisco to set up type.' 
'Put it there, Mac,' said a sixfooter who looked like a 
Swede lumberman, and gave Mac's hand a wrench 
that made the bones crack.(p.94-95) 
Mac soon receives a letter from Maisie, telling him she is pregnant, and 
expecting him to return. The letter coincides with Big Bill Haywood's 
arrival in Goldfield. As Mac listens to Haywood, whose biography appears 
just before this narrative episode, his mixed sentiments intrude into the 
narrative, which includes both Mac's impressions of Haywood's speech, 
and his concern about Maisie: 
Big Bill talked about solidarity and sticking together in 
the face of the masterclass and Mac kept wondering 
what Big Bill would do if he'd got a girl in trouble like 
that.(p.96) 
The narrative then both engages the reader directly in Mac's experience, as 
well as representing the conflict between Mac's domestic and political 
sensibilities. Maisie's lack of a political conscience is one of her 
shortcomings, but the resolute misogyny of the workers' movement is 
equally contemptible. Fred Hoff, one of the organizers, is rigorously 
puritanical, while the logic of Ben Evans' casual belittlement of Mac's 
concern is clearly flawed: "'For crissake, Mac, if a girl wasn't a goddamn 
whore she wouldn't let you, would she?"(p.99). 
These shifts of narrative focus establish Mac as both the representing 
subjectivity of the narrative and a represented figure, subjected to social 
forces outside himself. Elsewhere, similar narrative shifts can be traced. 
When Mac first arrives in San Francisco, for example, the narrative is 
disjointed and impressionistic: 
The streets were full of lights. Young men and pretty 
girls in brightcolored dresses were walking fast 
through a big yanking wind that fluttered dresses and 
scarves, slapped color into cheeks, blew grit and 
papers in the air.(p.84) 
Mac's disorientation generates a concomitant disengagement in the 




job and gradually settles into his environment, and the narrative shifts to 
accomoda te his changed situation: 
All that winter Mac worked at Bondello's, ate 
spaghetti and drank red wine and talked revolution 
with him and his friends in the evening, went to 
Socialist picnics or libertarian meetings on Sundays. 
Saturday nights he went round to whorehouses with 
a fellow named Miller, whom he'd met at the Y. 
Miller was studying to be a dentist. He got to be 
friends with a girl named Maisie Spencer who worked 
in the millinery department at the Emporium. 
Sundays she used to try to get him to go to 
church.(p.85) 
The images of Mac's life have now been integrated into familiar repeated 
patterns of experience, and a long period of time has been collapsed into 
one representational moment. Rather than the isolated subjectivity which 
dominated the narrative when he first arrived in San Francisco, Mac is 
now an object in a social environment, associated with two themes which 
will persistently clash in his life, his politics and his sexuality. 
This narrative style is recreated in all the fictional narratives. Sailing on a 
British ship, Joe is taken into custody in Liverpool, and an American 
consular official eventually comes to his aid. Much of this episode is 
represented in fairly conventional realistic narrative: 
The busylooking young man got to his feet and went 
up to Joe. 'Well, you've certainly been making me a 
lot of trouble, but I've been over the records in your 
case and it looks as if you were what you represented 
yourself to be ... What's your father's name?' 
'Same as mine, Joseph P. Williams .... Say, are you the 
American consul?' 
'I'm from the consulate .... Say, what the hell do you 
want to come ashore without a passport for? Don't 
you think we have anything better to do than to take 
care of a lot of damn fools that don't know enough to 
come in when it rains? Damn it, I was goin' to play 
golf this afternoon and here I've been here two hours 
waiting to get you out of the cooler.' 
'Jeez, I didn't come ashore. They come on and got me.' 
'That'll teach you a lesson, I hope .... Next time you 
have your papers in order.' 
'Yessirree ... I shu will.'(pp.375-376) 
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In this passage, Joe is a represented object, and the narrative includes his 
direct discourse. Once he is released, he wanders around the streets until 
he meets a group of American sailors. Once again the narrative shifts 
between using Joe's "voice" as a representational focus and representing 
Joe himself: 
Then just when the streetlights were going on, and 
Joe was feeling pretty discouraged, he found himself 
walking down a side street behind three Americans. 
He caught up to them and asked them if they knew 
where the Tampa was. Why the hell shouldn't they 
know, weren't they off'n her and out to see the 
goddam town and he better come along. And if he 
wasn't tickled to meet some guys from home after 
those two months on the limejuicer and being in jail 
and everything.(p.377) 
Joe's manner of speaking is now incorporated into the tone of the 
narrative - "And if he wasn't tickled" - and the narrative also registers the 
idiom in which his new friends speak. Once Joe returns to America, the 
narrative once again changes in focus and tone: 
· The Tampa had gone into drydock at Newport News 
for repairs on a started plate. Joe and Will Stirp hung 
around Norfolk all day without konowing what to do 
with themselves. Saturday afternoons and Sundays, 
Joe played a little baseball with a scratch team of boys 
who worked in the Navy Yard, evenings he went out 
with Della Matthews. (p.380) 
The temporal structure of the narrative is markedly different, reverting to 
an iterative technique which evokes a sense of regularity and familiarity. 
The distant overview of Joe not only places him in his historical 
environment but also emphasizes the extent to which he is subordinated 
to his environment. 
In Dick Savage's narrative, a similar dynamic is evident. As ambulance 
volunteers, he and his friends adapt very quickly to their European 
environment: 
Except for an occasional shell from the Bertha, Paris 
was quiet and pleasant that November. It was too 
foggy for airraids. Dick and Steve Warner got a very 
cheap room back of the Pantheon; in the daytime they 
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read French and in the evenings roamed round cafes 
and drinking places. Fred Summers got himself a job 
and a steady girl the second they hit Paris. Ripley and 
Ed Schuyler took lodgings in considerable style over 
Henry's bar.(p.494) 
The representation of Dick and his friends in Paris is essentially an 
overview of them, but elsewhere, the structure and tone of Dick's 
narrative is quite different. After his rejection of Anne Elizabeth, for 
example, Dick's thoughts begin to impose themselves upon the narrative 
as he drifts in to sleep: 
Tomorrow. Seventhirty: shave, buckle puttees ... cafe 
au lait, brioches, beurre. He'd be hungry, hadn't had 
any supper ... deux oeufs sur le plat. Bonjour 
m'ssieurs mesdames. Jingling spurs to the office. 
Sergeant Ames at ease. Day dragged out in khaki; 
twilight tea at Eleanor's, make her talk to Moorehouse 
to clinch job after the signing of the peace, tell her 
about the late General Ellsworth, they'll laugh about it 
together. Dragged out in khaki days until the signing 
of the peace. Dun, drab, khaki. Poor Dick got to go to 
work after the signing of the peace. Poor Tom's cold. 
Poor Dicky boy ... Richard ... He brought his feet up to 
where he could rub them. Poor Richard's feet. After 
the Signing of the Peace. 
By the time his feet were warm, he'd fallen 
asleep.(p.663) 
In Dick's narrative, then, we are presented with different perspectives on 
the historical events which have taken him there. From the external 
representations of particular episodes, to the retrospective summary of his 
lifestyle, to this highly personalized stream of consciousness. The overall 
representation of Paris is an amalgamation of all these different 
perspectives, each with a different emphasis. 
Eveline Hutchins and Eleanor Stoddard also find themselves in Paris, 
which, through all these different representations, takes on a concrete 
tangibility which allows it to serve as the location for the events of the 
narrative. Eveline's narrative evokes Paris in a similar textual manner to 
Dick's: 
Eveline went to live with Eleanor in a fine apartment 
Eleanor had gotten hold of somehow on the Quai de 
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la Tournelle. It was the mansard floor of a gray 
peelingfaced house built at the time of Richelieu and 
done over under Louis Quinze. Eveline never tired of 
looking out the window, through the delicate tracing 
of the wroughtiron balcony, at the Seine where toy 
steamboats bucked the current, towing 
shinyvarnished barges that had lace curtains and 
geraniums in the windows of their deckhouses 
painted green and red, and at the island opposite 
where the rocketing curves of the flying buttresses 
shoved the apse of Notre Dame dizzily upwards out 
of the trees of a little park. They had tea at a small 
Buhl table in the window almost every evening when 
they got home from the office on the Rue de Rivoli, 
after spending the day pasting pictures of ruined 
French farms and orphaned children and starving 
warbabies into scrapbooks to be sent home for use in 
Red Cross drives.(pp.514-15) 
In these representations of Paris, indeed in all of the representations of 
historical locations, the same narrative interrelation between different 
narrative focuses is evident. Each character's experience of their 
environment is juxtaposed with a kind of overview of the environment, 
with attention to landmarks, to incidental details such as the weather or 
the traffic on the river, and this mixture of the public and the individual 
allows the narrative to achieve a tense balance between representation and 
critique. Different accounts of the same event or location, such as the 
meeting between Joe and Dick Savage in Genoa, have a similarly mixed 
effect. On the one hand, the different representations of the same event 
compromise one another. But on the other, the accumulated experiences 
of Paris, or, later in the text, of New York, complement one another, 
creating a kind of narrative density within the overall design of the text, at 
the expense of its constituent stories. Dick and Steve Warner, although 
they are wandering rather aimlessly about, know their way around rather 
better than Joe does. Since their arrival in Italy, Dick's poor French has 
been replaced by his even poorer Italian but it has still helped him adapt to 
his environment. When he and Steve meet Joe, the encounter is 
represented from a balanced, middle-distance perspective: 
While they were looking at a marble lion, shaped like 
a dog, that stood polished to smoothness by centuries 
of hands at the bottom of a flight of steps, an 
American voice hailed them, wanting to know if they 





young fellow who was a sailor on an American boat 
that had come over with a carload of mules. 
'You guys seem to be a couple of pretty good guys,' the 
sailor said. They handed him the bottle and he took a 
gulp. 'You fellers are princes,' he added, spluttering, 
'and I'm going to tell you what I think, see .... This 
whole goddam war's a gold brick, it ain't on the level, 
it's crooked from A to Z. No matter how it comes out 
fellers like us gets the s---y end of the stick, see? Well, 
what I say is all bets is off ... every man go to hell in 
his own way ... and three strikes is out, see?' They 
finished up the cognac.(p.499) 
The meeting is placed carefully into context, and Joe's rough speech and 
his limited understanding of his environment become part of the 
represented context. But when the same meeting is delivered from Joe's 
perspective, the realistic context is not supplied with as much detail: 
On some steep steps he ran into a couple of 
Americans in khaki uniforms and asked them the 
way and they gave him a drink out of a bottle of 
cognac and said they were on their way to the 
Eyetalian front and that there'd been a big retreat and 
that everything was cockeyed and they didn't know 
where the cockeyed front was and they were going to 
wait right there till the cockeyed front came right to 
them. (p .530-31) 
The syntax of this overlong sentence betrays the lack of conceptual 
organization with which Joe registers this meeting, and is a pointed 
contrast to the same scene in Dick's narrative. Dick's greater capacity 
generally to balance his individual life with his environment supplies his 
representation of this scene with greater determinate detail, whereas Joe's 
lack of control sees his narrative become increasingly interior and 
indistinct. The rapid transitions in his story from New York to Bordeaux 
and then to Genoa, and shortly thereafter to St Nazaire are barely 
canvassed in the narrative. In St Nazaire, the narrative and Joe become 
increasingly disordered, and his story ends abruptly when he is killed in a 
fight. 
This analysis of the narrative sections of U.S.A. reveals several important 
features of the representational structure of the whole text. Each 
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individual narrative, as I have tried to show, is marked by important 
shifts of focus which offers the reader a range of experiences of the 
historical environment in which the narative is placed. The narrative 
shifts from retrospective summaries of periods of the characters' lives, to a 
more immediate overview of particular episodes, to a close interior focus. 
These different perspectives juxtapose different aspects of the same social 
and historical environment, which both complement each other and 
collide with each other. They can be aggregated, offering the reader a more 
complete representation, or counterposed, undermining the 
representational efficacy of the text. 
This narrative method is repeated in each fictional narrative. While the 
focus changes, the shifting narrative process is consistent from character to 
character. Once again, this has an ambivalent effect. The repetition of the 
pattern both reinforces and undermines each individual narrative section. 
There is also a general shift from the individual narratives to a sense of 
the collective representation which is constituted by all of them together. 
These different accounts of life in this particular milieu, both resemble 
each other, and yet differ importantly. Not only is each section a kind of 
hybrid of an individual and collective focus, but the text as a whole 
becomes accessible at an individual and a collective level. 
Individual and collective perspectives also have their own distinct voices 
in the text. The Camera Eye sections, and the Newsreel and biographical 
sections also figure in any interpretation of the text, and it is necessary to 
consider these dimensions of the text in greater detail. 
( d) The one and the many 
The extraliterary sections of U.S.A. as I have indicated above, can be 
understood in different ways. One possibility is to correlate this discourse 
with the events of the fictional narratives, and there is also a potential 
interpretive conflict between the Newsreel and Camera Eye sections. As 
Charles Marz points out, within U.S.A. the Newsreel and Camera Eye 
sections "chronicle the voices of the public sphere", and he goes on to 
suggest that the Camera Eye and the Newsreel collide in the text to create a 
conflict between the public and private voices.21 
21Marz, "Chronicle and Performance", p.403. 
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Certainly this conflict is evident if we think about the way in which 
sections of Newsreel often seem to be the kinds of things which Dick and 
Moorehouse, as publicrelations counsel, might have written. Dick and 
Moorehouse act as symbols of the disingenuous interests which are 
beginning to dominate and, in Dos Passos' view, impoverish and damage 
American society. Working alongside Dick and Moorhouse in this process 
are the twin enterprises of industrialization, represented by Charley 
Anderson, and popular culture, represented by Margo Dowling. As I have 
already discussed, U.S.A. dramatizes a process of historical degeneration, 
which Marz characterizes as the conflict between the public and private 
voices. He argues that the private voice in U.S.A., which is most directly 
represented by The Camera Eye sections, is gradually silenced22 a claim 
reinforced by the steady decline in the number of Camera Eye sections 
from The 42nd Parallel to The Big Money. 23 
This conflict between the public and private is what encourages Corkin to 
place Dos Passos in the philosophical tradition of anti-Stalinism and 
Western Hegelian-Marxism, and, as we have seen, to privilege the 
"modernism" of The 42nd Parallel over its "realism." Corkin suggests that 
the objectivity of history is questioned through the kind of critique 
developed by the early Lukacs and the theorists of the Frankfurt School24. 
Although Corkin limits his discussion to The 42nd Parallel, Adorno and 
Horkheimer's critique of the "culture industry" could certainly be ranged 
alongside Dos Passos' treatment of Hollywood in The Big Money. The 
public mind, then, is the reified ideological structure, and the interests 
behind it, a radical critique of which is posited as an urgent philosophical 
imperative. Marz' analysis reaches similar conclusions, focusing upon the 
images of alienation, and characterizing the fragments of historical 
discourse as "world and word debris, ... the slowly and inevitably 
triumphant noise of history."25 
22Marz, "Chronicle and Performance"p.400. 
23For what it is worth, the number of fictional narrative sections in each part of the trilogy 
varies negligibly, as do the number of biographies, while the Newsreels increase slightly 
(19 in The 42nd Parallel, 24 in 1919, and 25 in The Big Money). Only the number of Camera 
Eye sections changes significantly (27 in The 42nd Parallel, 15 in 1919, 9 in The Big Money). 
24Corkin, "Dos Passes and the American Left", p.592. 
25Marz, "Chronicle and Performance", p.407. 
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But these "disruptive" interpretations of the historical discourse in U.S.A. 
are not necessarily the last word on the dramatized conflict between the 
one and the many. Within the narrative sections, as I have tried to show, 
there is a similarly tensile synthesis of seemingly exclusive perspectives. It 
is possible, I suggest, to create a similar kind of synthesis within the text as 
a whole. This is particularly evident if we consider the reciprocal effects of 
the different sections, rather than conceiving of the extraliterary sections 
as a kind of disruption. As I have said, in U.S.A. the representation of 
social and historical reality works through correlating fictional and 
historical locations and events. In this regard, the Newsreel and 
biographical sections act in tandem with this process. During Mac's 
narrative, for example, the Newsreel intervenes with fragments of 
newsprint which allude to contemporary historical events: 
CLAIMS ISLANDS FOR ALL TIME (p.20) 
GENERAL STRIKE NOW THREATENS (p.61) 
TEDDY WIELDS BIG STICK (p.80) 
As well as the headlines, of course, there are sections of songs which 
allude to a general cultural environment, and fragments of news copy 
which juxtapose different historical events: 
Let me throw my arms around you 
Honey ain't I glad I found you 
Madero's troops defeat rebels in battle at Parral Roose-
velt carries Illinois oratory closes eyelids Chicago 
pleads for more water (p.119) 
The Newsreel then presents not only a disembodied public voice, or as 
Marz puts it, the noise of history. It can also be incorporated into the 
representational structure of the text, or rendered partially harmonious. 
The American entry into the war, for example, occasions Moorehouse's 
enlistment, and the general movement towards Europe by many of the 
characters. Shortly after the declaration of war appears in Eleanor 
Stoddard's narrative, the Newsreel offers several accounts of it. Headlines 
announcing U.S. AT WAR (p.301) and ARMIES CLASH AT VERDUN IN 
GLOBE'S GREATEST BATTLE (p.345) are juxtaposed with war songs 
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which announce that The Yanks are coming (p.301) and tell of the 
infantree the infantree/ With the dirt behind their ears. Simultaneously, 
however, resistance to the War, which is a significant theme in the 
narrative, is also registered. When Charley Anderson is in New York, just 
prior to his departure for Europe, he finds himself in a bar with Ben 
Compton and Al Johnson, a radical reporter. Discussing the declaration of 
war, Al Johnson predicts that "'[t]hey'll use it (the war) to clear up 
opposition at home""(p.339). His comment echoes the headlines in the 
previous Newsreel which include, along with the declaration of war, this 
warning: ABUSING FLAG TO BE PUNISHED (p.301). 
The Newsreels begin to resonate on different levels. On the one hand, 
they interrupt the text, compromising its representational efficacy. On the 
other, it is also possible interpretively to weave them into the general 
representational pattern of the text. The idea of realism for which I have 
argued ~ lloos these seemingly contradictory interpretive possibilities 
simultaneously to be entertained. The theoretical foundations of this idea 
of realism are marked by a similar internal tension, a conflict between the 
need for determinate meaning and the recognition of the problematic 
nature of meaning. In U.S.A. the representation of historical reality is 
marked by this kind of tension, and the different possibilities of the 
Newsreel sections are one manifestation of it. 
The same can be said of the biographies. As I have said, some of the 
biographical figures are insinuated into the narrative, serving as historical 
referents. At the same time, however, they are taken out of the narrative, 
and their representational and referential significance interrogated. But an 
analysis of the biographical sections also reveals a textual dynamic 
between an individual and a collective perspective. 
Individually, the biographies suggest that historical personalities, as part of 
a historical landscape, are put together through patterns of experience. 
They emerge from their social environment, rather than being explained 
in terms of their individuality: 
Debs was a railroadman, born in a weatherboard 
shack 
at Terre Haute. 
He was one of ten children. 
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At fifteen Gene Debs was already working as a 
machinist on the Indianapolis and Terre Haute 
Railway. 
He worked as a locomotive fireman, 
clerked in a store (p.37) 
The biography of Debs establishes an image of the historical personality 
through aggregating his experiences. These experiences then become the 
words which he speaks, and his capacity for speech establishes him as a 
quintessentially public figure, a presidential candidate in 1908. Many of the 
biographies establish similar patterns in their representation of historical 
figures. Andrew Carnegie, for example, 
always saved his pay 
whenever he had a dollar he invested it 
he had confidence in railroads, 
he had confidence in communications, 
he had confidence in transportation, 
he believed in iron. 
Andrew Carnegie believed in iron, built bridges 
Bessemer plants blast furnaces rolling mills; 
Andrew Carnegie believed in oil; 
Andrew Carnegie believed in steel; 
always saved his money 
whenever he had a million dollars he invested it 
Andrew Carnegie became the richest man in the 
world 
and died (pp.224-225) 
These biographies are presented, in a sense, poetically. If we take the 
historical figure as a kind of representational horizon, as a reality, the 
biographies make explicit the poetic structure of such realities. The lives of 
the historical figures are patterns of experience, repeated movements of a 
particular kind. Carnegie's thrift establishes his historical reality. An 
analogous pattern can be traced in the biography of Thomas Edison, whose 
compulsion to "try things out" lies behind his historical importance. 
The biographies, then, establish a nexus between the historical individuals 
and their historical significance. As individuals, their lives are made up of 
patterns of experience, and then these patterns become their historical 
importance. By capturing these patterns in the prose-poetry of the 
biographies, U.S.A. once again presents them as historical phenomena, 
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and illustrates the construction of these phenomena. They are, at once, 
affirmed as historically real, and yet characterized as quasi-poetic 
structures, as constructions. The possibility of correlating the historical 
figures with the fictional characters - Margo Dowling and Isadora Duncan, 
for example - has, once again, an ambivalent effect. The historical 
environment which enhances the realism of the fiction is enhanced by the 
correlation, but the historical characters are also subjected to a kind of 
fictionalizing. The blurring of the distinctions between fiction and history, 
and between literary and extraliterary discourse, creates a kind of dialogue 
which relativizes both sides of this equation. 
Alongside the correlation of the narrative sections with the free-floating 
historical discourse in the text, there is also the isolated subjectivity of the 
Camera Eye. Once again, however, the discord between the Camera Eye 
and the narrative sections, on the one hand, and the Newsreel and 
biographies, on the other, is not absolute. The progression of the Camera 
Eye sections suggests a kind of maturing process, an individual 
development which gradually expands its representational focus. The 
early Camera Eye sections are highly subjective, and it is difficult to see 
beyond them to determine what kind of social environment the "camera" 
is focused upon. The first section, for example, lacks any external 
perspective which can place the narrative impressions into a general social 
context: 
under the counter it's dark and the lady the nice 
Dutch lady who loves Americans and has relations in 
Trenton shows you postcards that shine in the dark 
pretty hotels and palaces O que c' est beau schon 
prittie prittie and the moonlight ripple ripple under 
the bridge (p.22) 
At this stage, the subjectivity of the Camera Eye doesn't assimilate any 
general sense of the context of these experiences, registering only a few 
isolated place names and a vague impression of an angry anti-British mob. 
Snatches of different languages - French, German, and Dutch or Afrikaans 
- are represented, but generally, the environment in which this experience 
is taking place is left unrepresented, the individual experience displaces 
the possibility of a more general impression. 
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As the trilogy progresses, however, the interrelation which we saw in the 
narrative sections between individual and public experience is resumed, 
and the Camera Eye begins to achieve a greater degree of narrative 
lucidity. The Camera Eye (16), for example, while still bound to an 
individual subjectivity is beginning to include matters which relate to the 
general context of the individual's experience: 
it was hot as a bakeoven going through the canal from 
Delaware City and turtles sunning themselves 
tumbled off into the thick ocher ripple we made in 
passing and He was very gay and She was feeling well 
for once and He made us punch of tea and mint and a 
little Saint Croix rum but it was hot as the hinges of 
Delaware and we saw scarlet tanagers and redwing 
blackbirds and kingfishers cackled wrathfully as the 
yellow wave from the white bow rustled the reeds 
and the cattails and the sweetflag and He talked about 
law reform and what politicians were like and where 
were the Good Men in this country and said Why 
thinking the way I think I couldn't get elected to be 
notary public in any county in the state not with all 
the money in the world no not even dogcatcher 
(p.153) 
The last Camera Eye sections, of course, break from this progression, and 
represent rather a protest against the social environment in which they 
are set. While, as I have said, there is a kind of conflict between the 
individual voice and the public mind, the individual voice is not, as has 
been suggested, entirely silenced at the end of U.S.A., but instead engages 
in a relentless critique of the social world, a critique most pointedly 
reflected in the Camera Eye (50) which, in response to the execution of 
Sacco and Vanzetti, grimly echoes Engels' (and Benjamin Disraeli's) 
apprehension of Victorian England: 
all right we are two nations (p.1105) 
The isolation of the individual voice, however, is vitiated by its 
relationship with the rest of the text. The Newsreel and the Camera Eye 
form a kind of dialectical representation of the social and historical 
environment. Alongside the Camera Eye and its grim concession of defeat 
which represents a personal response to the Sacco-Vanzetti affair, there is 
the way in which the same affair affects the life of a group of individuals 
within the narrative. In Mary French's story, the Sacco-Vanzetti affair is an 
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ingress into some of The Big Money's most poignant moments. Jerry 
Burnham, who has appeared sporadically throughout the trilogy as a kind 
of resident cynic, is at his most dissolute and caustic when he and Mary 
meet in Boston during the protests; Mary, on the other hand, both 
commits herself to the cause and uses Boston as an environment to 
recover from her disappointment in her relationship with Ben Compton; 
Don Stevens reappears, consolidating his personal power within the 
movement; the "laborfaker" G.H. Barrow, who is also another former 
lover of Mary's, is most pointedly found out when he refuses to participate 
in the demonstrations. As well as the narrative use of the Sacco-Vanzetti 
affair, there are also the Newsreel allusions to the case, and the startling 
headline: SACCO AND VANZETTI MUST DIE (p.1104) which takes its 
place alongside the narrative and Camera Eye representations of the 
matter. 
As well as the development within the Camera Eye, then, the individual 
perspective also becomes part of a representational dialogue within the 
text. The individual voice both affects and is affected by the rest of the text, 
criticizing, for example, the Sacco-Vanzetti headline, but also making 
possible the more complex social relationships occupying the narrative 
sections which focus upon the affair. This dialogue suggests that the 
apprehension of the historical world is a complicated matter, involving a 
negotiation between an isolated individual perspective and an 
overdetermined public mind. As each representational mode takes its 
place in this dialogue, the possibility of giving one or another priority 
becomes increasingly remote. Rather, U.S.A. suggests that history, and the 
historical reality of the U.S.A., cannot be considered an objective reality, 
but rather the reality of a combination of experience and voices. 
(e) Realism and ambiguity in U.S.A. 
Towards the end of The Big Money, Dick Savage, at this stage a rapidly 
rising executive working for J.W. Moorehouse, is embroiled in a heated 
conversation with one of his juniors. In an angry response to Reggie 
Talbot's drunken and belligerent cynicism, Dick makes this comment: 
'Whether you like it or not, the molding of the public 
mind is one of the most important things that goes on 
in this country ... '(p.1145) 
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Shortly thereafter, the situation somewhat smoothed over, Dick says, 
"'[w]e've got to be realists"'(p.1145). In the cold light of the day which 
follows this long night, Dick's "realism" enables him to shrug off the 
previous night's misadventures and struggle into the office where, since 
Moorehouse' s indisposition, he is assuming control, in which capacity he 
considers firing Reggie Talbot, who hasn't managed to make it in. 
For Dick, "realism" seems to mean something like getting one's priorities 
right. Reggie's denigration of Moorehouse and his failure, in Dick's view, 
properly to appreciate their work in "publicrelations" are serious 
improprieties, which, it seems, he will shortly have cause to regret. But 
there is something odd about Dick's sense of realism, something 
ambivalent about his assiduous commitment to his work in public 
relations. When Dick responds to Reggie's callous enquiry about 
Moorehouse' s health with a palliative version of events, even as he does, 
the artifice of what he is saying is not lost on him: 
'Say, Dick,' said Reggie, 'is there anything in the 
rumour that old doughface toppled over ?' 
'Mr Moorehouse had a little attack of acute 
indigestion ... he was better when I left,' said Dick in a 
voice that sounded a little too solemn in his 
ears.(p.1144) 
This distance between what Dick says publicly and his own sense of what 
he says is something which recurs throughout his story. When he and Ed 
Griscolm, his professional rival, are competing for the right to bid for an 
important account, Dick, in response to Griscolm' s proposal "heard his 
own voice saying it was wonderful, but it needed a slightly different 
slant"(p.1120), and during his argument with Talbot, he "wanted to shut 
up, but he couldn't"(p.1145). What Dick means by "realism," then, can also 
be read as something like duplicity, or artificiality. His public persona, his 
career, the very words he speaks are all part of a projection of himself, a 
reality which obscures, but only barely, other aspects of his existence. To be 
realistic, according to Dick, is to maintain an illusion. 
This kind of ambivalence is something of a defining motif in Dick's story. 
Dick has always had a capacity for dissimulation, which assists his career 
in advertising, and at this point his successful public life is asserting itself 
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against his less public life. Dick's sexuality, for example, is deeply 
ambivalent. On the one hand, he has always been a playboy and is now an 
eligible bachelor, and the last image we have of him is of his accepting a 
social invitation from the daughter of his most important client. On the 
other hand, however, there is a persistent suggestion of homosexuality in 
Dick's story, in Hiram Halsey Cooper's patronage of him, for example, or 
in his relationship with Ned at Harvard. The indistinct sexual adventures 
of the previous night - Dick takes two men named "Gloria Swanson" and 
"Florence" home with him and is subsequently robbed by them - are 
another of these suggestions, but Dick, despite his anxiety about blackmail 
and his life being ruined, manages to put his public face back on. 
The impact of this episode derives from the way in which it manages 
simultaneously to represent the different interpretive possibilities of the 
text. The narrative places the reader in an omniscient position, recording 
the speech of the characters and providing a detailed representation of 
their surroundings. At the same time, however, the narrative also 
registers Dick's unease, his sense of his own artificiality. Even as he 
participates in the action, his internal conflict acts as a critique of his own 
participation. Dick is at this stage a familiar character in the text, and this 
episode can thus be placed in the context of what we know of Dick's 
personal history. But it also represents the final sacrifice of Dick to the 
historical process of which U.S.A. is so condemnatory, as he slides into 
Moorehouse' s place and we leave him accepting a social invitation from 
the daughter of his client, the patent medicine magnate. 
These different suggestions in the narrative can't be considered 
independently of one another, nor can they easily be reconciled. But it is 
within this kind of realistic representation that the tension between them 
is most pointedly evident. Another of U.S.A.'s final scenarios reinforces 
this impression. As I have said, the representation of the Sacco-Vanzetti 
affair is particularly important in U.S.A. and it is Mary French's story 
which juxtaposes this historical event with fictional action. 
At the end of The Big Money, Mary French has taken a central position in 
the text. It is through her narrative that the political fragmentation of the 
U.S.A. is most pointedly represented. Her presence at Eveline Hutchins' 
party acts to criticize some of the values and interests which have come to 
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dominate the social and political environment. Margo Dowling is at the 
party, moving straight from the artifical sound-stage where we left her 
(p.1074) to the equally artificial environment at the cocktail party. Mary's 
friend Ada adds that they are "on their way to the Riviera" (p.1176). Their 
rarified presence at the party, however, interests Mary little: "'I'm sick of 
seeing movie actors on the screen,' said Mary, 'I don't want to see them in 
real life"'(p.1176) 
During this period, however, Mary is embroiled in more personal 
conflicts. Don Stevens, with whom she is involved, has left for Russia, a 
trip which indicates his growing status in the Communist Party. Don's 
influence in the party has brought him into conflict with Ben Compton. 
Compton says that Stevens will " .. . make the centralcommittee when 
they've cleaned out all the brains"'(p.1166), while Stevens has also 
foreshadowed Compton's expulsion from the party - which we must take 
alongside the sympathetic representation of Compton - in the name of 
"party discipline" (p.1163). At the same time, however, Ben and Don are 
Mary's former and current lovers, adding a personal dimension to the 
political conflict which is represented by their animosity. When Ben, 
having been expelled from the party, meets Mary inside the New York 
Public Library, the detailed narrative realism powerfully evokes the 
complexity of the reality, towards which the text is intended. When Ben 
speaks of his expulsion, the reasons for which are a thinly disguised 
accusation of Trotskyism, he affirms his commitment to social revolution. 
Mary's response is, at once, touching, and yet seems to undermine his 
revolutionary rhetoric: 
'Oh, Ben, I'm so sorry,' was all Mary could find to say. 
'You know I don't know anything except what I read 
in the Daily. It all seems too terrible to me.' 
'Let's go out, that guard's watching us.' 
Outside Ben began to shiver from the cold. His wrists 
stuck out red from his frayed green overcoat with 
sleeves much to short for his long arms. 
'Oh, where can we go?' Mary kept saying. (p.1166) 
This episode is fairly conventional narrative realism, but extremely 
fraught with conflicting concerns. Mary is caught between Don and Ben. 
Her commitment to Don makes her complicit in Ben's expulsion, but it is 
more a matter of ignorance than malice. Indeed, Mary, whose 
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revolutionary integrity is unimpeachable, confesses a kind of ignorance, 
she "doesn't know anything," other than the official voice of the party. But 
her sympathy for Ben also takes its place in the narrative, her shock at his 
frailty, his literally being out in the cold which complements his political 
isolation. The possibility of Ben's revolutionary efficacy is undermined by 
Mary's sense of his extreme frailty. 
Personal tension and political and historical conflict then are juxtaposed, 
and this juxtaposition is made possible by the aggregation of individual 
and social perspectives in the narrative. Ben and Don are counterposed in 
Mary's personal life, which makes possible the representation of their 
political differences, which in turn represent the fragmentation of the 
American left, and, through the Newsreel allusions to Stalin and Trotsky, 
hint at a concern which extends to the politics of Soviet and world 
communism. Don is, after all, in Russia in 1927. 
The orientation of this scene also undergoes several important shifts. 
While Mary is initially sympathetic, when Ben begins to turn the 
conversation to personal matters, she reverts to a kind of political rigidity 
which changes the dynamic and the representation of the scene. Ben 
begins to discuss their former relationship, making explicit the personal 
dimension of the environment, but Mary resists this development: 
'I've always liked music ... I ought to have kept you, 
Mary.' 
'A lot of water's run under the bridge since then,' said 
Mary coldly. 
'Are you happy with Stevens ? I haven't any right to 
ask.' 
'But, Ben, what's the use of raking all this old stuff 
up?' (p.1167). 
Their speech has clearly changed. Whereas Mary had previously spoken 
hesitantly, repeating herself and resorting to platitudes like "it all seems 
too terrible", and Ben had delivered a series of statements about his 
revolutionary commitment, Mary now speaks directly, while Ben's tone is 
wistful rather than forceful. Ben then begins to recombine the personal 
and the political, hoping to be reconnected to the political machine 
through his personal relationship with Mary, and Mary responds with the 
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kind of political voice with which Don would speak: '"I don't think they 
want any disrupting influences in the I.L.D.,' said Mary" (p.1167). 
When Mary lets slip that Stevens is "away", Ben's keen political mind 
seizes upon her admission: 
Ben looked at her with a sharp sudden look. 
'He hasn't by any chance sailed for Moscow with 
certain other comrades ?'(p.1167) 
When Mary leaves, the open conflict between them is once again vitiated. 
Ben's solitude recurs to Mary and she returns to soften the accusation 
which she last hurled at him. The personal, which had given way to the 
political, thus regains a certain primacy, and it is through Mary's eyes that 
we see Ben "staring at her, senselessly scraping the spoon round and 
round in the empty coffeemug" (p.1167) Ben's dejection, and above all his 
silence, make his personal isolation complete, just as his political 
dislocation has silenced the voice of social revolution which he 
represents. 
What is interesting about this episode is the interrelation between its 
narrative realism and the critical concerns of the text. The narrative shifts 
accomodate the reader within Ben and Mary's relationship, making all the 
different dimensions of this relatioAsl-iip interpretively available. The 
negotiations between their public and private concerns provides a great 
deal of representational depth to this scene. The personal distance between 
them is represented by Mary's transition from feeling sympathetic towards 
Ben to feeling threatened by him. Correspondingly, Ben begins by being 
feverishly excited, then lapses into nostalgia. This distance represents the 
persistent concern in U.S.A. with failed relationships, but at the same 
time, the factional struggles of the American left, indeed of all political 
movements, are also figured in the space between Ben and Mary. 
This multivocity is maintained when, shortly after this episode, Ben's 
enquiry about Mary's relationship with Stevens proves prophetic. Don 
returns from Moscow, an event which has profound political 
implications, but Mary's concern is almost entirely personal: 
Her whole body ached to feel his arms around her, for 
the rasp of his deep voice in her ears. All the time a 
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vague worry flitted in the back of her head, because 
she hadn't had a letter from him while he'd been 
away.(p.1172) 
Don, however, has married in Moscow, consummating his political life 
with his personal. Interestingly, Sylvia Goldstein speaks of Comrade 
Lichfield, Don's wife, in very personal terms:"' ... she's an English comrade 
... she spoke at the big meeting at the Bronx Casino last night ... she's got a 
great shock of red hair ... stunning, but some of the girls think it's 
dyed"'(p.1173). Don's political reification corresponds to his personal 
betrayal of Mary, and his wife is both politically and personally 
threatening. 
The political undertone of these episodes is unmistakable, and involves 
all the complicated problems of the public mind and the position of the 
individual, and places them into the discourse of narrative realism. This 
allows these ideas to be experienced on several levels. Locating the reader 
within the discussion between Mary and Ben, for example, represents 
Mary's different personal and political interests, suggesting that the 
general political movements with which the text is concerned cannot be 
considered in isolation from the concrete lives of individuals. When 
Stevens returns, Mary's personal emotional life is the representational 
focus, and it is her disappointment which allows the reader to experience 
the personal cost of her public commitment to the movement. The 
narrative realism which allows the reader to enter this environment is 
thus the vehicle of the text's critique of politics and of history. 
U.S.A. is a complicated text. As I have tried to show in this thesis, literary 
realism is a complex aesthetic phenomenon and, in U.S.A., this 
complexity is very much in evidence. The cities and nations, the real 
social background of the trilogy, are represented not as simple objective 
realities but as arenas in which social and historical activities take place. 
The fraught relationship between individuals and their environment is 
both the relationship which makes realism possible, and the most pointed 
problem which emerges from these social activities. Through the idea of 
realism which I have tried to develop in this thesis, the different 
understandings of the function of history in U.S.A., and their different 
interpretive consequences, can be brought into a complicated dialogue 
with each other. The narrative of U.S.A. and its unusual form synthesize 
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the representational and critical dimensions of the text in the same way as 
this thesis has tried to effect a synthesis of critical theory and the realistic 
novel. 
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epilogue: the interpretation of realism 
In the theoretical sections of this thesis I have tried to offer a particular 
way of understanding the idea of the realistic novel. Briefly to recapitulate, 
I have tried to develop a theory of interpretation which reconciles the 
need for determinate interpretation with the ineluctable problems 
associated with interpretation. Generally, my theoretical approach has 
been to try to think both these ideas at once. 
In the last two chapters I have tested this theory against the interpretation 
of two realistic novels. As I have tried to demonstrate, realism always 
involves an interpretive process, and if interpretation is understood as at 
once necessary and problematic, then the interpretation of a realistic novel 
inherits this theoretical tension. It is towards preserving this hermeneutic 
tension that this study has been intended. Critical theory, I have argued, is 
at its most creative when it clearly anticipates its own interpretive 
possibilities while recognizing its own limitations. Criticism which 
characterizes realism and theory as fundamentally opposed seems to fail to 
appreciate this tension: within such critical schemes, both phenomena are 
static, reduced to simple argumentative propositions. By suggesting how 
critical theory and the realistic novel might be synthesized, I have tried to 
restore the dynamic qualities of both theory and realism, and to reaffirm 
the fundamental tension between representation and interpretation. My 
approach, however, is necessarily an interpretation of the material. It, like 
the literary theories and texts which it has encompassed, is necessarily 
subject to challenge and to reconsideration. 
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